JUDGMENT : Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, J. Heard Sri Manish Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel representing the State-respondents and Sri Sanjay Tripathi, learned counsel representing the respondent No.4. 2. This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenges two orders; the first order under challenge is the order dated 30.08.2018, passed by the court of Atirikta Adhikari (First), Faizabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘trial court’), whereby he has allowed the application dated 03.03.2017 filed by the respondent no.4 under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’) and set aside the judgment and order dated 10.03.2016, whereby the suit filed by the petitioner under section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (herein referred to as ‘U.P. Z.A & L.R. Act’) was decreed. By the said order the learned trial court has restored the suit. 3. The other order, which has been assailed in these proceedings, has been passed on 18.09.2018, by the Board of Revenue, whereby the revision petition filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 30.08.2018, has been dismissed. 4. The facts, which can be culled from the pleadings on record, are that the petitioner filed a suit on 09.01.2007 under Section 229-B of the U.P. Z.A.& L.R. Act seeking declaration that he be declared Bhumidhar with transferable rights in respect of khasra Plot Nos. 1239 and 1320, situate in village-Januara, outside limit of Nagarpalika, Pargana-Haveli Oudh, Tehsil-Sadar, District-Faizabad and in respect of Plot No.64, 134Kha, 135Kha and 139Kha, situate in Village-Nandapur, Pargana-Haveli Oudh, Tehsil-Sadar, District-Faizabad. The said suit was filed impleading one Gulab Chandra Pandey and Smt. Sushila Devi as defendant nos.1 and 2. In the suit, the State of U.P. through Collector and Village Panchayats-Bheekhapur and Janaura were also impleaded as defendant Nos. 3 and 4 respectively. 5. The aforesaid suits by the petitioner was filed with the plaint averments that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are the Bhumidhars of the land in dispute and for repaying some debts they needed money and accordingly they executed a mortgage deed for a sum of Rs. 2 lacs. It was further alleged by the petitioner-plaintiff before the learned trial court that the petitioner had paid a sum of Rs. 1 and 2 are the Bhumidhars of the land in dispute and for repaying some debts they needed money and accordingly they executed a mortgage deed for a sum of Rs. 2 lacs. It was further alleged by the petitioner-plaintiff before the learned trial court that the petitioner had paid a sum of Rs. 1 lac and on execution of mortgage deed the petitioner-plaintiff would pay rest of the sum of Rs.1 lac in two installments to the defendants and that the amounts so received by the defendants would be returned back to the petitioner-plaintiff within a period of two and half years and in case the amount taken by the defendants is returned back, the mortgage deed shall be given back to the defendants. The petitioner further stated in the plaint that a sum of Rs.1 lac was paid on 30.03.2004 by the plaintiff to the defendants and accordingly mortgage deed was also executed on the said date i.e. on 30.03.2004 and further that while executing the mortgage deed, half share of the property in question was given in possession by the plaintiff to the defendants. It was also averred in the plaint that as per terms of the mortgage the plaintiff had paid rest of the amount of Rs.1 lac in two intallments on 17.04.2004 and 20.05.2004 and that when by the end of the month of September, 2006 the defendants did not return the money to the petitioner-plaintiff, defendants were asked by the plaintiff to return back the amount on which the defendants did not pay back the money and accordingly, a suit was filed on the basis of said mortgage deed dated 30.03.2004. 6. The suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed by the learned trial court by means of judgment and decree dated 10.03.2016. Thereafter respondent No.4-Smt. Kamlawati moved an application under section 151 of the CPC before the learned trial court with the prayer that since the judgment and decree dated 10.03.2016 has been obtained by committing fraud as such the same may be set aside. The application moved by the respondent No.4 on 03.03.2017, under section 151 of the CPC is on record as Annexure No.7 to the petition. The application moved by the respondent No.4 on 03.03.2017, under section 151 of the CPC is on record as Annexure No.7 to the petition. In the said application, it was stated by the respondent No.4 that Smt. Sushila had executed a sale deed on 07.04.2006 in respect of an area of 0.202 hectare of Gata No.1320 and on 14.11.2006, she executed another sale deed in respect of an area of 0.044 hectare of Gata No.1320 and in respect of Gata No. 64 as well situate in village Nandapur, in favour of respondent no.4. The sale deed was executed on 14.11.2006 by Smt. Sushila Devi in favour of respondent no.4 and that since the year 2006 itself she has been in possession over the land in suit as Bhumidhar with transferable rights and further that before the judgment and degree dated 10.03.2016, the name of applicant/respondent no.4 (Smt. Kamlawati) had been recorded in the revenue records. 