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2018 DIGILAW 247 (KER)

Vikraman, S/o. Balan v. Union of India

2018-03-15

B.KEMAL PASHA

body2018
JUDGMENT : (1) What is meant by the term “as the case may be” incorporated in Section 45(1) (ii) of the Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967? (2) In a case investigated by the CBI, in which offences under Chapters IV and VI of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 are also included, is it the Central Government or the State Government, to grant sanction for cognizance of the offences? (3) When competency of the authority to grant sanction is raised, is it a challenge regarding the validity of the sanction order or is it a case of absence of sanction? (4) Can validity of sanction be challenged at the very inception of the case? These are the main questions that arise for consideration in these writ petitions. 2. W.P.(C) No.25403/2017 (hereinafter referred to as the 'first writ petition') is filed by A1 to A19 in S.C.No.343/2017 of the Court of Special Judge (SPE/CBI)-III, Ernakulam. W.P.(C) No.31229/2017(hereinafter referred to as the 'second writ petition') is filed by A20 to A25 in the aforesaid sessions case. 3. Originally, Crime No.780/14 of the Kathirur Police Station was registered consequent to the incident involved. After the investigation for quite some time, the State Government thought it fit to request the CBI to take up the investigation of this case. The request was forwarded. The CBI accepted the request and consequently, the consent of the State Government under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act was given to the CBI to conduct an investigation and to file the final report in the matter. 4. The CBI took up the investigation, re-registered the crime as Crime No.RC10/(S)/2014/CBI/SCB/TVPM, conducted the investigation, and filed Ext.P1 final report in the first writ petition, on 06.03.2015. It seems that the Sessions Court, Thalassery “had taken on file” the said final report on 11.03.2015 for the offences punishable under Section 120B read with Sections 143, 147, 148, 201, 202, 212, 324, 307, 302 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 3 and 5 of Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Section 16(a) read with Section 15(1)(a)(i) and Section 19 of the Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short, 'the UAPA') and Section 27 of the Arms Act. Evidently, from the term 'taken on file' as Sessions Case for the aforesaid offences, it seems that the said Court had taken cognizance of the aforesaid offences on 11.03.2015. 5. Evidently, from the term 'taken on file' as Sessions Case for the aforesaid offences, it seems that the said Court had taken cognizance of the aforesaid offences on 11.03.2015. 5. The CBI continued the investigation and thereafter filed Ext.P2 supplementary final report in the second writ petition before the court below on 29.08.2017. The court below on 18.09.2017 passed an order showing that cognizance for the aforesaid offences was taken as against A20 to A25 also. 6. In the first writ petition, A1 to A19 have sought for the following reliefs as relief Nos.1 to 3: “(i) To call for the records leading to Ext.P2 and to quash the same by the issue of a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order; (ii) to set aside the order dated 11.3.2015 passed by the Sessions Court, Thalassery taking cognizance of the offences under Section 16-A read with Section 15(1)(a)(i) and Section 19 of the Unlawful Activities( Prevention) Act on the basis of Ext.P1 final report in S.C.No.200/2015(now re-numbered as S.C.No.343/2017 and pending trial on the file of the Special Judge's Court(SPE/CBI)- III, Ernakulam; (iii) to declare that the authority competent to grant sanction for prosecution of the petitioners in the case arising out of Crime No.780/2014 of Kathirur Police Station(R.C.No.10(S)/2014- CBI/SCB/TVPM) is the Government of Kerala” 7. In the second writ petition, the following reliefs have been sought for by A20 to A25. “(i) to call for the records leading to Ext.P3 and to quash the same by the issued of a Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order; (ii) to declare that the authority competent to grant sanction for prosecution of the petitioners in the case arising out of Crime No.780/2014 of Kathirur Police Station(R.C.No.10(S)/2014-CBI/SCB/TVPM) is the State Government of Kerala under Section 45(1)(ii) of the UAPA” 8. From the above, it is evident that in the first writ petition, what has been challenged is want of sanction for taking of cognizance of the offences under the UAPA by the Sessions Court, Thalassery as against A1 to A19 in Ext.P1 final report. Ext.P2 in the first writ petition is the sanction order dated 07.04.2015 issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of India, “By order and in the name of President of India”. Ext.P2 in the first writ petition is the sanction order dated 07.04.2015 issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of India, “By order and in the name of President of India”. Ext.P2 in the first writ petition was also sought to be quashed mainly by contending that the Central Government was not the authority to grant sanction to take cognizance of the offences under the UAPA against A1 to A19. That is evident from relief No.3, which has been sought for, for declaring that the authority competent to grant sanction for prosecution of the petitioners, is the Government of Kerala. 