JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. The centroidal issue in this case, if I may put it so, is rooted on the question whether a “Field Officer” would come within the definitional perimeters of the term “employee” under the provisions of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923, (herein after referred to as 'the Act' for short). While on one hand, the employer claims that a Field Officer is not an employee because he is a supervising Officer; on the other, the legal heirs of the employee contend that even though the post is designated as Field Officer, its essential attributes are not different from an employee under the provisions of the Act. The final resolution of this lis would depend upon the answer to this singular issue. 2. A quick glance into the essential facts would first be necessary, which is as under: This appeal is at the instance of the Kerala Forest Development Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as “the Corporation” for short) and its Divisional Manager, wherein they impugn the order of the Court of the Employees Compensation Commissioner (Industrial Tribunal and Employees Insurance Court), Kollam in E.C.C.No.605 of 2014. 3. The appellants were arrayed as the opposite parties before the Employees Compensation Commissioner and the respondents herein were the applicants. The claim for compensation was laid on file by the respondents herein, who are the legal heirs of a certain Sri. Sreekanth Mohan, who unfortunately died in a drowning accident on 30.11.2012, while he was working as a Field Officer in the Thrissur Divisional Office of the first appellant. 4. The deceased, as we can see from the pleadings on record, was employed as a Field Officer appointed through the Public Service Commission and posted to work in the Vettiyil Estate under the supervisory control of the Divisional Manager, who is the head of the Vettiyil Division. The materials on record would show that the aforementioned Sri. Sreekanth Mohan accidentally fell into the water and died due to drowning. His body was recovered on 03.12.2012. He was only 25 years in age at the time of his death and on the allegation that the appellants have refused to accede to their request for compensation, the respondents herein filed the claim before the Employees Compensation Commissioner for a total amount of Rs.20 Lakhs with interest. 5. His body was recovered on 03.12.2012. He was only 25 years in age at the time of his death and on the allegation that the appellants have refused to accede to their request for compensation, the respondents herein filed the claim before the Employees Compensation Commissioner for a total amount of Rs.20 Lakhs with interest. 5. The appellants filed a written statement before the Employees Compensation Commissioner primarily stating that the accident occurred not within the estate but outside it and therefore, that it is upto the respondents herein to prove that at the time of the alleged occurrence of the drowning accident, Sri. Sreekanth Mohan had a causal connection with an incident of employment and that the drowning happened during the course of his employment. 6. The Employees Compensation Commissioner assessed the pleadings and the materials on record and raised the following issues: “1. Whether there is any employer-employee relationship between the deceased and the opposite parties? 2. If the relationship is found existing, then, whether the accident occurred to the workman arose out of and in the course of his employment under the opposite parties? 3. Whether the opposite parties are liable to pay compensation to the applicants? 4. If found liable what shall be the quantum of compensation payable by the opposite parties? 5. Order as to costs. 7. It, thereafter, went on into the consideration of each of the issues and finally allowed the claim of the respondents herein declaring that they are entitled to get an amount of Rs.8,67,640/-, being the compensation, along with simple interest at the rate of 12% on such amount from the date of accident, i.e. from 30.11.2012 till the date of deposit/recovery. In addition to this, Rs.5,000/-was awarded as funeral expenses and Rs.4,000/-towards court fee. It is also declared that the appellants, being the employees of the deceased Sreekanth Mohan, are jointly and severally liable to pay the amount awarded to the respondents herein and a consequential direction was given to the appellants to deposit the amount awarded before the said court within a period of 60 days from the date of the order. 8. It is also declared that the appellants, being the employees of the deceased Sreekanth Mohan, are jointly and severally liable to pay the amount awarded to the respondents herein and a consequential direction was given to the appellants to deposit the amount awarded before the said court within a period of 60 days from the date of the order. 