JUDGMENT : 1. Smt. Bela Das filed a writ petition before this Court in 2015. It was numbered as W.P. 30214(W) of 2015. In that petition she wanted that her house in Ranaghat ought not to be demolished until compensation was paid to her in respect of an acquisition which had commenced under the National Highways Act, 1956. A Learned single Judge of this Court by an order dated December 23, 2015 had disposed of the writ petition as aforesaid by holding as follows: - “The determination of the compensation for any land or building or the completion of such process does not require the building to remain erect while the adjudication is undertaken. It is quite possible that the petitioner is dissatisfied with the paltry amount offered for her precious building. The arbitrator will decide on the appropriate compensation in course of the arbitral reference and the petitioner has even a right to challenge the award in accordance with law. W.P. 30214(W) of 2015 is disposed of by permitting the petitioner to protest the quantum offered to the petitioner by way of compensation, whether on account of the land or on account of the building standing thereon, but the petitioner’s right to protest the same or seek enhanced compensation will not entitle the petitioner to resist the National Highways Authority of India or any person deputed by such authority to demolish the petitioner’s building or any structure on the land in question. In the event the petitioner files a request for an arbitral reference with the competent authority, the competent authority should ensure that the reference is initiated at the earliest and that a notice of the first hearing of the reference is communicated to the petitioner within four weeks of the receipt of a copy of this order by the competent authority.” 2. After the disposal of the writ petition, the writ petitioner has admittedly applied to the competent authority to refer the disputes to the arbitration under a representation dated February 22, 2016 in compliance of the said Order dated December 23, 2015. Therefore, the first limb of the said order has been complied with. After the disposal of the writ petition, the writ petitioner has admittedly applied to the competent authority to refer the disputes to the arbitration under a representation dated February 22, 2016 in compliance of the said Order dated December 23, 2015. Therefore, the first limb of the said order has been complied with. However, though the learned single Judge had granted leave to the petitioner to make such a request by protesting the quantum of compensation, the second limb of the order that notice of hearing be first issued to the writ petitioner before the award was passed on the reference of the writ petitioner, was not complied with. It is not disputed either from the Bar or by showing any record by any of the respondents all of whom are represented today that the statement made by the writ petitioner at paragraph ‘12’ of the writ petition is false and that there is any notice of hearing given before passing of the award. 3. At paragraph ‘12’ of the writ petition the writ petitioner has stated as follows: “12. Your petitioner states that few days after receiving of the abovementioned arbitral reference dated 22.02.2016 the respondent No. 5 informed the petitioner that the Learned Arbitrator had completed the Arbitration hearing on 03.09.2015 and thus forwarded the synoptic order of that hearing vide Memo No. 219/L.A./N.H.A.I. dated 29.02.2016. Photocopy of the above referred memo dated 29.02.2016 and the copy of the alleged order of Arbitration are annexed hereto and collectively marked with the letter “P 7”. 4. At page ‘67’ of the writ petition, the writ petitioner has disclosed a Memo dated February 29, 2016 where it has been alleged that in compliance with the judgment dated 22.12.2015 of the Hon’ble Justice Sanjib Banerjee in W.P. 30214(W) of 2015, she is informed that the Arbitrationhearing of Mouja Dayabari J.L. No. 152, P.S. Ranaghat has been done and disposed of by the Learned Arbitrator & District Magistrate, Nadia on September 3, 2015 and after hearing in presence of Awardees, the rates of Bari/Viti/Church and Dokan/Bazar have been increased. It has also been alleged that a copy of the synoptic Order is enclosed for her information. The writ petitioner was informed that she may collect the certified copy of the Order through D.M.’s Record Room. 5. It has also been alleged that a copy of the synoptic Order is enclosed for her information. The writ petitioner was informed that she may collect the certified copy of the Order through D.M.’s Record Room. 5. Therefore, it appears that the Additional District Magistrate, Nadia by a Memo dated February 29, 2016, immediately after receiving the reference, has stated that in compliance with the judgment of the learned single Judge referred to above which was passed only on December 22, 2015 the arbitrator has passed an arbitral award on September 3, 2015 that is to say the arbitrator has purported to comply with the order dated December 22, 2015 more than three months before the said judgment was passed and more than five months before the arbitral reference was made. 6. In Bengali there is a saying, “Ram na Janmatei Ramayan” which freely translated means that Ramayan was composed even before the birth of Lord Rama. It was not known to the Court that the arbitrator being the learned District Magistrate, Nadia also combined in himself the poetic capacity of Adi Kabi Valmiki who was blessed by the Almighty through his sages to write truly that which was destined to happen. 