JUDGMENT 1. The present first appeal is arising out of the judgment and decree dated 2.12.2011 passed by the V Additional District Judge, Indore in Civil Suit No. 43A/2010. 2. Facts of the case reveal that the plaintiff who is the owner of the property situated at Bairathi Colony, Indore i.e., Municipal No. 18/1, has rented out a shop to the defendant, admeasuring 8' x 20' on 1/2/1994. It was agreed between the parties that after every three years there will be an enhancement by 15% in the rent. Another shop was rented out to the defendants on 1.4.1998 on a monthly rent of Rs.700/-. It was agreed between the parties that after every 11 months, there shall be an increase by 5% of the rent in respect of the shop which was subsequently rented out on 1.4.1998. It was stated by the plaintiff that the defendants for the last time on 22.5.2006 paid an amount of Rs. 2080/- for the period w.e.f. 1.1.2005 to 30.4.2005, however, in respect of the shop which was given on 1.2.1994, no such enhancement was made and for recovery of the difference of rent (as enhanced from time to time), a request was made to the defendant to pay the arrears of rent. A Notice was sent to the defendants on 26.4.2007 through registered post, however, no reply was given to the plaintiff, on the contrary, on 29.6.2007 a notice was received by the plaintiff in which it was stated by the defendant through his counsel that there was some encroachment in respect of the shop in question and the defendants have incurred expenses to the tune of Rs. 2.00 lacs and the same was claimed from the plaintiff by the defendants. The plaintiff, as stated in the plaint, did gave a reply on 18.1.2008 to the defendants in response to their notice dated 29.6.2007 and reiterated that the defendants have not paid complete rent to the plaintiff. A claim was made to the tune of Rs.91,708/- in respect of arrears of rent. 3. A Written Statement was filed by the defendants and the defendants have denied title of the landlord. 4. Various Issues were framed by the trial Court and the first Issue was in respect of the title of the property in question. A claim was made to the tune of Rs.91,708/- in respect of arrears of rent. 3. A Written Statement was filed by the defendants and the defendants have denied title of the landlord. 4. Various Issues were framed by the trial Court and the first Issue was in respect of the title of the property in question. Paragraph 22 of the impugned judgment reads as under : 22- izfroknh lfpu ¼iz-lk-1½ us izfrijh{k.k ds iSjk&43 esa Lohdkj fd;k gS fd uxj fuxe ds iz-Mh- 1 ls Mh- 3 ds nsLrkostksa esa gky edku ekfyd Hkxokunkl dkyjk fuokl 18@1 cSjkBh dkWyksuh dk mYys[k gS rFkk iSjk&34 esa Lohdkj fd;k gS fd mlus nksuksa nqdkusa oknh ls gh fdjk, ij yh Fkh vkSj fdjk;k Hkh oknh dks gh nsrs FksA bl lk{kh us iSjk&39 esa Lohdkj fd;k gS fd mlus vius tokcnkosa ds i`"B Ø- 2 ds iSjk&1 esa , ls , Hkkx esa ,oa ist u-5 ds iSjk u- 3 esa ,s ls , Hkkx rFkk ist Ø-4 ds iSjk&2 esa , ls , Hkkx ij tks fy[kok;k gS og i<+dj gh fy[kk;k gS vkSj lgh fy[kk;k gSA tokcnkos ds mDr va'kksa dk voyksdu djus ls Li"V gS fd izfroknhx.k ds }kjk oknksDr nqdkuksa va'kksa dk LokfeRo oknh dk gksus ls Li"V :i ls vLohdkj fd;k x;k gS rFkk iSjk&1 esa Li"V :i ls vfHkopu fd;k x;k gS fd ^^okLrfodrk ;g gS fd oknh oknksDr LFkku dk vkWuj ugha gS rFkk mDr Hkou uxj ikfyd fuxe bankSj }kjk lEifŸk /kkjd fooj.k ekax i=kd 2007&08 tkjh fnukad 25-10-2007 ds vuqlkj gksrpan firk ijekuan ds uke ij gSA^^ tcfd ftu dfFkr uxj fuxe ds nLrkostksa ds vk/kkj ij oknh dk LokfeRo vLohdkj fd, tkus dk rdZ fy;k x;k gS muesa gky Hkou Lokeh