JUDGMENT : D.P. CHOUDHURY, J. 1. Challenge has been made to the inaction of the opposite parties in not releasing the differential arrear salary of the petitioner as per the condition of the appointment letter as well as the Government Resolution and pay scale sanctioned by All India Council for Technical Education (hereinafter referred to as “the A.I.C.T.E.”) for the teaching staff including the post of Instructor and consequent retirement benefit of the petitioner. 2. The factual matrix leading to the writ petition is that the petitioner joined the post of welding Instructor on 14.10.1983 under Opp. Parties 3 and 4 which is duly affiliated to A.I.C.T.E. The petitioner was allowed to draw the salary as per the order of his appointment till 1985-86, but thereafter the petitioner was not allowed to draw his salary at the enhanced rate as per the Government of Orissa Regulation revised from time to time. In spite of his repeated request to the higher authorities, he was not paid his salary at the enhanced rate in spite of the fact that opp. Parties 3 and 4 Institution is recognized by the A.I.C.T.E. under the direct control of the Directorate of Technical Education and Training (in short “D.T.E.T.”). In the meantime the petitioner retired on 31.7.2008 on attaining the age of superannuation at the age of 58 years. Since the petitioner neither got the enhanced rate of salary in accordance with the A.I.C.T.E. instruction nor same under the Government of Orissa Regulation, the writ application has been filed seeking release of differential arrear salary in accordance with the Government Resolution and pay scale sanctioned by the A.I.C.T.E. and differential retiral benefits. SUBMISSIONS 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was working in the opp. Party nos. 3 and 4’s institution which is a technical education institute. As instructor he has to impart teaching to the students. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that in the appointment letter of the petitioner it has been clearly mentioned that the petitioner was appointed in the scale of pay as admissible to the Government servant of Orissa and the Sanjaya Memorial Institute of Technology (in short “SMIT”), which is affiliated to A.I.C.T.E. As such, recommendation of the A.I.C.T.E. for payment of the salary to the teachers under the institution affiliated to A.I.C.T.E. should be made available to the petitioner. Apart from this countering the argument of the learned counsel for the opp. Parties, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the SMIT is although a private institution, it is coming under the “authority”, amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 12 of the Constitution. Lastly he submitted that in the meantime the petitioner has retired and the differential arrear salary and the pensionary benefit should be extended to the petitioner. 4. Per contra, learned Addl. Standing Counsel on behalf of Opp. Parties 1 and 2 submitted that since the petitioner is working in a private institute, the State Government is not concerned in the matter to fix up the salary structure or fix the age of superannuation of the petitioner as the State Government is no way concerned in payment of salary, for which the writ application against opp. Parties 1 and 2 may be dismissed. 5. Mr. Milan Kanungo, learned Senior Advocate for the Opp. Parties 3 and 4 relying upon the counter affidavit, submitted that the writ application against opp. Parties 3 and 4 is not maintainable, because it is self finance, unaided and private professional institution, for which the writ application against the institution is not warranted. In this case he relied upon the Single Bench decision of this Court passed in W.P.(C) No. 6990 of 2016 (Prafulla Kumar Mishra v. State of Orissa and others), where His Lordship observed that SMIT is not the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and as such, the writ application is not maintainable. 6. Learned counsel for the Opp. Parties 3 and 4 submitted that the SMIT was established in the year 1980-81 and it was started with Diploma Engineering, PGCMS (MBA) and College of Library & Information Science. Teaching and nonteaching staff are appointed by the Managing Committee with consolidated salary or the scale of pay as approved by the said Committee. Since the petitioner’s appointment was subject to the condition as mentioned in the appointment letter, such appointment is purely temporary in nature and terminable by one month’s notice from either side. Moreover, the petitioner is not entitled to the scale of pay revised from time to time because his appointment was contractual one and confined to the scale of pay as mentioned in the appointment letter. 7. Learned counsel for Opp. Moreover, the petitioner is not entitled to the scale of pay revised from time to time because his appointment was contractual one and confined to the scale of pay as mentioned in the appointment letter. 7. Learned counsel for Opp. Parties 3 and 4 further submitted that the performance of the petitioner was not satisfactory, for which he was subjected to several disciplinary actions during his tenure and the same fact was not disclosed by the petitioner, for which he is guilt for misrepresentation. The service condition of the State Government is not applicable to the fact of the present case of SMIT. According to him, the petitioner was never dealt as per the Government Rule, but he was made to retire at the age of superannuation of 58 years as well as death-cum-gratuity fixed by the SMIT. Since the petitioner is not governed under the State Government Rules and he has been paid salary as per the office order, he is not entitled to any arrear salary. