JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. To challenge the order dated 29.06.2017 delivered in Civil. Misc.73 of 2015 by the Judge, Family court, Agartala the petitioner who raised the objection in the trial court that the suit was not properly valued and stamped as per the Court Fees Act, 1870 has contended that in a suit for maintenance and annuities as the court fees has to be paid ad valorem under Section 7(ii) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 specifically provides as under: “In suits for maintenance and annuities or other sums payable periodically—according to the value of the subject-matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be ten times the amount claimed to be payable for one year.” 2. The respondent, in this petition, instituted the suit under Section 20 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 to realize the maintenance allowance from the petitioner who is her father. 3. By filing the written objection on 02.05.2017, the petitioner herein (the Opposite Party in that proceeding) has categorically taken stand in the trial court that the suit was not properly valued and stamped as per the Court Fees Act, 1870. The petitioner herein filed an application on 29.06.2017 under Order VI Rule 17 read with Section 151 of the CPC for amendment of his written objection to highlight the said objection in respect of payment of the Court Fees Act and to hold that the suit is not maintainable for non-payment of due court fees as per the Court Fees Act, 1870. The said application for amendment of the written objection has been rejected and the trial court recorded the evidence led by the respondent and fixed the date on 07.09.2017 for recording the evidence for the opposite party, the respondent herein. Again the petitioner filed a petition on 07.09.2017 to recall the order dated 29.06.2017 and allow the petitioner to amend his objection and the said petition was fixed for hearing on 05.12.2017 and finally, by the order dated 07.09.2017, the trial court, according to the petitioner has curtailed the right of the petitioner from adducing the evidence. Again the petitioner filed a petition on 07.09.2017 to recall the order dated 29.06.2017 and allow the petitioner to amend his objection and the said petition was fixed for hearing on 05.12.2017 and finally, by the order dated 07.09.2017, the trial court, according to the petitioner has curtailed the right of the petitioner from adducing the evidence. According to the petitioner, the said order dated 07.09.2017 is grossly illegal and irregular and as such, the petitioner has evoked the superintending jurisdiction of this court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking interference in the order dated 07.09.2017 and also for recalling the order dated 29.06.2017 whereby the trial court had rejected the prayer for amendment for purpose of incorporating the said jurisprudential objection. The petitioner has further prayed in this revisional petition [under Article 227 of the Constitution of India] to allow him to amend the written objection filed on 02.05.2017 in terms of the schedule of his petition dated 29.06.2017 for amendment. 4. Mr. R. Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has focused his submission solely on the question of non-payment of the court fees act in terms of Section 7 under Chapter-III of the Court Fees Act, 1870. Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel has further submitted that the Civil Misc.73 of 2015 cannot be treated as the petition, on the contrary it should be treated as the suit instituted under Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. The respondent herein, the petitioner in the proceeding, stamped the petition by the Court Fees of Rs.1 without paying the proper court fees under the Court Fees Act, 1872. Since the petitioner did not take a categorical stand in this regard in the written objection he had filed the said amendment application but by means of an unsolicited “interpretation” of the judgment and order dated 12.10.2017 passed by the Gauhati High Court in CRP No.18 of 2017, the trial court has rejected the petitioner’s petition for amendment of his written objection. As stated, the said petition for amendment has been rejected and the proceeding continued and the date was fixed for examination of the witnesses by the opposite party [the petitioner herein]. By the order dated 07.09.2017, the proceeding was fixed for examination of the witnesses by the opposite party. As stated, the said petition for amendment has been rejected and the proceeding continued and the date was fixed for examination of the witnesses by the opposite party [the petitioner herein]. By the order dated 07.09.2017, the proceeding was fixed for examination of the witnesses by the opposite party. The trial court closed the evidence by observing as under: “Section 151 of the C.P.C. provides for inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. It is not a substantive provision and does not confer right to get any relief. The petition dated 29.06.2017 was rejected as already the Hon’ble High Court vide its judgment in Baby Deb vs. Ajit Deb had clarified that the petition made before the Family Court has to be treated as an application and not as a suit. Since present proceeding is not a suit, Court Fees Act or suit valuation does not come to play. My interpretation of the judgment of the Hon’ble Court may be wrong but that does not allow me to recall any order passed by me. The avenue left before the respondent is to challenge order dated 29.06.2017 before higher forum. This is being so the application filed by the respondent u/s. 151 of the C.P.C. to recall the order dt. 29.06.2017 is here by rejected.” 5. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 07.09.2017, the petitioner has approached this court for interference both in the order dated 29.06.2017 and 07.09.2017. By the order dated 29.06.2017, the trial court had occasion to observe as follows : “Perused the application. The written objection filed by him today is regarding non-payment of court fees by the petitioner as per the Court Fees Act. According to the respondent, the petitioner ought to have paid court fee on a suit valuation of Rs.7,20,000/-. Heard the parties. In CRP. 18 of 2007, similar matter went up to the High Court and in its judgment dt. 20.10.2007, between Baby Deb and Ajit Deb, Hon’ble High Court referring to the intention of the legislature held that every suit or case filed before the Family Court has to be treated as an application and not as a plaint and hence, a fixed court fee of Rs.1 is only payable. 