oknh ds uke dk gh mYys[k gS rFkk vfookfnr :i ls izfroknhx.k ds }kjk nksuksa fookfnr nqdkusa oknh ls gh fdjk;s ij izkIr dh xbZ FkhA vr% Hkkjrh; lk{; vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 116 ds varxZr izfroknhx.k oknksDr nqdkuksa esa oknh dk LokfeRo vLohdkj djus ls focafèkr gSA blds ckn Hkh mUgksusa tokcnkos esa 3 ckj vlafnX/k 'kCnksa esa oknh ds fookfnr Hkou ds LokfeRo dks vLohdkj fd;k gSA vr% vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 12¼1½¼lh½ ds varxZr izfroknhx.k ds fu"dklu dk vk/kkj izekf.kr ik;k tkrk gSA 5. The aforesaid findings makes it very clear that the defendant No.1 Sachin has admitted the title of the plaintiff, he has also admitted that the plaintiff is the landlord and, therefore, as there was a denial of title on the part of the defendant and the title was established before the trial Court by the plaintiff successfully, a decree has been passed by taking into account section 12(1)(c) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The plaintiff who is a physically handicapped person was in bona-fide need of the premises in question to start his business and the trial Court in paragraphs No. 23 to 26 has dealt with his bona-fide need which was established based upon the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. 6. The plaintiff who is a physically handicapped person was in bona-fide need of the premises in question to start his business and the trial Court in paragraphs No. 23 to 26 has dealt with his bona-fide need which was established based upon the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. 6. Paragraph 23 to 26 of the impugned judgment reads as under : 23- oknh Hkxokunkl ¼o-lk-1½ us eq[; ijh{k.k ds iSjk&11 esa crk;k gS fd og foDykax gS vkSj Lo;a dk O;olk; fookfnr LFkku esa izkjaHk djuk pkgrk gS] mls Lo;a ds izksfotu LVksj ds O;olk; ds fy, oknksDr LFkku dh ln~Hkkoukiw.kZ vko';drk gS rFkk mDr O;olk; ds fy;s mlds ikl Lo;a LoRo o vkf/kIkR; dk bankSj 'kgj esa mi;qDr rFkk oSdfYid LFkku ugha gSA tcfd izfroknh lfpu ¼iz-lk- 1½ us vius eq[; ijh{k.k esa crk;k gS fd oknh ds }kjk vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 12¼1½¼lh½ ,oa ¼,Q½ ds varxZr okn izLrqr ugha fd;k x;k gSA oknh }kjk Hksts x, lwpuk i= iz-ih 2 fnukad 26-4-2007 ds vuqlkj mls oknksDr nqdkuksa dh izksfotu LVksj ds fy, vko';drk gksus dk mYys[k fd;k x;k FkkA fdarq mlus ln~HkkoukiwoZd okni= esa mDr vkèkkj dks 'kkfey ugha fd;k gS rFkk okni= ds iSjk 18 esa oknh viuh O;olkf;d vko';drk ds vk/kkj ij vyx ls l{ke U;k;ky; esa fu"dklu dh dk;Zokgh djsxk ys[k gksus ls vko';drk dk vf/kdkj R;kx dj fn;k x;k gSA vko';drk dk vk/kkj okn esa la'kks/ku vkosnu fnukad 30-9-2008 ds }kjk tksM+k x;k gSA vr% mDr la'kks/ku fof/k lEer ugha gksdj iks"k.kh; ugha gSA oknh dks fookfnr nqdkuksa dh O;olk; vkfn ds fy;s vko';drk ugha gSA lk{kh tlikynkl ¼iz-lk- 2½ us Hkh oknh dks fookfnr nqdkuksa dh vko';drk ugha gksuk crk;k gS rFkk iSjk 24 esa crk;k gS fd oknh dh iq=h euh"k ds fookg ds vkea=.k i= fnukad 1-11-2008 iz-Mh- 23 esa oknh ds izfr"Bku dqekj esfMdy LVksj nok cktkj rFkk dqekj bysDVªksfuDl egkjkuh jksM+ vafdr gSA vr% oknh jksM+ vafdr gSA vr% oknh ds ikl mDr O;olk; dks izkjaHk djus ds fy, vU; oSdfYid LFkku miyC/k gSA ijUrq ,d fuea=.k i= ds vfrfjDr ,slh vU; dksbZ nLrkosth lk{; izLrqr ugha dh x;h ftlls ;g izdV gksa ldsa fd mijksDr dqekj esfMdy ,oa dqekj bysDVªkWfuDl dk ekfyd oknh Hkxokunkl gSA tcfd LVsV cSad vkWQ bafM;k fl;kxat 'kk[kk ds 'kk[kk izca/kd lw;Zdkar lkdYys ¼ok-lk- 2½ us izfrijh{k.k esa crk;k gS fd ftl dqekj esfMdy ds _.k [kkrs esa flD;wfjVh gsrq iz-ih 24 foØ; i= j[kk x;k gS] ftldh izksizk;Vj vk'kk dkyjk gS