7. In the application moved under section 151 of CPC, respondent No.4 further stated that she came to know only on 28.02.2017 that the petitioner has obtained judgment and degree in respect of the property in suit by committing forgery and in a pre-planned manner by suppressing material facts and committing fraud on the court and that on coming to know the said fraud, she moved the application for setting aside the judgment and decree dated 10.03.2016. It was also stated by the respondent No.4 that though the land in dispute is situated in two separate villages, namely, Village-Nandapur and Village-Janaura, however, the Gram Panchayats of the said villages were not impleaded as defendants separately; rather they were impleaded as defendant No.4 jointly and that the name of Gram Panchayat-Janaura was added by hand and that no notice as required under Section 106 of the U.P. Panchayati Raj Act was given before instituting the suit. Accordingly, suit itself was not maintainable for want of said notice. 8. Further submission made in the said application was that in respect of Gata Nos.1239 and 1320 the Regular Suit bearing No.171 of 2006 was filed by the petitioner seeking a decree of damages on the basis of some agreement to sell which was dismissed on 20.01.2010 and further that after dismissal of the said suit the petitioner orchestrated a separate case based on the alleged mortgage deed dated 30.03.2004. It was also stated in the application that the suit under Section 229-B of U.P. Z.A & L.R. Act was instituted on 09.01.2007 which was decided on 10.03.2016 and as such in case the mortgage deed dated 30.03.2004 was in existence, the said factum would have been averred in Regular Suit No.171 of 2006. It was, thus, averred that filing of the Regular Suit No.171 of 2006 was concealed with a view to commit fraud on the court, which amounted to abuse of the process of court. It was also stated that if the deed of mortgage dated 30.03.2004 was in existence, there was no occasion to institute the Regular Suit no.171 of 2006 on the basis of an agreement to sell dated 11.07.2005. Further averments made in the said application was that during the pendency of the suit before the learned trial court, on 11.05.2007 the petitioner got executed a sale deed on a sale consideration of Rs.2 lacs in favour of his wife-Anita Devi from Gulab Chandra in respect of Gata No.1320 which allegedly is subject matter of the mortgage deed as well. It was also averred that in respect of an area of 0.114 hectare of Plot No.1320, the sale deed was got executed in favour of Shobha Devi on 19.07.2004 on the basis of which she was recorded in the revenue records. 9. It was specifically averred in the application that alleged deed of mortgage dated 30.03.2004 is a forged and fabricated document and that Sushila Devi had put thumb impression on the sale deeds dated 30.06.2009 and 14.11.2006 whereas on the mortgage deeds Sushila Devi is shown to have appended her signatures. On these facts, it was pleaded in the said application filed by the respondent no.4 under Section 151 of the CPC that the petitioner had obtained judgment and decree dated 10.03.2016 by playing fraud not only on the party but also on the court and, thus, decree dated 10.03.2016 was liable to be set aside. 10. The petitioner opposed the said application moved by the respondent Nos. 10. The petitioner opposed the said application moved by the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 by filing his reply/objection stating therein that since the mortgage deed was executed on 30.03.2004 i.e. prior to execution of the sale deeds in favour of respondent No.4, as such the original tenure holder had lost his right to execute the sale deeds in respect of the property in suit in favour of respondent No.4 and that on the basis of such sale deeds, the respondent No.4 did not have any locus to move any application seeking cancellation of decree dated 10.03.2016. 11. The learned trial court after hearing the parties and after appropriately discussing the material available on record, has considered the entire matter and passed the order dated 30.08.2018 recording the finding that before institution of the suit by the petitioner, the land in suit was already sold and on the basis of such sale deeds even the mutation orders were passed and the land was recorded in the revenue records in the names of vendees, however, these vendees were not made parties to the suit. Learned trial court has also given a finding that respondent No.4 is an affected/necessary party in the suit for the reason that the sale deeds in her favour were already executed even prior to institution of the suit and that the petitioner-plaintiff had deliberately not impeaded her as defendant in the suit. 12. Learned revisonal court i.e. Board of Revenue while affirming the order dated 30.08.2018 passed by the learned trial court, has dismissed the revision petition. 