JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent represented in person through its proprietor. 2. This is an appeal under Section 39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1940 by the defendant/opposite party/appellant herein. Pursuant to the order of Calcutta High Court, an Advocate of Orissa High Court Shri M. M. Bhattacharya was appointed as an Arbitrator by the order of Managing Director of the appellant-Company on the request of claimant for adjudication of the dispute. Claimant was awarded work for construction of 5 Blocks of Hostels on 7th December, 1989 to be completed within 9 months and 15 days i.e., 22nd September, 1990 for an estimated value of Rs. 30,79,695.94. With consent of the parties, additional work for 2 Blocks was awarded by order dated 10th March, 1990 for a sum of Rs.12,37,990.37 with a completion date of 10th December, 1990. Work value came to Rs. 50,47,233.06. Due to some modification in the work, completion period of first 5 Blocks was extended up to 22nd October, 1990 and subsequent work was to be completed by 10th January, 1991. Completion period was further extended till 7th December, 1990 & 25th February, 1991 respectively. Further extension was granted till 30th June, 1991 & 14th September, 1991 respectively. Lastly, extension of time for completion of work was granted till 30th September, 1992 with a condition that if it is not completed, the work order would be cancelled. Appellant chose to foreclose the agreement on 1st June, 1992 invoking the relevant Clause of Agreement. Appellant chose to invoke the Bank Guarantee submitted by the claimant as well, of a value of Rs. 6,57,950/- given under Work Order No. 190. Before learned Arbitrator, claimant raised 15 claims while defendant/appellant herein raised a counter claim on 3 items. Learned Arbitrator by Award dated 9th October, 1995 allowed the following claims of claimant with interest as against Item Nos. 1, 6, 10, 15 and 16 respectively for the period indicated in the Chart below as also items No. 3, 5, 7 & 8, 11 & 13 and 12(d) without interest. “Claim No. 1: Rs. 4547.40 with 17% interest from 2.6.92 to 9.10.95. Claim No. 6 : Rs. 1,02,006.45 with 17% interest from 2.6.92 to 9.10.95 Claim No. 10: Rs. 6,57,950.00 with 23.25% interest from 25.2.93 to 9.10.95. Claim No. 15: Rs. 1,550.00 with 17% interest from 2.6.92 to 9.10.95. “Claim No. 1: Rs. 4547.40 with 17% interest from 2.6.92 to 9.10.95. Claim No. 6 : Rs. 1,02,006.45 with 17% interest from 2.6.92 to 9.10.95 Claim No. 10: Rs. 6,57,950.00 with 23.25% interest from 25.2.93 to 9.10.95. Claim No. 15: Rs. 1,550.00 with 17% interest from 2.6.92 to 9.10.95. Claim No. 16: Rs. 42,787.91 with 17% interest from 2.6.92 to 9.10.95.” First item of counterclaim of defendant/appellant herein for a sum of Rs. 1,67,095/- was awarded in their favour @ 17% per annum for the period 27th May, 1992 to 9th October, 1995. Rest of the two items of counter claim were rejected. 3. Claimant filed an application before learned Court of Sub Judge,-I, Ghatshila for making the Award a Rule of the Court i.e. Title Suit No. 9 of 1998. Objections were raised by the defendant/opposite party/appellant herein. By order dated 9th May, 2003, the Award was made Rule of the Court with interest of 18% post award till the date of payment. This is under challenge by the Corporation in the present appeal. 4. At the outset, learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that 50% awarded amount has been deposited by virtue of the interim order passed in this appeal. Counterclaim has been awarded in favour of the appellant as well with interest @ 17%. per annum. There are three or four major items out of 16, awarded by the Arbitrator which are main bone of contention such as Item Nos. 6, 10 and 16. Other contention is in relation to award of interest @ 17% per annum in respect of Item Nos. 6, 15, 16 and @ 23.25% against Item no. 10 relating to encashment of Bank Guarantee. Learned counsel for the appellant has also painstakingly tried to question the dates from which the interest has been awarded i.e. with effect from 2nd June, 1992, under those items, except under Item no. 10 i.e. with effect from 25th February, 1993 i.e., the date of invocation of Bank Guarantee. Next contention of the appellant is in relation to adjudication of claim under Item no. 10 relating to encashment of Bank Guarantee by the Corporation after foreclosure of the agreement. According to the appellant, Bank Guarantee was unconditional and irrevocable. The beneficiary i.e., Corporation had all the rights to invoke it which the Bank was obliged to honour. Next contention of the appellant is in relation to adjudication of claim under Item no. 10 relating to encashment of Bank Guarantee by the Corporation after foreclosure of the agreement. According to the appellant, Bank Guarantee was unconditional and irrevocable. The beneficiary i.e., Corporation had all the rights to invoke it which the Bank