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for Opp. Parties 3 and 4 that SMIT has two wings, one is for technical Degree courses and the other is for Diploma course. For Technical/Degree courses the institution is affiliated to A.I.C.T.E. while on the other hand Diploma Course are controlled by National Council of Vocational Training (in short “NCVT”). Since the petitioner was the Instructor for Diploma course in I.T.I. of SMIT, the petitioner is not entitled to revisional scale of pay as claimed by him and the writ application should be dismissed. 8. POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION: (I) Whether the writ application is maintainable against the opp. parties 3 and 4 institution? (II) Whether the petitioner is entitled to arrear salary under the Revised Scale of Pay as per the U.G.C. or A.I.C.T.E. Guidelines? 9. POINT NO.I It is the admitted fact that the petitioner has joined as an Instructor in SMIT and he also continued as such and retired on attaining the age of superannuation at the age of 58 years. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the writ application is maintainable because of the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court. It is reported in the case of Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University and others; (2015) 16 SCC 530 , where Their Lordships at paragraphs 27 to 31 observed as follows:- “27. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the writ application is maintainable because of the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court. It is reported in the case of Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University and others; (2015) 16 SCC 530 , where Their Lordships at paragraphs 27 to 31 observed as follows:- “27. This issue was again examined in great detail by the Constitution Bench in Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Anr. V. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649 wherein the question which fell for consideration was whether the Board of Control for Cricket in India (in short “BCCI”) falls within the definition of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution. This Court approved the ratio laid down in Andi Mukta’s case but on facts of the case held, by majority, that BCCI does not fall within the purview of the term State. This Court, however, laid down the principle of law in Paras 31 and 33 as under: “31. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that the Board does discharge some duties like the selection of an Indian cricket team, controlling the activities of the players and others involved in the game of cricket. These activities can be said to be akin to public duties or State functions and if there is any violation of any constitutional or statutory obligation or rights of other citizens, the aggrieved party may not have a relief by way of a petition under Article 32. But that does not mean that the violator of such right would go scot-free merely because it or he is not a State. Under the Indian jurisprudence there is always a just remedy for the violation of a right of a citizen. Though the remedy under Article 32 is not available, an aggrieved party can always seek a remedy under the ordinary course of law or by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is much wider than Article 32. * ** 33. Thus, it is clear that when a private body exercises its public functions even if it is not a State, the aggrieved person has a remedy not only under the ordinary law but also under the Constitution, by way of a writ petition under Article 226.” 28. * ** 33. Thus, it is clear that when a private body exercises its public functions even if it is not a State, the aggrieved person has a remedy not only under the ordinary law but also under the Constitution, by way of a writ petition under Article 226.” 28. It is clear from a reading of the ratio decidendi of judgment in Zee Telefilms Ltd. that firstly, it is held therein that the BCCI discharges public duties and secondly, an aggrieved party can, for this reason, seek a public law remedy against the BCCI under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 29. Applying the aforesaid principle of law to the facts of the case in hand, we are of the considered view that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in holding that respondent No. 1 is not subjected to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In other words, it should have been held that respondent 1 is subjected to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 30. This we say for the reasons that firstly, respondent 1 is engaged in imparting education in higher studies to students at large. Secondly, it is discharging "public function" by way of imparting education. Thirdly, it is notified as a "Deemed University" by the Central Government under Section 3 of the UGC Act. Fourthly, being a “Deemed University”, all the provisions of the UGC Act are made applicable to respondent 1, which inter alia provides for effective discharge of the public function, namely, education for the benefit of public. Fifthly, once respondent 1 is declared as “Deemed University" whose all functions and activities are governed by the UGC Act, alike other universities then it is an "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Lastly, once it is held to be an "authority" as provided in Article 12 then as a necessary consequence, it becomes amenable to writ jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 31. In the light of foregoing discussion, we cannot concur with the finding rendered by the Division Bench and accordingly while reversing the finding we hold that the appellant's writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against respondent 1 is maintainable.” 