rFkk Hkxokunkl ¼oknh½ tekurnkj gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa dfFkr dqekj esfMdy ,oa dqekj bysDVªkWfuDl dk izksizk;Vj oknh dks gksuk izekf.kr ugh ik;k tkrk gSA 24- izfroknhx.k dh vksj ls rdZ esa ;g Hkh O;Dr fd;k x;k gS fd oknksDr LFkku dh vko';drk dk vk/kkj la'kks/ku ds ek/;e ls okni= esa tksM+k x;k gSA vr% izLrqfr fnukad ls oknh dks oknksDr LFkku dh vko';drk ugha gksus ds dkj.k bl vk/kkj ij oknh fu"dklu dk t;i= izkIr djus dk vfèkdkjh ugha gSA mDr rdZ Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS vkSj ek- e-iz- mPp U;k;ky; }kjk 'kkjnknsoh fo- lksguyky 2001¼1½ ,eih-MCY;w-,u- uksV 170 esa ;g fl)kar izfrikfnr fd;k x;k gS fd okn yafcr jgus ds nkSjku Hkh csn[kyh ds fy;s vk/kkj miyC/k gS rks okni= esa la'kks/ku djds lfEefyr fd;k tk ldrk gSA blds vfrfjDr oknh ds }kjk izsf"kr lwpuk i= o okni= ds in Ø- 7 esa oknh dks O;olkf;d vko';drkvksa ds vk/kkj ij oknksDr LFkku dh vko';drk gksuk O;Dr fd;k x;k Fkks ;|fi okni= esa i`Fkd ls l{ke U;k;ky; us fu"dklu dh dk;Zokgh fd;s tkus dk mYys[k fd;k x;k Fkk laHkor% oknh dk vk'k; vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 23¼ts½ ds vuqlkj HkkM+k fu;a=.k izkfèkdkjh ds le{k vkosnu izLrqr djus dk jgk gksxk fdUrq ckn esa mlds }kjk lnHkkfod vko';drk ds vk/kkj ij vo'ks"k fdjk, ,oa oknh ds LokfeRo dks vLohdkj fd;s tkus ds vk/kkj lfgr lnHkkfod vko';drk gsrq flfoy U;k;ky; esa gh okn pykuk mfpr le>kA vr% blh vk/kkj ij ;g ugha ekuk tk ldrk fd okn izLrqr fd, tkus ds le; oknh dks oknksDr LFkku dh lnHkkfod vko';drk ugha FkhA izfroknh dh vksj ls rdZ ds nkSjku ;g Hkh O;Dr fd;k x;k gS ln~Hkkfod vko';drk ds laca/k esa vk/kkj la'kks/ku ds ek/;e ls ugha tksM+k tk ldrk fdUrq la'kks/ku vkosnu iwoZ esa gh Lohdkj fd, tk pqds gSa blfy;s la'kks/ku ds laca/k esa vc fu.kZ; ds le; fopkj ugha fd;k tk ldrk gSA 25- izfroknhx.k dh vksj ls rdZ ls ;g Hkh O;Dr fd;k x;k gS oknh ds vuqlkj gh og fodykax gS] vr% vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 23¼ts½ ds varxZr vFkkZraxZr HkwLokeh gksus ds dkj.k vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 12¼1½¼bZ½ ;k ¼,Q½ ds varxZr flfoy U;k;ky; ds le{k nkok iks"kuh; ugha gSA bl laca/k esa izfroknhx.k dh vksj ls jkejru O;kl fo- xkso/kZu 2007¼1½ ,e-ih- ,-lh-ts- 325 dk U;k; n`"Vkar Hkh izLrqr fd;k x;k gSA ftlesa /kkjk 23¼d½ ;k ¼[k½ ds vèkhu vkus okys HkwLokeh dks /kkjk 12¼1½¼bZ½ vkSj ,Q ds varxZr csn[kyh dh fMØh dh bIlk djus ds fy;s HkkM+k fu;a=d izkf/kdkjh ds le{k vkosnu nkf[ky djuk pkfg;s rFkk flfoy dksVZ dks ,slh vkKfIr ikfjr djus dk vf/kdkj ugha gS O;Dr fd;k x;k gSA tcfd v'kksd dqekj fo- ckcwyky 1998¼1½ ,e-ih-,y-ts- 461 e-iz- mPp U;k;ky; dh iw.kZ ihB esa ;g fl)kar izfrikfnr fd;k x;k gS fd /kkjk 23¼ts½ ds vFkkZrxZRk HkwLokeh flfoy U;k;ky; esa tkus dk Hkh gdnkj gSA ;g HkwLokeh dh bPNk gS fd mls vfèkfu;e ds vè;k; 3¼,½ ds varxZr l`ftr fo'ks"k eap dk ykHk mBkuk gS vFkok ugha \ lqykspuk fo- jktsUnz flag 2009¼1½ ts-,y-ts- 244 esa Hkh ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk O;Dr fd;k x;k gS fd tgka lnHkkfod vko';drk ds vfrfjDr vU; vk/kkjksa ij Hkh okn gks rks vfHk/kkjh dh csn[kyh ds fy, lfEeJokn fo'ks"k izoxZ ds HkwLokeh }kjk flfoy U;k;ky; esa QkbZy fd;k tk ldrk gSA bl izdj.k esa Hkh c<+s gq, vo'ks"k fdjk;k cdk;k gksus ds vk/kkj ij okn izLrqr fd;k x;k gS rFkk tokcnkos esa oknh ds LokfeRo dks vLohdkj djus dk u;k vk/kkj mRiUu gqvk RkFkk bu vkèkkjksa ij fu"dklu dh vkKfIr ikfjr djus dk vk/kkj HkkM+k fu;a=.k izkfèkdkjh dks ugha FkkA vr% ln~HkkoukiwoZd nqdku dh vko';drk ds vkèkkj ij okn bl U;k;ky; esa izpyu ;ksX; gksuk ik;k tkrk gSA 26- izfroknhx.k dh vksj ls rdZ esa ;g Hkh O;Dr fd;k x;k gS fd] oknh us fookfnr nqdku ds izFke