JUDGMENT : The instant intra Court Appeal has been filed by the Appellant under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, read with Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 10.02.2014, dismissing the application filed by the Appellant under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred as 'the Act'). 2. There arose disputes between the first Respondent and the Appellant under a Sales Contract dated 25.01.2006. In view of the dispute, the Appellant had made an Arbitration claim against the first respondent in accordance with the Arbitration Clause contained in the Contract. The questions for consideration in this Appeal are:- (a) whether the Arbitrator had construed the 30% option clause available under the Contract dated 25.01.2006 properly; (b) whether the Appellant is entitled to be paid for the entire 975 liners as per the price fixed under the original Contract dated 25.01.2006 and; (c) whether the Arbitrator was right in allowing the claim of the Appellant under the existing price only for the 650 nos., of cylinder liners and not for the balance 325 nos., which was allowed under the reduced revised price. 3. As per the Contract, the Appellant started supplying 650 nos., of cylinder liners from April 2006 onwards. The supply continued from April to August 2006 for 5 months. On 4.09.2006, the first respondent floated another tender and the first respondent received a reduced quotation for a total all in cost of Rs.6,354.61/-. According to the Appellant, unaware of the same, they supplied 650 nos., on 4.09.2006, another 650 nos., on 18.09.2006 and yet another consignment of 325 nos., on 25.09.2006. 4. After receiving 975 nos., of cylinder liners, in the month of September 2006 over and above the quota for that month, the first respondent informed the Appellant that in the tender opened on 4.09.2006, an offer for a lower rate has been received and that if the Appellant agrees to accept the lower rate, the excess quantity of 975 nos., of cylinder liners supplied on 18.09.2006 and 25.09.2006 could be accepted and paid at the reduced rate. But the appellant sent a reply dated 24.11.2006, pointing out that the original purchase order did not envisage any variation in price. 5. But the appellant sent a reply dated 24.11.2006, pointing out that the original purchase order did not envisage any variation in price. 5. Therefore, by letter dated 23.08.2007, the Appellant called upon the first respondent either to accept the 975 nos., of cylinder liners at the rate fixed under the existing Contract dated 25.01.2006 or to return back the cylinder liners. 6. After repeated correspondence, the first respondent sent a communication dated 3.10.2007, taking a stand, that part of the quantity had been consumed and therefore, it is not possible to return the cylinder liners. However, the first respondent reiterated their offer to pay the reduced rate of Rs.6,354.61/- instead of the higher rate of Rs.7,508.85/- per cylinder liner fixed under the Contract dated 25.01.2006. 7. The Appellant did not agree to the counter offer made by the first respondent for reduction in price and the dispute was referred to Arbitration before the second respondent, in accordance with the Arbitration Clause contained under the Contract dated 25.01.2006. The Appellant made a claim and the first respondent also made a counter claim before the Arbitral Tribunal. 8. After considering the claim and counter claim and after taking into account the materials available on record, the Arbitrator passed an Award partially allowing the claim of the Appellant by directing the first respondent to pay the Appellant for 650 nos., of cylinder liners at the Purchase Order rate dated 25.01.2006 including ED, CST and freight and for the balance 325 nos., of cylinder liners, at the reduced counter offer rate given by the first respondent subsequent to the fresh tender. Therefore, as against that portion of the Award granting a reduced rate for 325 nos., of cylinder liners and on the failure of the Arbitrator to Award interest, the Appellant filed O.P. No. 430 of 2011 before this Court under Section of 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, challenging the Award. The second respondent/Arbitrator rejected the counter claim made by the first respondent and the first respondent also has not challenged the rejection of the counter claim and therefore the rejection of the counter claim has now become final. 9. The second respondent/Arbitrator rejected the counter claim made by the first respondent and the first respondent also has not challenged the rejection of the counter claim and therefore the rejection of the counter claim has now become final. 