JUDGMENT : 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 18.03.1997 passed by the respondent no. 2 –the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. II, Dhanbad in Reference No. 128 of 1996 under Section 10(1)(d) and 2(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whereby the reference has been answered in favour of the concerned workmen directing the management of Food Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as “FCI”), Patna to reinstate them and to regularize their services in Class-IV posts w.e.f 10.05.1990 with 75% of back wages. Further prayer has been made for quashing the Gazette Notification dated 31.03.1997 issued by the Desk Officer, Ministry of Labour, Government of India, New Delhi publishing the said award dated 18.03.1997. 2. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the concerned workmen were engaged by the management of FCI, Food Storage Depot, Chandauti under the District Manager, FCI, Gaya from May 1989 as casual workers to perform the job of casual employees, however, they were stopped from doing the work from 10.05.1990. The sponsoring Union raised the claim for regularization and back wages of the concerned workmen and when the conciliation failed, the dispute was referred by the appropriate government to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2, Dhanbad vide Reference No. 128 of 1996 having the following terms of the reference: “Whether the action of the management of Food Corporation of India, Patna retrenching the services of S/Sh. Sashi Shankar and 20 others (list enclosed) is justified and legal? If not, what relief the concerned workmen are entitled to?” 3. The learned Tribunal passed the award dated 18.03.1997 in favour of the concerned workmen and directed the petitioner to reinstate and regularize them in service in Class-IV post with effect from 10.05.1990 i.e., the date of their retrenchment from work with 75% of back wages within two months from the date of publication of the award which gives rise to filing of the present writ petition. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner-management submits that there was no legal evidence or any cogent material to support the claim of the concerned workmen, however, the learned Tribunal passed the award in favour of the concerned workmen. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner-management submits that there was no legal evidence or any cogent material to support the claim of the concerned workmen, however, the learned Tribunal passed the award in favour of the concerned workmen. It is further submitted that while rendering the award, the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that there was nothing on record to show the relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and the concerned workmen. The concerned workmen were never engaged by the management and there was absolutely no evidence in support of the claim of engagement made by the concerned workmen. The learned Tribunal while passing the impugned award has given much weightage to Ext. W-3 which is an attendance register filed on behalf of the workmen, however, the same is a forged document and was non-existence in the office of the management. It is further submitted that the alleged attendance register brought on record before the learned Tribunal by the concerned workmen was shown to have been endorsed by the depot In-charge who was a Class-III employee and had got no authority to make endorsement on the attendance of any employee or workmen. It is also submitted that the said signature of the Depot In-charge has also not been authenticated and thus has no evidentiary value. The said document has been created in collusion with the interested persons only for the purpose of managing back door entry in the employment of the Corporation which is an instrumentality of the Government of India. It is further submitted that the concerned workmen had stated before the Assistant Labour Commissioner that they were employed by the management in December, 1988 and in March, 1989 but in the written statement filed before the Tribunal, they have stated that they were engaged by the Management in May, 1989 which contradicts and falsifies the claim of the concerned workmen. It is also submitted that Ext. W-1 (the letter dated 13.05.1996) carries no evidentiary value as without knowing any fact of engagement of the concerned workmen, the District Manager ordered for tracing out the records, if any, and thus the said letter is irrelevant. Further, from Ext. W-2, it would be evident that the concerned workmen were not even engaged by the contractor during the period 1988-89. Further, from Ext. W-2, it would be evident that the concerned workmen were not even engaged by the contractor during the period 1988-89. It is thus submitted that the learned Tribunal has no jurisdiction to direct for regularization of the concerned workmen contrary to the established procedure of public appointment. The learned Tribunal got misdirected in law in making the award for payment of 75% of back wages since 10.05.1990, though there was nothing on record to suggest that the concerned workmen were ever engaged in the alleged depot and were at work. The petitioner has duly complied the order dated 05.08.1999 passed by this Court and has been paying the wages to the concerned workmen as were payable to the casual labourers at the relevant time. It is also submitted that the concerned workmen are being paid wages at the rate fixed according to the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 and on that basis, the payment has been made to the concerned workmen from 06.04.1998 to September 1999 and further payments are being made month to month to each of the 21 workmen individually on the same basis and the same are being received by them. The Food Corporation of India prescribes pay scale for its regular employees but the casual labourers are paid wages according to the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 in terms with relevant notification of concerned State, thus the claim of the concerned workmen for payment of equal wages to that of the regular employee is not tenable. 