was obliged to honour. This claim was also unconnected with the scope of the reference. These grounds have not been duly considered by Sub Judge-I, Ghatshila though they established a misconduct on the part of the Arbitrator. Other grounds have also been urged to question each of the items awarded and upheld by learned court below. Learned counsel for the appellant has also questioned the award of interest post decree @ 18% by the learned Sub Judge-I, Ghatshila, perhaps, being influenced by the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, though the reference was under the Act of 1940. The same is also not proper in the eye of law. 5. On the other hand, claimant/respondent appearing In Person has contested the grounds on the following submissions. Relying upon a judgment of Orissa High Court reported in AIR 1981 ORISSA 188 in the case of Union of India vs. M/s. Builders Union, it has been submitted that unless there is a specific Clause in the Agreement prohibiting award of interest the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to award interest from the due date of payment till the date of the award. The award of interest on certain items has therefore been strongly defended. In support of the submissions, reliance is placed on a judgment of Calcutta High Court in the case of Sankari Prasad Kundu Vs. Union of India and others [AIR 1987 Calcutta 53] rendered in a case under the Arbitration Act, 1940 on the jurisdiction of Arbitrator to award interest. Respondent has argued that the appellant has miserably failed to show any error apparent on the face of the Award to invite interference. Learned Arbitrator has passed a well reasoned Award on each of the claims. Therefore, appellant has not been able to show that the learned Arbitrator has misconducted himself in passing the Award. 6. Contention of the parties on each of the claims have been duly considered while passing the Award. Learned Arbitrator has passed a well reasoned Award on each of the claims. Therefore, appellant has not been able to show that the learned Arbitrator has misconducted himself in passing the Award. 6. Contention of the parties on each of the claims have been duly considered while passing the Award. The foreclosure of the agreement before the stipulated date of completion of the work has been held against Corporation as a breach of terms and conditions of agreement. The claimant had executed about 66% of the work and three months were still left to complete the balance work. Therefore, under different items, including escalation; illegal encashment of Bank Guarantee and retention of machinery and plant, delay in payment of final bills etc., the claims have been awarded. Learned arbitrator has consciously rejected some of the claims of the claimant also. As such, there has been no bias in the adjudicatory process which could show any misconduct on the part of the Arbitrator. Learned Trial Court has also taken into account all the objections raised by the opposite party/appellant herein and dealt with each one of them with proper reasons. Learned Court did not find any ground to interfere in the well reasoned Award whereunder a total amount of Rs. 17,40,153.21 was awarded against a claim of about Rs. 44 Lakhs. Learned Court also had jurisdiction to award interest post decree while passing the impugned order. Since it is a money claim, the interest is awarded to protect the value which the awarded amount would have earned over a period of time till it is paid. As such, the award of interest is also not susceptible to be interfered. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to Section 29 of the Old Act of 1940 which provides for interest on award. He submits that the Court while passing the decree may award interest at such rate which it deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum as adjudged by the award and confirmed by the decree. In this case, the interest post decree @ 18% is on the total awarded amount which contains both principal amount as well as interest component. The post decretal interest awarded by learned court amounts to award of interest over the interest component also which renders the impugned order passed by learned Sub Judge, I, Ghatshila, vulnerable on that count. 8. In this case, the interest post decree @ 18% is on the total awarded amount which contains both principal amount as well as interest component. The post decretal interest awarded by learned court amounts to award of interest over the interest component also which renders the impugned order passed by learned Sub Judge, I, Ghatshila, vulnerable on that count. 8. I have considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties and gone through the impugned order as also the Award rendered by learned Arbitrator being part of the Lower Court Records. 