JUDGMENT : Aniruddha Bose, J. We are taking up this appeal for hearing at this stage only on consent of the learned Advocates appearing for the parties. 2. The appellant was working as an Office Assistant in J.J. College, Jhumeretilaiya in the District of Koderma under the administrative control of Vinoba Bhave University. On 23rd July, 1978 an F.I.R. was registered against him on the allegation of defalcation of funds. The sum involved, we are apprised by Mr. Tandon, learned counsel for the appellant, was Rs.1150/-. Subsequently, upon trial he was convicted under the provisions of Sections 408/477(A) of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months along with a fine for Rs.1000/-. The judgment of conviction was delivered on 15th September, 1989. The appellant, however, was on bail during the pendency of the appeal instituted by him against the judgment of the Trial Court. He was successful in his appeal before the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Koderma. He was acquitted of the charges. 3. The appellant was placed under suspension on 23rd July, 1978. After his conviction, a show cause notice was issued to him and thereafter he was dismissed from service on 18th September, 2003. The ground for his dismissal, as it appears from the memorandum issued by the Registrar of the University bearing No. VBU/R/P/1380/2003 dated 18th September, 2003, was his conviction in the criminal case. The said instrument, made Annexure-1 to the memorandum of appeal, is reproduced below :- “That the Vice-Chancellor has gone through the records of the case relating to Sri Raj Ballabh Sharma, a suspended grade-III employee of J.J. College, Jhumritelaiya; That it was found that a criminal case was instituted against Mr. Sharma under Section 408, 420 and 477 of I.P.C. in relation to defalcation and forgery. That the said employee was convicted in the said criminal case by judgment of 1st Class Magistrate, Koderma dated 15th September, 1989. That the said employee was served notice (VBU/P/577/2003 dated 11.4.2003) to give any proof if he had been acquitted by any competent court of law. That after examining his reply, he was served with a show-cause notice (VBU/P/731/2003 dated 10.05.2003). That the said employee was served notice (VBU/P/577/2003 dated 11.4.2003) to give any proof if he had been acquitted by any competent court of law. That after examining his reply, he was served with a show-cause notice (VBU/P/731/2003 dated 10.05.2003). That after going through the reply dated 22.05.03 of the employee to the show-cause notice, the Vice-Chancellor is convinced that the concerned employee has been convicted by a competent court of law in relation to charges amounting to morale turpitude. Therefore, in exercise of his powers vested in him under section 10(18) of Jharkhand State University Act 2000, as amended up-to-date and section 16 of the concerned statue, the Vice-Chancellor has been pleased to pass orders dismissing Sri Raj Ballabh Sharma from the services with immediate effect.” 4. As we have already indicated, he was acquitted by the Appellate Court on 4th January, 2005. On 9th July, 2005 he made a request for reinstatement based on the judgment of acquittal by the Appellate Court. The representation was made before the Vice Chancellor of the University. This request or representation, however was kept pending and no decision was taken in that respect. Thereafter the appellant instituted a writ petition before this Court on 7th March, 2007. In the writ petition prayer was made for quashing the dismissal order and for restoration of all pay and benefits for the period he was kept under suspension and the period he remained under order of dismissal, deducting there from subsistence allowance received by him. The learned First Court dismissed the writ petition, primarily referring on Section 10(18) of the Jharkhand University Act, 2000. Under the aforesaid provision, the Vice Chancellor has been conferred the power to take disciplinary action against all employees of the University including officers and teachers thereof. The learned First Court opined :- “4. From the aforesaid, it is apparent that the Vice- Chancellor has power and jurisdiction to pass an order of dismissal from service. Representation dated 04.07.2005 submitted by the petitioner seeking payment of full salary and allowances would disclose that he was involved in three different criminal cases. No doubt, the petitioner has asserted that he has been acquitted in all three cases, the fact remains that he was a convicted employee on the date he would have superannuated from service. Representation dated 04.07.2005 submitted by the petitioner seeking payment of full salary and allowances would disclose that he was involved in three different criminal cases. No doubt, the petitioner has asserted that he has been acquitted in all three cases, the fact remains that he was a convicted employee on the date he would have superannuated from service. Subsequent order of acquittal in the criminal case would not clothe him with a right to seek full salary and allowances for the period between 01.09.1978 to 30.11.2003. 5. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I find no infirmity in impugned order dated 18.09.2003. Consequently, prayer for grant of salary etc. since 01.09.1978 cannot be granted. 6. The writ petition, devoid of merits, is dismissed.” 5. The appellant assails the judgment of the learned First Court. Main submission of Mr. Tandon, learned counsel for the appellant is that in the case of the appellant, there was no independent disciplinary proceeding on the allegation of defalcation of funds. His dismissal was made only because of the judgment of conviction. Now that his client has been acquitted, the order of dismissal ought to stand automatically revoked. We must add here that though there is reference to involvement of the appellant in three criminal cases in the judgment under appeal, which fact was ascertained from the appellant’s representation dated 4th July, 2005, the order of his dismissal referred to only one case. No other case was brought to our notice by either of the parties in course of hearing of this appeal. We have accordingly considered the import of only that criminal case because of which the dismissal order was issued against him. 6. Case of the University, argued by Mr. Singh is that in case of conviction there is no requirement of holding any regular departmental proceeding and punishment may be imposed by the employer solely based on conviction by a Court of competent criminal jurisdiction. His further submission is that an employee dismissed because of conviction in a criminal case can seek automatic reinstatement only if he is “honourably acquitted”. Mr. Singh has cited two decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of S. Bhaskar Reddy and Another Vs. Superintendent of Police and Another, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 365 and Ajay Kumar Singh Vs. Mr. Singh has cited two decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of S. Bhaskar Reddy and Another Vs. Superintendent of Police and Another, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 365 and Ajay Kumar Singh Vs. Flag Officer, Commanding-in-Chief and