ORDER : D.N. PATEL, J. 1. This Letters Patent appeal has been preferred by the original respondent no. 1 in W.P(S) no. 3519 of 2013. 2. The writ petition was preferred by respondent no. 1, challenging the order of disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority, whereby he was removed from the services mainly on the ground that he was unauthorizedly absent on and from 15.05.2000 till the date of his removal, i.e. up to 16.08.2002. The disciplinary authority has also dismissed the departmental appeal vide order dated 24.03.2003. Both these orders – one which is passed by the disciplinary authority dated 16.08.2002 as well as the order passed by the appellate authority dated 24.03.2003 were under challenge in the writ petition, preferred by respondent no. 1, which was allowed and hence, the original respondent no. 1 has preferred this present Letters Patent Appeal mainly on the ground that initially also, this respondent no. 1 (original petitioner) had gone on leave for 569 days and in second spell, he wanted to go on study leave to pursue his “Companies Secretary Study” with effect from 15.05.2000 for two years (730 days). These leaves were not granted, but, this employee (original petitioner) has granted leaves to himself which led into issuance of charge-sheet, and thereafter the charges levelled against the delinquent were proved. The disciplinary authority passed an order of removal of the respondent no.1 (original petitioner) and in appeal, the disciplinary departmental authority confirmed the order of the disciplinary authority. 3. Factual Matrix: •? The respondent no.1 is the original petitioner was an employee, who was appointed in the services of Life Insurance Corporation on 09.01.1996 as an Assistant who joined the services on 19.01.1996. •? After sometime into the services, he went on leaves for 569 days which is more than one year i.e. approximately 19 months. •? Life Insurance Corporation with all reluctance had sanctioned these leaves, this is chapter no. 1, so far as unauthorized absenteeism leave is concerned of the respondent no. 1 (original petitioner). •? Now, second spell of unauthorized leave started. Encouraged by the earlier sanction of leaves, this respondent preferred an application for study leaves to pursue his “Companies Secretary study” for two years (24 months). This application was preferred on 16.02.1998. •? Thus, he joined the services on 19.01.1996 and thereafter proceeded on leaves for approximately 19 months. 1 (original petitioner). •? Now, second spell of unauthorized leave started. Encouraged by the earlier sanction of leaves, this respondent preferred an application for study leaves to pursue his “Companies Secretary study” for two years (24 months). This application was preferred on 16.02.1998. •? Thus, he joined the services on 19.01.1996 and thereafter proceeded on leaves for approximately 19 months. Thus, if the leave period is added to 19.01.1996, it comes to approximately the end of July 1997. Thus, he has remained on leave for this much period and again he has given application on 16.02.1998 for study leaves for two years and that too for “Companies Secretary Study” which can be pursued from his home also. •? Thus, after joining the services as an Assistant on 19.01.1996, he went on leave for 569 days which brings a period approximately up to August 1997, and after five or six months again, an application for leave was given on 16.02.1998 for study leave of two years. •? There is no provision for study leaves neither under the Life Insurance Corporation Act nor under the Rule or Regulation enacted under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The respondent no.1 (original petitioner) tendered his conditional resignation on 11.04.2000 that he will go on leave on or before 15.05.2000. Thus, the respondent no. 1 (original petitioner) has already made an announcement that whether management sanction leave or not, he shall proceed with the leave with effect from 15.05.2000. •? When the leave was not sanctioned, again the respondent no.1 (original petitioner) made a request that he should be transferred to Ranchi, which is the capital city of State of Jharkhand from the District Daltongang. •? Meanwhile, several letters were sent by this appellant-management to resume the duties because the respondent no.1 was not attending the duties with effect from 15.05.2000. These letters are annexed with memo of this Letters Patent Appeal which are dated 10.05.2000, 27.05.2000, 10.11.2000 etc. • ?As the respondent no. 1 (original petitioner) has not resumed the duties, the Life Insurance Corporation-appellant issued a charge-sheet on 16.01.2001 which is at Annexure-10 to the memo of the Letters Patent Appeal. •? It was replied by respondent no. 1 that this respondent no. 1 had also preferred one leave application to the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation on 24.11.1999 that the respondent no. •? It was replied by respondent no. 1 that this respondent no. 1 had also preferred one leave application to the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation on 24.11.1999 that the respondent no. 1 (original petitioner) wants to proceed on leave with effect from 01.01.2000 for two years for his “Company Secretary Study”. •? An Inquiry officer was appointed and inquiry was conducted, several witnesses including delinquent-respondent no. 1 (original petitioner) were examined. •? On the basis of evidences on record, both, oral and documentary, the Inquiry Officer arrived at the conclusion in the report dated 07.02.2002 that the charges levelled against the delinquent-respondent no.1 (original petitioner) has been proved ( Annexure-21 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal). •? Second show-cause notice was given to the delinquent on 22.06.2002 which was replied by the respondent no. 1. •? On the basis of the Inquiry officer’s report and the reply given by the delinquent disciplinary authority-Senior Divisional Manager, Eastern Zonal Office Jamshedpur has passed an order on 16.08.2002 whereby, the services of the delinquent-respondent no.1 (original petitioner) was brought to end an end by order of removal.. •? Departmental appeal was preferred by respondent no.1. Departmental appeal preferred by respondent no. 1 (original petitioner) was dismissed, vide order dated 24.03.2003 which was passed by Zonal Manager Eastern Zonal Office, Kolkata. • ?Being aggrieved and feeling dissatisfied by the order of the disciplinary authority dated 16.08.2002 and the order passed by departmental appellate authority dated 24.03.2003, a writ petition was preferred by respondent no. 1 being W.P.