JUDGMENT : C.V. Bhadang, J. By this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, who is the original tenant, is challenging the concurrent orders passed by the Courts below directing eviction of the petitioner from the suit premises. 2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the petition may be stated thus: That shops bearing no.4 and 5 on the ground floor of a building know as "Rukmini Vihar", Mundvel, Vasco-da-Gama, Goa are subject matter of dispute and are hereinafter referred to as the 'suit premises'. That now deceased Vithal Nagappa Agrahar, the original landlord had leased out the suit premises to the father of the petitioner, late Mr. Dattaram Mukund Shetye under a lease deed dated 9/10/1974 for a period of eleven months. Even after the expiry of the said period Dattaram Shetye continued as a tenant in the suit premises on condition that he would make prompt payment of the monthly rentals as agreed from time to time. Dattaram Shetye died on 16/6/2006, after which the tenancy was inherited by the petitioner who happens to be the son of Dattaram and he continued in possession of the suit premises as a tenant thereof. 3. The respondents are claiming to be the owners/landlords in respect of the suit premises, under a registered Public Will dated 17/10/2006 executed by Mr. Vithal Agrahar, who expired on 7/3/2008. 4. On 21/9/2013, the respondents issued a notice to the petitioner claiming that since October 2007, there was failure on the part of the petitioner to make the payment of rent. It was contended that by a letter dated 15/12/2008 the petitioner was informed about the death of Vithal Agrahar and the respondents having succeeded to the suit property by virtue of the public Will dated 17/10/2006 executed by Mr. Vithal Agrahar. By the said notice the respondents also sought the arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 58,320/- as set out in para 5 of the notice. 5. The petitioner issued a reply to the said notice on 7/10/2013. It was contended that the agreed monthly rent of Shop no.5 was Rs. 290/- p.m. while in respect of the shop bearing no.4 it was Rs. 520/- p.m.. It was contended that at no point of time there was any agreement to increase the rent. 5. The petitioner issued a reply to the said notice on 7/10/2013. It was contended that the agreed monthly rent of Shop no.5 was Rs. 290/- p.m. while in respect of the shop bearing no.4 it was Rs. 520/- p.m.. It was contended that at no point of time there was any agreement to increase the rent. It was contended that the rent was paid up to January 2008 to Vithal Agrahar and even the house tax in respect of both the shops was paid up to March 2018. It was contended that the Will, (a copy of which was sent to the petitioner) shows that Vithal Agrahar had bequeathed his "disposable share" in the suit premises, in favour of the respondent "thereby leaving a doubt that the respondents are not the exclusive owners of the suit shops". 6. It was further contended that there were inventory proceedings bearing no.26/2008/C initiated on the death of Vithal Agrahar , in which one Vinayak Venkatesh Bhatkalkar, claimed that he was appointed as the Cabeca de Casal. It was further pointed out that subsequently the respondents by a letter dated 28/1/2010 informed the petitioner that they are appointed as the Cabesa de Casal in the inventory proceeding in the place of Vinayak Bhatkalkar. In short, according to the petitioner there was a serious doubt as to whether the respondents were the exclusive owners of the suit shops and consequentially the petitioner was in doubt as to whom the rent is payable. 7. According to the respondents they discovered that a temporary electricity connection was granted by the Electricity department to the suit shops without their consent. The respondents therefore filed an application under The Right to Information Act (RTI) to the Electricity Department on 4/11/2013 and the Electricity department gave a reply dated 29/11/2013 whereby it was revealed that the petitioner had sublet the premises to one Mr. Abu Gaffar Khan on 6/9/2013 and the temporary electricity connection was granted in the name of said Mr. Abu Gaffar Khan. 8. Abu Gaffar Khan on 6/9/2013 and the temporary electricity connection was granted in the name of said Mr. Abu Gaffar Khan. 8. In such circumstances, the respondents filed an application before the Rent Controller at Mormugao under section 22 (2)(a),(b)(i) and (f) of the Goa, Daman & Diu Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1968 (Act, for short) for eviction of the respondent on three grounds, namely (i) non payment of rent for a period of more than three months (ii) the tenant ceasing to occupy the premises for more than four months and (iii) subletting the suit premises, without the written consent of the respondents. 9. The petitioner filed a reply and resisted the application. It was denied that the suit shops have been sublet or the petitioner has ceased to occupy the same. In so far as the ground of arrears of rent is concerned, it was contended that the public will under which the respondents are claiming right to the suit shops shows that Mr. Vithal Agrahar had bequeathed his "disposal share" in the property and thus the respondents could not be the exclusive owners of the suit premises and thus there was a genuine doubt as to whom the rent is payable. 