eafty esa fjDr LFkku gksuk izfrijh{k.k esa Lohdkj fd;k gSA blh izdkj oknh dh nqdku ds cxy esa iM+k gqvk ,d xkyk ftl ij 'kVj ugha yxk gS Hkh fjDr gksuk O;Dr fd;k gSA vr% oknh dh vko';drk dh iwfrZ mDr LFkku ls gh gks tkrh gSA fdarq mDr rdZ Hkh Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; ugha gSA oknh dh vksj ls mls izksfOkgtuy LVksj gsrq yxHkx 2000 oxZQhV LFkku dh vko';drk gksuk O;Dr fd;k x;k gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa Hkh vuqi;qDr iM+s dfFkr xkys okys vR;Ur NksVs LFkku ls oknh dh vko';drk dh iwfrZ gksuk ugha ekuk tk ldrk gS rFkk Hkou dh izFke eafty vkoklh; iz;kstu ds fy, rks iz;qDr gks ldrh gS fdUrq O;olkf;d vko';drk ds fy;s izFke eafty dk LFkku mi;qDr ugha gks ldrk gSA lk{kh t;ikynkl ¼iz-lk- 2½ us iSjk&10 esa Lohdkj fd;k gS fd oknh dk tks xkyk iM+k gS og nhokj gS rFkk iSjk&15 esa Lohdkj fd;k gS fd mij dh eafty dk LFkku cSad ds fy, mi;qDr ugha Fkk blfy;s [kkyh fd;k FkkA iSjk&20 esa Lohdkj fd;k gS fd dfFkr [kkyh xkyk djhc nks&<kbZ QhV dk gksxk vkSj ;g lgh gS fd oknh ds ikl dksbZ can iaM+h gqbZ [kkyh nqdku oknksDr LFkku okys Hkou esa ugh gS ftlls ;g Li"V gS fd oknh ds ikl fookfnr LFkku okys Hkou esa O;olk; ds fy, oSdfYid LFkku miyC/k ugha gS rFkk HkwLokeh dks mldh lEifRr dk mlds lqfo/kkuqlkj miHkksx djus dk dk vf/kdkj gS vkSj U;k;ky; vius fopkj vf/kjksfIkr ugha dj ldrk gSA bl laca/k esa dSyk'kpUnz fo- iatkc us'kuy cSad] 2000¼3½ ,e-ih-,y-ts-&343] ukekeky fo- izdk'kpUnz tSu] 2009¼1½ ,e-ih-,y-ts- 313] jk?kosUnz dqekj fo- QeZ izse eh'kujh] 2000¼1½ ts-,y-ts- 186 lq-dks- fgUnqLFkku isVªksfy;e fo- dey okfluh vxzoky] 2006¼3½ ,e-ih-,y-ts- 404 vkfn esa izfrikfnr fl}kar voyksduh; gSA vr% oknh dks fookfnr nqdkuksa esa izksOghtu LVksj ds O;olk; gsrq ln~HkkoukiwoZd vko';drk gS rFkk oknh ds ikl bankSj 'kgj esa mDr iz;kstu ds fy, oSdfYid LFkku miyC/k ugha gksuk izekf.kr ik;k tkrk gSA vr% okniz'u Øekad 6 ldkjkRed Bgjk;k tkrk gSA 7. This Court is of the considered opinion that keeping in view the aforesaid, as the plaintiff was able to establish his bona-fide need, there was a categorical denial of title of the plaintiff, the trial Court was justified in passing the impugned judgment and decree of eviction under section 12(1)(c) and 12(1)(f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 8. This Court in the case of Mahendra Kumar Jain v. Smt. Usha Jain reported in 1997 (I) MPWN 105 has held that a landlord is entitled for a decree of eviction in case it is established that the tenant has abused the landlord and is in habit of abusing the landlord. It has also been held that decree under section 12(1)(c) can be granted in those circumstances. 9. The apex Court in the case of Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishna Rao, reported in AIR 1989 SC 2187 was dealing with a case where again the title of the landlord was denied. The apex Court in the aforesaid case in paragraph 5 has held as under : 5. It was argued by learned counsel for the appellant that even accepting that there was a denial of title by the appellant and the result would be only that the respondent landlord became entitled to forfeit the lease and in order to be a ground for eviction in a suit that forfeiture would have to precede the suit or petition for eviction. It was submitted by him that it was not open to a landlord to take advantage of a denial of title by the tenant in the very proceedings for eviction in the course of which the denial was made. The denial must be anterior to the eviction pro- ceedings. In support of this argument learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in Maharaja of Jeypore