5. On the contrary, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent no. 3 submits that for the similar relief, one writ petition being CWJC No. 4986 of 1994(R) was filed by the management in the High Court of Judicature at Patna, Ranchi Bench against the award passed in favour of the workmen, which was finally dismissed by upholding the award of regularisation. It is further submitted that the impugned award has been passed after considering all the evidence available on record. It has been specifically held by the learned Tribunal that the retrenchment of the concerned workman was ab-initio void w.e.f 10.05.1990 without issuing any notice or paying compensation to them by the management and thus the direction for payment of 75% back wages with other benefits has been issued. There was sufficient evidence including the attendance register i.e., Ext. It has been specifically held by the learned Tribunal that the retrenchment of the concerned workman was ab-initio void w.e.f 10.05.1990 without issuing any notice or paying compensation to them by the management and thus the direction for payment of 75% back wages with other benefits has been issued. There was sufficient evidence including the attendance register i.e., Ext. W-3 in support of the claim of concerned workmen and the admissibility of the said attendance register was never questioned by the management before the learned Tribunal. Moreover, in such similar circumstance, the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Patna, Ranchi Bench dismissed CWJC No. 1195 of 1991(R) on 01.07.1991. It is further submitted that since the admissibility of the attendance register was never questioned before the learned Tribunal, now the management is estopped from raising that issue before this Court at this stage. The finding so made in the award is final in nature and the writ court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not supposed to act as an Appellate Court so as to interfere with the finding of fact arrived by the learned Tribunal. It is also submitted that in the year 1989, one of the concerned workmen namely, Sri Jitendra Sharma was paid Rs. 60/- per day and he had received Rs. 1530/- for 25½ days as his monthly payment in respect of the wages of August 1989 prior to the interim order, however, the concerned workmen were being paid Rs. 507/- per month which was in violation of the condition of stay granted by this Court vide order dated 05.08.1999. It is further submitted that the impugned award has in fact been implemented after the order dated 12.05.2000 passed in MJC No. 371 of 2000(R), vide office order dated 10/17.11.2000 issued by Sr. Regional Manager, Regional Office, FCI, Patna and corrigendum order dated 27.11.2000 issued by the Regional Manager, FCI, Patna, thus there is no scope to realize or recover the amount from the concerned workmen paid long back in the year 2000 and after payment of 75% of the back wages from 10.05.1990 to 18.03.1997 and thereafter, full wages of Category IV. There is no scope to realize or recover the amount from the concerned workmen after implementation of the award even in case any adverse order is passed in this case. There is no scope to realize or recover the amount from the concerned workmen after implementation of the award even in case any adverse order is passed in this case. It is also submitted that the petitioner-management has made a wrong statement before this Court so far as sanctioned posts are concerned only to mislead this Court. On perusal of the statement showing existing vacancy as on 30.06.2000 and 30.06.2006, it would be evident that there were total 873 and 359 sanctioned posts of Watchmen on the respective dates, out of which 171 and 331 vacant post were still existing on the aforesaid dates respectively. Thus, total 395 Class-IV posts were still vacant as on 30.06.2006. As such, the plea of the management that the post on which the concerned workmen were working and were being paid the current wages were un-sanctioned is not correct, rather far from the truth. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The petitioner-management has challenged the order of the Industrial Tribunal, whereby it has been directed to regularize the concerned workmen with 75% back wages. The learned Tribunal has held that the concerned workmen were stopped from work w.e.f 10.05.1990 without issuing any notice or paying compensation as provided under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It has further been held that the attendance register i.e., Ext. W-3 proved the working of the concerned workmen for 240 days in the FCI. Though the management filed Ext. M-7 i.e., the attendance sheet of the contractor and tried to make out a case that they were working under the contractors, the said fact has not been proved by producing any witness in evidence. The learned Tribunal has further observed that in the similar situation, the Tribunal had earlier passed the award of regularization of the workmen which was also affirmed by the Patna High Court and finally, the award has been implemented. 