7. At any event, no case has been made out by Mr. Susovan Sengupta, learned Senior Government Advocate appearing for the State of West Bengal and the competent authority that the said District Magistrate is in possession of a time machine which would allow him rush forward in time to December 22, 2015 and know that an order would be passed on that day by the Hon'ble High Court giving liberty to the writ petitioner to file a reference, and know the contents of the application for reference which was made only on February 22, 2016, and then rush back in time to September 3, 2015 to pass an award, in respect of the disputed compensation, even before the application for reference was temporally made. 8. The writ petitioner’s further case is that pursuant to the aforesaid reference a farcical synoptic order as mentioned in paragraph ‘12’ of the writ petition was served on him. This is at page ‘68’ of the writ petition. While the amount being the basic rate and the particulars for different classes of lands have been mentioned there, the said order is wholly innocent of the plot number or details of the land. This is at page ‘68’ of the writ petition. While the amount being the basic rate and the particulars for different classes of lands have been mentioned there, the said order is wholly innocent of the plot number or details of the land. 9. Mr. Sengupta, learned senior Government Advocate strenuously has contended as follows: (i) The writ petition is barred by constructive res judicata in view of the order dated December 22, 2015 passed by a co- ordinate Bench of this Court. Mr. Chaudhiri’s client has complied with the said order of the learned single Judge referred to above by which her attempt to undo the demolition and stall the development project was not given any credence by the writ Court; (i) He has tried to make submission without instruction that actually the anomaly in time which was noted above by me had been happened due to disturbance in the time space continuum. (i) Possibly by mistake at the time of hearing of the earlier writ petition, the Learned Advocate for the State of West Bengal had not pointed out that the award had already been passed on September 3, 2015 this is despite the order having been passed ex parte; however, Mr. Sengupta did not explain why after this so-called mistake was detected, the State of West Bengal did not take steps to get the order dated December 22, 2015 reviewed, and allowed the farce of an arbitration to continue. It was incumbent on the State of West Bengal to have pointed out to the coordinate Bench that the order which had been passed by it was on the basis of fact not disclosed to the Court, which materially affected the outcome. The writ petitioner, admittedly, before February 29, 2016, knew nothing of the passing of the arbitral award dated September 3, 2015. None of the respondents had chosen to appear despite service. So none could point this out on December 22, 2015 when the order was passed. (i) Mr. The writ petitioner, admittedly, before February 29, 2016, knew nothing of the passing of the arbitral award dated September 3, 2015. None of the respondents had chosen to appear despite service. So none could point this out on December 22, 2015 when the order was passed. (i) Mr. Sengupta continues, that in fact, in order to comply with the order dated December 22, 2015 passed by the coordinate Bench in the earlier writ petition a fresh opportunity of being heard was given to the writ petitioner by a notice dated March 29, 2016 by the self-same Additional District Magistrate and Competent Authority on April 6, 2016 with all papers relating to the said earlier writ petition by a Memo No.289/LA/N.H.A.I. This is at page 69 of the writ petition. (i) Thereafter, on April 6, 2016, a so-called hearing was held where the said competent authority, who is emphatically not the arbitrator being the District Magistrate and Collector, merely held that already arbitration was done for that Mouza, and the compensation for the “Viti” class of land for that Mouza had been enhanced. Still the said competent authority and not the arbitrator, directed that verification of the structure of the writ petitioner be done since she was aggrieved with the structure value, even while holding that there was no scope of further enhancement of the land value. This is at page 70 of the writ petition. (i) Thereafter the writ petitioner represented that the verification and measurement of the structure was done in her absence without prior notice, and the Order dated April 6, 2016 does not fix a date of inspection, but only a date of filing the report. This is from page 71 of the writ petition. 10. None of the above submissions of fact after the issuance of the intimation dated February 29, 2016 alters the fact that the order was passed on December 22, 2015 giving liberty to the writ petitioner herein to request the competent authority to initiate a reference to arbitration, and he was to do so only after giving an notice of hearing to the writ petitioner. The competent authority (the respondent No. 5) was required under Section 3G of the National Highways Act, 1956 to refer the dispute to the Arbitrator being the respondent No. 4, and no arbitration reference could be initiated or completed and no award could be passed without first giving an opportunity to the writ petitioner to be heard, in terms of the order dated December 22, 2015. Admittedly, the respondents violated the order of the coordinate Bench aforesaid, and in fact in abuse of process of this Court, with a view to avoiding any mandatory order on the writ petition. Had the respondents brought it to the notice of His Lordship, even after the writ petition had been disposed of, by way of a petition for review, that the award had already been passed, without putting the writ petitioner on notice, and without serving any copy of the award to the writ petitioner, an affected party, then the situation would have been different. The said proceedings in arbitration wholly in violation of the basic principles of natural justice by the “State”, may have been interfered with by His Lordship. 11. Now, the State of West Bengal, ex facie a wrong doer which determines compensation and does not put on notice the affected land-owner before doing so, and does not contemporaneously inform the land-owner of having done so, and holds arbitrations affecting the entirety of the lands acquired, again without putting the affected writ petitioner on notice, is trying to say a post-award opportunity of being heard granted by someone who is not the arbitrator but only a competent authority who cannot touch the award, is in compliance of the order dated December 22, 2015 even though by such stratagems the right of the writ petitioner to have recourse to such right of arbitration has been made illusory. 