10. 31. In the light of foregoing discussion, we cannot concur with the finding rendered by the Division Bench and accordingly while reversing the finding we hold that the appellant's writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against respondent 1 is maintainable.” 10. With due regard to the aforesaid decision it appears that the word “authority” used in Article 226 of the Constitution must receive liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12 of the Constitution. Strictly speaking, if the institution is not the “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution, but an “authority” discharging public function/duty must be amenable to Article 226 of the Constitution. 11. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Jaminikanta Das & others v. Governing Body of Sanjaya Memorial Institute of Technology & others; 84 (1997) CLT 483 have been pleased to observe at paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 as follows:- “5. Preliminary objection having been raised to the maintainability of this application, let us, therefore, find out if the Sanjaya Memorial Institute of Technology is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Against whom a writ will lie? Answer to this question is found in Article 226 itself which states, inter alia, that every High Court throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction shall have power to issue directions, orders or appropriate writ to any person or authority including in appropriate cases any Government. Since in the present case the controversy centers round the expression “authority”, we may plainly state that a writ lies against an “authority” if it is the “State” within Article 12 of the Constitution. If an authority does not satisfy the requirements of the “State” as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution, will it not be amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution? This very question came up for decision before the Supreme Court in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Mukharjee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smark Trust v. V.R. Rudani, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1607. K. Jagannatha Shetty, J. speaking for the Court opined in paragraph-19 of the judgment as follows: “The term ‘authority’ used in Article 226, in the contest, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. K. Jagannatha Shetty, J. speaking for the Court opined in paragraph-19 of the judgment as follows: “The term ‘authority’ used in Article 226, in the contest, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words ‘any person or authority’ used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.” In paragraph 21 of the judgment, the Court further observed infra: “Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor De Smith states:” To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statutes. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract.” (Judicial Review of Administrative Act 4th Ed. P.540). We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available ‘to reach injustice wherever it is found’. P.540). We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available ‘to reach injustice wherever it is found’. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226……………..” Following the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, a Bench of this Court presided over by Hansaria, C.J. (as he then was) in Antaryami Rath v. State of Orissa, 70 (1990) C L T 642, Basanti Mohanty v. State of Orissa, 72 (1991) C L T 127 and Susama Patnaik v. Managing Committee, Buxi Jagabandhu English Medium School and others, 73 (1992) C.L.T. 494 held that private educational institutions discharge public duty as they perform the most useful social function of imparting education and that too in accordance with the curricula prescribed by the respective statutory bodies and, as such, they are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court on the ground that they perform public duty. In O.J.C. Nos.6605, 7233 and 7712 of 1995 decided on 10-9-1996 (Niladri Mohanty & another etc v. Regional College of Management and another etc) question arose whether Regional College of Management, Bhubaneswar, a private educational institution, is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. A Bench of this Court to which one of us (R.K. Patra, J) was a party following the ratio of the judgments of the Supreme Court in V.R. Rudani (supra) and that of this Court in Antaryami Rath (supra) and Basanti Mohanty (supra) held that a writ will lie against the Regional College of Management as it performs public duty. 6. From the aforesaid analysis, we have no doubt to hold that a private educational institution is amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that as an authority it discharges public duty. If any further authority is necessary in this regard, one may profitable see the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Unni Krishna, J.P. etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh etc., A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178. If any further authority is necessary in this regard, one may profitable see the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Unni