7. This Court while granting stay in the matter vide order dated 05.08.1999, had directed the petitioner-management to pay full wages last drawn by the concerned workmen including any maintenance allowance admissible to them under any rule. Thereafter, the petitioner started making payment of Rs. 507/- per month to the concerned workmen claiming that they were entitled only to the minimum wages. Thereafter, the petitioner started making payment of Rs. 507/- per month to the concerned workmen claiming that they were entitled only to the minimum wages. However, the said payment was objected by the concerned workmen claiming that the last wages drawn by them was Rs. 60/- per day and as such, they were being paid less wages in complete violation of the order of this Court and filed M.J.C Case No. 371 of 2000(R) which was disposed of on 12.05.2000 by holding that if the management fails to comply the conditions of the order dated 05.08.1999 within a period of two weeks, the order of stay would automatically be vacated and the concerned workmen would be entitled to take all the legal steps for implementation of the award. Thereafter, the petitioner-management acted in compliance of Sr. Regional Manager, FCI, Patna office order no. Estt.30 (88)/94-Vol. II dated 10/17.11.2000 and issued office order no. Estt. 10(C/L-cum-Class-IV)/2000/1927 dated 24/26.11.2000 under the signature of the District Manager (I/C), District Office, FCI, Gaya, thus implemented the award by reinstating the concerned workmen and paying 75% of back wages from 10.05.1990 to 18.03.1997 and thereafter full wages of Category IV, however, the same was made subject to the final outcome of the present writ petition. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner-management has given stress to the argument that Ext. W-3 i.e., the attendance register filed on behalf of the concerned workmen is a forged document and the learned Tribunal erroneously relied upon the said document while passing the impugned award. 9. In the case of “Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar Vs. Paschim Gujarat Vij Co. Ltd.”, reported in (2014) 6 SCC 434 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: 15. We find the judgment and award of the Labour Court well-reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The High Court has erred in its exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul the findings of the Labour Court in its award as it is well settled law that the High Court cannot exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate court or re-appreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court. Only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record and given a well-reasoned order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the award of the Labour Court was based on sound and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of justice. 10. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not supposed to sit in appeal over the award of the Labour Court/Tribunal and to re-appreciate the evidence. It is only when there appears serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, the High Court under the power of superintendence, can interfere with the award of the industrial adjudicator. 11. In the present case, the petitioner-management did not raise any objection before the Industrial Tribunal with respect to the admissibility of Ext. W-3 and the same was taken on record without any objection, thus any contention as to the veracity of Ext. W-3 cannot be entertained under the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The learned Tribunal after appreciation of the evidence on record came to a concrete finding that the concerned workmen had worked under the petitioner for 240 days and admittedly, they were stopped from doing work without compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 12. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent no. 3 has contended that the similarly situated persons have been regularized by the petitioner-management in view of the orders passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna, Ranchi Bench. The said contention has neither been controverted by the petitioner-management nor has distinguished the case of the concerned workmen as against those persons. 13. The said orders were passed during 1998 to 2000 and much water has flown since then. The said contention has neither been controverted by the petitioner-management nor has distinguished the case of the concerned workmen as against those persons. 13. The said orders were passed during 1998 to 2000 and much water has flown since then. The issue with regard to claim of the persons seeking employment, absorption, regularization or permanent continuance, temporary employment, contractual or casual engagement, appointment on daily wages or adhoc basis has been considered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of “Secretary, State of Karnataka Vs. Umadevi (3)” reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 , holding as follows: “Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment do not acquire any right. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post.” 14. In the case of “Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Ashok Ranghba Ambre” reported in (2008) 2 SCC 717 , it is held as under: 11. To us, however, the learned counsel for the appellant-Corporation is right in submitting that setting aside an action of termination of services being violative of Section 25F of the Act does not necessarily follow that the workman must be held entitled to the benefits claimed by him in the writ petition, namely, status of permanency and claim of regular pay scales and other benefits based on permanency. In our judgment, two things are distinct, different and operate in different areas. In Reference proceedings, the question before the Industrial Tribunal as also before the High Court was whether termination of services of the workman was in consonance with law. In our judgment, two things are distinct, different and operate in different areas. In Reference proceedings, the question before the Industrial Tribunal as also before the High Court was whether termination of services of the workman was in consonance with law. Once it was held that there was breach of Section 25F of the Act, it necessarily followed that the order of termination was in violation of law and direction was required to be issued in the form of reinstatement of the workman. The said order was, therefore, confirmed by the High Court. But in our considered opinion, in the proceedings before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution as to permanency and other benefits on that basis, the writ petitioner could not contend that since the action of termination of his services was held to be illegal and he was ordered to be reinstated by Industrial Tribunal and the said Award was confirmed by the High Court, ipso facto, he ought to be treated as permanent employee of the Corporation and must be held entitled to the benefits claimed in the writ petition. To that extent, therefore, the order passed by the High Court is not in consonance with law. 15. In the case of “Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Haryana” reported in 2010(3) SCC 786 , it has been held as under: “In Ramesh Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court has clearly held that retrenchment should be in accordance with law and in case of termination in contravention of the provisions of Section 25-F of the Act of 1947, the workman would be entitled for reinstatement and he would not be entitled for regularization. It was observed as under: - "We are conscious of the fact that an appointment on public post cannot be made in contravention of recruitment rules and constitutional scheme of employment. However, in view of the materials placed before the Labour Court and in this Court, we are satisfied that the said principle would not apply in the case on hand. As rightly pointed out, the appellant has not prayed for regularization but only for reinstatement with continuity of service for which he is legally entitled to. It is to be noted in the case of termination of casual employee what is required to be seen is whether a workman has completed 240 days in the preceding 12 months or not. As rightly pointed out, the appellant has not prayed for regularization but only for reinstatement with continuity of service for which he is legally entitled to. It is to be noted in the case of termination of casual employee what is required to be seen is whether a workman has completed 240 days in the preceding 12 months or not. If sufficient materials are shown that the workman has completed 240 days then his service cannot be terminated without giving notice or compensation in lieu of it in terms of Section 25-F. The High Court failed to appreciate that in the present case appellant has completed 240 days in the preceding 12 months and no notice or compensation in lieu of it was given to him, in such circumstances his termination was illegal. All the decisions relied on by the High Court are not applicable to the case on hand more particularly, in view of the specific factual finding by the Labour Court.” 16. It is now well settled that merely by the fact that any causal employee has worked for 240 days in the preceding 12 calendar months, is not entitled for regularization. However, if he has been terminated without any notice or compensation in lieu of the same as provided under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, he would be entitled for reinstatement and not regularization. 17. Nevertheless, the fact of the case reveals that on filing of the present writ petition, the operation of the impugned order was ordered to be stayed with a specific direction to the petitioner to pay the last drawn wages to the concerned workmen. However, the petitioner violated the said order and paid the less wages which led to filing of the contempt case being M.J.C No. 371 of 2000(R), wherein a specific direction was given on 12.05.2000 that if the management fails to fulfill the conditions of the order dated 05.08.1999 within a period of two weeks from that day, the order of stay will automatically vacate. Even after the order passed in M.J.C case, the petitioner failed to comply the same and thus the order of stay got automatically vacated. The petitioner, finding no way, complied the impugned award. Thus, the entire circumstance reflects that it is only the petitioner who was at fault in getting the order of stay vacated. Even after the order passed in M.J.C case, the petitioner failed to comply the same and thus the order of stay got automatically vacated. The petitioner, finding no way, complied the impugned award. Thus, the entire circumstance reflects that it is only the petitioner who was at fault in getting the order of stay vacated. Had the petitioner paid the last drawn wages to the concerned workmen in terms with the condition of stay, the present situation would not have arisen. The concerned workmen have been availing the benefits of the impugned award for more than 18 years and if the said position is changed at this stage, it would cause great hardship to the concerned workmen without any fault on their part. 18. In view of the peculiar fact of the present case, though the award of the learned Tribunal particularly to the extent of regularization of the concerned workmen does not appear to be tenable, yet I refrain from interfering with the impugned award under the aforesaid exceptional circumstance. 19. The writ petition is dismissed with aforesaid observations. I.A. No. 779 of 2000(R) and I.A. No. 878 of 2000(R) also stand disposed of accordingly.