(S) no. 3519 of 2003. This writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 12.12.2013 by quashing and setting aside the aforesaid two orders, mainly on the ground that as application was preferred by the respondent no.1 (original petitioner) before the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation for his two years study leave and the reply of the management which was the rejection order, was not supplied to the delinquent, the matter was remanded by the learned Single Judge to the Appellate Authority and hence, respondent no. 1 (original petitioner) has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal mainly on the ground that no prejudice has been caused to the respondent no. 1 (original petitioner) has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal mainly on the ground that no prejudice has been caused to the respondent no. 1 (original petitioner) for want of supply of reply of the Chairman rejecting his study leave with effect from 01.01.2000 because the whole matter is of unauthorized absenteeism of the delinquent with effect from 15.05.2000, till the order of dismissal (16.08.2002). 4. Argument canvassed by the counsel for the appellant (original respondent) •? Counsel appearing for the appellant (original respondent no. 1) has submitted that the respondent no. 1 (original petitioner) is fond of going on unauthorized leave. The delinquent is more interested in leaves rather than of doing work with Life Insurance Corporation. He joined the services as an Assistant with effect from 19.01.1996 and remained on leave for 569 days. Thus, if this period is calculated, it will come approximately August, 1997 and again, on 16.02.1998, an application for study leave was preferred for two years to prosecute the study of “Companies Secretary”. Earlier much lenient view was taken and 569 days leaves was granted and being encouraged by such type of lenient action of the public body like this appellant, again respondent no. 1 (original petitioner) wanted to go on leave for two years and that too, for study of “Companies Secretary”. These leaves were not granted. Even then, he preferred application to the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation on 24.11.1999 because he wanted to proceed with the leave from 01.01.2000 for two years. Every now and then, the delinquent was thinking of leaves, whether authorized or unauthorized, rather than doing work of the Life Insurance Corporation hence, his request was stern down. Even, the respondent no.1 (original petitioner) wrote a letter on 01.04.2000 that he is tendering a conditional resignation and he shall proceed with leave from 15.05.2000. Never such leave was further granted by the Chairman or by the Life Insurance Corporation, but, the respondent no. 1 (original petitioner) seeks leaves to himself and proceeded on leave with effect from 15.05.2000. As it was unauthorized leave, several letters were sent to this appellant to resume the duties like letter dated 16.05.2000, 27.05.2000 and 10.11.2000 etc. •? Very arrogant reply has been received by this Life Insurance Corporation. 1 (original petitioner) seeks leaves to himself and proceeded on leave with effect from 15.05.2000. As it was unauthorized leave, several letters were sent to this appellant to resume the duties like letter dated 16.05.2000, 27.05.2000 and 10.11.2000 etc. •? Very arrogant reply has been received by this Life Insurance Corporation. Apart from the arrogant reply and non-joining of the duties in spite of the arrogant reply received by the Life Insurance Corporation, the letter was forwarded by this appellant and charge-sheet was issued on 06.01.2001 which was replied by the respondent no. 1 and ultimately the Inquiry Officer conducted detailed inquiry on the basis of the evidences, both, oral as well documentary. The Inquiry Officer in his report dated 07.02.2002 concluded that the charges levelled against the delinquent respondent no. 1 has been proved. The disciplinary authority had passed an order on 16.08.2002 after giving second show-cause notice and after giving adequate opportunity of being heard to the respondent no.1 (original petitioner). Even a departmental appeal preferred by respondent no.1 was dismissed by the appellate authority, vide order dated 24.03.2003. •? It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellant that initially the respondent no.1 had demanded the leaves for 569 days which was, for any reason whatsoever granted. Now, again instead of doing job of Life Insurance Corporation, he was more interested in going on leaves for further period of two years and therefore, application dated 16.02.1998 was preferred. Thus, after joining the services as an Assistant on 19.01.1996, hardly for six or seven months, he has worked and again on February, 1998, application came for study leaves. •? It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellant that as the aforesaid reasons were not accepted by the Life Insurance Corporation nor the leaves were granted, he wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation on 24.02.1999 that the respondent no.1 (original petitioner) want to proceed on leave for two years with effect from 01.01.2000. •? Much has been argued out in the judgment of the learned Single Judge that the reply given by the Chairman which is a rejection order was not supplied to the delinquent and hence, the matter was remanded to the appellant authority. This reply of the Chairman has never caused any prejudice to the delinquent. •? Much has been argued out in the judgment of the learned Single Judge that the reply given by the Chairman which is a rejection order was not supplied to the delinquent and hence, the matter was remanded to the appellant authority. This reply of the Chairman has never caused any prejudice to the delinquent. As there is no provision for study leaves there was no question of granting study leaves whatsoever arises. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by learned Single Judge and hence, the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) no.3519 of 2003 dated 12.12.2003 deserves to be quashed and set aside. •? It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellant that every letter of the respondent no.1 (original petitioner) is not to be replied by the higher ranking administrative officers. He was fond of leaves. Leaves and leaves which includes unauthorized leaves, which also includes the leaves which were not permitted by any law, rules and regulations. He was moving from pillar to post for getting such types of leaves. Desperately, respondent no.1 has written such a letter to the Chairman and hence, the Chairman had ultimately rejected the said requests and this rejection letter issued by Chairman was not supplied to the delinquent. This non-supply of reply of the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation has never caused any prejudice to this appellant. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and hence, the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) no. 3519 of 2003 dated 12.12.2003, deserves to be quashed and set aside. •? It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that this Court is not sitting in an appeal against the order and the conclusion arrived at by the Inquiry Officer in his report dated 07.02.2002 (Annexue-21 to the memo of the writ petition). Even the second showcause notice was also given to the delinquent-respondent no.1 (original petitioner). During course of inquiry several documentary evidences were laid and reply of the charge-sheet was also filed by the delinquent respondent and on the basis of the documentary evidences on record, it was concluded by the Inquiry Officer that charges lebelled against the respondent (original petitioner have been proved. During course of inquiry several documentary evidences were laid and reply of the charge-sheet was also filed by the delinquent respondent and on the basis of the documentary evidences on record, it was concluded by the Inquiry Officer that charges lebelled against the respondent (original petitioner have been proved. Thus, there is no procedural lacuna in holding the inquiry nor there is any violation of principle of natural justice. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned single Judge while deciding W.P.(S) no. 3519 of 2003, vide judgment and order dated 12.12.2003 and hence, the said judgment and order deserves to be quashed and set aside. • ?It has been submitted by the counsel for the appellant that there is no right vested in respondent no.1 (original petitioner) to get the study leaves because there is no such provision. Moreover looking to the length of services and absenteeism, it appears that the said respondent no.1 (original petitioner) has remained absent for more days, than the days which he has performed his duties. •? It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellant that “Companies Secretary Study” can be done even while remaining at home. There is no residential school or college for this type of study. Much less there is no need to go to any sort of class or classes even while remaining at home “Companies Secretary study” can be done. • ?It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellant that Life Insurance Corporation has suggested that the delinquent-respondent no.1 (original petitioner) can study any course relating to Life Insurance Corporation pertaining to insurance etc.- actuarial science. Thus, it appears that the respondent no.1 (original petitioner) was never interested in the job of Life Insurance Corporation. He was interested in the study pertaining to insurance or Life Insurance Corporation. The respondent no. 1 (original petitioner) was interested just to have a tag of an employee of Life Insurance Corporation and by hook and crook, the delinquent pursue his own study for his personal benefit and therefore, he was consistently absent initially for 569 days and thereafter, wanted to go on study leaves for two years which were never granted by the management. •? •? It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellant that as the respondent no.1 (original petitioner) was on unauthorized leave with effect from 15.05.2000, till his removal from services, i.e. till 16.08.2002, the punishments of removal cannot be lebelled as shockingly disproportionate punishment nor it can be lebelled unreasonably excessive punishment. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned single Judge while deciding W.P.(S) no. 3519 of 2003, vide judgment and order dated 12.12.2003 and hence, the said judgment and order deserves to be quashed and set aside. •? Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that the respondent has also given much advice to the Life Insurance Corporation to amend the Rules of the Life Insurance Corporation so that, if there is no provision for study leaves, the laws of the Life Insurance Corporation should be amended and to create the provisions for study leaves. •? It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellant that maximum permissible extra ordinary leaves as per Regulation no. 65 of Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations Act, 1960, the maximum permissible extra ordinary leaves, during the entire period of services till retirement, is 365 days. Thus, the respondent no. 1 (original petitioner) cannot be given study leaves for the period of two years therefore, earlier absenteeism period of 569 days were indicated in the charge-sheet. Mentioning of the earlier sanctioned leave for 569 days was mentioned only to point out to the delinquent that by no stretch of imagination, study leave of two years can be granted because more than maximum was already granted. What is not permissible by law cannot be allowed by the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation and much less by any administrative authorities below the rank of Chairman and hence, the reply given by the Chairman, who has rejected the request, even it was not supplied to the delinquent has not created any sort of prejudice to the delinquent. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned single Judge while deciding W.P.(S) no. 3519 of 2003 vide judgment and order dated 12.12.2003 and hence the said judgment and order deserves to be quashed and set aside. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned single Judge while deciding W.P.(S) no. 3519 of 2003 vide judgment and order dated 12.12.2003 and hence the said judgment and order deserves to be quashed and set aside. • ?It is further submitted by the counsel for the appellant that the proceeding has been initiated upon the delinquent under Regulation 39 of Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Even If otherwise also, if any employee goes on leave for several weeks or several months unauthorizedly then, the employee has no inbuilt power, jurisdiction and authority to bring an end of the services of such type of employee. Moreover, the reply of the Chairman which is the denial of the requests of the leaves for two years were never part and parcel of the inquiry. Moreover, it was never replied by the Inquiry Officer and hence also, no prejudice has been caused to the delinquent of non-supply of reply of the Chairman to the delinquent. 5. Arguments canvassed by the counsel for the respondent (original petitioner) •? Counsel appearing for the respondent (original petitioner) submitted that a letter was written to the Divisional Manager on 27.05.2000 for sanction of the leaves for two years for the study of “Company Secretary Course”. The Divisional Manager has not given any reply to the delinquent nor the reply dated 31.05.2000 of the Chairman of Life Insurance Corporation was ever supplied to the respondent (original petitioner). This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent and hence this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court. •? Learned counsel appearing for the respondent (original petitioner) submitted that earlier the leaves for 569 days was already sanctioned by this appellant management and hence earlier period ought not to be mentioned at all by this appellant for terminating the services of the respondent (original petitioner). • ?It is further submitted by the counsel for the respondent that there is violation of fundamental Rules 1992, especially Rule no. • ?It is further submitted by the counsel for the respondent that there is violation of fundamental Rules 1992, especially Rule no. 18 and there is violation of Rule no.60 to be read with Rule 61 of the Life Insurance Corporation (Staff) Regulation, 1960 because for the over staying period beyond the sanctioned leaves resulted no salary, but, no disciplinary action can be initially taken against the respondent for his absenteeism. •? Counsel appearing for the respondent has also submitted that there is a violation of Article 51-A (j) of the Constitution of India by this appellant because the respondent has taken study leaves to achieve his excellence. •? Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that if there is no provision for the grant of more than 365 extra ordinary leaves then, this appellant should have created enacted provisions for the study leaves. • ?It is submitted by the counsel for the respondent that this Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable because the matter has been remanded by the learned Single Judge. •? Counsel for the respondent (original petitioner) has relied upon the decision reported in (i) (2001) 3 Jharkhand Criminal Reporter Jharkhand High Court Crr. 577 (Jharkhand) (ii) (2006) 2 SCC 584 (iii) (2015) 9 SCC 1 (iv) (1984) supplementary SCC 528 On the basis of the aforesaid decisions, it is submitted by the counsel for the respondent that this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this court. 6. Reasons: •? Having heard counsel for both the sides looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated hereinabove, we hereby, quash and set aside the judgment and order delivered by learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 3519 of 2003 vide judgment and order dated 12.12.2003 for the following facts and reasons: (i) The respondent is an original petitioner who had preferred a writ petition bearing W.P.