9. The learned single Judge after considering the Award passed by the second respondent/ Arbitrator and after hearing the submissions of both the parties came to the conclusion that the Appellant has not made out any ground for interference to the Arbitration Award under Section 34 of the Act. While rejecting the application under Section 34 of the Act, the learned Singe Judge has also complemented the second respondent/Arbitrator for being fair and courageous for passing an Award in favour of the Appellant for 650 nos., of cylinder liners out of 975 nos., of cylinder liners under the original purchase price, despite being an employee of the first respondent. 10. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge dated 10.2.2014, the instant Appeal has been filed under Section 37 of the Act. Submission of the Counsels: 11. Mr. K.V. Subramaniam, learned senior counsel for the Appellant submitted that 30% option clause available under the Contract was not properly exercised by the first respondent. He drew the attention of this Court to the letter dated 17.10.2006 issued by the first respondent to the Appellant exercising the 30% option clause available under the Contract. As per the said letter, the total quantity of 5185 nos., of cylinder liners under the Contract dated 25.01.2006 was reduced to 3900 nos., of cylinder liners by the first respondent, exercising the 30% option clause. 12. According to the learned senior counsel, the Appellant had already effected supplies of 975 nos., of cylinder liners in the month of September 2006 itself which was also inspected and received by the first respondent. According to him, only after due inspection by the first respondent, 975 nos., of cylinder liners were supplied. Hence, the first respondent having received the 975 nos., of cylinder liners before 17.10.2006 and having utilised the same, has to necessarily pay the Appellant for the entire quantity of 975 nos., of cylinder liners, under the original purchase price fixed under the Contract dated 25.01.2006 and not under the revised price exercising the 30% option clause. 13. Hence, the first respondent having received the 975 nos., of cylinder liners before 17.10.2006 and having utilised the same, has to necessarily pay the Appellant for the entire quantity of 975 nos., of cylinder liners, under the original purchase price fixed under the Contract dated 25.01.2006 and not under the revised price exercising the 30% option clause. 13. The learned senior counsel further submitted that inspection certificates dated 15.09.2006 for 650 nos., of cylinder liners and 24.09.2006 for the balance 325 nos., of cylinder liners were also issued by the first respondent. Having inspected the entire quantity of 975 nos., of cylinder liners and having taken delivery and utilised the same, the first respondent is liable to pay the price for the entire quantity of 975 nos., of cylinder liners as per the original price fixed under the Purchase Order No.13/06405 dated 24.02.2006. 14. The learned senior counsel also drew the attention of this Court to the letter dated 26.09.2006 issued by the first respondent to its inspecting authorities M/s Rites Limited, informing them that under the new tender, lower price was received and the minus 30% option clause is being exercised against the purchase order No.13/06405 issued to the Appellant. According to the learned senior counsel, a copy of the said letter dated 26.09.2006 of the first respondent was never sent to the Appellant. According to him, only on 17.10.2006, by the letter of the first respondent, the Appellant was informed about the exercise of minus 30% option clause and by that time, the Appellant had already supplied the entire quantity of 975 nos., of cylinder liners. 15. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that the findings of the second respondent/Arbitrator under the Arbitration Award dated 31.1.2011 are erroneous. According to the learned senior counsel, despite the findings by the second respondent/Arbitrator that, the supplies are to be effected by the Appellant under staggered delivery schedule, the second respondent/Arbitrator disallowed the claim of the Appellant for the payment of the entire quantity of 975 nos., of cylinder liners as per the original purchase price. Despite observing that it is a severable Contract and each monthly installment constitutes a separate Contract, the second respondent/Arbitrator did not allow the entire claim of the Appellant. 16. Despite observing that it is a severable Contract and each monthly installment constitutes a separate Contract, the second respondent/Arbitrator did not allow the entire claim of the Appellant. 