v. Rukmani Pattamahdevi, 46 I.A. 109; AIR 1919 P.C. 1 . In our view, this argument also does not stand scrutiny. In V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Arnrnal, [1980]1 SCR 334 a Constitution Bench of this Court comprising seven-learned Judges held that in the matter of determination of tenancy the State Rent Acts do not permit a landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant merely by serving on him a notice to quit as is the position under the Transfer of Property Act. The landlord can recover possession of the property only on one or more of the grounds enacted in the relevant section of the Rent Acts. Even after the termination of the contractual tenancy the landlord under the definitions of landlord and tenant contained in the Rent Acts, remains a landlord and a tenant remains a tenant because of the express provision made in the enactments that a tenant means ‘a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour’. Yet another important feature of the Rent Acts is that either by way of a non obstante clause or by neces- sary implication these enactments have done away with the law contained in section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee. The difference between the position obtaining under the Transfer of Property Act and the Rent Acts in the matter of determination of a lease is that under the former Act in order to recover possession of the leased premises determination of the lease is necessary because during the continuance of the lease the landlord cannot recover possession of the premises while under the Rent Acts the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession only on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in the relevant sections. He cannot recover possession merely by determining the tenancy. Nor can he be stopped from doing so on the ground that he has not terminated the contractual tenancy. In the case before us, we find that the denial of landlord’s title by the tenant has been expressly made a ground for eviction under section 10(2)(vi) of the A.P. Rent Act which we have already set out earlier. In view of this, the entire basis for the argument that the denial of title must be anterior to the proceedings for eviction under the A.P. Rent Act is knocked out. In our opinion, the argument of learned counsel for the appellant must, therefore, be rejected. In view of this, the entire basis for the argument that the denial of title must be anterior to the proceedings for eviction under the A.P. Rent Act is knocked out. In our opinion, the argument of learned counsel for the appellant must, therefore, be rejected. We find, on the other hand, that a number of High Courts have taken the view that even a denial of the landlord’s title by a tenant in a written statement in an eviction petition under the Rent Act concerned furnishes a ground for eviction and can be relied upon in the very proceedings in which a written statement containing the denial has been filed (See: Sada Ram and Others v. Gajjan Shiama, AIR 1970 Punjab & Haryana 511; Shiv Parshad v. Smt. Shila Rani, AIR 1974 H.P. 22 and Machavaram Venkata Narayana Rao v. Sarvepalli Nara- yana Rao Sarada and another, [1978]1 R.C.J. 368. As observed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court to insist that a denial of title in the written statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord would only lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the landlord would be obliged to file a second suit for eject- ment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entailed by the tenant’s denial of his character as a tenant in the written statement. 10. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, as the title was denied by the defendant, this Court is of the considered opinion that the trial Court has rightly passed a decree of eviction. 11. In the case of Kashi Bai v. Dashrath, reported in 1995(II) MPWN 194 , again the title of the landlord was disclaimed in the Written Statement and it has been held in the aforesaid case that the landlord is entitled for decree of eviction. 12. In the present case, the title was denied and, therefore, in the light of the judgment delivered in the case of Kashibai (supra), the trial Court was justified in passing the impugned judgment and decree. 13. 12. In the present case, the title was denied and, therefore, in the light of the judgment delivered in the case of Kashibai (supra), the trial Court was justified in passing the impugned judgment and decree. 13. A similar view has been taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Balveersingh v. Kishanlal, reported in 1988 JLJ 693 , as in the present case there is a decree on the ground of non-payment of rent / arrears of rent and the same has been established, the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court does not warrant any interference, in the light of the judgment delivered in the case of Bhagwati Prasad v. Rameshchand and others, reported in 1994 MPLJ 619 . 14. In the present case, during the pendency of the trial, a ground was added ie., bona-fide need, as provide under section 12(1) (f) and decree has been passed on the ground of bona-fide need also. Such an amendment is also permissible. 15. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Chhotelal v. Akbarali and another reported in ( AIR 1983 MP 50 ), in paragraph 6 has held as under : 6. It was, however, urged on behalf of the defendant by Shri Waghmare that the language of section 12(1) of the Act rules out induction of additional ground for eviction after the institution of a suit for eviction. The contention cannot be upheld. section 12 (1) of the Act merely provides that no suit shall be filed for eviction except on a ground specified in that section. This restriction on the right to institute a suit for eviction only emphasises that if a suit for eviction were to be brought without disclosing a ground specified in section 12 (1) of the Act, then in that case, the plaint would be liable to be rejected for failure to disclose cause of action. There is nothing in the language of section 12 (1) of the Act, which forbids addition of a ground for eviction in a suit for eviction already instituted in accordance with the provisions of section 12 (1) of the Act. There is nothing in the language of section 12 (1) of the Act, which forbids addition of a ground for eviction in a suit for eviction already instituted in accordance with the provisions of section 12 (1) of the Act. It may be, that in some cases, the requirement of a particular ground specified in section 12 (1) of the Act is such as cannot be fulfilled unless that ground has come into existence prior to the filing of the suit, as in the case of a ground specified in section 12 (1) (d). But tenability of a ground sought to be added by way of amendment, does not affect the jurisdiction of a Court to permit that amendment. It may be that in such a case, it would be a sound exercise of discretion by the Court, if leave to amend is refused inasmuch as a decree for eviction cannot be passed on such a ground. But as already observed, this aspect