9. At the same time, cognizance has not been challenged in the second writ petition. What has been challenged is the validity of Ext.P13 sanction order dated 09.05.2016 issued by the very same Under Secretary “By order and in the name of President of India”. The second relief sought for is a declaration that the authority competent to grant sanction for prosecution of A20 to A25 is the Government of Kerala under Section 45(1)(ii) of the UAPA. 10. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri.Sidharth Luthra and Sri. K. Gopalakrishna Kurup, learned Counsel Sri.K. Vijayan and Sri.P.N. Sukumaran, for the petitioners, the learned Additional Solicitor General of India Sri. K.M. Natarajan for respondents 1 and 2, the learned Standing Counsel for the CBI Sri. Sasthamangalam S. Ajith Kumar and learned Senior Public Prosecutor Sri. Suman Chakravarthy for the 3rd respondent. 11. The matter was heard at length. The main point argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners is that as per Section 45(1)(ii) of the UAPA, only with the previous sanction of the State Government, a court can take cognizance of the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the UAPA. It has been argued that even though the term “as the case may be” incorporated in the said provision gives power to the Central Government or the State Government to grant sanction, when it is a matter relating to the State, or an incident happened within the territory of the State as in this particular case, sanction has to be obtained from the State Government and not from the Central Government. The argument is precisely that the power to grant sanction is not investigation centric or investigation specific; whereas, it should be jurisdiction centric or jurisdiction specific. The argument is precisely that the power to grant sanction is not investigation centric or investigation specific; whereas, it should be jurisdiction centric or jurisdiction specific. It has been argued that what has been challenged is not the validity of sanction; whereas, what has been challenged is the absence of sanction. The argument is that, when sanction has been granted by the Central Government in a case wherein sanction had to be obtained from the State Government, it should be treated as want of sanction. 12. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor for the 3rd respondent has argued that this is a case in which, in fact, the offences under the UAPA cannot be attracted. Over and above it, it has been argued that it was the State Government who had handed over the investigation to the CBI, and that when the incident had happened within the territory of the State, the CBI ought to have approached the State Government for sanction within the meaning of Section 41(1)(ii) of the UAPA. It has been argued that so far they have not approached the State Government for any such sanction. 13. Per contra, the learned Additional Solicitor General and the learned Standing Counsel for the CBI have argued that the term 'as the case may be' incorporated in Section 45(1)(ii) of the UAPA does not confer any power on the State Government to exercise the power to grant sanction, when the case is investigated by the CBI. It has been argued that on a literal interpretation of the provisions contained in Section 43 and Section 45(1) of the UAPA, it is evident that the term 'as the case may be' has been deliberately used by the legislature to give the power of sanction in certain cases to the Central Government and in certain cases to the State Government. It has been argued that when an investigation has been conducted under Section 43(a) it is the Central Government alone who has the power to grant sanction. It is argued that only when investigation is conducted as contemplated under Section 43(b) and (c) of the UAPA, the power of sanction may be exercised by the State Government. 14. It has been argued that when an investigation has been conducted under Section 43(a) it is the Central Government alone who has the power to grant sanction. It is argued that only when investigation is conducted as contemplated under Section 43(b) and (c) of the UAPA, the power of sanction may be exercised by the State Government. 14. According to the learned Additional Solicitor General, in all such cases investigated under Section 43(b) and (c) also, it cannot be said that the power to grant sanction for taking cognizance of the offences should be exercised by the State Government. If it is a case covered by Section 15(1)(a)(iv) of the UAPA for damage or destruction of any property in India, through a terrorist act, either the Government of India or the State Government concerned, should exercise the power to grant sanction. If the property belongs to the Union of India, necessarily in such case, sanction has to be granted by the Central Government. If the damage or destruction caused is relating to the property of the State Government, the State Government concerned has to grant sanction for taking cognizance. It has been further argued that normally such a case relating to the property of a State Government will be investigated by any of the officers under clause (b) or clause (c) of Section 43. 