13. Impeaching the orders impugned in this petition, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri Manish Kumar has vehemently argued that on an application filed under Section 151 of the CPC, the final judgment and decree dated 10.03.2016 could not have been set aside for the reason that setting aside the judgment and decree on an application moved under Section 151 CPC is beyond the scope of the said provision. He has also stated that if the respondent No.4, in any manner, was aggrieved it was open to her to have moved appropriate application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC. 14. Relying upon a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prakash Agarwal and another Vs. He has also stated that if the respondent No.4, in any manner, was aggrieved it was open to her to have moved appropriate application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC. 14. Relying upon a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prakash Agarwal and another Vs. Gopi Krishan (dead through L.Rs.) and others, reported in [ 2013(31) LCD 881 ], Sri Manish Kumar has stated that the inherent powers vested in a court under Section 151, C.P.C., cannot be used to reopen the settled matters and that in view of expressed and specific provision contained under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC, such powers could not have been exercised by the learned trial court on an application moved by the respondents under Section 151, CPC. Sri Manish Kumar has further argued that even if respondent No.4 was aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 10.03.2016, the appropriate course open to her was that she ought to have moved the court under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC. He has also stated that it is not a case where the respondent No.4 has succeeded in establishing that the judgment and decree dated 10.03.2016 was obtained by committing any fraud on the court. Drawing distinction between the allegation of fraud on court and fraud on party, Sri Manish Kumar has further argued that in case where it is a case that some fraud has been committed on a party, such party could file a separate suit for setting aside such decree and in any case, in a proceedings drawn on an application moved under Section 151, C.P.C., the judgment and decree which had attained finality, could not have been set aside by the learned trial court. 15. Learned counsel representing the respondent No.4, on the other hand, has stated that the facts of the present case clearly reveal and establish that the judgment and decree dated 10.03.2016 was obtained by committing fraud on court, inasmuch as the plaintiff-petitioner had concealed material facts while contesting the suit and had deliberately not impleaded the respondent No.4 in the suit as defendant, though the land in suit was transferred in favour of the respondent No.4 by the original tenure holder by executing registered sale deeds after execution of alleged mortgage deed i.e. after 30.03.2004. His submission is that if any material fact is concealed for seeking any remedy or relief from a court of law, the same would amount to committing fraud on court. Drawing attention of the provision of Order 1 Rule 3 of the CPC, it has been argued on behalf of the respondent No.4 that all persons are to be joined in the suit where any right to relief in respect of any act or transaction is alleged to exist against such person/persons and that since on the basis of sale deeds executed by the original tenure holder, the respondent No.4 had become Bhumidher with transferable rights and her name was already recorded in the revenue records prior to institution of the suit, as such by not impleading the respondent No.4 as defendant, the plaintiff-petitioner has clearly committeed fraud on court. He has also stated that while filing of suit the current khatauni was not filed by the plaintiff-petitioner which amounted to concealment of the material fact. His submission, in sum and substance, is that respondent No.4 has fully established that the judgment and decree dated 10.03.2016 was obtained by fraud. 16. Lastly, learned counsel for the respondent No.4 has stated that in any case by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 10.03.2016, since the learned trial court has restored the suit, the petitioner-plaintiff will have ample opportunity to contest his claim and lead evidence afresh and hence by orders impugned in this petition, no prejudice is going to be caused to the petitioner. 17. I have considered the competing arguments made on behalf of the learned counsel representing the respective parties and have also gone through the record of the writ petition. 18. The only question, which needs determination in this case, is as to whether the learned trial court could or could not have set aside the judgment and decree dated 10.03.2016 in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction vested in it under Section 151 of the CPC. The law in this regard is very well settled. Ordinarily for setting aside a decree, if it is an experte decree, the remedy available to the person aggrieved is to either invoke the provision of Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC or to file a separate suit claiming a relief for setting aside such decree. The law in this regard is very well settled. Ordinarily for setting aside a decree, if it is an experte decree, the remedy available to the person aggrieved is to either invoke the provision of Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC or to file a separate suit claiming a relief for setting aside such decree. Usually the inherent powers vested in a court under Section 151 of the CPC cannot be put to service to set aside a final judgment and decree for the reason that Section 151 of the CPC does not appear to be a substantive provision conferring any right to seek relief of any kind; rather it is procedural in nature which is available to a party to the proceedings to ensure that the proceedings of the suit are conducted in a manner consistent with equity and justice. This proposition has clearly been laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgement in the case of Ram Prakash Agarwal (supra), which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 19. However, having observed as above, I may refer to paragraph-9 of the said judgment, wherein it has clearly been held that in exceptional circumstances, inherent powers can be exercised by the court to set aside an ex parte decree in addition to the provision of Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC. Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly been laid down in the case of Ram Prakash Agarwal (supra) that an exparte decree passed on account of non-appearance of the counsel of a party, owing to the fact that the party was not at fault, can be set aside. It has also been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that in a situation where absence of a defendant is caused on account of a mistake of the Court, the application under Section 151 of the C.P.C. is maintainable. Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held that in the event an ex parte order has been obtained by fraud upon the court or by collusion, such application under Section 151 of the C.P.C. would be maintainable. Para-9 of the said judgment is extracted herein below : “9. In exceptional circumstances, the Court may exercise its inherent powers, apart from Order IX CPC to set aside an ex parte decree. Para-9 of the said judgment is extracted herein below : “9. In exceptional circumstances, the Court may exercise its inherent powers, apart from Order IX CPC to set aside an ex parte decree. An ex parte decree passed due to the non appearance of the counsel of a party, owing to the fact that the party was not at fault, can be set aside in an appeal preferred against it. So is the case, where the absence of a defendant is caused on account of a mistake of the Court. An application under Section 151 CPC will be maintainable, in the event that an ex parte order has been obtained by fraud upon the court or by collusion. The provisions of Order IX CPC may not be attracted, and in such a case the Court may either restore the case, or set aside the ex parte order in the exercise of its inherent powers. There may be an order of dismissal of a suit for default of appearance of the plaintiff, who was in fact dead at the time that the order was passed. Thus, where a Court employs a procedure to do something that it never intended to do, and there is miscarriage of justice, or an abuse of the process of Court, the injustice so done must be remedied, in accordance with the principle of actus curia neminem gravabitan act of the Court shall prejudice no person.” 20. In para-11 of the judgment in the case of Ram Prakash Agarwal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has cited another judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Indian Bank Vs. M/s. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., reported in AIR 1996 SC, 2592, wherein it was held that the fraud not only affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the court, but also amounts to abuse of the process of court and, thus, the court in exercise of its inherent powers, specially under Section 151, CPC can recall its judgment and order, if it is found to have been obtained by fraud upon the court. Para-11 of the said judgment in the case of Ram Prakash Agarwal (supra) is reproduced herein below: “11. Para-11 of the said judgment in the case of Ram Prakash Agarwal (supra) is reproduced herein below: “11. In Indian Bank v. M/s Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1996 SC 2592 , this Court dealt with a similar case and observed, that fraud not only affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the court, but that it also amounts to abuse of the process of court. The court further held, that “the judiciary in India also possesses inherent powers, specially under Section 151 CPC, to recall its judgment or order if the same has been obtained by fraud upon the court. In the case of fraud upon a party to the suit or proceedings, the court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud.” 21. Para-13 of the judgment in the case of Ram Prakash Agarwal (supra) is also extracted herein below: “13. In view of the above, the law on this issue stands crystalised to the effect that the inherent powers enshrined under Section 151 CPC can be exercised only where no remedy has been provided for in any other provision of the CPC. In the event that a party has obtained a decree or order by playing a fraud upon the court, or where an order has been passed by a mistake of the court, the court may be justified in rectifying such mistake, either by recalling the said order, or by passing any other appropriate order. However, inherent powers cannot be used in conflict of any other existing provision, or in case a remedy has been provided for by any other provision of the CPC. Moreover, in the event that a fraud has been played upon a party, the same may not be a case where inherent powers can be exercised.” 22. Summarizing the law on the issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para-20, in the case of Ram Prakash Agarwal (supra), has held as under: “20. Moreover, in the event that a fraud has been played upon a party, the same may not be a case where inherent powers can be exercised.” 