10. The learned Rent Controller framed the following issues for consideration: (i) Whether the applicants prove that the responder has not paid the rent for more than 3 months till date? (ii) Whether the applicants prove that the respondent has ceased occupation of the premises for more than 4 months? (iii) Whether the applicants prove that the respondent has sublet the leased premises without written consent of the applicants? 11. The Rent Act came to be amended and the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller is conferred on the Civil Judge Junior Division, whereupon the matter was transferred to the file of the learned Civil Judge Junior Division at Vasco in Rent Case No.78/RC/2014/C. Before the Rent Controller, the respondent Subray Shety examined himself (AW.1), while the petitioner examined himself (RW.1). The parties also produced certain documents on record. 12. The Rent Controller answered the issue no.1 in the negative, as the petitioner deposited the entire arrears of rent from October 2007 till October 2014. Thus the ground of arrears of rent did not survive. The parties also produced certain documents on record. 12. The Rent Controller answered the issue no.1 in the negative, as the petitioner deposited the entire arrears of rent from October 2007 till October 2014. Thus the ground of arrears of rent did not survive. In so far as issue no.2 and 3 are concerned the learned Rent Controller answered both theses issues in the affirmative and allowed the application for eviction by judgment and order dated 23/10/2014 on the ground under section 22(2)(b)(i) and (f) of the Act. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner challenged the same before the learned District Judge in Rent Appeal No.17/2014/I. The learned District Judge by a judgment and order dated 7/7/2015 has dismissed the appeal, which brings the petitioner to this Court. 13. I have heard Shri Mendes, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Khandeparkar, the learned counsel for the respondents. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, I have gone through the record. 14. Shri Mendes, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Public Will on the strength of which the respondents are claiming to be the owners of the suit premises, is not a document of title. It is submitted that even otherwise all that Mr. Vithal Agrahar, the original landlord has bequeathed is "his disposable share", in favour of the respondents. It is submitted that in the absence of what is the disposable share of Mr. Vithal Agrahar, in the suit premises, the respondents cannot claim to be the exclusive owners of the suit premises. It is submitted that in the inventory proceedings, one Vinayak Bhatkalkar, had claimed that he was appointed as the Cabeca de casal and subsequently the respondents claimed that they were appointed as the cabeca de casal in place of Mr. Vinayak Bhatkalkar. It is submitted that once the inventory proceedings have been dismissed, the status of the respondents as cabeca de casal has also come to an end and thus they can no longer claim to be the administrators of the properties which are subject matter of the Will of Vithal Agrahar, which includes the suit premises. It is submitted that the respondents as such could not have initiated the eviction proceedings against the petitioner. It is submitted that the respondents as such could not have initiated the eviction proceedings against the petitioner. The learned counsel was at pains to point out that a person would be only competent to initiate eviction proceedings provided he is a landlord within the meaning of section 2(i) of the Act. It is submitted that neither the Rent Controller nor the Appellate Board have taken note of this aspect which renders the order of eviction bad in law. This is the principal ground on which the impugned order of eviction is challenged by the petitioner. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that the grounds of eviction as contemplated under section 22(2)(b)(i) and (f) of the Act are not established. It is submitted that the finding that the petitioner has ceased to occupy the suit premises for a continuous period of four months, would run contrary to the finding that the petitioner has sublet the suit premises. In other words, it is submitted that both the findings cannot exist together. Except this, there are no other contentions raised. 16. Shri Khandeparkar, the learned counsel for the respondents, has supported the impugned order. It is submitted that even a co-owner, can seek eviction of the tenant and it is not necessary that all the co-owners should join in the application for eviction. It is thus submitted that even assuming that the respondents are not the exclusive owners of the suit premises, nothing prevented the respondents from seeking the eviction of the petitioner. It is submitted that there is no other person who is claiming to be the co owner of the suit premises, apart from the respondents. The learned counsel pointed out that this ground about the respondents not having established that they are the exclusive owners of the suit shops was not raised before the Appellate Board and thus the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise it for the first time before this Court. The learned counsel pointed out that the evidence of Subray Shetty (AW.1) about the respondents being the exclusive owners of the suit shops under the Public Will is not even challenged in the cross examination. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan and Others Vs. The learned counsel pointed out that the evidence of Subray Shetty (AW.1) about the respondents being the exclusive owners of the suit shops under the Public Will is not even challenged in the cross examination. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan and Others Vs. M. Chinniyan and anr., (2016) 3 SCC 296 , in order to submit that even one of the co owners can seek eviction of a tenant. Reliance is also placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Harish Loyalka and anr. Vs. Dilip Nevatia and Others (Suit No.3598 of 1996 decided on 30/10/2014, in order to submit that during the cross examination the affirmative, essential and the material case has to be put to the witness of the adversary so that the witness has an opportunity to meet the same,which is not done in this case. 17. In so far as the merits are concerned, it is submitted that there is an agreement entered into by the petitioner with Mr. Abhu Gaffar Khan parting with the possession of the suit premises. It is submitted that the Courts below are justified in coming to the conclusion on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence in the form of the electricity bills, that the petitioner had ceased to occupy the suit shop premises, for a period of more than four months, without any reasonable cause. It is submitted that the said finding cannot run counter to the finding of subletting. 18. I have carefully considered the circumstances and the submissions made and I do not find that any case for interference is made out. 19. It has come on record that there was a previous Will of Mr. Vithal Agrahar which was dated 2/6/2004. The Will under which the respondents are claiming to be the owners of the suit shops is a subsequent Will dated 17/10/2006. There is no dispute regarding the existence of the said Will which is a registered Public Will executed by Vithal Agrahar. The only contention on behalf of the petitioner is that under the said Will Vithal Agrahar had bequeathed his "disposable share" in favour of the respondents and, as such, the respondents cannot claim exclusive ownership over the suit shops premises on the basis of the said Will. The only contention on behalf of the petitioner is that under the said Will Vithal Agrahar had bequeathed his "disposable share" in favour of the respondents and, as such, the respondents cannot claim exclusive ownership over the suit shops premises on the basis of the said Will. The contention in my considered view cannot be accepted, at least for the present purpose of the respondents seeking eviction of the petitioner from the suit shop premises. 20. It is now well settled that even one of the co-owners can maintain an action for eviction of a tenant, in the absence of the other co owners. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan has held that joinder of all the co owners in a eviction petition under the rent law is not necessary. The Supreme Court has relied upon its earlier decision in the case of Dhannala Vs. Kalawathibai and Others, (2002) 6 SCC 16 , in which in para 16 of the judgment it is held thus : "16. It is well settled by at least three decisions of this Court, namely, Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, (1976) 4 SCC 184 , Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak, (1977) 2 SCC 814 and Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh, (1989) 1 SCC 444 , that one of the co- owners can alone and in his own right file a suit for rejectment of the tenant and it is no defence open to the tenant to question the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the other co-owners were not joined as parties to the suit. When the property forming the subject-matter of eviction proceedings is owned by several owners, every co-owner owns every part and every bit of the joint property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property so long as the property has not been partitioned. He can alone maintain a suit for eviction of the tenant without joining the other co-owners if such other co-owners do not object. He can alone maintain a suit for eviction of the tenant without joining the other co-owners if such other co-owners do not object. In Sri Ram Pasricha case reliance was placed by the tenant on the English rule that if two or more landlords institute a suit for possession on the ground that a dwelling house is required for occupation of one of them as a residence the suit would fail; the requirement must be of all the landlords. The Court noted that the English rule was not followed by the High Courts of Calcutta and Gujarat which High Courts have respectfully dissented from the rule of English law. This Court held that a decree could be passed in favour of the plaintiff though he was not the absolute and full owner of the premises because he required the premises for his own use and also satisfied the requirement of being "if he is the owner", the expression as employed by Section 13(1)(f) of the W.B. Premises Tenancy Act, 1956." 