15. Unlike TADA, in the case of the UAPA, any sanction is not required for the registration of the case. Sanction is required only for taking cognizance of the offences under the UAPA. There is a lot of difference between the sanction for prosecution and sanction for taking cognizance of an offence. After the investigation of the case, on the filing of the final report alleging commission of offences, the next stage is prosecution. The prosecution involves taking of cognizance of the offences, the inquiry after the taking of cognizance of the offences, and the trial. Here, sanction is not required for the prosecution of the case; whereas sanction is required for the taking of cognizance. Sanction is not required for filing the final report. If an order of sanction is not produced along with the final report, or subsequent to the final report, the Court concerned cannot take cognizance of the offences under the UAPA. It is not a pre-requisite that order of sanction should be produced along with the final report. Sanction is not required for filing the final report. If an order of sanction is not produced along with the final report, or subsequent to the final report, the Court concerned cannot take cognizance of the offences under the UAPA. It is not a pre-requisite that order of sanction should be produced along with the final report. At the same time, the wording of Section 45(1)(ii) reveals that sanction is a pre-requisite for the taking of cognizance of the offences under the UAPA. 16. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has argued that this is not a case wherein they are challenging the validity of sanction; whereas, they are challenging the absence of sanction. 17. In the first writ petition, cognizance taken by the Sessions Court, Thalassery on Ext.P1 final report for the offences under the UAPA has also been challenged. It has been pointed out that Ext.P2 sanction was granted on 07.04.2015 only whereas, the cognizance was taken on 11.03.2015. The learned Additional Solicitor General also has fairly conceded that in such case, the said Court could not have taken cognizance of the offences under the said Act when there was no order of sanction as on the date of taking cognizance. It is evident that the Sessions Court Thalassery has gone wrong in taking cognizance of the offences under the UAPA on 11.03.2015 as against A1 to A19 who are the petitioners in the first writ petition, when Ext.P2 sanction order was issued on 07.04.2015 only. 18. At the same time, that is not the end of the road as far as the prosecution is concerned. It has to be considered that there was no cognizance at all or at the most the cognizance was bad in law. Therefore, it has to be declared that the cognizance taken by the Sessions Court, Thalassery as against A1 to A19 in respect of the offences under the UAPA on 11.03.2015, was bad in law for want of sanction on that particular date. Therefore, it has to be declared that the cognizance taken by the Sessions Court, Thalassery as against A1 to A19 in respect of the offences under the UAPA on 11.03.2015, was bad in law for want of sanction on that particular date. When the cognizance is bad in law, the resultant position is that the said accused persons as far as the offences under the UAPA are concerned, they continue to be accused in Ext.P1 final report, and the court below has again to take cognizance of the offences under the UAPA against the said accused persons, in case the court below finds that cognizance can be taken as against those accused, based on Ext.P1 final report and Ext.P2 sanction order. 19. This is a case in which the trial has not been commenced so far. There is no bar in taking fresh cognizance of the said offences as against A1 to A19 on the basis of Exts.P1 and P2, in case the court below is satisfied that cognizance of the said offences can be taken. When the trial has not been commenced, it will not practically make any difference at all. If fresh cognizance has to be taken as against A1 to A19 in respect of the offences under the UAPA, the court below shall apply its mind on the facts contained in Ext.P1, records produced along with it and also Ext.P2 sanction order. If materials are available, which are sufficient to take cognizance of the said offences, still the court below can take cognizance of the offences under UAPA as against A1 to A19. 20. Relating to the other argument that sanction orders in both these writ petitions cannot be considered as sanction orders at all when the power to exercise sanction has been exercised by the Central Government, the question as to the meaning of the term 'as the case may be' in Section 45(1)(ii) of the UAPA or the question as to what the legislature has meant by incorporating such a term, has to be considered. 21. 21. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners have invited the attention of this Court to the decision of the Madras High Court in S.Soman @ Somasundaran v. State by the Inspector of Police (2017 SCC Online Mad.12222) wherein it was held that sanction from the Central Government is a pre-requisite for taking cognizance of an offence under Section 13(2) of the UAPA. In that particular case some of the witnesses were examined. In the said case, for want for sanction, the proceedings were quashed. 22. The offence under Section 13(2) of the UAPA comes under Chapter III of the UAPA. This is not a case covered by Chapter III of the UAPA; whereas, the offences alleged herein are coming under Chapters IV and VI of the UAPA. Section 45(1) of the UAPA says:- 45. Cognizance of offences.-(1) No court shall take cognizance of any offence- (i) under Chapter III without the previous sanction of the Central Government or any officer authorised by the Central Government in this behalf; (ii) under Chapters IV and VI without the previous sanction of the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government, and where such offence is committed against the Government of a foreign country without the previous sanction of the Central Government.” 