22. Summarizing the law on the issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para-20, in the case of Ram Prakash Agarwal (supra), has held as under: “20. In view of the above, the legal issues involved herein, cannot be summarised as under : (i) An application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC cannot be filed by a person who was not initially a party to the proceedings; (ii) Inherent powers under Section 151 CPC can be exercised by the Court to redress only such a grievance, for which no remedy is provided for under the CPC ; (iii) In the event that an order has been obtained from the Court by playing fraud upon it, it is always open to the Court to recall the said order on the application of the person aggrieved, and such power can also be exercised by the appellate court ; (iv) Where the fraud has been committed upon a party, the court cannot investigate such a factual issue, and in such an eventuality, a party has the right to get the said judgment or order set aside, by filing an independent suit. (v) A person aggrieved may maintain an application before the Land Acquisition Collector for reference under Section 18 or 30 of the Act, 1894, but cannot make an application for impleadment or apportionment before the Reference Court.” 23. So far as the facts of the instant case are concerned, admittedly, the respondent No.4 was not impleaded as a defendant and as such in view of the conclusion drawn in Para20 (i) of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Prakash Agarwal (supra), the recourse to Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC was not available to the respondent No.4. In the said case itself Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held that in case a party approaching the court under Section 151 of the C.P.C. is able to establish that the judgment and order or decree complained against has been obtained by playing fraud on court, such an order or judgment or decree can be set aside in exercise of inherent powers by the Court. 24. 24. Reverting to the facts of this case, the sale deeds by the original tenure holder were executed in favour of the respondent No.4 prior to the institution of the suit. The suit was filed by the petitioner-plaintiff on 09.01.2007, whereas the sale deeds were executed in favour of the respondent No.4 on 07.06.2006 and 14.11.2006. It has also come on record that on the basis of the said sale deeds, name of the respondent No. 4 was also recorded in the relevant revenue records and as such at the time of filing of the suit on 09.01.2007, the respondent No.4 was a necessary party. Non-disclosure of execution of the sale deeds and that of recording of the name of the respondent No.4 in the relevant revenue records is nothing but suppression of material facts for which responsibility is to be saddled only on the party bringing any legal action by instituting a suit. If any material fact is concealed by any party bringing any legal action in any court of law and if such fact is so material that it has potential of not only of changing nature of the proceedings but also of changing of the result of the suit, such suppression, in my considered opinion, would amount to playing fraud on the court as well. 25. If an element of fraud is present in a given set of facts and circumstances of a case, every court is vested with inherent powers to set aside its order even without issuing notice. It is the duty of the court to protect the solemnity of its proceedings and in case of suppression of material facts, the purity and solemnity of such proceedings get polluted and vitiated. I am of the opinion that the moment any such factum of suppression of material fact or fraud played upon the court is brought to the notice of the court, there should not be any hesitation of any kind to take immediate action to set the proceedings right. It is the duty of the court to ensure that any fraud played upon it, is not allowed to succeed or perpetuate. 26. It is the duty of the court to ensure that any fraud played upon it, is not allowed to succeed or perpetuate. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner has attempted to defend impleadment of respondent No.4 in the suit on the ground that petitioner’s claim is confined to only half of the share of the land in question, as such there was no need of impleading respondent No.4 as defendant in the suit. The said submission does not appeal to the court. This Court also cannot loose sight of the fact that the petitioner had earlier instituted a regular suit before the Civil Court claiming his right in the property in suit on the basis of some agreement to sell. All these facts were neither pleaded in the plaint nor were brought on record of the suit during its pendency by the petitioner-plaintiff. Such an act on the part of the plaintiff-petitioner is nothing short of playing fraud upon the court and as such, learned trial court in this case has rightly exercised its inherent powers under Section 151 of the CPC. 27. Learned revisional court has also, thus, rightly not interfered with the order dated 30.08.2018, passed by the learned trial court. 28. For the reasons given above, I have no hesitation to hold that this petition lacks merit, which, resultantly, is dismissed. 29. However, learned trial court is directed to expedite the proceedings of the suit which stands restored under the order dated 30.08.2018 and conclude the same within maximum period of nine months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. 30. It is further directed that parties to the proceedings before the learned trial court shall not seek any unnecessary adjournments and adjournment, if prayed for, will be permissible to be granted by the learned Presiding Officer only in exceptional circumstances. 31. There will be no order as to costs.