Krishna, J.P. etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh etc., A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2178. After considering the case of V.R. Rudani (supra) and the case of Dwarka Nath v. Income tax Officer, Special Circle, D. Ward, Kanpur, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 81, the Constitution Bench in paragraph 83 of the judgment opined as follows: “The emphasis in this case is as to the nature of duty imposed on the body. It requires to be observed that the meaning of authority under Article 226 came to be laid down distinguishing the same term from Article 12. In spite of it, if the emphasis is on the nature of duty on the same principle it has to be held that those educational institutions discharge public duties. Irrespective of the educational institutions receiving aid it should be held that it is a public duty. The absence of aid does not detract from the nature of duty.” (Emphasis supplied) 7………….Now coming to the Sanjaya Memorial Institute of Technology, it will be seen that the said Institute is engaged in imparting education in Engineering Science of different faculties and the nature of the function discharged by it is nothing but public duty. For all the reasons mentioned above, we have no hesitation to hold that the Institute in question although is not the ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, it being an authority discharging public duty is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The preliminary objection raised by Shri Pal has thus no merit and is hereby overruled.” 12. With due respect, Their Lordship after analyzing various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held that Opp. Parties 3 and 4 institution are amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court although it is not coming under the definition “State” as per Article 12 of the Constitution. 13. There is another writ application vide O.J.C. No.7646 of 1993 filed by one B. Gangadhar Setty v. State of Orissa and others. In that case the learned Single Judge of this Court after following the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench decision of this Court has held that Opp. Parties 3 and 4 are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. In that case the learned Single Judge of this Court after following the aforesaid decision of the Division Bench decision of this Court has held that Opp. Parties 3 and 4 are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The decision of this Court was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Apex Court did not interfere with the observation of this Court. 14. Not only this, but also the aforesaid decision of this Court was also followed in similar question in W.P.(C) No.3175 of 2006. Learned counsel for the opp. Parties 3 and 4 relied upon the decision of the learned Single Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.6990 of 2016 in the case of Prafulla Kumar Mishra v. State of Orissa and others (supra), where the learned Single Judge observed that Sanjaya Memorial Institute of Technology is not the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and as such the writ application is not maintainable. In that case this Court has not referred to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court and the Division Bench of this Court, where it has been held that Opp. Parties 3 and 4 are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Moreover, aforesaid decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court and Division Bench of this Court have not been placed before this Court as the learned Single Judge of this Court had not discussed the word “authority” as available in Article 226 of the Constitution. Hence, with due respect the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court is distinguished and as such the same is not applicable to the fact and circumstances of this case. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the view that even if Sanjaya Memorial Institute of Technology is self financed institution, but same being “authority” under Article 226 of the Constitution, the writ application is maintainable. Point No.I is answered accordingly. 16. POINT NO.II. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the institution of Opp. parties 3 and 4 is affiliated to the A.I.C.T.E. and the petitioner was appointed in that institution. On the other hand, learned counsel for Opp. Parties 3 and 4 asserted that opp. Parties 3 and 4 have got two streams, one is Degree/ Technical and another is Diploma courses. Degree courses are affiliated to A.I.C.T.E., whereas Diploma courses are affiliated to NCVT. On the other hand, learned counsel for Opp. Parties 3 and 4 asserted that opp. Parties 3 and 4 have got two streams, one is Degree/ Technical and another is Diploma courses. Degree courses are affiliated to A.I.C.T.E., whereas Diploma courses are affiliated to NCVT. 17. Learned counsel for the Opp. Parties 3 and 4 could not place any sort of material to show that Diploma courses are affiliated and controlled by the NCVT. On the other hand the petitioner filed the brochure of the institution for the session 1988-89, where the Diploma Engineering wing is under the A.I.C.T.E. because it has submitted information to A.I.C.T.E. through D.T.E.T., Orissa. It is needless to say that the petitioner was appointed as Instructor in Diploma Engineering course. Thus, it must be observed that the petitioner joined in SMIT which is affiliated to A.I.C.T.E. 18. The appointment letter vide Annexure-1 which is also admitted by the Opp. Parties 3 and 4 is placed below for reference:- “Office of the Sanjaya Memorial Institute of Technology, At/P.O. Ankuspur, Via-Kukudakhandi, Dist.Ganjam. No.