8. The appellants impugn the order of the Employees Compensation Commissioner by raising the following questions of law:- (a) Whether the Employees Compensation Act applicable to a claim for compensation while the legal heirs for the death of an employee who died, while the employees was working as Filed Officer and whether such employee will come under the definition of employee under Employees Compensation Act, 1923? (b) When the circumstances leads to a conclusion that the employee was entrusted with supervision work and no work was entrusted outside the estate, whether employer is liable to compensate for the death of an employee, which occurred not during the course of his employment? 9. Sri.T.R.Harikumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the two primary issues raised by the appellants before this court are as to whether a Field Officer can be construed to be an employee under the provisions of the Act and whether, at the time of the unfortunate drowning incident, Sri.Sreekanth Mohan can be seen to have had a causal connection with his employment. Sri. T.R. Harikumar accedes that the appellants do not contest any of the other findings and conclusions of the Employees Compensation Commissioner and therefore, we do not deem it necessary to bestow attention to any other issue other than the two issues above. 10. The issue as to whether a Field Officer, employed under the 1st appellant Corporation, can be construed to be an “employee” under the provisions of the Act, we must notice, has not been seen raised specifically before the court below. We, however, see that this is an issue urged as being a substantial question of law and therefore, even though this had not been raised specifically before the court below, we still deem it necessary to consider and answer the same, since it has been impelled before us as an issue in law, which, we are of the view, can be raised before this court even as a first instance. 11. 11. The term 'employee' is defined under the Act in Section 2(1)(dd). There are several categories of persons enumerated in the said definition, but for the purpose of this case, clause(iii) of Section 2(1)(dd) would be relevant, which reads as under:- (iii) “employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union; and any reference to any employee who has been injured shall, where the employee is dead, include a reference to his dependents or any of them;” 12. As is perspicuous from the above definition, all those persons who are employed in such capacity, as specified in Schedule II of the Act, would immediately be construed as an employee. We, therefore, will have to look through the provisions of Schedule II of the Act to verify whether a Field Officer can be found included in one of the categories therein, which would then bring it within the definition of the term 'employee'. 13. In Schedule II of the Act, the list of persons who are within the definitional purlieu of Section 2(1)(dd) of the Act are listed in seriatim. There are several categories of persons shown therein and for the purpose of the examination of the issues in this case, we are of the view that clauses (xviii) and (xxix) of Schedule II of Section 2(1)(dd) of the Act, along with the State amendments, would alone be relevant. 14. Coming first to clause (xviii) of Schedule II of the Act, it categorises those persons “employed on any estate which is maintained for the purpose of growing cardamom, cinchona, coffee, rubber or tea” and in the Kerala State amendment to this sub clause, the words “eucalyptus, orange or teak and also any plantations maintained by the Department of the State Government” are also incorporated. As regards clause (xxix) of Schedule II of Section 2(1)(dd) of the Act is concerned, it takes in all those persons who are “employed in horticultural operations, forestry, bee-keeping or farming by tractors or other contrivances driven by steam or other mechanical power or by electricity”. 15. As regards clause (xxix) of Schedule II of Section 2(1)(dd) of the Act is concerned, it takes in all those persons who are “employed in horticultural operations, forestry, bee-keeping or farming by tractors or other contrivances driven by steam or other mechanical power or by electricity”. 15. The forensic query before us is whether a Field Officer would come within the descriptional parameters of these two categories. We are afraid that an assessment of this issue, with respect to the specific factual situation of this case is extremely impeded because, nothing has been placed on record by either of the parties to show the real nature of the duties of a person employed as a Field Officer in the service of the first appellant Corporation. 16. Sri.T.R.Harikumar, of course, submits that a Filed Officer is a supervisory officer, whose duties are confined to supervising the employees working on the estates and he asserts, therefore, that a Field Officer cannot be construed to be an employee under the Act. As we have already said above, we do not have any affirmative information as to the real nature of the duties of a Field Officer in the services of the appellants, however, it is virtually conceded that a Field Officer is employed on the estate but, allegedly only to supervise the employees. 