9. As described above, claimant had raised 16 claims. Learned Arbitrator proceeded to deal with each of them, accepting some of them with interest while rejecting against other items. Claim No. 1 was for a sum of Rs. 7776.00 for supply and fixing of 30 X 30 angle iron frames for cup-boards which did not find place in the schedule of the contract. According to the claimant, these were purchased from open market at a particular rate which comes to Rs. 7776/-. This was objected to by the defendant. However, upon discussion of the contention of the parties, learned Arbitrator awarded an amount of Rs. 4,547.40 P. together with interest @ 17% per annum from 2nd June, 1992 till the date of Award. Claim no. 2 was for a sum of Rs. 6,000/- for expenditure incurred by him in providing wash basins with rim. In view of the quotation given by the claimant to fix wash basins as per the specification given in the map, learned Arbitrator found no reason to entertain such claim and it was rejected. Claim No. 3 was for a sum of Rs. 89,600/- on account of materials lying at the site at the time of closure of the work. After detailed discussion of the contention of the parties, learned Arbitrator held the claimant entitled to a sum of Rs. 14,921.85 but without any interest. Claim No. 4 was for a sum of Rs. 75,000/- towards advances paid to suppliers for supply of materials and labour/skilled workers. According to the complainant, advances were paid to the suppliers for supply of materials for completion of contracted works and as the contract was unceremoniously foreclosed, he was not a position to get back such amount from the suppliers. 75,000/- towards advances paid to suppliers for supply of materials and labour/skilled workers. According to the complainant, advances were paid to the suppliers for supply of materials for completion of contracted works and as the contract was unceremoniously foreclosed, he was not a position to get back such amount from the suppliers. This was refuted by the defendant relying upon Clause-39 of the contract which did not provide payment for any such compensation towards advances. Claimant could not produce any money receipt in proof. Therefore, this claim was rejected. Claim No. 5 was for a sum of Rs. 2,95,000/- towards expenditure incurred for construction of temporary accommodation at site to execute the contract. Claimant justified it as necessary for providing accommodation to the staff for carrying out the execution of the work. He also stressed that he was not allowed to move any of the materials after the contract was foreclosed and therefore the respondent was bound to take over materials left by him and pay compensation. This was refuted by the defendant and a joint inspection was agreed. Local inspection and measurement was made by Sri S. Sircar and the claimant also accepted such measurement. In terms of Clause-39 1(b) (i) the contractor was held entitled to receive compensation on that score. Accordingly, a sum of Rs. 1,93,328/- was awarded after deducting a reasonable depreciation towards wear and tear of those constructions. Claim No. 6 was for a sum of Rs. 6,68,282.64 due to escalation payable as per agreement after April, 1991 till the date of foreclosure of work on the basis of Clause-8 of the contract. Claimant relied upon the minutes of meeting dated 26th March, 1992 whereunder extension was given to him for all the blocks which did not exclude claim of escalation charge. He also relied upon another letter dated 23rd September, 1991. Perusal of the final bill showed that escalation charges had been paid to him till April, 1991 for all the Blocks. Learned Arbitrator found that the contract was foreclosed on 1st June, 1992 as was indicated in letter dated 25th April, 1992 on the basis of price index as on 30th April, 1991. As such, an amount of Rs. 1,02,006.45 together with interest @ 17% per annum from 2nd June, 1992 till the date of Award was granted. Claim Nos. 7 & 8 was for a sum of Rs. As such, an amount of Rs. 1,02,006.45 together with interest @ 17% per annum from 2nd June, 1992 till the date of Award was granted. Claim Nos. 7 & 8 was for a sum of Rs. 4,00,000/- on account of heavy loss suffered due to unilateral closure of works. Rs. 78,875/- (as referred to in the Award) towards emoluments paid to staff and workers during that period. Claimant alleged breach of contract on the part of the Respondent-UCIL in arbitrary manner by closing down the work by letter dated 2nd June, 1992. Details of the work awarded to him with extension granted from time to time and the stipulated period of completion being 31st September, 1992 were also argued in support. Learned Arbitrator found that Respondent-UCIL had extended the period for completion of work on being satisfied about the hindrances caused in the progress of work due to disturbance of local people and labour problems. Accordingly, he was of the opinion that the allegation of the respondent that the claimant had defaulted in progress of the work which necessitated in unilateral closure of the work had no basis and was unacceptable. Contention