________/83. Dated 14.10.83 Office Order Sri Subha Chandra Mishra, Misra Engineering, Berhampur is appointed as welder Instructor and remain in-charge of fabrication in the scale of Rs.300-8-308-10-358-LB-12-442-14-470/-per month with usual D.A. and A.D.A. as admissible to the Govt. servants of Orissa. The appointment is temporary and terminable with one month’s notice from either side in liew thereof. He should join his appointment forthwith. He should come with his welding Transformer with him which will be returned after we procure our own transformer. Sd/-B. Nayak, 30.9.83 President” 19. From the aforesaid office order, it is clear that the petitioner was appointed as Instructor (Welding) and remained in charge of Fabrication with the scale of pay with D.A. and A.D.A. admissible to the Government servant of Orissa. There is nothing found from this order that the petitioner was appointed for a fixed period with consolidated amount of salary as claimed by the Opp. parties 3 and 4 in their counter affidavit. Moreover, the Service Book as placed by the petitioner and the Opp. Parties 3 and 4 clearly shows that the Service Book as maintained for Government servant has been followed by Opp. Parties 3 and 4. 20. parties 3 and 4 in their counter affidavit. Moreover, the Service Book as placed by the petitioner and the Opp. Parties 3 and 4 clearly shows that the Service Book as maintained for Government servant has been followed by Opp. Parties 3 and 4. 20. When the Service Book is maintained and appointment letter is clear to show that the scale of pay as admissible to Government servants should be made available to the petitioner, the Court is of the opinion that the petitioner is a regular employee and he was receiving salary as Government employee. 21. The copy of the Service Book also shows that the petitioner has been given annual increments time to time and the service has been verified from time to time as per procedure applicable in Government service. Besides this, the petitioner has been allowed revised scale of pay with effect from 1.1.2006 and also it appears that on attaining the age of superannuation was relieved from duties on 31.7.2008. When the Service Book is maintained showing revision of scale and on the date of superannuation he was allowed to retire, the contention of the learned counsel for Opp. Parties 3 and 4 that the petitioner was paid consolidated pay and the job was temporary one, is untenable. 22. It is contended by learned counsel for the Opp. Parties 3 and 4 that SMIT being self financed meets the requirement of the staff from its own source. It is also submitted that the claim of the petitioner for payment of arrear salary should not be allowed as the Opp. Parties 3 and 4 never pay the salary to its employees at par with the Government employee. When the office order shows that the payment of salary is made as available to the Government servants and the revision of the scale of pay have been made as per the Revision of Scale of Pay Rules either in 1998 or 2008 passed under State Government, the contention of the learned counsel for Opp. Parties 3 and 4 that it has no obligation to pay any amount at par with the Government servants is inapposite. 23. Parties 3 and 4 that it has no obligation to pay any amount at par with the Government servants is inapposite. 23. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court is of the view that the petitioner is not only entitled to the scale of pay at par with the Government employees as per the Orissa Revised Scale of Pay Rules framed from time to time but also entitled to receive the same under the A.I.C.T.E. as the institute of Opp. Parties 3 and 4 is affiliated to A.I.C.T.E. Point No.II is answered accordingly. CONCLUSION: 24. In the writ application it has been prayed to release the differential arrear salary as per the terms and condition of the appointment letter as admissible to Government servant and the pay scale sanctioned to the Instructor by the A.I.C.T.E. 25. It has been observed that the scale of pay at par with the Government servant of the petitioner has been revised, but the revised scale of pay under the A.I.C.T.E. has not been released. At the same time in the counter affidavit the Opp. Parties 3 and 4 have taken the stand that the petitioner is not entitled to any amount than the contractual amount mentioned in the appointment letter. In fact from Annexure-2, it appears that the petitioner has been paid some salary at the discretion of SMIT, but neither according to the Orissa Revised Scale of Pay Rules nor the A.I.C.T.E. Rules. So, it is axiomatic to observe that the petitioner is entitled to the scale of pay of an Instructor as payable in the institution affiliated to A.I.C.T.E. as claimed by the petitioner. So, this Court direct the Opp. Parties 3 and 4 to fix up the pay in accordance with the A.I.C.T.E. Rules for the post of Instructor from the date of his appointment i.e. 1985-86 till his retirement and make disbursement of the differential arrear salary. It is needless to say that after re-fixation of salary, pensionary benefits, if any, accrued on re-fixation be re-fixed on the last pay drawn and differential arrear amount be released to the petitioner by Opp. Parties 3 and 4. The entire exercise be completed by Opp. Parties 3 and 4 within a period of four months from today. With the aforesaid direction the writ application is disposed of.