16. The learned senior counsel further submitted that the Appellant was communicated about the exercise of the minus 30% option clause by the first respondent only under their letter dated 17.10.2006. The receipt of the letter dated 24.09.2006 referred to in paragraph 2.1 of the Arbitration Award communicating the receipt of a fresh tender on 4.09.2006 to the Appellant is also denied by the learned senior counsel for the Appellant. According to the learned senior counsel, no such letter dated 24.09.2006 was issued to the Appellant and for the first time, the first respondent had made any communication about the exercise of the minus 30% option clause, was only on 17.10.2006. At this juncture, the learned senior counsel Mr. R. Thiyagarajan for the first respondent submitted that the letter dated 24.09.2006 referred in the Arbitration Award was in fact sent to the Appellant and a copy of the same is also available with the first respondent. 17. The learned senior counsel for the Appellant further relied upon Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act and submitted that “Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered. Relying upon the said Section, the learned senior counsel submitted that the first respondent ought to have made the payment in accordance with the original purchase order or atleast returned the 975 nos., of cylinder liners back to the Appellant. Having taken delivery of the same and utilized it, the first respondent has to necessarily pay the value of the cylinders under the original purchase price.” 18. Having taken delivery of the same and utilized it, the first respondent has to necessarily pay the value of the cylinders under the original purchase price.” 18. The learned senior counsel also relied upon various decisions in support of the case of the Appellant which are as follows:- a. Judgment Reported in 1970 SC 256 CDJ - Piloo Dhunjishaw Sidhwa Versus Municipal corporation of the City of Poona; b. Judgment Reported in 1973 SC 366 CDJ - Pannalal Versus Deputy Commissioner, Bhandara and another; c. Judgment Reported in 1980 SC 172 CDJ - Union of India Versus J.K. Gas Plant; d. Judgment Reported in 1992 (1) MLJ 225 - The Food Corporation of India Versus The Bengal Trading Company; e. Judgment Reported in 2003 (3) MLJ 256 - M/s Hybro Chains Private Limited Versus M/s Asil Industries Limited; f. Judgment Reported in 2008 DHC 2559 CDJ - Union of India Versus M/s Modern Laminators Ltd., g. Judgment Reported in 2010(3) MLJ 760 (SC) State of Haryana and others versus S.L. Arora & Company; h. Judgment Reported in AIR 2011 SC 224 - State of Uttararanchal (now known as State of Uttkharakhand) and Ors. Versus M/s Khurana Brothers. i. Judgment Reported in 2013(3) SCC 747 - P. Radhakrishna Murthy Versus National Buildings Constructions Corporation Limited; j. Judgment Reported in 2012(I) MLJ 905 - AMK & Co., Versus Deputy Chief Materials Manager, Golden Rock, Southern Railway Thiruchirappalli and Ors. 19. The learned senior counsel for the Appellant further submitted that despite giving a clear finding, that the first respondent has taken delivery of the entire 975 nos. of cylinder liners and the monthly installment of supplies being a severable Contract, the second respondent/Arbitrator has erroneously disallowed the entire claim of the Appellant for payment of the entire quantity of 975 nos., of cylinder liners under the original purchase price. 20. According to the learned senior counsel, having supplied the entire quantity of 975 nos., of cylinder liners, before the receipt of the letter dated 17.10.2006 exercising the minus 30% option clause, the Arbitrator has erred in passing the Award directing the first respondent to pay the Appellant at the original purchase price only for 650 nos., of cylinder liners and not for the balance 325 nos., of cylinder liners. 21. 21. The learned senior counsel for the Appellant further submitted that the first respondent ought not to have utilised the cylinder liners but should have retuned the same as requested by the Appellant. Instead, according to the learned senior counsel, the first respondent has exercised the minus 30% option clause and has also taken delivery of the entire quantity of 975 nos., of cylinder liners and utilised the same, but failed to pay the amount under the original purchase price. 22. According to the learned senior counsel for the Appellant, the Award passed by the second respondent/Arbitrator is arbitrary and patently illegal. Therefore, this Court under Section 34 of the Act, ought have modified the Award by directing the first respondent to pay the value of 325 nos., of cylinder liners also at the original purchase price. According to the learned senior counsel, the learned single Judge has failed to note that the Arbitration Award is not sustainable under law and on facts, it is perverse, arbitrary and manifestly unjust and illegal. 23. Per contra, Mr. Thyagarajan, learned senior counsel for the first respondent submitted that the first respondent has properly exercised the minus 30 % option clause available to them under the Contract. Before making his legal submissions, the learned senior counsel submitted that the difference in price under the original purchase order and the revised price under the counter offer was Rs.1,154/- per cylinder liner. Therefore, according to the learned senior counsel, for the quantity of 325 nos., of cylinder liners which is the subject matter of the dispute, the difference in price would be approximately Rs.4,00,000/- (1154 X 325) which is the only contentious dispute in the present Appeal. 