23. On a perusal of the said provision it is evident that when cognizance has to be taken for any of the offences under Chapter III of the UAPA, previous sanction of the Central Government or any officer authorised by the Central Government in that behalf is required. Evidently it is a prerequisite for taking cognizance of an offence under Chapter III of the UAPA. Regarding the offences under Chapters IV and VI it has been mentioned that “the previous sanction of the Central Government or, as the case may be, the State Government is a pre-requisite except in cases wherein such offence is committed against the Government of a foreign country. In case of any of the offences under Chapters IV and VI has been committed against the Government of a foreign country, the sanction of the Central Government is a pre-requisite for taking cognizance of such an offence. 24. We need only consider the first part of Section 45(1)(ii) of the UAPA. It shows that either the Central Government or the State Government can exercise the power to grant sanction in such cases. 24. We need only consider the first part of Section 45(1)(ii) of the UAPA. It shows that either the Central Government or the State Government can exercise the power to grant sanction in such cases. At the same time, the term “as the case may be” has also been incorporated. Evidently, it shows that in some cases it is for the Central Government to grant sanction and in some cases it is for the State Government to grant sanction. 25. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners have invited the attention of this Court to the decision in Ashrafkhan and others v. State of Gujarat and others [ (2012) 11 SCC 606 ] wherein the Apex Court held that the negative words incorporated in Section 20A(1) of TADA can rarely be held directory. It was held that the plain, ordinary grammatical meaning affords the best guide to ascertain the intention of the legislature. Other methods to understand the meaning of the statute is resorted to if the language is ambiguous or leads to an absurd result. It was held that no such situation exists in Section 20A(1) of TADA. 26. In Ashrafkhan (supra) it was held that the absence of sanction goes to the root of the matter and it is not a curable one within the meaning of Section 465 of the Cr.P.C. It is true that the opening words in Section 45(1) is also negative in form. As held by the Apex Court in Ashrafkhan (supra) such negative words incorporated therein can rarely be directory in nature. Therefore, if there is no sanction order in this case, it also goes to the root of the case and it is not a curable defect. 27. In Union of India and others v. Ashok Kumar and others [(2005) 8 SCC 760] the meaning of the term “as the case may be” was considered. In paragraph 10 it was held:- “The High Court is plainly in error in holding that it is only the Central Government which is competent to act in terms of Sub-rule (2). Expression “as the case may be” is otherwise rendered superfluous. Both the authorities can act in terms of Sub-rule (2). High Court overlooked the salient factor that any other interpretation would render reference to the Director-General meaningless.” 28. Expression “as the case may be” is otherwise rendered superfluous. Both the authorities can act in terms of Sub-rule (2). High Court overlooked the salient factor that any other interpretation would render reference to the Director-General meaningless.” 28. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has an occasion to consider the very same question in Pragya Singh v. State of Maharashtra (2017 Legal Eagle 235) wherein it was held that both the Central Government and the State Government are empowered to appoint the Reviewing Authority contemplated under the UAPA, thereby indicating that both the Central Government and the State Government are competent to accord sanction. It was held that otherwise, there was no reason for directing the State Government also to appoint such independent Authority. 29. In J.K.Steel Ltd. v. Union of India and others ( AIR 1970 SC 1173 ), it was held that the words “as the case may be” indicate that a choice has to be made between two types. In Subramaniam Shanmughm v. M.L.Rajendran and others [ (1987) 4 SCC 215 ), it was held in paragraph 3:- “Justice Morris in Bluston & Bramley Ltd. V. Leigh explained that the phrase “as the case may be” meant in the events that have happened. Our attention was also drawn to the expression “as the case may be” as appearing in the Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition 4 page 596. The meaning of the expression “as the case may be” is what the expression says, i.e., as the situation may be, in other words in case there are separate and distinct units then concept of need will apply accordingly. Where, however, there is no such separate and distinct unit, it has no significance. There is no magic in that expression. The expression “as the case may be” has been properly construed in the judgment mentioned hereinbefore.” The view taken in Subramaniam Shanmughm (supra) is that the meaning of the expression “as the case may be” is equal to the term “as the situation may be”. 30. The learned Additional Solicitor General has argued that at this stage the accused can only challenge the want of sanction, and not the validity of sanction. It has been argued that the present stage is too premature for the accused to forward a challenge on the validity of the sanction. 