21. Admittedly, there is no other person who has come forward claiming any share in the suit shop premises on the strength of the said Will or any other disposition. Be that as it may, it is not necessary to dwell on the question of exclusive title of the respondents over the suit shop premises. The limited question which needs to be addressed is whether the respondents could seek eviction of the petitioner from the suit shop premises on the strength of the Will executed by Mr. Vithal Agrahar. As noticed earlier, even going by the fact that the 'disposable share' of Mr. Vithal Agrahar has been bequeathed to the respondents, still they would become the co owners of the suit shop to the extent of the disposable share of Mr. Vithal Agrahar and being the co owners, their action of seeking eviction of the petitioner/tenant from the suit shop premises is perfectly justified and cannot be questioned on the ground that Mr. Vithal Agrahar had only bequeathed his disposable share in favour of the respondents. The contention in my considered view is clearly misconceived and cannot be accepted. 22. Vithal Agrahar and being the co owners, their action of seeking eviction of the petitioner/tenant from the suit shop premises is perfectly justified and cannot be questioned on the ground that Mr. Vithal Agrahar had only bequeathed his disposable share in favour of the respondents. The contention in my considered view is clearly misconceived and cannot be accepted. 22. In so far as the dismissal of the inventory proceedings are concerned, it transpired during the course of the arguments that the inventory proceedings have been dismissed on the technical ground as to whether a non Goan, can initiate inventory proceedings for separation of the assets of the deceased estate lever. It is further undisputed that the order dismissing the inventory proceedings is subject matter of challenge before this Court. Be that as it may, I do not find that the dismissal of the inventory proceedings has any bearing on the competency of the respondents for initiating the eviction proceedings. This is because all that the inventory proceedings are about is separation of the respective share of the interested parties of the assets left behind by the estate lever. Thus till the assets which are part of the inheritance of Mr. Vithal Agrahar are separated by metes and bounds, each co-heirs/co-sharer owns every bit of the joint property, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dhannalal . The fact remains that under the registered public Will, the estate lever, Mr. Vithal Agrahar has bequeathed his 'disposable share', in favour of the respondents. Some assistance in this regard can be had from the spirit of section 18 of the Goa Succession, Special Notaries and Inventory Proceeding Act 2012 (Act of 2012, for short). The section reads as under : "18. Vithal Agrahar has bequeathed his 'disposable share', in favour of the respondents. Some assistance in this regard can be had from the spirit of section 18 of the Goa Succession, Special Notaries and Inventory Proceeding Act 2012 (Act of 2012, for short). The section reads as under : "18. Right of co-heir to claim the inheritance in its entirety-Any heir may recover the whole of the estate or part thereof in possession of a third party or obtain an injunction against such party under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (Central Act 47 of 1963) and the latter shall be precluded from raising the plea that such estate or part thereof does not solely belong to such co-heir." It can thus be seen that any co-heir may recover the whole of the estate or part thereof in possession of a third party and the later is precluded from raising a plea that such estate or part thereof does not solely belong to such co-heir. 23. The learned counsel for the respondents is also right in contending that the evidence of (AW.1) on the point of their exclusive ownership of the suit shop premises on the strength of the Will has not even been challenged in the cross examination. As held by this Court in the case of Harish Loyalka and anr. , the affirmative, essential and material case has to be put to the witness of the adversary so that he has an opportunity to meet the same, which has not been done in this case. That apart, no such ground was ever raised before the Appellate Board. For this reason the contention as raised on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 24. Although the learned counsel for the petitioner had principally challenged the order of eviction on the ground that the respondents cannot claim to be exclusive owners of the suit shops on the strength of the Public Will, I propose to briefly consider the matter in so far as the merits of the two grounds on which the order of eviction has been passed. 25. It has come in the evidence of (AW.1) that since October 2007, the petitioner failed to make payment of the monthly rent and also stopped occupying the suit shop premises. 