12. Mr. Das, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the NHAI hands up a copy of an order dated December 20, 2017, passed by me in more or less similar matters including W.P. No. 12953 (W) of 2017 [Raj Kumar Agarwal v. State of West Bengal and Others], where I had directed that despite the lacunae involved in similar synoptic copies of the award passed without issuing notice to the affected parties, instead of the writ Court interfering, the matter should be relegated to the appropriate forum for setting aside the arbitral award. 13. 13. The distinction between that case and this case is the State of West Bengal in that case through their learned counsel has not tried to defend its abuse of process and chicanery outlined above. The Learned Advocate General appeared in the earlier case and argued the question of law whether the writ court ought to intervene in such a matter where setting aside of an arbitral award was available, and the time to challenge the award would run from the date a copy of the actual award was made available to the writ petitioner. An offer was made by the State of West Bengal to supply a copy of the arbitral award such that the writ petitioner could avail of that remedy. Most importantly there had been no question of State of West Bengal and its servants trying, I say with greatest possible respect, to defraud the Court. The facts that the award was passed on arbitration on September 3, 2015 when the request for reference was not made until February 22, 2016 and the order granting liberty to the writ petitioner, to make such a request for reference had not been passed by a Co-ordinate Bench until December 22, 2015 show that the award passed by the respondent No. 4 whose factum (though not complete contents) was communicated by the respondent No.5 on February 29, 2015, is not an award as envisaged by the order dated December 22, 2015. However, bad a person may be, such person is entitled to equal protection of the laws. The conduct of the respondent No. 4 shocks the conscience of this Court because of unequal oppression by the State authorities which is actually supported by the learned senior Government Advocate and the entire machinery of the State. 14. There has been gross violation of the basic principles of natural justice by passing an arbitral award even before the reference was made by the writ petitioner, and purporting to be an award passed on such reference, and that too, without hearing the petitioner and this amounts to a spine-chilling violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in material terms. This is one of the cases where the writ Court ought to intervene under Article 226 of the Constitution of India especially because the distinction between this case and my order in the earlier writ petition in the case of Raj Kumar Agarwal (supra) is too glaring to be ignored. 15. In none of the other cases, the State has tried to defraud the petitioner as also the Court and has not even offered to supply a copy of the arbitral award instead of making do with a summary under the name of a synoptic copy which does not even give particulars of the plot of land. 16. Even though my findings are prima facie as of today, there is nothing on record to even dispute these facts stated on oath by the writ petitioner. I find a prima facie case on records in favour of the writ petitioner. The preponderance of balance of convenience is in favour of the writ petitioner and the orders prayed for being granted. There appears to be some urgency in the matter. 17. In the changed circumstances the State cannot be permitted to act as a predator grabbing land under the guise of development work. Had that been the case, then every fraud and expropriation of land by fraud without following procedure established by law would have to be allowed to succeed once the sacred incantation of “Development” was chanted like a magic formula. When the coordinate bench was pleased to refuse to pass any order stopping demolition, it had not been apprised that the award had already been made without allowing the petitioner any opportunity to be heard, on a reference not made by him in respect of the quantum of compensation determined by the competent authority without giving him any effective opportunity of being heard. The actual facts are now before this Court. That is why the coordinate bench was of the view that if the writ petitioner was aggrieved by the initial amount determined, she could go for enhancement of the compensation amount in accordance with law before the arbitrator as provided under the law. The actual facts are now before this Court. That is why the coordinate bench was of the view that if the writ petitioner was aggrieved by the initial amount determined, she could go for enhancement of the compensation amount in accordance with law before the arbitrator as provided under the law. It was naturally beyond the comprehension of the coordinate bench – as it would have been, had the facts not been brought before me, even beyond my comprehension – that the District Magistrate, Nadia would have caused an antedated order to be served, in the manner indicated above. Had this been so, His Lordship, I am sure, may have been pleased to pass an order similar to what I pass now. 18. Accordingly, I pass an interim order restraining the respondents and/or any of them from obstructing and/or interfering with the peaceful possession of the writ petitioner in the land in question and the building standing thereon till the disposal of this writ petition and/or further orders whichever is earlier. 19. I make it clear that I have considered the earlier order passed by this Court which appears at page ‘59’ of the writ petition before passing this order. 20. Affidavits in opposition shall be filed within a period of four weeks from date. Reply thereto, if any may be filed within a period of two weeks from date. 21. The costs of today’s hearing are reserved. 22. The parties are at liberty to mention for early hearing.