24. The learned senior counsel for the first respondent drew the attention of this Court to the discussions made by the second respondent/Arbitrator to each and every issue raised by the Appellant before the learned Single Judge as well as before this Court in the instant Appeal. 25. According to the learned senior counsel, the second respondent/Arbitrator has passed a reasoned and judicious Award and therefore, submitted that there is no scope for interference under Section 34 of the Act or by this Court under Section 37 of the Act. 25. According to the learned senior counsel, the second respondent/Arbitrator has passed a reasoned and judicious Award and therefore, submitted that there is no scope for interference under Section 34 of the Act or by this Court under Section 37 of the Act. The learned senior counsel referred to the discussions and findings of the second respondent/Arbitrator under the award and submitted that there is no scope for interference under Section 34 of the Act. 26. According to the learned senior counsel, the learned Single Judge under Section 34 of the Act has rightly rejected the contentions of the Appellant. The learned senior counsel relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2015 3 SCC 49 in the case of Associated Builders vs., Delhi Development Authority and submitted that unless and until the Award is contrary to (a) Fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) The interest of India; or (c) Justice or morality, or (d) patently illegal, there is no scope for interference under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. According to the learned senior counsel, the Award which is under challenge is a reasoned Award and has been passed in accordance with law after giving sufficient opportunity to the Appellant to put forward their contentions. According to him, the present Appeal under Section 37 of the Act is a continuation of the Section 34 proceedings and the learned Single Judge having properly considered the grounds of challenge raised by the Appellant, the present Appeal also does not deserve any merit. Discussion: 27. The only question for consideration by this Court is to whether the second respondent/Arbitrator has properly considered the minus 30% option clause available under the Contract entered into between the Appellant and first respondent and whether the learned Single Judge had committed an error by dismissing the application filed by the Appellant under Section 34 of the Act. 28. It is clearly evident from the discussion under the Award that each and every issue which was the subject matter of the dispute was duly considered by the second respondent/Arbitrator. The second respondent/Arbitrator has given his findings only based on the materials available on record as evident from the reasoning given by him for arriving at his conclusions. 28. It is clearly evident from the discussion under the Award that each and every issue which was the subject matter of the dispute was duly considered by the second respondent/Arbitrator. The second respondent/Arbitrator has given his findings only based on the materials available on record as evident from the reasoning given by him for arriving at his conclusions. The discussions made by the second respondent/Arbitrator in the Award are as follows: (a) The delivery schedule fixed under the purchase order placed by the first respondent are supply to be made after 01.04.2006 and to be completed on 30.11.2006 at the rate of 650 nos., per month i.e., 650 nos., on 30.04.2006, 650 nos., on 31.05.2006, 650 nos., on 30.06.2006, 650 nos., on 31.07.2006, 650 nos., on 31.08.2006, 650 nos., on 30.09.2006, 650 nos., on 31.10.2006 and 635 nos., on 30.11.2006. The Appellant has supplied 975 nos., of excess cylinder liners for the month of September 2006, over and above the stipulated quantity for the said month under the Contract. (b) The lower rate received against the fresh tender opened on 04.09.2006 was communicated to the Appellant by the first respondent on 24.09.2006. (c) With regard to the exercise of 30% option clause, the Board's guidelines insist that the Contractor is given reasonable time/notice for executing the increase/decrease. However, the terms 'reasonable time' is not specific or defined. Though the Appellant had got the knowledge of the lower rate on 04.09.2006 (the date of fresh tender opening), for the purpose of exercising the minus 30% option clause, the need for sending the communication in writing to the Appellant is absolutely mandatory, as per the extant orders. The first respondent who had taken 20 days to communicate the 'lower rate