ORDER : Shaffique, J. By a reference order dated 16/10/2017, a Division Bench of this Court had doubted the correctness of the judgment in Elsie Felix v. Larsen and Toubro [ 2004 (1) KLT 619 ] which was followed in Asya v. Sundaram Finance Limited [ 2016 (3) KLT 195 ]. 2. The issue involved is relating to the court fee payable for an appeal u/s 37(1)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 1996 Act). 3. The court fee payable is stipulated under Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. Art. 4 of Schedule II deals with the court fee payable for filing appeal u/s 37(1)(a) of 1996 Act. As far as the appellant is concerned, he sought for arbitration under the National High Ways Act, 1956 and the arbitration proceedings commenced on 12/7/2010. The procedure for arbitration under the National Highways Act, 1956 is in accordance with the provisions of the 1996 Act which enables the claimant/petitioner to challenge an award by invoking S.34 of the 1996 Act. Petitioner filed an application u/s 34 which came to be rejected against which the present appeal has been filed before this court. Article 4 of Schedule II was amended by Kerala Finance Act, 2013. w.e.f. 01/04/2013 by which it read: “4. Memorandum of appeal under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996.” …...... Prior to the said amendment, it read as under :- “4. Memorandum of appeal under section 39 of the Arbitration Act 1940.” …...... 4. The contention urged by learned counsel for appellant was that there was no specific provision for payment of court fee for filing an appeal under the 1996 Act and therefore, the court fee payable was the court fee which was paid before the court below to set aside an award under the Act where the maximum fee is only Rs. 400/-. As far as the appellant/petitioner is concerned, the law as on the date when the arbitration commenced regarding payment of court fee has to be considered and since the amendment in Article 4 has come into effect only on 01/04/2013, obligation of the petitioner is to pay court fee only at the pre-amended stage when there was no specific provision at all for payment of court fee. 5. 5. The Division Bench while referring the question however observed that in the light of Section 7 of the Travancore Cochin Interpretation of General Clauses Act, 1125, even without a corresponding amendment to Article 4, the petitioner will be under obligation to pay the court fee on the basis of the court fee payable under the pre-amended position. 6. S.7 of the Kerala Interpretation of General Clauses Act, 1125 reads as under :- “7. Construction of reference to repealed enactments-Where any Act repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification any provision of a former enactment, then, references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted.” 7. In fact, there is no dispute about the fact that the court fee payable for preferring an appeal would be the court fee applicable at the time of initiation of proceedings. In so far as the arbitration commenced on 12/7/2010, the liability to pay court fee will be with reference to the court fee payable as on that date. 8. The only question that arises in this reference is in regard to the interpretation of S.7 read with Art.4 of Schedule II of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. In Elsie Felix, (supra), the Division Bench had considered the very same issue and had observed that S.7 can be invoked only when the legislature has omitted to take note of the incorporation of the new Act while amending the Court Fees Act. It is held that Art.11(m) shows that the legislature was aware of the 1996 Act and did not incorporate a similar provision in Art.4 of Schedule II for memorandum of appeals filed from an order setting aside the arbitral award under the 1996 Act. It was therefore held that Art.4 of Schedule II of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act only mentions about an appeal u/s 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as the 1940 Act) and therefore the said provision cannot be made applicable to an appeal u/s 37 of the 1996 Act. 9. Of course, the Court Fees Act had underwent an amendment by Act 2 of 2003. Article 4 was also amended and in Article 4, the rate of fee was enhanced without making any mention about amendment to 1940 Act. 9. Of course, the Court Fees Act had underwent an amendment by Act 2 of 2003. Article 4 was also amended and in Article 4, the rate of fee was enhanced without making any mention about amendment to 1940 Act. By the very same Amendment Act 2 of 2003, in Article 11, changes had been made with reference to the rate and in Article 11(m), the 1940 Act has been substituted as under :- “(m) Application to set aside an award under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Central Act 26 of 1996,-” 10. Therefore, in Elsie Felix (supra), Division Bench held that when the 1996 Act had been incorporated into the statute by way of an amendment in 2003, the legislature was aware of amending Article 4 as well, and since it has not been done, legislature thought it fit not to make any changes in the statute thereby not incorporating the 1996 Act. Elsie Felix (supra) had been followed by another Division Bench in Asya (supra). 11. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side. Learned counsel for the appellant tried to substantiate his contentions based on the judgment in Elsie Felix (supra) and Asya (supra). On the other hand, learned Government Pleader emphasised his submissions based on S.7 of the Kerala Interpretation of General Clauses Act. 12. The question to be considered is whether in spite of an amendment made to the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act as per Act 2 of 2003, in view of S.11(m), by incorporating the court fee payable for petitions filed to set aside an arbitration award, when no amendment is made to Article 4, can the Government rely upon S.7 of the Kerala Interpretation of General Clauses Act. 13. Under normal circumstances, if there is no amendment to the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act by Act 2 of 2003, S.7 automatically applies. Since 1940 Act was repealed and re-enacted as the 1996 Act, normally in such instances, “unless a different intention appears”, it has to be construed as reference to the provision so re-enacted. The question is whether a different intention appears. What exactly would be the meaning of the words “unless a different intention appears” in S.7 would answer the question. S.7 is almost analogous to S.8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Central Act). The question is whether a different intention appears. What exactly would be the meaning of the words “unless a different intention appears” in S.7 would answer the question. S.7 is almost analogous to S.8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Central Act). S.8 reads as under :- '8 Construction of references to repealed enactments-(1) Where this Act, or any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification any provision of a former enactment, the references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted. (2) [Where before the fifteenth day of August, 1947, any Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom repealed and re-enacted], with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, then reference in any [Central Act] or in any Regulation or instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted.]” 14. While construing the relevance of words “unless a different intention appears”, in Rajrajeshwarashram v. Swarupanandtirtha (AIR 1927 Bombay 499), the aforesaid question cropped up for consideration. The facts in the said case were as under :- Under the Bombay Pleaders Act, 1920, any application under Regulation 8 of 1827 or the Succession Certificate Act of 1889 is governed by Rule 5 of the Schedule to it and not Rule 1. In Rule 1 (c)(ii) of Schedule 3, the words “Indian Succession Act, 1865” has to be read as “Indian Succession Act, 1925” with the result that the ad valorem fee payable would come to Rs. 1,264/-. It is on account of the fact that S.390 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 provided that S.383 and S.384 are to apply to certificates granted under Regulation 8 of 1827. It was held that taking Succession Certificate Act as a test, it is clear that the said Act has been repealed and re-enacted by Act of 1925 with or without modification. Consequently, Act 1925 has to be read into Section 5 as well as Section 1 of Schedule 3 to the Bombay Pleaders Act in the absence of a contrary intention. Consequently, Act 1925 has to be read into Section 5 as well as Section 1 of Schedule 3 to the Bombay Pleaders Act in the absence of a contrary intention. It was held that, having regard to the frame of Schedule 3, a different intention is shown by the Bombay Pleaders Act itself, namely, that as regards applications under the Succession Certificate Act a fixed fee shall be levied u/s 5 as opposed to an ad valorem fee for applications under the Indian Succession Act, 1865. Consequently, the corresponding applications under the consolidating Act must be treated in the same way, for otherwise S.1 would conflict with S.5. The other learned Judge while expressing a concurring view held that when the Succession Certificate Act has been repealed and re-enacted as Part X of Indian Succession Act of 1925, the nature of the proceedings under that chapter did not differ from the proceedings under the Old Succession Certificate Act 1889. The proceedings now being adjudged was not of final in nature and did not prevent the parties from having their rights decided in a regular suit. It was held that a regular suit between them is pending in the District Court and under such circumstances it was clear that the provision in the General Clauses Act which refers to the contrary intention would apply and it is a case in which Schedule 3 of Bombay Pleaders Act 17 of 1920 indicates a contrary intention. 15. In the case on hand, it is not disputed that while the Kerala Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act was amended initially in 2003 by Act 2 of 2003, the legislature did not think it necessary to amend Article 4. Legislature therefore thought it fit to treat Art.4 and Art.11 (m) separately. Therefore, as held in Elsie Felix (supra), the legislature was conscious about the 1996 Act and the necessity to amend Art.11(m) as well as Art.4. By Amendment Act 2 of 2003, in Art.4, the rate of fee had been changed. Whether this constitutes a different intention is the question. 16. Necessarily, when the legislature, conscious about the existence of the 1996 Act, had made provisions to change the rate of fee for filing an application to set aside the award u/s 34, Art.4 was very much in the statute book. Whether this constitutes a different intention is the question. 16. Necessarily, when the legislature, conscious about the existence of the 1996 Act, had made provisions to change the rate of fee for filing an application to set aside the award u/s 34, Art.4 was very much in the statute book. Legislature did not feel it necessary to amend Art.4 other than amending the rate involved in the matter. We are of the view that, this instance itself primarily indicates a different intention that is borne out from the factual aspects. Legislature while enacting Amendment Act 2 of 2003, could have amended Art.4 by substituting 1940 Act with 1996 Act. But legislature was very conscious to avoid incorporating the 1996 Act to Art.4, thereby virtually permitting appeals to be filed with the Court fee payable taking into account the unamended provision. 17. In the above circumstances, we do not think that the doubt expressed by the Division Bench contrary to the opinion expressed in Elsie Felix (supra) and Asya (supra) can be accepted. We are of the view that while amending Art.4 and Art.11(m) by Act 2 of 2003, legislature has consciously avoided substituting 1996 Act with the 1940 Act thereby creating a different intention and therefore S.7 of the Kerala Interpretation and General Clauses Act cannot be made applicable. 18. The reference is therefore answered upholding the judgments of the Division Bench in Elsie Felix (supra) and Asya (supra). Registry shall place the matter before the appropriate Court for being heard.