of the Corporation that claimant could not have completed the works to the tune of Rs. 3 Lakhs at best till 30th September, 1992 after the date of foreclosure were found to be based on mere assumption. Contractor had admittedly done work for the value of Rs. 34 Lakhs and balance work of Rs. 15 Lakhs and odds were to be completed within the extended period. Perusal of letter dated 2nd June, 1992 showed that direction was issued to stop all works from morning of 2nd June, 1992 and measurement was to be taken for the works done till 1st June, 1992. Learned Arbitrator upon consideration of the terms of the agreement and the materials on record including the submission of rival parties held that requirement of Clause-39 of the contract had not been complied. Although, the Clause did not provide for any specific time for issue of notice regarding closure of the work, yet prior notice before a reasonable period must have been given for a stoppage of the work particularly when the claimant had brought in all the resources at his command to complete the work by 30th September, 1992. Although, the Clause did not provide for any specific time for issue of notice regarding closure of the work, yet prior notice before a reasonable period must have been given for a stoppage of the work particularly when the claimant had brought in all the resources at his command to complete the work by 30th September, 1992. In that view of the matter, respondents could not take resort to Clause-39 of the contract to block the contractor’s claim for damages. As per letter dated 2nd June, 1992, although the contractor was directed to complete certain unfinished item of work yet joint measurement was directed in respect of works done till 5 p.m of 1st June, 1992. Subsequently, the Corporation vide its letter dated 6th July, 1992 stopped the works required to be completed vide letter dated 2nd June, 1992. Therefore, learned Arbitrator held that the claimant even on a conservative estimate would have earned gross profit of 8% & 3% on overheads if he would have been allowed to execute the balance work of Rs. 15,93,846.43. Claim No. 8 had to be considered in that context. Based on the detailed discussion, an amount of Rs. 1,75,323.10 was awarded under Claim Nos. 7 & 8. Claim No. 9 was for a sum of Rs. 2,16,000/- as interest paid to various institutions for non-payment of dues by UCIL. However, learned Arbitrator did not find any merit in such claim and rejected it. Claim No. 10 was for a sum of Rs. 9,47,448/- for unlawful encashment of Bank Guarantee by the respondent-UCIL after closure of the work. Learned Arbitrator took into account the contention of the Corporation that no claim in respect of the decline work done by the contractor earlier and revocation and encashment of Bank Guarantee towards some fictitious claim of UCIL would fall in the scope and purview of Clause-51 of the contract. Learned Arbitrator on reading of the said Clause opined that UCIL can realize overpayments or claims relating to this contract from the contractor which had become due or may become due to him and such amount could also be adjusted from deposits made under other contracts. Clause-51.3 specifically provided that such right can be exercised by the Corporation within a period of two years from the date of communication of minus final bill or payment of final bill to the contractor. Clause-51.3 specifically provided that such right can be exercised by the Corporation within a period of two years from the date of communication of minus final bill or payment of final bill to the contractor. Claimant stated that the decline work was completed in November, 1989 and final bill was submitted within three months thereof with the certificate that the contractor had done work as per specification and there was no outstanding due against the contractor. When representative of the Corporation was asked to produce final bill and M.B of the decline work, for reasons best known to him he chose not to file the same or produce copy thereof before the Arbitrator. Learned Arbitrator also found that Corporation had not initiated any proceeding against M/s. METATI for claim of realization of any of their dues from the contractor. On the other hand, it was submitted that the other case pending before learned Arbitrator Mr. Karwalkar on the claims made by the claimant, UCIL had made counter claims only. Added to it the security deposit and advances to the tune of about Rs. 8 Lakhs in the form of Bank Guarantee furnished by M/s. Meteti had already been released in favour of the contractor on the completion of the work and maintenance period. Relying upon the judgment of Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry, [ AIR 1974 S.C 1265 ], learned Arbitrator held that a claim for unliquidated damages does not give rise to a debt until the liability is adjudicated and damaged assessed by the decree or orders of a Court or other adjudicatory authority