JUDGMENT : Mr. Ramchandra Singh Jhala, J. This second appeal has been filed by the appellant-plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 28.8.2017 passed by learned Additional District Judge No.2, Bhilwara in Civil Appeal No.48/2013 whereby it confirmed the judgment and decree dated 29.11.2012 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) West, Bhilwara in Civil Original Suit No.77/2008 filed for permanent and mandatory injunction. 2. Brief facts of the case are that appellant-plaintiff filed a suit for permanent and mandatory injunction against the defendant Urban Improvement Trust (UIT) Bhilwara alleging therein that house No.3-S-28/3 was allotted to Shri Devi Das S/o Asan Das by the defendant respondent UIT. Thereafter Shri Devi Das as per sale agreement dated 27.6.2006 sold the house to the appellant-plaintiff and he received an amount of Rs. 75,000/- from the appellant-plaintiff and handed over the possession to her with a condition that whatever amount is remaining to be paid to the defendant-UIT will be deposited by the appellant-plaintiff. After taking possession of the house in question, the appellant-plaintiff shifted to this house with her family and took electricity connection also and is living there with her family. The appellant-plaintiff thereafter approached the office of the defendant-UIT and requested them that the house in question be allotted to her and the plaintiff is ready to deposit whatever amount is due against the original allottee but in vain. 3. The defendant-UIT filed its written statement and submitted that house in question was allotted to Shri Devi Das Sindhi and allotment letter was issued in his favour on 5.4.2005 but since the due amount was not deposited by Shri Devi Das within a stipulated period hence according to allotment conditions, the allotment made in his favour has automatically cancelled and it was a prior condition in the allotment letter that the possession letter will be issued only after deposition of requisite amount and in this way the house in question was never in possession of Shri Devi Das. 4. 4. On the basis of the pleading of the parties, the learned trial court framed the following issues:- ^^1- vk;k izfroknh oknh ds LokfeRo o vkoaVu dCts'kqnk x`g la0&3&,l&28@3 ls okfn;k dks fcuk fdlh gd ,oa mfpr vk/kkj ds csn[ky djuk pkg jgs gSa\ 2- vk;k nkok djus ls iwoZ izfroknh foHkkx dks nks ekg dk uksfVl ugha nsus ls oknh dk nkok pyus ;ksX; ugha gS \ 3- vuqrks"k \^^ 5. The learned trial court decided the issue No.1 against the plaintiff and issue No.2 against the defendant and vide judgment and decree dated 29.11.2012 dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved with the judgment and decree dated 29.11.2012, the appellant-plaintiff preferred first appeal before D.J. Bhilwara which was transferred for hearing to learned Additional District No.2, Bhilwara which was also dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 28.8.2017. 6. Now the appellant-plaintiff has preferred this second appeal before this Court against the judgment and decree of learned both the courts below. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff has submitted that impugned judgments and decrees of both the court below are ex-facie illegal, arbitrary, perverse and has been passed without appreciating the factual matrix of the case and, therefore, cannot be sustained in the eye of law. It is submitted that on 30.9.2011 she herself present before the learned trial court but her cross-examination could not be recorded due to non-availability of Presiding Officer. Thereafter for almost one year, she could not appear before the learned trial court due to delivery, therefore, the reason for non-availability of the plaintiff for recording her evidence from the period October 2011 to December, 2012 is justified. 9. It is contended that the plaintiff was physically unfit due to delivery and regarding delivery relevant documents have been submitted by the plaintiff-appellant with the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. It is also contended that the respondent-UIT is not likely to use the house in question for its own purpose, after getting the possession of the house in question from the appellant-plaintiff. The defendant-UIT is again going to auction this house and will not fetch any rate beyond the market value of the house in question and the appellant-plaintiff is ready to deposit that market value of the house in question. 