received' to the Appellant could give only 24 days' notice to the Appellant to invoke the minus 30% option clause which is obviously a 'shorter period', not sufficient enough to curtail the supplies and therefore, cannot be considered as totally valid. The first respondent who had taken 20 days to communicate the 'lower rate received' to the Appellant could give only 24 days' notice to the Appellant to invoke the minus 30% option clause which is obviously a 'shorter period', not sufficient enough to curtail the supplies and therefore, cannot be considered as totally valid. However, taking a period of 30 days' as 'reasonable time', only a part of the supplies made by the Appellant under dispute (i.e.,) out of 975 cylinder liners, the installment due for October 2006 (650 nos., which was supplied in advance on 20.09.2006) becomes eligible to be considered for acceptance, whereas in respect of the balance quantity of 325 nos., of cylinder liners supplied (on 26.09.2006) which is beyond 30 days of issue of notice, the reduction of quantity invoking minus 30% option clause by the first respondent becomes justified. (d) The first respondent on receipt of the supply of 975 nos., of cylinder liners (under dispute) from the Appellant (which was received on 20.09.2006 and 26.09.2006) had kept the material under tally for a prolonged period inspite of the fact that; (1) the supplies received pertains to the month of October/November 2006 installments and further, (2) having received a direction from the Headquarters (Respondent -Railways) to the Appellant to defer dispatch in view of lower rates received in the fresh tender communicated vide letter dated 24.09.2006 and above all, (3) ignoring the fact that the ordered quantity was subsequently reduced from 5185 nos., to 3900 nos., vide MPO dated 17.10.2006 (invoking minus 30% option clause). While it is true that the item was critical at depot and urgently required for production, at no point of time, the user department, (rep. Respondent-Railways) had sent any communication to the Appellant either to remove the supplies received or advise the further course of action. (e) The failure on the part of the first respondent to appraise the position/return the liners to the Appellant for such a longer period is quite objectionable. A prima facie conclusion that the first respondent had no intention of returning the liners received in advance is reached. The Appellant had been pressing for payment with regard to 975 nos., of cylinder liners in dispute through their various letters dated 17.04.2007, 05.05.2007, 23.05.2007, 12.10.2007, 18.08.2007 & 02.08.2008 but the first respondent was unmindful and lethargic in replying to the Appellant. The Appellant had been pressing for payment with regard to 975 nos., of cylinder liners in dispute through their various letters dated 17.04.2007, 05.05.2007, 23.05.2007, 12.10.2007, 18.08.2007 & 02.08.2008 but the first respondent was unmindful and lethargic in replying to the Appellant. It is evident from the various correspondence made by the user department to the first respondent that the material was urgently required by the consignee and that non-availability of material could cause idling of employees and affect the turn-out of locomotives. (f) The user department was well-informed that the disputed quantity of 975 nos., of liners received is under 'acceptance' and that in case of any need to use those liners under urgency, it is but necessary to take the acceptance of the Appellant for such action. Failure to take the concurrence of the Appellant for using the material under dispute tantamount to 'acceptance of the material' directly and can never be interpreted as anything short of that. Having utilised the materials even before its acceptance, the first respondent cannot escape its liability. (g) In such circumstances, reduction of quantity by invoking minus 30% option clause, becomes invalid, due to non-conformity of 'reasonable time' required for the issue of notice for the part quantity of (650 nos.,) cylinder liners. In view of the situation that the first respondent was not in a position to return all the 975 nos., of cylinder liners as claimed by the Appellant, it is logical to allow the excise duty and sales tax paid by the Appellant to the Government on the invoice value of all the 975 nos., of cylinder liners under tally. (h) The Appellant has claimed that in one of their previous fixed price Contract, placed by the first respondent, no variation price was allowed to the Appellant, inspite of steep increase in prices of materials etc. Therefore, the same logic will have to be applied for the instant case also. The second respondent/Arbitrator gave a finding that the Contract quoted by the Appellant has no relevance to the subject case and each Contract needs to be dealt with separately. 