30. The learned Additional Solicitor General has argued that at this stage the accused can only challenge the want of sanction, and not the validity of sanction. It has been argued that the present stage is too premature for the accused to forward a challenge on the validity of the sanction. Reliance has been placed on the decision in Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal [ (2014) 14 SCC 295 ], wherein it was held in paragraph 18 that the stage at which the validity of sanction order could be raised was no more res integra in view of the decision in Dinesh Kumar v. Airport Authority of India ( AIR 2012 SC 858 ). In Dinesh Kumar (supra), it was held in paragraph 13:- “In our view, having regard to the facts of the present case, now since cognizance has already been taken against the appellant by the Trial Judge, the High Court cannot be said to have erred in leaving the question of validity of sanction open for consideration by the Trial Court and giving liberty to the appellant to raise the issue concerning validity of sanction order in the course of trial. Such course is in accord with the decision of this Court in Prakash Singh Badal, [2006 KHC 1810 : 2007 (1) SCC 1 : JT 2007 (1) SC 89 : AIR 2007 SC 1274] and not unjustified.” 31. In paragraph 59 of Central Bureau of Investigation (supra) it was held that undoubtedly, the stage of examining the validity of sanction is during the trial and such a question should not be examined during the stage of inquiry or at pre-trial stage. Evidently, the present stage of the case before the court below is inquiry when trial has not been commenced, and therefore, the court below or this Court cannot go into the question of validity of the sanction order. In Dinesh Kumar (supra), it was held that the validity of a sanction order would depend upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority, and the consideration of the material implies application of mind. In paragraph 11, the Apex Court has drawn a distinction between the absence of sanction and validity of sanction. 32. In Dinesh Kumar (supra), it was held that the validity of a sanction order would depend upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority, and the consideration of the material implies application of mind. In paragraph 11, the Apex Court has drawn a distinction between the absence of sanction and validity of sanction. 32. In Parkash Singh Badal and another v. State of Punjab and others (AIR 2007 SC 1274), it was held that the absence of sanction could be raised at the inception and threshold by an aggrieved person; however, where sanction order exists, but its legality and validity is put in question, such issue has to be raised in the course of trial. It was a case wherein the validity of sanction was challenged on the ground of non-application of mind by the sanctioning authority. In paragraph 11 of Dinesh Kumar (supra), it was held: “In our view, invalidity of sanction where sanction order exists, can be raised on diverse grounds like non-availability of material before the sanctioning authority or bias of the sanctioning authority or the order of sanction having been passed by an authority not authorised or competent to grant such sanction. The above grounds are only illustrative and not exhaustive. All such grounds of invalidity or illegality of sanction would fall in the same category like the ground of invalidity of sanction on account of non-application of mind”.(Emphasis supplied) 33. Therefore, even when the challenge is regarding the competency of the authority who granted sanction, it is a challenge on mere invalidity of sanction on account of non-application of mind. Going by the aforesaid view taken by the Apex Court, it is evident that even if there is a challenge that the Central Government has granted sanction in a case wherein the State Government had to accord sanction, it is nothing but a challenge regarding the validity of sanction order on account of mere non-application of mind by the sanctioning authority. Even if the sanction order was granted by an Authority who is not authorized or competent to grant sanction, that also falls within the category of a challenge regarding the validity of sanction order on account of mere non-application of mind. All such contentions can only be forwarded during trial and such contentions cannot be forwarded at pre-trial stage, or even during inquiry. 34. All such contentions can only be forwarded during trial and such contentions cannot be forwarded at pre-trial stage, or even during inquiry. 34. Therefore, the argument forwarded by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that the challenge forwarded by them that the incompetency of the sanctioning authority to grant sanction has to be treated as total lack of sanction, cannot be accepted. 35. In State of Bihar and Ors. v. Rajmangal Ram [2014 AIR SCW 2101] also the decision in Prakash Sing Badal (supra) was followed. 36. In Union of India and Ors. v. Ashok Kumar and Ors. [(2005) 8 SCC 760], it was held in paragraph 18: “The words “as the case may be” mean “whichever the case may be” or “as the situation may be”. (See Shri Balaganesan Metals v. M.N.Shankugham Chetty.) The expression means that one out of the various alternatives would apply to one out of the various situations and not otherwise.” It was held therein that, the expression “as the case may be” means that one out of the various alternatives would apply to one out of the various situations. 37. The learned Additional Solicitor General has argued that it depends on various situations to interpret and construe the application of the term “as the case may be” incorporated in Section 45(1)(ii) of the UAPA. Such a situation has been pointed out before this Court as an illustration, a case wherein the High Court is ordering the investigation of a case by the CBI by disregarding the stiff resistance from the part of the State Government. If such an investigation has been ordered and a final report is filed by the CBI by arraigning the accused, if the CBI is driven to seek sanction from the State Government concerned for the purpose of cognizance of the offences, the power granted to the High Court to order such an investigation by the CBI itself will become redundant. The State Government in such a case can frustrate the provisions either by sitting upon the application seeking sanction or by denying sanction. Therefore, it is argued that in a case where the CBI is ordered to conduct an investigation, it cannot be said that the CBI should seek sanction from the State Government, and in such cases, the CBI need only seek sanction from the Central Government. 38. Therefore, it is argued that in a case where the CBI is ordered to conduct an investigation, it cannot be said that the CBI should seek sanction from the State Government, and in such cases, the CBI need only seek sanction from the Central Government. 38. The learned Additional Solicitor General has argued that Section 45 of the UAPA shall be considered and construed along with Section 43 of UAPA. Section 43 of UAPA says: 43.Officers competent to investigate offences under Chapters IV and VI.- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no police officer,- (a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, constituted under Sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, (25 of 1946), below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of equivalent rank; (b) in the metropolitan areas of Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Ahmedabad and any other metropolitan area notified as such under subsection (1) of section 8 of the Code, below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner of Police; (c) in any case not relatable to clause (a) or clause (b), below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of an equivalent rank, shall investigate any offence punishable under Chapter IV or Chapter VI. 39. Three groups of officers are mentioned in Section 43 of the UAPA as officers competent to investigate the offences under Chapters IV and VI. When the said provision is relating to the competency of the officers to investigate offences under Chapters IV and VI, much discussion is not required to conclude that Section 45 (1) (ii) of the UAPA should also be construed in the light of Section 43 of the UAPA. Section 45 (1) (ii) also specifically deals with offences under Chapters IV and VI. Therefore, the argument forwarded by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that Section 45(1)(ii) shall be construed in isolation, does not seem to be correct. 40. As per Section 43 (a) when an offence under the UAPA is investigated by the CBI, it should be investigated by an officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent rank. 40. As per Section 43 (a) when an offence under the UAPA is investigated by the CBI, it should be investigated by an officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent rank. As per clause (b), when any of such offences is being investigated in the metropolitan areas of Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai and Ahmedabad and any other metropolitan area notified as such under subsection (1) of section 8 of Cr.P.C., the officer should be a person not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner of Police. As per clause (c) in any case not coming under clause (a) and clause (b), the officer to investigate such offences should be an officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of an equivalent rank. 41. As rightly pointed out by the learned Additional Solicitor General, three situations are contemplated for the investigation of the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the UAPA. The first situation is an investigation by the CBI. The second situation is an investigation by an officer not below the rank of an Assistant Commissioner of Police in metropolitan areas as aforesaid. The third situation is an investigation by a Police officer not below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police. When an investigation is conducted by the CBI, evidently as per Section 45(1)(ii) of the UAPA, it is for the Central Government to grant sanction. In cases covered by clauses (b) and (c) to Section 43, it is for the State Governments concerned to grant sanction if those areas do not form part of any Union Territory. 42. When the investigation is conducted by CBI and a final report is filed and especially when stiff resistance is there from the part of the State Government in conducting a proper prosecution, it cannot said that the CBI ought to have sought for sanction from the State Government. In this context, the stand taken by the learned Senior Public Prosecutor for the 3rd respondent and the counter affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent in the matter assume importance. It is quite unfortunate that it has been stated in paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit: “It is submitted that as per Section 45(1) (ii) of the UAP Act, it may be considered that the State Government is competent to grant sanction “as the case may be”. It is quite unfortunate that it has been stated in paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit: “It is submitted that as per Section 45(1) (ii) of the UAP Act, it may be considered that the State Government is competent to grant sanction “as the case may be”. However, the second respondent has never approached the State of Kerala for grant of sanction. Further, as per S.O. (1004) (E) the Central Government has authorized the Secretaries of State Government in charge of Home Department to exercise the powers to sanction prosecution in respect of offenses punishable under Chapter III of UAP Act. Thus it could be seen that State Government has competence to grant sanction under the UAP Act. In this case, the prosecuting authority is CBI, who conducted the investigation as ordered by the State Government on 12.09.2014 as per S.R.O. No.542/2014. The said order is issued as per Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. As per this Section CBI can exercise powers and jurisdiction in a State only with the consent of the State Government. CBI commenced and concluded investigation as ordered by State Government. Apart from that the occurrence has taken place with the territories of the State and there is no allegation of any terrorist Act as defined on Section 15(1) of the UAP Act which threatens the unity, integrity and security of sovereignty of India. In the circumstances, sanction for prosecution in this case can be given only by State Government and not the Central Government.” 