20.10.2007, between Baby Deb and Ajit Deb, Hon’ble High Court referring to the intention of the legislature held that every suit or case filed before the Family Court has to be treated as an application and not as a plaint and hence, a fixed court fee of Rs.1 is only payable. On perusal of the application of the petitioner I find Rs.1 has been given as court fees along with process fees. Therefore, the objection as filed by the respondent is untenable and is rejected.” 6. Since, the said objection was treated as untenable, as it surfaces, the petitioner herein was agitated by rejection of his petition by the order dated 29.06.2017. The fundamental question as arises is that whether the action filed under Section 20 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is a suit or a petition and if it is not a suit whether the respondent herein was obligated to pay the court fees ad valorem on the sum of Rs.72,000/- being the total maintenance allowance in a year to be recovered. According to the trial court, the said action is a petition and since the court fees required to be paid for a petition was duly paid, the petition was treated in form. The trial court has discarded the objection of the petitioner herein that the said action is not a petition but a suit. 7. To distinguish the judgment of this court delivered in Baby Deb vs. Ajit Deb [AIR 2008 Gauhati 49] Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that the claim for maintenance is a claim for money so it is apparent that the action is a money suit. He has referred to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Darubai versus Shankar Narayan Petil reported in AIR 1974 Bom 215 where the expression “suit for money” as used in Section 3(1) of the Bombay Execution of Decrees (Temporary Postponement) Act, 1959 has been distinguished and held that : “It is quite clear that the Legislature was aware of the fact that a suit for money arising out of a claim for maintenance could be a suit in which a decree for money could be a suit in which a decree for money could be passed. The provisions of Section 8 are in the nature of exemption and will have to be strictly construed. The provisions of Section 8 are in the nature of exemption and will have to be strictly construed. The Legislature has only granted exemption to the decrees for money and not to the suit for money arising out of the claim for maintenance. It is established principle of law that as gathered from the express words used in the Statute. If the express words used in Section 3 and Section 8 of the Act are read together, in my opinion, it is quite clear that the term “suit for money” will govern the suit in which a claim for money arising out of the claim for maintenance is made.” [Emphasis added] 8. Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel has also referred a decision of the Kerala High Court in Thulasikumar Anil Kumar and Another versus Raghavan Nair reported in AIR 1985 Ker 20 . In that report, the Kerala High Court has dealt with a case where the suit was filed for realizing the sum of maintenance. Further reference has been made to a decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Dodiyala Krishnaprasada Rao versus K. Jayasri and Others reported in AIR 1986 AP 126 . 9. It has been observed by Andhrapradesh High Court, in a different context, that as per Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 the obligation of a person to maintain his or her aged or infirm parents or a daughter who is unmarried, as the case may be, is unable to maintain herself or himself out of his own earning source or property and to maintain daughter regardless of age so long is unable to maintain herself out of her earning or property. The question that has been debated by the parties has not been directly dwelled upon by Dodiyala Krishnaprasada Rao (supra). Therefore, the right to get the maintenance cannot be questioned in view of Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. The question therefore is whether the said claim for maintenance by the daughter from her father forms a suit or a petition for maintenance. A sum of Rs.6000/- has been sought monthly as maintenance by the respondent under Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. 10. The action under Chapter-III of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 for the substantive right of the person is bound to be termed as suit. A sum of Rs.6000/- has been sought monthly as maintenance by the respondent under Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. 10. The action under Chapter-III of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 for the substantive right of the person is bound to be termed as suit. “Suit” is a term of wider significance than mere action. It may even include a proceeding on a petition yet generally speaking “suit” and “petition” are very nearly synonymous but in the Judicature Act, 1925 [for England and Wales] Clause-49 Section 25 does not include a petition though by a petition someone can be sued. For example, a mortgager?s petition for payment out of a fund in the court is not a suit to recover interest, but the action claiming the mortgagers right of retainer out of proceeds of sale is a suit. A suit encompasses an action in law. Hence, the action in terms of Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is an outcome of independent and a substantive law. Even if the suit is not framed under Order 2 of the CPC that pleading can also be treated as the suit by the court if is not required by the procedure or practice. 11. Mr. R. Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has referred another decision of the Orissa High Court in Purusottam Mahakud versus Smt. Annapurna Mahakud and Another reported in AIR 1997 Ori 73 but that decision does not have any relevance in the present context. 