Another, reported in (2016) 9 SCC 179 to contend that the accused in a criminal case has to be honourably acquitted and not acquitted on the basis benefit of doubt to seek automatic reinstatement in his service. There is however one distinction in the factual context of this case vis-à-vis the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Bhaskar Reddy (supra). In that decision, as it appears from paragraphs 2 and 3 of the report, there was departmental proceeding against the delinquent officer. In the case of Ajay Kumar Singh (supra) the principle explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that an acquittal on benefit of doubt cannot automatically lead to reinstatement of a dismissed Government employee. That was a case arising out of a Court Martial proceeding of certain naval personnel, which reached the Hon’ble Supreme Court after the decisions of the Court Martial was challenged before the Armed Forces Tribunal. The Tribunal had acquitted one of the Navy Personnel giving him benefit of doubt, but directed that he would not be entitled to any financial benefit like back wages etc; for the period he remained under arrest. Certain pensionary benefits however were protected by the Tribunal. He had appealed against that decision by which certain benefits including that of reinstatement was denied to him. The Hon’ble Supreme Court declined to accept his plea on the ground that he was acquitted only on benefit of doubt. 7. Mr. Singh has also cited a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Haricharan Mahto Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors reported in 2016 (2) JBCJ 559(HC) in which it has been held that following Rule 170 of Bihar Board Miscellaneous Rules, 1958 read with Rule 166 thereof, no disciplinary proceeding before dismissal is necessary if a delinquent officer is judicially convicted. 8. The stand of the appellant, however, is that his acquittal was honourable from the criminal trial by the Appellate Court. In this regard, following passages of the judgment of the Appellate Court have been relied upon by Mr. 8. The stand of the appellant, however, is that his acquittal was honourable from the criminal trial by the Appellate Court. In this regard, following passages of the judgment of the Appellate Court have been relied upon by Mr. Tandon :- “14.From perusal of the record it is apparent that the receipts filed in the case were sent to expert from the comparison of writing and signature of the accused. But the expert did not submit any report in the regard on the plea that the required documents were not produced before him inspite of several requisites made by the expert. 15. It was argued on behalf of defence that there was long and unexplained delay in lodging in F.I.R. F.I.R was lodged on 23.07.1978 but the same was sent to court on 03.08.1978. 11 days after lodging the F.I.R, which is unexplained either by the informant or by the I.O. in this case. Chargesheet witness Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15 and 16 has not been examined in the case. Besides I.O of the case who investigated the case has not examined which caused serious prejudiced against accused and making the prosecution case doubtful. The charge framed in the case is vague and unspecific. The charge framed in the case do not show clearly for which three dates alleged defalcation of the charges has been framed and thus the trial itself became illegal causing great prejudice to the accused. There was no proof or evidence to show that accused was intrusted the alleged amount and he cheated any person. The statement of witnesses are not reliable and full of contradiction. The documents were filed in the court by college authority were not produced before the I.O in course of investigation and non-examination of I.O is fatal to the prosecution case.” 9. This is not a judgment in which the appellant has been acquitted merely on benefit of doubt. Several flaws in the prosecution case was noted by the Appellate Court and on that basis the conviction order was set aside. Thus, if we are to accept the argument of Mr. Singh and retain the dismissal order of the appellant, there would be no charge subsisting on the basis of which the appellant would have had been kept out of employment. Thus, if we are to accept the argument of Mr. Singh and retain the dismissal order of the appellant, there would be no charge subsisting on the basis of which the appellant would have had been kept out of employment. The foundation of his order of dismissal collapsed with his acquittal by the First Appellate Court. In the case of the appellant, there was full-fledged trial and apart from other flaws in the prosecution case, the First Appellate Court found the statements of the witnesses were not reliable and full of contradiction. This was a case where the judgment of acquittal was passed on consideration of prosecution evidence and the prosecution had failed to prove the charges levelled against the appellant. Merely because the learned Vice-Chancellor possessed power under the statue to pass an order of dismissal from service, it does not automatically follow that such power could be exercised in every situation. Objective factors must exist upon consideration of which power under Section 10(18) of the Jharkhand University Act, 2000 could be exercised. In the event the factors forming the basis of exercise of such power is later on found to be erroneous by a competent legal forum, it would be within the jurisdiction of the writ Court to invalidate the order of dismissal passed in exercise of such power. The appellant remaining a convict on the date of his superannuation cannot ipso facto ratify his dismissal for all time to come even if his conviction is set aside at a later date. 10. Admitted position now is that the appellant has crossed the age of superannuation and the question of reinstatement would not arise in the instant case. This being the position, we do not intend to add another layer to the decision making process by remanding the matter to the appellate forum even though there is provision for appeal before the Hon’ble Chancellor against an order of dismissal from service passed by the Vice Chancellor. The case relates back to the year 1978 and the appellant remained under suspension since then till he was dismissed in the year 2003. He was convicted on 15th September, 1989. 11. We accordingly set aside the judgment and order of the learned First Court as also his order of dismissal by the learned Vice Chancellor. The case relates back to the year 1978 and the appellant remained under suspension since then till he was dismissed in the year 2003. He was convicted on 15th September, 1989. 11. We accordingly set aside the judgment and order of the learned First Court as also his order of dismissal by the learned Vice Chancellor. As regards his financial claims, which include diverse monetary benefits accruing from the date of his suspension, we remand the matter to the learned Vice Chancellor of the Binoba Bhave University to determine all the benefits he would be entitled to taking into account the period he remained under suspension and also the period subsequent thereto after his dismissal. 12. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms.