JUDGMENT : 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the entire proceeding of SARFAESI Case No. 14/2018 including the order dated 12.06.2018 (Anneuxre-2 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent No.3 on the application filed under Section 14 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the SARFAESI Act, 2002’) to take physical possession of the residential house of the petitioners without determination of the issues on merit. 2. The factual background of the case, as stated in the writ petition, is that the petitioners had taken loan for construction of residential house from the respondent-Bank and the loan account subsequently became Non-Performing Assets (in short NPA). A notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI, Act, 2002 was issued to the petitioners on 19.03.2013 and thereafter the symbolic possession of the mortgaged property was taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Under the One Time Settlement (in short OTS) scheme, the petitioner was directed to deposit Rs.4,37,681/- till 31.03.2018 which according to the petitioners was not availed due to physical inability. In the meantime, the respondent-Bank filed an application under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 before the respondent No.3 which was registered as SARFAESI Case No. 14/2018 wherein a notice was issued to the petitioners. Thereafter, the petitioners approached the Bank and on assurance of the Bank that the loan account would be settled amicably under the OTS scheme, they did not turn up in the said SARFAESI case. Thus, the respondent No.3 vide order dated 12.06.2018, has directed the Bank to deposit the required amount through Nazir receipt for deputing the police force to take possession of the mortgaged property. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that though the Bank was ready to settle the loan account under the OTS scheme and the petitioners were also ready to deposit all the legitimate dues of the Bank, yet the steps are being taken for their dispossession from the property in question which shows arbitrariness on the part of the respondent-Bank. The respondent No.3 while passing the impugned order has also not satisfied himself as required under the provisions of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 4. The respondent No.3 while passing the impugned order has also not satisfied himself as required under the provisions of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank submits that the present wit petition is not maintainable either on facts or on law, as the petitioners have invoked the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court without taking recourse of alternative/efficacious/statutory remedy provided under the provisions of Sections 17 & 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and looking to the contents of the present writ petition, it appears that the petitioners have put challenge to the proceeding initiated under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 by the respondent No.3. The said step has been taken by the respondent No.3 in consequence of the notice issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 by the respondent-Bank which is appealable in nature. 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors. reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 , has held as under: “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.” 7. Further, in the case of Standard Chartered Bank Vs. V. Noble Kumar & Ors. reported in (2013) 9 SCC 620 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “27. The “appeal” under Section 17 is available to the borrower against any measure taken under Section 13(4). Taking possession of the secured asset is only one of the measures that can be taken by the secured creditor. V. Noble Kumar & Ors. reported in (2013) 9 SCC 620 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “27. The “appeal” under Section 17 is available to the borrower against any measure taken under Section 13(4). Taking possession of the secured asset is only one of the measures that can be taken by the secured creditor. Depending upon the nature of the secured asset and the terms and conditions of the security agreement, measures other than taking the possession of the secured asset are possible under Section 13(4). Alienating the asset either by lease or sale, etc. and appointing a person to manage the secured asset are some of those possible measures. On the other hand, Section 14 authorises the Magistrate only to take possession of the property and forward the asset along with the connected documents to the borrower (sic the secured creditor). Therefore, the borrower is always entitled to prefer an “appeal” under Section 17 after the possession of the secured asset is handed over to the secured creditor. Section 13(4)(a) declares that the secured creditor may take possession of the secured assets. It does not specify whether such a possession is to be obtained directly by the secured creditor or by resorting to the procedure under Section 14. We are of the opinion that by whatever manner the secured creditor obtains possession either through the process contemplated under Section 14 or without resorting to such a process obtaining of the possession of a secured asset is always a measure against which a remedy under Section 17 is available.” 8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of United Bank of India (Supra) and Standard Chartered Bank (Supra) has held that the proceeding under Section 14 is consequential action of Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Thus, the efficacious and effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person under Sections 17 & 18 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 9. So far as invoking of writ jurisdiction in the matters of realization of loan by the financial institutions are concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent judgment rendered in the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore & Anr. Vs. Mathew K.C. reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85 , while considering the earlier judicial pronouncements made in this regard, has held thus: “15. Vs. Mathew K.C. reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85 , while considering the earlier judicial pronouncements made in this regard, has held thus: “15. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon (supra), has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order:- “46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” 16. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” 16. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference.” 10. Considering the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 as well as the aforesaid judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court, I am not inclined to entertain the present writ petition at this stage and the same is accordingly dismissed as not maintainable. The petitioner is however at liberty to take recourse before the appropriate Forum, as provided under the law, if so advised.