10. The defendant-UIT is again going to auction this house and will not fetch any rate beyond the market value of the house in question and the appellant-plaintiff is ready to deposit that market value of the house in question. 10. In view of above arguments learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff has prayed that this second appeal may kindly be admitted. 11. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondent-defendant has opposed the contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff and has supported the impugned judgments and has submitted that there is concurrent finding of both the learned courts below, therefore, the same cannot be interfered with by this Court in the second appeal. It is also submitted that no error has been committed by learned first appeal court as well as learned trial court while passing the impugned judgments and decrees as the same have been passed after appreciating and scrutinizing the material available on record. Therefore, it is prayed that the present second appeal may be dismissed at the admission stage. 12. Upon perusal of record, the appellant-plaintiff in her plaint has stated as under:- ^^1- ;g gS fd izfroknh uxj fodkl U;kl }kjk iVsy uxj ;kstuk esa ,d vkokl x`g la[;k 3&,l-&28@3 fnuakd 22-02-05 dks Jh nsoh nkl iq= vklu nkl dks vkoafVr fd;k x;k ,oa blds laca/k esa vkoaVu i= izfroknh }kjk fnukad 05-04-05 dks tkjh fd;k x;k ftlds laca/k esa vko';d jkf'k Jh nsoh nkl }kjk tek djkbZ xbZA ftlls dCtk Jh nsoh nkl dk gks x;kA 2- ;g gS fd mDr edku dks nsoh nkl us jde dh vko';drk gksus ls Jh nsoh nkl us fnukad 27-06-06 dks fcy ,ot 75]000@& :- esa okfn;k dks foØ; dj dCtk lqiqnZ dj fn;k ,oa ;g 'krZ r; gqbZ fd cdk;k tks Hkh jde gksxh og izfroknh dk;kZy; esa tek djkuh gksxh og okfn;k tek djok,xhA** 13. So the plaintiff herself has clearly stated that due to issuance of allotment letter Devi Das came in possession of the disputed house, but upon perusal of Ex.1 allotment letter, it is clear that UIT has specifically mentioned in allotment letter as under:- ^^3- vkoklx`g Hkwfe o miyC/k lqfo/kkvksa dk dqy ykxr :i;s 107]418-00 gksxhA 1- vkosnu&i= ds lkFk vekur jkf'k :i;s 500-00 2- izFke iwoZ xzg.k jkf'k :i;s 17653-00 3- f}rh; iwoZ xzg.k jkf'k :i;s 17653-00 4- fd'rs 240@& ¼20 o"kZ½ :i;s 644-00 4- iwoZ xzg.k jkf'k izFke fd'r :i;s 17]653-00 bl uksfVl izkfIr ds 30 fnol esa f}rh; fdLr 17653-00 :i;s vxys 30 fnu esa U;kl es tek djkuh gksxhA mDr le;kof/k esa jkf'k tek ugha djkus ij vkoaVu i= izkfIr ds 60 fnol rd jkf'k fu;ekuqlkj ns; C;kt ds lkFk tek djkbZ tk ldrh gSA 60 fnol ¼lkB fnol½ esa jkf'k tek ugha gksus ij vkoaVu Lor% gh fujLr gks tkosxsA rFkk vkosnu i= ds lkFk tek vekur jkf'k izkIr dj yh tkosxhA 5- iwoZ xzg.k jkf'k tek gksrs gh vkoklx`g dk dCtk&i= tkjh fd;k tk;sxkA ftlds vk/kkj ij vkoklx`g dk dCtk lacaf/kr dfu"V vfHk;ark ls 15 fnu ds vUnj izkIr djuk gksxk vU;Fkk vkoklx`g ds izfr U;kl dh dksbZ ftEesnkjh ugha gksxhA vkoklx`g dk dCtk tSlh fLFkfr esa gS mlh fLFkfr es fn;k tk;sxkA vkoaVh dCtk ysus ls iwoZ vkoklx`g vPNh rjg ls ns[k ysus ds ckn vkaoVh dks dksbZ ,srjkt ekU; ugha gksxkA vkoklx`g dks jkf'k :i;s 71]612-00 dk e; C;kt ds 240 fdLrksa esa tek djkuh gksxh vkidks vkokl dk ekfld fdLr ewy o C;kt lfgr :i;s 644-00 ;g ekfld fdLr fnukad May&2005 ls vkidks fu;fer :i ls tek djkuh gksxhA ;g jde izR;sd ekg dh 15 rkjh[k rd U;kl esa tek djkuh gksxhA foyEc ls tek djus ij fu;ekuqlkj ns; C;kt tek djkuh gksxhA** 14. According to allotment letter Exhibit 1, it is also clear that upon deposit of first and second installments of Rs. 17,653/- each, the allottee was entitled to obtain possession of the disputed house, but the plaintiff had failed to produce any receipt in trial court about depositing of first and second installments of Rs,.17,653/- each. Even the plaintiff had not pleaded in her plaint that said Devi Das deposited first and second installments as per condition of allotment letter and then after he took possession from the respondent-defendant. Even the plaintiff had not pleaded in her plaint that said Devi Das deposited first and second installments as per condition of allotment letter and then after he took possession from the respondent-defendant. In spite of this, no possession letter has been produced by the plaintiff in trial court. 