like the Arbitrator. In view of the factual and legal position, learned Arbitrator had reasons to hold that the action of UCIL is revoking and encashing Bank Guarantee furnished by the claimant in respect of Decline case was completely illegal and arbitrary and unsustainable under Clause-51 of the agreement. As such, the claimant was entitled to get back the aforesaid amount of Bank Guarantee worth of Rs. 6,57,950/- with interest @ 23.25% over the said amount with effect from 25th February, 1993 i.e., the date from which the Bank had charged interest at the said rate till the date of Award. Learned Arbitrator considered the Claim Nos. 11 & 13 relating to a sum of Rs. 6,57,950/- with interest @ 23.25% over the said amount with effect from 25th February, 1993 i.e., the date from which the Bank had charged interest at the said rate till the date of Award. Learned Arbitrator considered the Claim Nos. 11 & 13 relating to a sum of Rs. 8 Lakhs for unlawful detention and confinement of equipment and machinery at the work site after foreclosure. After detailed consideration of the rival claims and in view of the findings recorded by it earlier, came to an opinion that non-utilization of the machineries detained by the UCIL and the depreciation of such machineries due to natural wear and tear entitled interest @ 9% per annum over the expected turnover of Rs. 20 Lakhs per year as just and equitable to compensate the claimant on this score. Accordingly, claimant was entitled to get Rs. 5,40,000 for three years from the respondent on that score. Claim No. 12 (a) (b) & (c) were rejected. Claim No. 12(b) was for a sum of Rs. 15,000/-. Claim No. 14 of Rs. 10,000/- was rejected. Claim No. 15 for a sum of Rs. 1550/-was allowed @ 17% from the date of foreclosure till the date of Award. It related to stresses for return of materials or the price taken from Contractor’s store by Mr. Srivastava, Assistant Engineer, at site. Item no. 16 for a sum of Rs. 1,66,261.91 was in respect of payment of final bill. This was allowed to the extent of Rs. 42,787.91@ 17% from the date of foreclosure i.e., from 2nd June, 1992 to 9th October, 1995. Learned Arbitrator undertook a detailed calculation to come to this amount also accounting for deductions/recoveries under different heads. This amount also carries interest @ 17% from 2nd June, 1992 till the date of Award. 10. Counter claim of the respondent was allowed on the balance mobilization advance of Rs. 1,67,095/- with interest @ 17% per annum from 27th May, 1992 till the date of Award. This is not under challenge by the claimant. 11. Individual claims allowed or rejected by learned Arbitrator were also discussed in detail by learned trial court while passing the impugned order. 12. Detailed consideration of the materials findings rendered by learned Arbitrator as upheld by learned Sub-Judge-I, Ghatshila have been undertaken to test the contention raised by the appellant. This is not under challenge by the claimant. 11. Individual claims allowed or rejected by learned Arbitrator were also discussed in detail by learned trial court while passing the impugned order. 12. Detailed consideration of the materials findings rendered by learned Arbitrator as upheld by learned Sub-Judge-I, Ghatshila have been undertaken to test the contention raised by the appellant. The scope of interference in Award at this stage under Section 39 (1)(iv) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is quite limited as held by the pronouncement of Apex Court from time to time. Appreciation of the material evidence considered by learned Arbitrator cannot be gone into unless the findings recorded thereupon are perverse in the eye of law. Construction of the terms and conditions of the agreement lie within the domain of the Arbitrator. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Harish Chandra and Company Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2016) 9 SCC 478 , paragraphs 23, 24, 25 and 26 as under: “23. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Allied Constructions, while examining the scope of Section 30 held as under: (SCC p. 398, para 4) “4…. The award is a speaking one. The arbitrator has assigned sufficient and cogent reasons in support thereof. Interpretation of a contract, it is trite, is a matter for the arbitrator to determine (see Suddarsan Trading Co. v. State of Kerala). Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 providing for setting aside an award is restrictive in its operation. Unless one or the other condition contained in Section 30 is satisfied, an award cannot be set aside. The arbitrator is a Judge chosen by the parties and his decision is final. The Court is precluded from reappraising the evidence. Even in a case where the award contains reasons, the interference herewith would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the court unless, of course, the reasons are totally perverse or the judgment is based on a wring proposition of law. An error apparent on the face of the records would not imply closer scrutiny of the merits of documents and materials on record. Once it is found that the view of the arbitrator is a plausible one, the court will refrain itself from interfering……” 24. An error apparent on the face of the records would not imply closer scrutiny of the merits of documents and materials on record. Once it is found that the view of the arbitrator is a plausible one, the court will refrain itself from interfering……” 24. S. Mukharji, J. as his Lordship then was, speaking for the Bench in Sudarsan Trading Co. v. State of Kerala., while examining the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 30 held as under: (SCC p. 39) “However, there is a distinction between disputes as to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and the disputes as to in what way that jurisdiction should be exercised. There may be a conflict as to the power of the arbitrator to grant a particular remedy. One has to determine the distinction between an error within the jurisdiction and an error in excess of the jurisdiction. The Court cannot substitute its own evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact to come to the conclusion that the arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the parties. Whether a particular amount was liable to be paid or damages liable to be sustained, was a decision within the competency of the arbitrator in this case. By purporting to construe the contract, the court could not take upon itself the burden of saying that this was contrary to the contract and, as such, beyond jurisdiction. If on a view taken of a contact, the decision of the arbitrator on certain amounts awarded, is a possible view though perhaps not the only correct view, the award cannot be examined by the court.” The aforesaid view was consistently followed in later decisions by this Court in State of A.P. v. R.V. Rayanim and Ravindra Kumar Gupta & Co. v. Union of India. 25. One cannot, therefore, dispute the legal proposition, which is now fairly settled keeping in view the aforementioned law laid down by this Court that an award can be set aside only on the grounds specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 30 of the 1940 Act and on no other grounds. Indeed this is clear from the opening words of Section 30 itself which starts with the words “An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds. Indeed this is clear from the opening words of Section 30 itself which starts with the words “An award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds. A fortiori, a reasoned award cannot be set aside unless it falls in any of the three clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 30 of the 1940 Act. 26. The grounds such as inadequacy of reasons in support of an award, error committed by the arbitrator on facts, alternate and/or more plausible view could be taken then what is taken by the arbitrator, improper appreciation of evidence done by the arbitrator in recording any finding, etc. are not the grounds on which any award much less a reasoned award can be set aside. In other words, none of these grounds can be made the foundation for setting aside the award because they do not fall within the four corners of any of the three sub-clauses of Section 30 of the 1940 Act.” 13. Perusal of the Award and the impugned order show that learned Arbitrator has come to a finding that the decision to foreclose the agreement about three months prior to its stipulated date of completion of work was arbitrary and not inconsonance with the terms and conditions of the agreement. Amounts awarded under escalation or under Claim Nos. 7, 8, 11, 13 and 15 are guided by these considerations. Learned Arbitrator had while adjudicating the claim under Claim No. 10 relating to encashsment of Bank Guarantee also been persuaded with these findings that foreclosure by the Corporation was arbitrary illegal and contrary to the terms and conditions of agreement. Encashment of Bank Guarantee, furnished by the claimant, was therefore not proper in the eye of law. Claimant was found to have suffered due to illegal encashment of Bank Guarantee though the breach was on the part of the Corporation. Bank had charged interest @ 23.25% upon the contractor on invocation of Bank Guarantee. This appears to be the basis to award interest at a rate of 23.25% from the date the Bank started charging interest till the date of decree. Interest @ 17% on four items i.e., 1, 6, 15 and 16 were awarded from 2nd June, 1992 i.e. the date of foreclosure apparently, for the reasons that the foreclosure was arbitrary and contrary to the terms of the agreement. 14. Interest @ 17% on four items i.e., 1, 6, 15 and 16 were awarded from 2nd June, 1992 i.e. the date of foreclosure apparently, for the reasons that the foreclosure was arbitrary and contrary to the terms of the agreement. 