29. As seen from the discussions made by the second respondent/Arbitrator, it is evident that the Arbitration Award is a reasoned and a well considered Award. The second respondent/Arbitrator gave a finding that the Contract quoted by the Appellant has no relevance to the subject case and each Contract needs to be dealt with separately. 29. As seen from the discussions made by the second respondent/Arbitrator, it is evident that the Arbitration Award is a reasoned and a well considered Award. The Appellant has also raised inconsistent grounds for challenge in the application filed under Section 34 of the Act, as well as in the instant Appeal. The scope for interference under Section 34 of the Act are all well settled by decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the instant Appeal does not fall within any of the said parameters laid down in those decisions. 30. The learned senior counsel for the Appellant has raised several issues which have been duly considered by the second respondent/Arbitrator while passing the Arbitration Award. As rightly observed by the learned single Judge that the second respondent/ Arbitrator, though being an employee of the first respondent was very fair and courageous to pass an Award in favour of the Appellant in respect of 650 nos., of cylinder liners out of the 975 nos., of cylinder liners under the original purchase price. 31. The second respondent/Arbitrator has also granted to the Appellant , the refund of the excise duty and sales tax paid by the Appellant on the original value in respect of all the 975 nos., of cylinder liners. 32. The learned Single Judge has also considered each and every ground of challenge raised by the Appellant in accordance with law, while considering the application under Section 34 of the Act. The Act is a special code by itself and the grounds for challenge must satisfy the requirements of Section 34 of the Act, which we are afraid, has not been satisfied by the Appellant. 33. The supplies were effected by the Appellant to the first respondent as per the Contract dated 25.01.2006. Under the Contract, the delivery schedule was fixed. There was only one Contract and the terms of payment were also agreed upon. The 30% option clause is also found only in the Contract dated 25.01.2006. That being the case, the submission of the learned senior counsel for the Appellant that, in a staggered delivery schedule, each instalment of supplies pertain to a separate Contract is incorrect. There was only one Contract and the terms of payment were also agreed upon. The 30% option clause is also found only in the Contract dated 25.01.2006. That being the case, the submission of the learned senior counsel for the Appellant that, in a staggered delivery schedule, each instalment of supplies pertain to a separate Contract is incorrect. He has misunderstood the findings of the second respondent/Arbitrator in that regard. Further, the Appellant is raising the ground, only for the first time in the instant Appeal and has not raised such a ground in the application filed under Section 34 of the Act. It is trite law, that such a new ground cannot be raised in an Appeal filed under Section 37 of the Act. 34. Section 70 of the Contract Act will not apply for the facts of the instant case. The instant case is not a case where no payment was made for the supplies made. The issue involved in this case was, whether the supplier will have to be paid at the original purchase price or at the revised price. The second respondent/Arbitrator has directed the first respondent to pay the Appellant for 650 nos., liners at the original purchase price and for the balance 325 nos., liners at the revised purchase price. Therefore, the submission of the learned senior counsel for the Appellant that Section 70 of the Contract Act will apply, is rejected by us. 35. Regarding non-awarding of interest by the second respondent/Arbitrator in the Award, the learned Single Judge has considered the Contract as well as the various decisions of the High Courts and the Hon'ble Supreme Court and has come to the right conclusion that the claim for interest is unsustainable. 36. The decisions relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the Appellant are not applicable for the instant case on hand. As discussed earlier;- (a) Section 70 of the Contract Act is not applicable, as the supplies are not gratuitous and the only issue for consideration by the second respondent/Arbitrator was whether payments will have to made as per the original purchase price or as per the revised price. The judgments cited by the learned senior counsel under Section 70 of the Contract Act, all pertain to cases where payments were not made after the supplies were effected. The judgments cited by the learned senior counsel under Section 70 of the Contract Act, all pertain to cases where payments were not made after the supplies were effected. (b) In so far as the judgments cited by the