(S) no. 3519 of 2003 challenging the order of removal of the respondent (original petitioner), passed by disciplinary authority dated 16.08.2002 and the order passed by the departmental appellate authority dated 24.03.2003. This writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge and hence the original respondent no. 1 has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. (ii) The respondent (original petitioner) was appointed as Assistant on 09.01.1996 and joined the services of Life Insurance Corporation on 19.01.1996. This writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge and hence the original respondent no. 1 has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. (ii) The respondent (original petitioner) was appointed as Assistant on 09.01.1996 and joined the services of Life Insurance Corporation on 19.01.1996. (iii) Immediately after joining the services, the respondent (original petitioner) had gone on leaves for 569 days with all reluctance though there is a provision for maximum extra ordinary leaves for 365 days, the leaves were sanctioned. In fact once the leniency is shown by the management, the bad habits are being reared up in the employees and therefore sometimes strictness by the management is also desirable. (iv) As stated hereinabove, immediately after joining the services from 19.01.1996, the respondent (original petitioner) had gone on leaves for 569 days. If these days are added to the date of joining the leaves period will come up to an end of “August, 1997”. (v) Now, once a leniency shown by the management, bad habit has been cultivated into respondent (original respondent). Now, again he apply for leaves after couple of months on 16.11.1998 for study leaves for two years. (vi) As there was no provisions for study leaves it was not granted. (vii) As the respondent was moving from pillar to post for getting the leaves which were not permitted at all in the eye of law and now, he preferred an application on 24.11.1999 before the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation for leaves for two years with effect from 01.01.2000. This application was denied by the Chairman Life Insurance Corporation. (viii) It further appears from the facts of the case that respondent was more interested in the leaves than in working with the Life Insurance Corporation. Some persons are accepting the Government job, as stepping stone, for some other types of services in future. Some persons are accepting the Government job to use it as a leverage to get something more, from other institutions. It appears that the respondent is not exception to such type of employee. After joining the services as an Assistant from 19.01.1996 except leaves he did not do anything else. Consistently he was moving here and there for getting further leaves for two years after taking the leaves of 569 days. (ix) As there was no provision for study leaves, this appellant has never granted the study leaves. After joining the services as an Assistant from 19.01.1996 except leaves he did not do anything else. Consistently he was moving here and there for getting further leaves for two years after taking the leaves of 569 days. (ix) As there was no provision for study leaves, this appellant has never granted the study leaves. Nonetheless, the respondent was preferring applications before higher authorities. One more application was preferred by the respondent dated 11.04.2000 and now, the adamant respondent (original petitioner) informed the Life Insurance Corporation that he shall go on leave, on his own, with effect from 15.05.2000 and he has mentioned this fact in his application dated 11.04.2000. He tendered his conditional resignation. This “leave application” itself is a full arrogance because he himself is seeking for the leaves and granting leaves to himself and is also giving a conditional resignation. (x) This request for study leave was again not accepted by this appellant-management. (xi) Now, the respondent (original petitioner) had gone on unauthorized leave without any sanction on and from 15.05.2000, till the date of his removal from the services i.e. 16.08.2002. (xii) The respondent (original petitioner) had not resumed the duties and immediately from 15.05.2000 onwards this appellant started writing letters one after another requesting respondent to resume the services. These letters are: (a) dated 16.05.2000 (b) dated 27.05.2000 (c) dated 10.11.2000 (xiii) Despite all these requests from management, and despite the fact that respondent-delinquent was replying upon these notices, the respondent has never joined the duties of the Life Insurance Corporation and now charge-sheet was issued upon the respondent dated 06.01.2001 because already in the earlier letters by the appellant-Life Insurance Corporation, it was mentioned that the respondent should resume the duties otherwise it will be treated as absenteeism as he has abandoned the services. (charge-sheet is at Annexure-10 to the memo of the writ petition). (xiv) The charge-sheet was replied by the respondent -delinquent on 22.01.2001. (xv) The Inquiry officer was appointed by this appellant and the inquiry was conducted. It appears that the respondent-delinquent was more interested in leaves which was unauthorized in nature. He has remained absent during the course of inquiry. Inquiry officer on the basis of documentary evidences on record and looking to the reply filed by the respondent (original petitioner) gave a report on 07.02.2002 (Annexure-21 to the memo of the writ petition). It appears that the respondent-delinquent was more interested in leaves which was unauthorized in nature. He has remained absent during the course of inquiry. Inquiry officer on the basis of documentary evidences on record and looking to the reply filed by the respondent (original petitioner) gave a report on 07.02.2002 (Annexure-21 to the memo of the writ petition). It was held by the Inquiry Officer that the charges levelled against the respondent (original petitioner)-delinquent has been proved. (xvi) Second show-cause notice was given to the respondent on 22.06.2002 which was also replied by the respondent. (xvii) Disciplinary authority passed an order on 16.08.2002 of removal of the respondent (original petitioner) from the services of the Life Insurance Corporation. (xviii) The respondent preferred a departmental appeal. The departmental appellate authority, who is Zonal Manager, Eastern Zonal Office, Kolkata dismissed the appeal preferred by the respondent (original petitioner), vide order dated 