of the matter has no impact on the question of jurisdiction of the Court to permit the plaintiff to amend the plaint by adding a new ground for eviction. Any observation to the contrary which can be read in 1961 MPLJ 7 (supra) or 1980 MPLJ 182 (supra) does not, in our opinion lay down correct law. 16. Keeping in view the aforesaid, the learned Court below was justified in passing the impugned judgment and decree on the ground of bona-fide need also. 17. A ground has been raised in the present case that it was a composite suit and no such decree could have been passed. The apex Court in the case of Smt. Sulochana v. Rajendra Singh reported in ( AIR 2008 SC 2611 ) has dealt with a similar issue. Paragraph 16 and 36 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under : 16. Chapter III-A provides for special provisions. It is confined to eviction of tenants on grounds of bona fide requirement of different classes of landlords specified therein. A summary procedure is provided for. Recourse thereto can be taken only by the specified landlord within the meaning of the provision of section 23-J of the Act which means a ‘landlord who is a widow or divorced wife’ amongst others. Amongst others a servant of any Government including a member of defence services, would also fall within the purview of the said definition. Recourse thereto can be taken only by the specified landlord within the meaning of the provision of section 23-J of the Act which means a ‘landlord who is a widow or divorced wife’ amongst others. Amongst others a servant of any Government including a member of defence services, would also fall within the purview of the said definition. Only a landlord who comes within the purview of the said definition is entitled to file suit on the ground of his or her bona fide requirement. 36. The definition of ‘specified landlord’ as contained in section 23-J of the Act is not as broad as the definition of the same term as contained in section 2(b) thereof. A statute must be read, keeping in view the constitutional scheme of equality as adumbrated in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Once a special benefit has been conferred on a special category of landlord, the same must receive strict construction. Even otherwise, it is well settled, that an exclusion provision must be construed strictly. A statute ousting jurisdiction of the civil Court should also be strictly construed. 18. The composite suit could have been very well filed as held by the apex Court. 19. In the present case, the bona-fide need has been established by the plaintiff before the trial Court and, therefore, once the bona-fide need has been established, no case for interference is made out in the matter keeping in view the judgment delivered by the Division Bench in the case of Shivprakash Agrawal v. Ashok Kumar Patel, reported in 2010 (I) MPWN 30 . 20. Thus, in short, the plaintiff was successful in establishing his claim. He was successful in establishing his bona-fide need, he was successful in establishing the title, he was successful in establishing that the defendants have not paid rent and difference of rent and, therefore, the findings of fact arrived at by the trial Court does not warrant any interference. The findings arrived at by the trial Court is not at all perverse. On the contrary, they are duly supported by the evidence on record. This Court does not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 21. Accordingly, the present appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. A decree be drawn up accordingly.