17. Going by the categories of persons included in clauses (xviii) and (xxix) of Schedule II of Section 2(1)(dd) of the Act as mentioned above, we cannot find any distinction among the persons who are employed on the estate, whether they be supervisory or otherwise, in the manner as has been now urged by Sri.T.R.Harikumar. It does not categorise the various persons, employed on the estate, into different classes as supervisory cadre or non-supervisory cadre, but it merely says that it will include every employee who is employed on an estate which is maintained for certain specified purposes. Among the purposes shown therein, of course are plantations, which are maintained by the Department of the State Government to grow among other things, tea and this is relevant because the estate in question is conceded to be a Tea Estate. 18. Among the purposes shown therein, of course are plantations, which are maintained by the Department of the State Government to grow among other things, tea and this is relevant because the estate in question is conceded to be a Tea Estate. 18. The learned counsel, appearing for the respondents adds to this by saying that under clause (xxix) aforementioned, forestry is also one of the enumerated types of activity in the estate and he says that the estate in question is also one that is maintained as a part of the forestry operations of the first appellant Corporation. 19. We have examined the submissions and the provisions very intently. As we have already stated above, from the provisions at supra, we cannot discern a distinction between one employee and another who are both employed on the estate, on the differntia that one is of a supervisory cadre and the other is not. Even assuming the submissions of Sri.T.R.Harikumar, the learned counsel for the appellants, to be accurate that a Field Officer is employed on the estate not for the purpose of actually working on it, but to supervise the other field workers, we cannot find any reason to deny the benefit of the provisions of the Act, which is a beneficial act intended for the amelioration of the employees, merely because his actual duties are alleged to be supervisory in nature. As long as we cannot find such a distinction in the provisions itself, it would not be justified for us to answer it against the respondents herein or in favour of the appellants. We, therefore, find the issue against the appellants. 20. Coming to the question as to the causal connection of the employee to his employment, at the time when the unfortunate incident of drowning happened, we notice that the court below has answered the issue, while considering issue No.2, which issue is extracted as under:- 2. If the relationship is found existing, then, whether the accident occurred to the workman arose out of and in the course of his employment under the opposite parties? 21. We notice that the court below has considered all the exhibits, which are more than 11, and has found that the deceased succumbed to drowning on 31.11.2012 while he was on duty. 21. We notice that the court below has considered all the exhibits, which are more than 11, and has found that the deceased succumbed to drowning on 31.11.2012 while he was on duty. The court below has also seen that there is no contrary evidence adduced by the appellants before it and that merely because, what he was found in a pond, which is 600 metres away from the office building, but concededly within the perimeters of the estate itself, it would only lead to an inferential conclusion that he was actually on duty in the estate at the time when the incident of drowning happened. We do not deem it necessary to reopen these issues at all, since these are essentially in the realm of facts, which the court below has considered meticulously, adverting to the relevant factual factors and the documentary evidence on record. This court, while exercising powers under Section 30 of the Act, would not be justified in considering these issues as it is being considered at the first instance, specially because, the appellants did not adduce any contrary evidence with respect to these factual factors before the court below. 22. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere in any manner with the conclusions of the Employees Compensation Commissioner on the issue and more so for the reason that this fact is explicitly conceded by the second appellant herein, who was examined as RW1 before the court below, who admitted that Vettiyil Estate is comprised of 59.5 hectares in area and that the office is situated in the middle portion of the estate thus making it luculent that the pond is well within the territorial environs of the Estate. The scene mahazar Ext.P2, also shows that the exact place of the accident was only 600 meters away from the office building and therefore, is unequivocal that site of the accident was well within the Vettiyil estate. 23. In the compendium of our views as above, we dismiss this appeal, confirming the order of the Employees Compensation Commissioner (Industrial Tribunal and Employees Insurance Court), Kollam in E.C.C. No.605 of 2014.