24.03.2003 and hence the order of removal passed by the disciplinary authority “Senior Divisional Manager, Jamshedpur” was affirmed. (xix) Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that respondent had initially gone on leaves for 569 days, immediately after joining the duties from 19.01.1996 and again he applied for the leaves which was never granted and thereafter he applied to the Chairman-Life Insurance Corporation, which also never granted then again he applied for the study leaves on 11.04.2000 and now he was informing the management that he shall go on leaves with effect from 15.05.2000. For this type of behavior, necessary notices were also given before the charge-sheet by the appellant requesting the respondent to resume the duties. This requests were also turned deaf ear to, by the respondent and ultimately the chargesheet was given to the respondent followed by the punishment. Again, during the course of inquiry, the respondent has not remained present, but, he has replied the charge-sheet. On the basis of the documentary evidences on record and on the basis of reply given by the respondent, it appears that the Inquiry Officer has concluded the inquiry and has arrived at the conclusion that the charges levelled against the respondent has been proved. Looking to the Inquiry Officer’s report, it cannot be said that it was same and based upon no evidence. Basically, charge was for absenteeism, without sanctioning of the leaves. This charge has been proved. Looking to the Inquiry Officer’s report, it cannot be said that it was same and based upon no evidence. Basically, charge was for absenteeism, without sanctioning of the leaves. This charge has been proved. Even, second show-cause notice was also given by this appellant on 22.06.2002. The disciplinary authority passed an order on 16.08.2002 of the removal of the respondent from the services. Thereafter a departmental appeal was preferred by the respondent. The departmental appellate authority had dismissed the appeal on 24.03.2003 after giving adequate opportunity of being heard to the respondent. Thus, there is no procedural lacuna in holding the departmental proceeding against the respondent nor there is any violation of principle of natural justice by this appellant, while holding the departmental proceeding. Thus, the departmental proceedings are legal and valid. (xx) Once this Court comes to the conclusion that the departmental proceeding concluded by the management is legal and valid, the only question left out to the Court is to look into the quantum of punishment. (xxi) So far as quantum of punishment of removal is concerned, looking to the nature of misconduct committed by respondent, it cannot be said that the punishment of the removal from the services of the Life Insurance Corporation is reasonably excessive nor it can be lebelled as shockingly disproportionate to the charges. On the contrary, the punishment inflicted upon by this appellant is absolutely just and proper. A newly appointed Assistant, who joins the services on 19.01.1996, proceeded on leave for 569 days. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the management has granted those leaves. This has given more encouragement to the adamant respondent and again he has applied for leaves after couple of months, for two years for the study of “Company Secretary Course”. This course can be done from the home also. It is not a requirement that those who are doing Company Secretary Course, they must join some college or hostel. It appears that the respondent was using the job of Life Insurance Corporation just as a stepping stone, for getting another job. It appears that the respondent was not serious for his public post. It appears that the respondent was more interested in leaves by hook or crook. It appears that the respondent was using the job of Life Insurance Corporation just as a stepping stone, for getting another job. It appears that the respondent was not serious for his public post. It appears that the respondent was more interested in leaves by hook or crook. There is no provision for extra ordinary leaves in the whole service career, beyond the period of 365 days as per Regulation No. 165 of Life Insurance Corporation, (Staff) Regulations, 1960 enacted in the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. Thus, none of the authorities of the Life Insurance Corporation can grant study leaves because- (a) There is no provision for study leaves at all with the Life Insurance Corporation. (b) Even if, somebody has gone on leaves, only 365 days leave can be granted as extra ordinary leaves during the whole service period as per Regulation no.165 of Life Insurance Company (Staff) Regulations, 1960. (c) Even the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation cannot grant leaves for which too much has been argued by the counsel of the respondent and on this ground the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition. The reason given by the learned Single Judge deserves to be quashed and set aside. (xxii) Too much leniency shown by the employee-management leads to such types of situation initially the leaves for 569 days ought not to have been granted at all by this appellant. Sometimes, some persons are more influential than efficient. Initially, influence might have worked (due to condonation of leaves of 569 days), but, latter on the bad habit has been rightly punished and we see no reason to interfere with the quantum of the punishment which is removal from the services. (xxiii) Enough is enough. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing W.P.(S) no. 3519 of 2003 vide judgment and order dated 12.12.2003 and hence said judgment and order deserves to be quashed and set aside. (xxiv) Much has been argued out by the counsel for the respondent about the Fundamental Rules, 1992 especially, Rules 18, 22 and 25 thereof. 