15. In the written statement, the respondent-UIT has specifically stated as under:- ^^1- ;g fd okni= ds iSjk la[;k 1 ftl izdkj vafdr fd;k x;k gSa vlR; o vk/kkjghu gksus ls vLohdkj gSA Jh nsohnkl fla/kh dks vkokl x`g dk vkaoVu i= fnukad 05-04-05 dks tkjh fd;k x;k Fkk ijUrq Jh nsohnkl }kjk mDr vkokl x`g ds vkoaVu i= ds vuqlkj fofgr vof/k esa jkf'k ugha tek djk;s tkus ds dkj.k vkoaVu i= dh 'krksZa ds vuqlkj Lor% gh fujLr gks x;k Fkk rFkk vkoaVu i= esa Li"V vafdr Fkk fd iwoZxzg.k jkf'k tek gksus ds i'pkr gh dCtki= tkjh fd;k tkosxkA bl izdkj Li"V gS fd iVsy uxj ;kstuk ds vkokl x`g la[;k 3&,l&28@3 dk dCtk Jh nsohnkl dk ugha Fkk o u gh gSA 2- ;g fd okni= ds iSjk la[;k 2 tkudkjh ds vHkko esa vLohdkj gSA vkoaVu i= fnukad 05-04-05 Li"V vafdr gS fd vkokl x`g dh leLr vkoaVu jkf'k tek gksus rd vkokl x`g dk LokfeRo izfroknh esa fufgr jgsxkA bl izdkj okfn;k us ;fn dksbZ foØ; bdjkj fd;k gS rks og izfroknh ds fo:) voS/k o vukf/kd`r gksdj izfroknh ds fo:) izHkkoghu gSA 3- ;g fd okni= ds iSjk la[;k 3 vlR; o vk/kkjghu gksus ls vLohdkj gSA Jh nsohnkl dks vkokl x`g la[;k 3&,l&28@3 dk dCtk lqiqnZ ugha fd;k gSa o mlds i{k esa fd;k x;k vkoaVu Hkh Lor% fujLr gks pqdk gSA ;fn okfn;k voS/k o vukf/kd`r :i ls mDr vkokl x`g esa izos'k dj viuk dCtk izdV djrh gS rks og voS/k vfrØe.k gksdj /kkjk 94d uxj fodkl vf/kfu;e o Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk ds izko/kkuksa ds vuqlkj n.Muh; vijk/k gSaA** 16. Upon perusal of record, it is also clear that when the respondent-UIT has specifically mentioned in the written statement the above facts that due to non-deposit of amount according to the allotment letter, the allotment was automatically cancelled, but the appellant-plaintiff has failed to submit any rejoinder controverting the said averment. 17. Upon perusal of record, it is also clear that when the respondent-UIT has specifically mentioned in the written statement the above facts that due to non-deposit of amount according to the allotment letter, the allotment was automatically cancelled, but the appellant-plaintiff has failed to submit any rejoinder controverting the said averment. 17. It is also admitted fact in this case that plaintiff had only submitted her affidavit for examination in chief but she never appeared in trial court for her cross-examination, in these circumstances, the affidavit submitted by the plaintiff for examination in chief has no evidentiary value. There is no iota of evidence on record which shows that Devi Das deposited first and second installments according to the allotment condition in UIT, Bhilwara. In these circumstances, when Devi Das was not in possession of the disputed house neither he deposited the money demanded by UIT through allotment letter to take possession of the said disputed house nor UIT handed over the possession to Devi Das, so no right is accrued to the Devi Das over the disputed house then the said sale deed which was executed in favour of the appellant-plaintiff by Devi Das is void ab initio and on the basis of said sale deed, no right is accrued to the appellant-plaintiff Anjana Devi over the disputed house. 18. Upon perusal of record, it is also reveals that the Court has given so many adjournments for plaintiff's evidence but the plaintiff had failed to produce her evidence in the trial court. Upon perusal of last order sheet dated 27.11.2012 it reveals that on that day on behalf of plaintiff no any sufficient cause was shown before the Court for not producing the evidence, therefore, the trial court closed the evidence of the plaintiff and also specifically stated in the order sheet that:- ^^cŒiŒ miŒA lkŒoknh ds xokg vuqŒA leqfpr volj fn, tk pqds gSA vkt lk{; is'k ugha djus dk dksbZ ;Fkksfpr dkj.k izLrqr ugha gSA lkŒ oknh dk volj lekIr fd;k tkrk gSA izfrŒ i{k dh lk{; is'k ugha djuk pkgrs gSA vr% i=kŒ okLrs fu.kZ; fnŒ 29-11-12 dks is'k gksA** 19. On perusal of record, it is also clear that first time plaintiff's case was fixed for her evidence on 6.8.2009 and thereafter so many times the case was adjourned for plaintiff's evidence and ultimately on 27.11.2012 due to non-appearance of the plaintiff, her evidence was closed by the trial court. There is no any explanation on behalf of the plaintiff that before delivery why in between 6.8.2009 to 24.5.2012 plaintiff did not appear in the trial court for her cross-examination and why she did not produce her evidence. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff that trial court has erred in closing the plaintiff's evidence is not tenable. 20. So far as the contention of appellant-plaintiff that due to delivery the appellant-plaintiff was unable to remain present in court is concerned, upon perusal of order sheet of the trial court it reveals that on behalf of the plaintiff nothing was mentioned in the trial court about this fact. So far as the plaintiff's delivery is concerned, upon perusal of the discharge ticket Exhibit A/1, the appellant-plaintiff was operated on 24.5.2012 and was discharged from the hospital on 1.6.2012. It is also mentioned at the back side of discharge ticket in column No.4 that ^^ vkWijs'ku ds nwljs fnu ls viuk jkstkuk dk dk;Z dj ldrh gSA** 21. In these circumstances, it is also not tenable that the plaintiff was unable to do her daily work and she was unable to come to the Court for her evidence. 22. Upon perusal of record it reveals that fact that the plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence to prove her suit and in view of above discussions, it is also clear that the plaintiff failed to explain any sufficient reason for non-production of her evidence in the trial court. In these circumstances, the learned courts below have rightly held that the appellant-plaintiff has failed to prove her suit and have rightly dismissed the suit filed by the appellant-plaintiff. 23. It is settled proposition of law that the plaintiff must stand on his own legs, he cannot take support from weakness of defendant. 24. In view of above discussions, this Court is satisfied that learned trial court as well as learned first appellate court have not committed any error in dismissing the suit of the appellant-plaintiff. 23. It is settled proposition of law that the plaintiff must stand on his own legs, he cannot take support from weakness of defendant. 24. In view of above discussions, this Court is satisfied that learned trial court as well as learned first appellate court have not committed any error in dismissing the suit of the appellant-plaintiff. It has also been rightly held that due to non-depositing first and second installments according to the allotment letter, the allotment made by the UIT was automatically cancelled, hence, no right is accrued to Devi Das in the disputed house, therefore, he had no right to transfer the said property to any other person. Sale deed Ex.2 also unregistered and insufficient stamped and executed without accruing any right which has been executed in favour of the plaintiff by Devi Das is void ab initio and does not confer any right to the plaintiff. It is also settled proposition of law that nobody can transfer a better title than he himself has. 25. The general rule regarding transfer of ownership is that "Nemo Dat Quad Non Habet" it means "No one can give what he has not got" 26. This Court is satisfied that no substantial question of law arises in this appeal for further consideration by this Court and finding of the learned courts below appears to be finding of fact based on material available on record which cannot be said to be perverse in any manner and, therefore, does not give rise to any substantial question of law. The present appeal is thus found to be devoid of any merit and the same is liable to be dismissed. 27. In view of above, the second appeal is hereby dismissed. The stay petition and application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. are also disposed of. No order as to costs.