14. Jurisdiction of the learned Arbitrator to award pre-reference interest pendente lite interest and future interest is no longer res integra in view of the recent judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme in the case of Reliance Cellulose Products Limited Vs. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited [ (2018) 9 SCC 266 ], at Paragraph 24 thereof, it has been held in the following terms:- “24. A conspectus of the decisions that have been referred to above would show that under the 1940 Act, an arbitrator has power to grant pre-reference interest under the Interest Act, 1978 as well as pendente lite and future interest. However, he is constricted only by the fact that an agreement between the parties may contain an express bar to the award of pre-reference and/or pendente lite interest. Since interest is compensatory in nature and is parasitic upon a principal sum not having been paid in time, this Court has frowned upon clauses that bar the payment of interest. It has therefore evolved the test of strict construction of such clauses, and has gone on to state that unless there is a clear and express bar to the payment of interest that can be awarded by an arbitrator, clauses which do not refer to claims before the Arbitrators or disputes between parties and clearly bar payment of interest, cannot stand in the way of an arbitrator awarding pre-reference or pendente lite interest. Thus, when one contrasts a clause such as the clause in Second Ambica Construction Case with the clause in Tehri Hydro Development Corpn. Ltd., it becomes clear that unless a contractor agrees that no claim for interest will either be entertained or payable by the other party owing to dispute, difference, or misunderstandings between the parties or in respect of delay on the part of the engineer or in any other respect whatsoever, leading the Court to find an express bar against payment of interest, a clause which merely states that no interest will be payable upon amounts payable to the contractor under the contract would not be sufficient to bar an arbitrator from awarding pendente lite interest under the 1940 Act. As has been held in First Ambica Construction Case, the grant of pendente lite interest depends upon the phraseology used in the agreement, clauses conferring power relating to arbitration, the nature of claim and dispute referred to the Arbitrator, and on what items the power to award interest has been taken away and for which period. We hasten to add that the position as has been explained in some of the judgments above under Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act, is wholly different, inasmuch as Section 31(7) of the 1996 Act sanctifies agreements between the parties and states that the moment the agreement says otherwise, no interest becomes payable right from the date of the cause of action until the award is delivered.” 15. On none of the counts, therefore, this Court is persuaded to believe that the Arbitrator misconducted himself in awarding the claim. Award under each of the items is well reasoned and takes into account the contention of rival parties, the relevant terms of the agreement as well as materials adduced during the arbitration proceedings in respect thereof. Learned Sub-Judge-I, Ghatshila therefore did not find any error apparent on the face of the award or any misconduct on the part of Arbitrator to interfere in the matter on the specific grounds urged by the objector/appellant herein. However, there is no other rational basis showed in the impugned order to award interest @ 18% post decree. Apart from that, learned counsel for the appellant is right in saying that the post decretal interest @ 18% has erroneously been granted over the total sum which includes principal and interest component. Under 1940 Act, Section 29, the Court has the discretion to award interest at a reasonable rate from the date of decree to be paid on the principal sum as adjudged by the award and confirmed by the decree. Learned Sub Judge-I, Ghatshila therefore committed an error in law in awarding interest @ 18% over the adjudged amount i.e. both principal and interest taken together. As such, on this score, this Court is satisfied that the impugned order needs interference. There are no materials on record to show as to what was the prevalent rate of interest at the time the award was passed. In such circumstances, this Court is of the view that the principal amount i.e., Rs. As such, on this score, this Court is satisfied that the impugned order needs interference. There are no materials on record to show as to what was the prevalent rate of interest at the time the award was passed. In such circumstances, this Court is of the view that the principal amount i.e., Rs. 10,82,203.21 as adjudged under the award should carry interest @ 10% per annum from the date of decree till it is paid. 16. Accordingly, appeal stands partly allowed with the aforesaid modification in the impugned order.