JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. D. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. H. Laskar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. K. Nath, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. This is an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC from the order of dismissal dated 02.12.2015 delivered in Title Appeal No.35 of 2014 by the Additional District Judge, No.3, West Tripura, Agartala. It is on records that the appeal has been dismissed as the delay in filing the said appeal being Title Appeal No.35 of 2014 was not condoned and the petition filed for such purpose being Civil Misc.(Condonation) 43 of 2014 was rejected by the first appellate court. 3. This appeal was admitted to be heard on merit on the following substantial question of law by the order dated 01.03.2016: “Whether order dated 02.12.2015 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Court No.3, West Tripura, Agartala dismissing the appeal being Title Appeal No.35 of 2014 suffers from perversity.” The substantial question of law is reframed on consensus as under: “Whether the finding that the delay has not been explained is in observance of the law or it defies the fundamental tenets of condoning the delay on the basis of assigning sufficient cause?” 4. Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel has submitted that in the petition filed for condonation of delay under Order XLI Rule 3A of the CPC read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, it has been asserted that even though the judgment was delivered on 30.04.2014 but the fact of delivery of that judgment was notified on 25.06.2014 and not before that. Finally, when the appellants came to know about the delivery of the judgment on 25.06.2014, he filed an application for obtaining the certified copy of the said judgment. The said certified copy was delivered on 10.07.2014. It has been further asserted that the other appellant being the appellant No.2 was not interested in conducting the suit, whereas the appellant No.3 is a minor and the appellant No.4 is busy for earning her livelihood. As such, it was the appellant No.1 who was authorized to supervise the case in the court and accordingly, the appellant No.1 had affirmed the petition for condonation of delay on oath. As such, it was the appellant No.1 who was authorized to supervise the case in the court and accordingly, the appellant No.1 had affirmed the petition for condonation of delay on oath. Further, the appellant No.1 has stated in the petition for condonation of delay that since she was bed ridden for a certain period, she could not come to the court for affirming the application for condonation of delay and ultimately, the appellants filed the appeal along with the petition for condonation of delay on 19.08.2014. Hence, the delay of 66 days for preferring the appeal was occasioned. The petition for condoning the delay was, therefore, 66 days. But the respondents had seriously opposed the petition by stating that the impugned judgment since was delivered on 30.04.2014, the limitation for filing the appeal shall invariably start from 30.04.2014 but the appellants applied for the certified copy on 25.06.2014 after expiry of the period of appeal. According to the respondents, the delay was 110 days but the appellants did not explain such delay properly. Thus, the petition for condonation is liable to be rejected. 5. Having appreciated the rival contentions, the first appellate court has observed as follows: “On perusal of the petition for condonation it appears that there has been a delay of 108 days of which the petitioner spend for 16 days for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and as such, virtually there has been a delay of 92 days but the petitioner did not explain such delay properly and as such, I do not find any ground to condone such delay.” As consequence of the rejection of the petition for condonation, the appeal was dismissed. 6. Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel has submitted that there was proper explanation that the number of delay was computed as 66 days but according to the first appellate court that the delay was 92 days and therefore, an inference has been drawn that the remaining days were not properly explained. Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel has submitted that the said delay occurred for absence of knowledge and that has been clearly mentioned in the petition. That is the reason why further explanation was not provided, even for the period from 30.04.2014 to 25.06.2014. Despite such premise made out in the petition, the first appellate court rejected the petition for condonation. 7. Mr. That is the reason why further explanation was not provided, even for the period from 30.04.2014 to 25.06.2014. Despite such premise made out in the petition, the first appellate court rejected the petition for condonation. 7. Mr. Nath, learned counsel has sought seriously to resist the proposition as advanced by Mr. Chakraborty, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants contending that since the period from 30.04.2014 to 25.06.2014 has not been explained properly, this court may not interfere with the impugned order or the judgment of dismissal. 8. Having appreciated the submission made by the counsel for the parties and scrutinized the records, this court is of the view that true it is that the days of delay was not properly reflected in the petition but this court finds that there is an explanation from the period 30.04.2014 to 25.06.2014. According to the appellants, during this period he did not know that the judgment was pronounced. Even though it was found by the first appellate court that in the cause list dated 30.04.2014, the pronouncement of the judgment was duly reflected but the appellants had contended that the reflection was only made on 25.06.2014. Even if the contention of the appellants is not accepted, then also the absence of knowledge during the period may be taken as the good cause for condoning the delay. 9. Having observed thus and taken a liberal approach, this court finds that there is a substance in the appeal. The delay is liable to be condoned on the cause of substantive ends of justice and accordingly, the delay is condoned. In the result, the order dated 02.12.2015 delivered in Civil Misc.(Condonation) 43 of 2014 and the consequential order passed in the appeal being Title Appeal No.35 of 2014 on 02.12.2014 are interfered with and set aside. The sufficient cause has been laid in the petition for condoning the delay. Hence, the delay is to be condoned. The appeal be considered for admission. 10. Having observed thus, this appeal stands allowed. The appellants are permitted to make an application for correction in terms of the substitution carried out in the appeal. Prepare the decree accordingly. Send down the LCRs thereafter.