43. Still the State Government maintains a view that this is not a case wherein an offence under the UAPA can be attracted. The learned Additional Solicitor General has invited the attention of this Court to order dated 03.02.2015 in Crl.M.C.No.6110/2014 passed by this Court. The said Crl.M.C. was filed by the first accused in this case challenging the first information report in which the offences under the UAPA were incorporated. This Court could notice that the allegations could invite the ingredients of the second limb of Section 15(1) of the UAPA. After a detailed discussion, this Court held that the investigation then in progress under the UAPA should be proceed with. This Court could notice that the allegations could invite the ingredients of the second limb of Section 15(1) of the UAPA. After a detailed discussion, this Court held that the investigation then in progress under the UAPA should be proceed with. It was further held, “Here, I find no situation of any serious breach of any law to quash the FIR partly as regards the provisions of the UAPA incorporated therein, or to quash Annexure- A3 report submitted by the investigating officer.” Consequently, the said 'Crl.M.C. was dismissed in limine without being admitted to files'. 44. When this Court had passed such an order and it was held that the investigation of the offences under the UAPA had to be proceeded with, it is not fair on the part of the State Government to still hold the view that the offences under the UAPA cannot be attracted. Even the first accused has not challenged the said order passed by this Court. The present attitude of the State Government is just as one who is 'more loyal than the King'. 45. Even though in the counter affidavit it has been contended that the investigation by the CBI was ordered by the State Government, presently it has been conceded that it was an error in stating so. The State Government cannot order the CBI to conduct an investigation. When the CBI wants to investigate a case concerning a matter comes under the State list, and if such an investigation is not ordered by the High Court, the consent of the State Government is required within the meaning of Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. Apart from that, the State Government cannot order an investigation by the CBI. Here, the investigation was happily handed over to the CBI by the State Government themselves. Thereafter, the State Government cannot lament that CBI has not turned up to seek sanction from them. When the matter was left with the CBI and they conducted and completed the investigation and filed the final report, the CBI could seek sanction from the Central Government alone, within the meaning of Section 43 clause (a) of the UAPA read with Section 45(1) (ii). In this particular case, when the State Government is entertaining the aforesaid views, if the CBI is driven to seek sanction from the State Government, could the CBI expect that they would grant sanction? In this particular case, when the State Government is entertaining the aforesaid views, if the CBI is driven to seek sanction from the State Government, could the CBI expect that they would grant sanction? 46. Regarding the interpretation of the provisions contained under Section 45(1)(ii) of UAPA, the learned Additional Solicitor General has invited the attention of this Court to the decision in S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. [ AIR 1996 SC 2184 ] wherein it was held in paragraph 10 that the rule of interpretation of statutes is that the text and the context of the entire Act must be looked into while interpreting any of the expressions used in statute. Therefore, Section 45(1)(ii) cannot be interpreted in isolation, whereas, it should be construed in the light of Section 43 of the UAPA. 47. In Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd.[ AIR 1987 SC 1023 ] it was held: “Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place". 48. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place". 48. In N.K. Jain v. C. K. Shah[ (1991) 2 SCC 495 ] it was held: “In gathering the meaning of a word used in the statute, the context in which that word has been used has significance and the legislative purpose must be noted by reading the statute as a whole and bearing in mind the context in which the word has been used in the statute.” 49. In Raghunath Rai Bareja and another v. Punjab National Bank and others[(2007) 2 SCC 230] it was held that: “The first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of interpretation e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation etc., can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very object of the statute.” It was further held therein that where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be made to the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule. 50. In paragraph 40 of Raghunath Rai Bareja(supra) based on Prakash Nath Khanna v. C.I.T.,[ (2004) 9 SCC 686 ], it was held: “The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. The legislature is presumed to have made no mistake. The presumption is that it intended to say what it has said. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court cannot correct or make up the deficiency, especially when a literal reading thereof produces an intelligible result, vide Delhi Financial Corporation v. Rajiv Anand.” 51. In Andhra Pradesh v. Road Rollers Owners Welfare Association[(2004) 6 SCC 210], it was held: “Where the legislative intent is clear from the language, the Court should give effect to it and the Court should not seek to amend the law in the garb of interpretation.” 52. In paragraph 41 of Raghunath Rai Bareja (supra) it was held: “The great judges have constantly admonished their brethren of the need for discipline in observing the limitations. In paragraph 41 of Raghunath Rai Bareja (supra) it was held: “The great judges have constantly admonished their brethren of the need for discipline in observing the limitations. A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policymaking might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration. He must not read in by way of creation. He must not read out except to avoid patent nonsense or internal contradiction.” It was further held in paragraph 43: “In other words, once we depart from the literal rule, then any number of interpretations can be put to a statutory provision, each Judge having a free play to put his own interpretation as he likes. This would be destructive of judicial discipline, and also the basic principle in a democracy that it is not for the Judge to legislate as that is the task of the elected representatives of the people. Even if the literal interpretation results in hardship or inconvenience, it has to be followed (see G.P. Singhs Principles of Statutory Interpretations, 9th Edn. pp 45-49). Hence departure from the literal rule should only be done in very rare cases, and ordinarily there should be judicial restraint in this connection.” 53. The rules of interpretation other than the literal rule will come into play only if there is any doubt with regard to the express language used in the statute or if the plain meaning would lead to an absurdity. Where the words are unambiguous, there is no scope for importing any rule of interpretation other than the literal rule. 54. In the light of Section 43, if an interpretation is given to the term 'as the case may be' in Section 45(1)(ii) that sanction for cognizance has to be taken from the State Government concerned in all the incidents occur within the territory of a State Government, it will lead to an absurdity. The Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. When Section 43 deals with three situations relating to the investigation of offences under Chapters IV and VI, the term 'as the case may be' employed in Section 45(1)(ii) necessarily contemplates those situations and that is why the term 'as the case may be' has been employed. 55. When Section 43 deals with three situations relating to the investigation of offences under Chapters IV and VI, the term 'as the case may be' employed in Section 45(1)(ii) necessarily contemplates those situations and that is why the term 'as the case may be' has been employed. 55. If the investigation is in respect of an offence coming under Chapter III of the UAPA, whoever be the investigating officer, it falls under Section 45(1)(i) and sanction for cognizance has to be obtained from the Central Government. In cases being investigated by the CBI under clause (a) to Section 43, sanctioning authority is the Central Government, if the offences are coming under Chapters IV and VI. If such investigation is carried out by the officers mentioned under clauses (b) and (c) to Section 43, necessarily, sanctioning authority is the State Government concerned, in case such places of occurrence are not coming within any Union Territory, or the property destroyed does not belong to the Union of India or a Foreign Government. In the result, W.P.(C) No.25403.2017 is allowed in part and W.P.(C) No.31229/2017 is dismissed, as follows:- It is concluded that there is no want of sanction as such in these matters. At the same time, when cognizance was taken by the Sessions Court, Thalassery for the offences under UAPA also as against A1 to A19, even prior to Ext. P2 sanction order, that cognizance is bad in law. It is declared that the said cognizance is bad in law. It has to be treated that no cognizance as such has been taken. Therefore, the court below where the final report is presently there shall apply its mind as against A1 to A19 afresh in the light of Exts.P1 and P2 in the first writ petition, consider the matter afresh and decide whether cognizance can be taken or not. If it is decided that cognizance has to be taken, there is no need for allotting a separate number to the case, since the cognizance taken for other offences is unaffected and remains to be valid. Therefore, the case need not be numbered again; whereas, there should be an order of taking cognizance of the offences under the UAPA. The reliefs sought for, for a declaration that the State Government is the authority competent to grant sanction are only to be declined. Therefore, the case need not be numbered again; whereas, there should be an order of taking cognizance of the offences under the UAPA. The reliefs sought for, for a declaration that the State Government is the authority competent to grant sanction are only to be declined. The reliefs sought for to quash the sanction orders cannot be entertained. At the same time, the petitioners are at liberty to challenge the validity of sanction during trial, if any.