learned senior counsel for the Appellant on non-award of interest, the contract does not stipulate payment of interest and the learned Single Judge has also considered various decisions of the High Courts and the Hon'ble Supreme Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the Appellant is not entitled for interest. (c) The Judgments cited by the learned senior counsel for the Appellant to substantiate his argument, that the Award will have to be modified by directing the first respondent to pay the price of the entire quantity of 975 nos., of cylinder liners under the original purchase price do not have relevance for the facts of the instant case as the judgments cited by the learned senior counsel are all judgments under the Arbitration Act, 1940 and not under the 1996 Act. 37. The scope for interference under Section 34 of the Act to an Arbitral Award is covered by the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in,- (i) Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. vs. Saw Pipes Limited reported in (2003) 5 SCC 705 , wherein it was held that the Court can set aside an Award, if – 1. it is contrary to:- (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; (or) (b) Interest of India; (or) (c) Justice and morality. 2. it is patently illegal 3. it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court. (ii) McDermott International Tnc. Vs. Burn Standard Co., Ltd and others reported in (2006) 11 SCC 181 , which followed the decision in Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd., vs. Saw Pipes Limited referred to supra and the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the term patent illegality and observed that patent illegality must go to the root of the matter. Public policy violation should be so unfair and unreasonable as to shock the conscience of the Court. The supervisory role of the Court under section 34 is to be kept a minimum level and interference is envisaged only in case of fraud or bias, violation of the natural justice, etc. Public policy violation should be so unfair and unreasonable as to shock the conscience of the Court. The supervisory role of the Court under section 34 is to be kept a minimum level and interference is envisaged only in case of fraud or bias, violation of the natural justice, etc. If the Arbitrator has gone contrary to or beyond the express law of the Contract or granted relief in the matter not in dispute, that would come within the purview of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996. 38. According to the said decision, what would constitute public policy is a matter dependent upon the nature of transaction and nature of statute. For the said purpose, the pleadings of the parties and the materials brought on record would be relevant to enable the Court to judge what is in public good or public interest or otherwise would be injurious to the public good at the relevant point. The Supreme Court in its latest decision in the case of Associated Builders vs. DDA (2015) 3 SCC 49 has also followed the decision rendered in Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd., vs. Saw Pipes Limited reported in (2003) 5 SCC 705 and McDermott International Tnc., Vs. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and others reported in (2006) 11 SCC 181 . 39. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in its recent decision dated 25.09.2017 in the case of Ogene Systems India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Technology Development Board reported in 2017 SCC Online DL 11136 delineated the following propositions after considering all the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relating to the scope of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act right from Renusagar Power Company Ltd vs. General Electric Company 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644 to the recent Associated Builders Vs. DDA (2015) 3 SCC 49 . (i) The four reasons motivating the legislation of the Act, in 1996, were:- (a) to provide for a fair and efficient arbitral procedure, (b) to provide for the passing of reasoned Awards, (c) to ensure that the arbitrator does not transgress his jurisdiction, and (d) to minimize supervision, by courts, in the arbitral process. (ii) The merits of the Award are required to be examined only in certain specified circumstances, for examining whether the Award is in conflict with the public policy of India. (ii) The merits of the Award are required to be examined only in certain specified circumstances, for examining whether the Award is in conflict with the public policy of India. (iii) An Award would be regarded as conflicting with the public policy of India if:- (a) it is contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, or (b) it is contrary to the interests of India, (c) it is contrary to justice or morality, (d) it is patently illegal, or (e) it is so perverse, irrational, unfair or unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court. (iv) An Award would be liable to be regarded as contrary to the fundamental policy of Indian law, for example, if (a) it disregards orders passed by superior courts, or the binding effect thereof, or (b) it is patently violative of statutory provisions, or (c) it is not in public interest, or (d) the arbitrator has not adopted a “judicial approach”, i.e. has not acted in a fair, reasonable and objective approach, or has acted arbitrarily, capriciously or whimsically, or (e) the arbitrator has failed to draw an inference which, on the face of the facts, ought to have been drawn, or (f) the arbitrator has drawn an inference, from the facts, which, on the face of it, is unreasonable, or (g) the principles of natural justice have been violated. (v) The “patent illegality” had to go to the root of the matter. Trivial illegalities were inconsequential. (vi) Additionally, an Award could be set aside if, (a) either party was under some incapacity, or (b) the arbitration agreement is invalid under the law, or (c) the applicant was not given proper notice of appointment of the arbitrator, or of the arbitral proceedings, or was otherwise unable to present his case, or (d) the Award deals with a dispute not submitted to arbitration, or decides issues outside the scope of the dispute submitted to arbitration, or (e) the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or in accordance with Part I of the Act, or (f) the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or in accordance with Part I of the Act, or (g) the Award contravenes the Act, or (h) the Award is contrary to the Contract between the parties. (vii) “Perversity”, as a ground for setting aside an arbitral Award, has to be examined on the touchstone of the Wednesbury principle of reasonableness. It would include a case in which (a) the findings, in the Award, are based on no evidence, or (b) the Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something irrelevant to the decision arrived at, or (c) the Arbitral Tribunal ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision. (viii) At the same time, (a) a decision which is founded on some evidence, which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious, cannot be treated as “perverse”, (b) if the view adopted by the arbitrator is a plausible view, it has to pass muster, (c) neither quantity, nor quality, of evidence is open to re-assessment in judicial review over the Award. (ix) “Morality” would imply enforceability, of the agreement, given the prevailing mores of the day. “Immorality”, however, can constitute a ground for interfering with an arbitral Award only if it shocks the judicial conscience. (x) For examining the above aspects, the pleadings of the parties and materials brought on record would be relevant. (xi) The court cannot sit in Appeal over an arbitration Award. Errors of fact cannot be corrected under Section 34. The Arbitrator is the last word on facts.” (xii) The Arbitrator has considered each and every objection raised by the first respondent and only thereafter the Award has been passed in favour of the first respondent. The first respondent has filed 99 documents, and the Appellant had filed 33 documents before the Arbitrator and all the documents were marked as exhibits. The stand taken by the Appellant in the Application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, that exclusive jurisdiction is vested with Bangalore Courts is inconsistent and contrary to the stand taken before the Arbitral Tribunal, wherein they have averred that the entire cause of action arose only at Delhi. The stand taken by the Appellant in the Application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, that exclusive jurisdiction is vested with Bangalore Courts is inconsistent and contrary to the stand taken before the Arbitral Tribunal, wherein they have averred that the entire cause of action arose only at Delhi. The reply filed by the Appellant to the statement of claim filed by the first respondent is reproduced below:- “this Hon’ble Authority has got no jurisdiction to try and entertain the present claim petition because the agreement dated 16.04.2007 was entered into between the parties at Delhi, the orders for purchase of goods were placed by the respondent at Delhi, the goods were supplied at Delhi and the payments were made at Delhi, hence, dispute, if any, has arisen in Delhi and in view of this only Courts at Delhi have got the jurisdiction in the matter.” 40. Therefore, in our considered view, the learned single Judge has rightly dismissed the application filed by the Appellant under Section 34 of the Act and the grounds for challenge raised by the Appellant in this Appeal against the order of the learned single Judge also does not deserve any merit. Accordingly, the Appeal shall stand dismissed. No costs.