25. It has come in the evidence of (AW.1) that since October 2007, the petitioner failed to make payment of the monthly rent and also stopped occupying the suit shop premises. He also claimed that the electricity bills remained unpaid for several years which eventually resulted in termination of the electricity connection. In support of the same, the respondents produced office copies of the legal notices at (Exhibit 30) along with envelope which was refused with the postal endorsement as "left RTS". The respondents also produced, several electricity bills of the suit shop premises at Exhibit 27 and 28 (colly). While the bills at Exhibit 27 stand in the name of one Joao Manuel Bento Vaz, the bills at Exhibit 28 stand in the name of Mr. V. N. Agrahar. There was no dispute that the said electricity bills are in respect of the suit shop premises. The electric bills show that the units consumed were shown as "0" and there was no consumption of electricity from May 2009 to May 2011. The petitioner (RW.1) also admitted in his cross examination that the suit shop premises do not have any electricity connection, as on the date of recording his evidence i.e. 16/9/2014. He claimed that he along with Abu Khan was jointly conducting a business of glass and hardware in the suit shop. It is difficult to accept as to how the said business could be conducted in the absence of the electricity connection. The Rent Controller has also considered that no complaint was ever made to the Electricity department during the period from May 2009 to May 2011 pertaining to the electricity connection to the suit shop premises. It is in these circumstances that the Courts below have concurrently accepted the ground under section 22(2) (f) of the Act holding that the petitioner had ceased to occupy the suit shop premises without reasonable cause. 26. Coming to the ground of subletting, it is the case made out by the petitioner that he was conducting the business in a joint venture with Abu Khan since 6/9/2013. In short, the fact that Abu Khan was the in the suit shop premises is not disputed. There is an agreement between the petitioner and Mr. Abu G. Khan (Exhibit 41) dated 6/9/2013 produced on record. In short, the fact that Abu Khan was the in the suit shop premises is not disputed. There is an agreement between the petitioner and Mr. Abu G. Khan (Exhibit 41) dated 6/9/2013 produced on record. The Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Board have considered the recitals of the said deed and have rightly come to the conclusion that the petitioner had sublet the suit shop premises in favour of Mr. Abu Khan. The Appellate Board has extensively considered the recitals in the agreement in para 16 of the judgment in order to record a finding that the suit shop premises were sublet to Abu Khan. The petitioner is shown as 'Party of the First Part', while Mr. Abu Khan is shown as the 'Party of the Second Part'. Mr. Abu Khan had agreed to deposit an amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- and further agreed to pay an amount of Rs. 25,000/- per month to the petitioner out of the profits made in the business. The said monthly payment was to be made by Abu Khan to the petitioner "irrespective of the fact whether the business runs on profit or on loss" and the monthly payment was to be increased by 5% every year. This itself would be sufficient to show that it was not a joint venture, else otherwise, Abu Khan would not have agreed to pay the amount of Rs. 25,000/- per month to the petitioner irrespective whether the business earns profit or not. Mr Abu Khan is made personally answerable for maintaining the peaceful and congenial atmosphere for conducting the business and to settle/deal with "all problems/obstacles", if any, during the currency of the agreement. Mr. Abu Khan had also undertaken to settle all the issues concerning the suit shop premises, with the landlord including any "legal matters". 27. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ms. Celina Coelho Pereira and Others. V. Ulhas M. Kholkar and ors., (2010) AIR SC 603, has inter alia held that even where the agreement is purportedly made for a partnership, if the purpose of such partnership is ostensible and the deed of partnership is so drawn to conceal the real transaction of subletting, then the court can lift the veil of partnership to find out the real nature of transaction entered into by the parties. The Courts below have rightly found that it is a case of subletting. The Courts below have rightly found that it is a case of subletting. The contention that the finding under section 22(2)(b)(i) of the Act would be contrary to the finding under section 22(2) (f) of the Act also cannot be accepted. 28. It is now well settled that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is neither appellate nor revisional in nature. It is essentially supervisory and is aimed at keeping the subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority. In the exercise of such jurisdiction this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence unless the finding recorded is based on no evidence or so absurd that no prudent person in the given circumstances would come to such a conclusion. I have carefully gone through the reasoning as articulated by the learned Rent Controller and by the Appellate Board, in coming to the conclusion of the petitioner having sublet the premises and also having ceased to occupy the same without any reasonable cause and I do not find that the findings so recorded suffer from any infirmity. 29. In the result the petition is without any merit and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. The petitioner is given three months time to vacate the suit premises.