12. From the other side, Mr. R.R. Datta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents counsel has strongly supported the impugned order by stating that there is no error of law, inherent or apparent, in the impugned judgment dated 07.09.2017 as in Baby Deb versus Ajit Deb, it has been clarified that any proceeding brought before the family Court would by a petition. Mr. R.R. Datta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents counsel has strongly supported the impugned order by stating that there is no error of law, inherent or apparent, in the impugned judgment dated 07.09.2017 as in Baby Deb versus Ajit Deb, it has been clarified that any proceeding brought before the family Court would by a petition. Mr. Datta, learned counsel for the respondent has referred to a decision of the apex court in Jagadish Jugtawat versus Manju Lata and Others reported in (2002) 5 SCC 422 where it has been held that the order of maintenance in favour of the daughter against her father even after her attaining the majority but till her marriage taking the view that it would avoid multiplicity of proceedings, as otherwise the daughter would be forced to file another case under Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 for further maintenance. In the following passage it has been observed as under : “4. Applying the principle to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, it is manifest that the right of a minor girl for maintenance from parents after attaining majority till her marriage is recognized in Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. Therefore, no exception can be taken to the judgment/order passed by the learned Single Judge for maintaining the order passed by the Family Court which is based on a combined reading of Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure and Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. For the reasons aforestated we are of the view that on facts and in the circumstances of the case no interference with the impugned judgment order of the High Court is called for.” 13. Having perused the ground of objection against the order under challenge and the submission of the counsel representing the respective parties, this court would observe that ordinarily the action for maintenance under Chapter-III of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 be treated as the suit, to be filed in the trial court of the competent jurisdiction and hence, there cannot be any doubt that an action under Section 20(3) of the said Act shall also be treated as the suit, to be filed in the civil court. Whether for purpose of claiming maintenance, Section 7(ii) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 would apply for computation of the fees? Whether for purpose of claiming maintenance, Section 7(ii) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 would apply for computation of the fees? The said provision, as reproduced, would apply in a suit for maintenance and annuities. Section 9 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887 provides how to determine the value of the certain suit. It provides that when the subject matter of the suit of any class, other than suits mentioned in the Courts Fees Act, 1870, the suits of those class shall for purpose of the Court Fees Act, 1870 may be valued by the superior court if the superior court is not satisfied regarding the valuation of the suit. 14. The first four clauses of Section 7 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887 as amended in Assam and extended to Tripura give discretion to the plaintiff to fix the suit value for purpose of court fees and not for jurisdiction. The jurisdictional value is to be determined with reference to the Suit Valuation Act [AIR 1970 Tripura 51]. The matter of under valuation of the suit is between the plaintiff and the court. The other party has no locus standi to object to enhancement of the valuation of the suit ordered by the court. 15. In the case in hand, there cannot be any controversy that the suit for maintenance has been specifically mentioned in Section 3(ii) of the Court Fees Act, 1870. Section 7(2) applies in all cases where a claim to a right of maintenance is being set up and Section 7(i) applies to claims for arrears of maintenance where the right to such maintenance has already been established. Where a suit is simply brought for a sum claimed as arrears of maintenance in absence of any previously established right to the maintenance claim, the payment of an ‘ad valorem’ court fees on the annual value of the maintenance claimed under Section 7(ii) becomes payable on the ground that the plaintiff cannot maintain the claim for arrears of maintenance without having established his right of maintenance at the rate as claimed [AIR 1961 Punjab 11]. When a person sues for maintenance at a particular rate, whether or not she has already been refused maintenance by the Magistrate under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. [old Section 488 of the repealed Cr.P.C.], she is clearly making a money claim whose value for purpose of taxation can be assessed in the manner given in Section 7 of the Court Fees Act. When the Magistrate has ordered maintenance, the husband or father comes to the civil court, he does not exactly ask for cancellation of a specific monitory liability. What he can urge is that there are circumstances which entitled him to a declaration that the person concerned is not his wife or child or that the right to maintenance has been lost by her or his own conduct. Even when there is suit for reduction of maintenance fixed by a decree the suit should not be taxed „ad valorem’ while one for increase for maintenance should be so taxed. Thus, if the proceeding for maintenance or for arrear maintenance is brought before any civil court ‘ad valorem’ court fees (referred as the “tax”) has to be paid in terms of section 7(i) or (ii) whichever is applicable having regard to the nature of the suit as discussed above. But the said proposition of law cannot be applied in the suit filed in the Family Court. 16. In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 23 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the Family Courts Act (Gauhati High Court) Rules, 1989 has been framed and has come into force and the same is the part of Appendix 12 of the said Rules. Para-6 of the Family Courts Act (Gauhati High Court), Rules, 1989 provides as under : “Institution of Proceedings- All proceedings instituted before the Family Court will be by way of a petition. However, in respect of applications under Chapter XI of the Criminal Procedure Code the provisions of that Code shall apply.” The said provision is a state policy not to treat any action in the Family Court as the suit as consequence, not to charge any court fee in an action brought under the provisions of Family Courts Act, save and except the fixed fee as required to be paid for a petition. But in the civil courts, the said exemption will not be available for the person instituting the suit under Chapter- III of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Thus, even though for different analogy the impugned order dated 07.09.2017 delivered in Civil Misc. 73 of 2015 does not call for any interference. The petitioner is given liberty to approach the trial court for affording an opportunity to adduce his evidence, if deemed necessary. Having observed thus, this petition stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.