3519 of 2003 vide judgment and order dated 12.12.2003 and hence said judgment and order deserves to be quashed and set aside. (xxiv) Much has been argued out by the counsel for the respondent about the Fundamental Rules, 1992 especially, Rules 18, 22 and 25 thereof. This contention is of no help to the respondent because Life Insurance Corporation have their own Rules which is known as Life Insurance Corporation (Staff) Regulations, 1960 which is enacted under the Life Insurance Corporation Act 1956 and as per these Rules maximum leaves during the whole period of services, only 365 days extra ordinary leaves can be granted or sanctioned under Regulation no. 165, thereof. Moreover, the respondent was in a habit of going on leave which cannot be tolerated every time by the management. No employee of the Life Insurance Corporation can use the job of the Life Insurance Corporation to increase their education qualification by going on leave without pay, so that in future for getting another job from earlier employment will give them some credit. This type of duty cannot be tolerated by the management. In fact, these fundamental rules are not applicable to the respondent, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case. (xxv) Much has also been argued out by the counsel for the respondent (original petitioner) about violation of Article 51-A (j) of the Constitution of India. It is submitted by the counsel for the respondent that the respondent wanted to go on study leaves to achieve his personal excellence. This absurd argument has nothing to do at all with Article 51-A(j) and right to go on “unauthorized leaves” . Nobody can go on unauthorized leave, to achieve excellence. He has gone on unauthorized leave, this reflects the mindset of the respondent that he know how he wants to continue as an employee, even without salary. He wants to increase his personal excellence, so that he can get another better job. Such type of employees’ services ought to be terminated forthwith. (xxvi) It is also submitted by the counsel for the respondent (original petitioner) that application preferred to Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation for study leaves dated 24.11.1999 was never replied or if replied then the copy of reply was not supplied. Hence, the termination order is bad. Such type of employees’ services ought to be terminated forthwith. (xxvi) It is also submitted by the counsel for the respondent (original petitioner) that application preferred to Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation for study leaves dated 24.11.1999 was never replied or if replied then the copy of reply was not supplied. Hence, the termination order is bad. This argument is of no help to the respondent because- (a) After joining the services as Assistant, on 19.01.1996, immediately the respondent (original petitioner) had gone on leaves for 569 days. These leaves, were beyond the maximum permissible leaves. But, much leniency was shown by this Life Insurance Corporation and these leaves were sanctioned against Rule 165 of the Life Insurance Corporation Rules. (b) The respondent preferred another application for study leaves on 16.02.1998 for two years which was never granted by the management. (c) There is no provision for study leaves at all, neither under Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 nor under the Life Insurance Corporation (Staff) Regulations, 1960. (d) Desperately respondent was moving here and there, for getting the leaves and he was applying before every type of authorities, every now, and then. Once such application was dated 24.11.1999 before Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation which was rejected by Chairman of Life Insurance Corporation and the intimation was given through proper channel of employment to the respondent on 02.03.2000. This factum has been denied by the respondent that any reply was given by the Chairman. Be as it may, even if the reply of the Chairman is not given to the respondent, no prejudice has been caused to the respondent. (e) Even if, no reply is given by Chairman of Life Insurance Corporation or the rejection order passed by the Chairman Life Insurance Corporation is not communicated to the respondent, then also respondent cannot go on unauthorized leaves for weeks together, for months together and for years together. (f) Learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition because the Chairman’s reply was not served upon the respondent. This cannot be the ground to allow the writ petition. Every type of the application of the employee for the leaves after initial rejection, is not required to be even replied by the management, otherwise there will be no end of such type of applications. This cannot be the ground to allow the writ petition. Every type of the application of the employee for the leaves after initial rejection, is not required to be even replied by the management, otherwise there will be no end of such type of applications. Every time management has not pass the orders upon such type of leave applications for the same reason again and again which is of study leave. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition and hence, also the judgment and order delivered by learned Single Judge deserves to be quashed and set aside. (g) Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation has no power, authority and jurisdiction to grant the study leaves because there is no provisions for the study leaves and moreover, maximum extra ordinary leaves are 365 days. The respondent had also enjoyed 569 days leaves, immediately after joining the services on 19.01.1996. (h) Even the respondent was having sufficient knowledge that there is no provision for grant of study leaves. Even the respondent was thinking with his demand for study leaves and is beyond the law because he has advised the Life Insurance Corporation in one of the replies which is at page nos. 196 of the memo of the Letters Patent Appeal, which reads as under: “I am to add that I have duly applied to the Hon’ble Chairman, LIC of India, Mumbai for creating the provision for study leave which is hitherto unknown to the officers of the middle and lower rung of the LIC Administration. (emphasis supplied) Moreover, he has also stated in the aforesaid reply on page no. 198 as under: In face of the fact that the basket containing the rules is short and shallow which needs to be thrown off and renovated to accommodate the aspirations of this millennium.” (emphasis supplied) (i) Thus, the respondent was well-aware that there is no provisions for study leaves. He has also advised the Life Insurance Corporation that as the Rules are short and shallow which should be thrown off. Learned counsel has also argued that the Life Insurance Corporation must amend their provisions. It appears that the respondent is absolutely an adamant employee. It appears that the respondent has no respect for the management. It appears that the respondent has no intention to follow the rules of discipline. Learned counsel has also argued that the Life Insurance Corporation must amend their provisions. It appears that the respondent is absolutely an adamant employee. It appears that the respondent has no respect for the management. It appears that the respondent has no intention to follow the rules of discipline. It appears that the respondent is more interested that management should amend the tailor made type of rules suitable to the need of the respondent. (xxvii) Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon the decisions as stated hereinabove, but, none of the aforesaid decisions upon which the reliance is placed by the respondent is helpful to the respondent because of the peculiar facts of the present case - (1) after joining the services by the respondent of Life Insurance Corporation dated 19.01.1996, the respondent had gone on leaves for 569 days, (2) with all reluctance these leaves were sanctioned, (3) being encouraged by such type of sanctioning of the leaves, again on 16.02.1998, the respondent applied for two years study leave, (4) This application was never allowed by the management-appellant because there is no provisions for study leaves, (5) The respondent had again preferred an application to the Chairman of the Life Insurance Corporation on 24.11.1999, which was also rejected by the Chairman, (6) Again the respondent preferred an application on 11.04.2000 for which now he has informed the management that he shall go on leave with effect from 15.05.2000, (7) And in fact, on and from 15.05.2000, till his removal i.e. up to 16.08.2000, the respondent remained absent, unauthorizedly, (8) Charge-sheet was issued. Inquiry Officer was appointed. Inquiry was conducted. Previously also, before issuance of charge-sheet, several letters were written by the management to the respondent employee to resume the services, but, the respondent has not resumed the services and ultimately inquiry was conducted. On the basis of the reply of the charge-sheet given by the respondent and on the basis of documentary evidences on record, the conclusion was that the charge-sheet lebelled against the respondent has been held as proved vide inquiry report dated 07.02.2002. The second show-cause notice was given to the respondent-delinquent. This notice was also replied by the respondent. (9) Disciplinary authority passed an order of removal of the respondent, from the services of Life insurance Corporation vide order dated. 16.08.2002. Even departmental appeal was allowed to be preferred. The second show-cause notice was given to the respondent-delinquent. This notice was also replied by the respondent. (9) Disciplinary authority passed an order of removal of the respondent, from the services of Life insurance Corporation vide order dated. 16.08.2002. Even departmental appeal was allowed to be preferred. This departmental appeal was also dismissed vide order dated 24.03.2003. These facts make the present case different from the facts of the reported decisions, upon which the reliance is placed by the respondent (original petitioner) and hence the ratio propounded in the aforesaid decisions is of no help to the respondent. (xviii) It has been held by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board & Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu reported in (2014) 0 AIR SCW 1142 in paragraph no. 31 which reads as under: “31. Another aspect needs to be noted. The respondent was a Junior Engineer. Regard being had to his official position, it was expected of him to maintain discipline, act with responsibility, perform his duty with sincerity and serve the institution with honesty. This kind of conduct cannot be countenanced as it creates a concavity in the work culture and ushers in indiscipline in an organization. In this context, we may fruitfully quote a passage from Government of India and another v. Geroge Philip [(2006) 13 SCC 1]: - “In a case involving overstay of leave and absence from duty, granting six months’ time to join duty amounts to not only giving premium to indiscipline but is wholly subversive of the work culture in the organization. Article 51-A (j) of the Constitution lays down that it shall be the duty of every citizen to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavor and achievement. This cannot be achieved unless the employees maintain discipline and devotion to duty. Courts should not pass such orders which instead of achieving the underlying spirit and objects of Part-IV-A of the Constitution have the tendency to negate or destroy the same.”” (emphasis supplied) In the aforesaid decisions the earlier decision rendered by Hon’ble the Supreme Court reported in (2006) 13 SCC (1) has been relied upon. (xxix) In the case of State of Punjab v. Dr. (xxix) In the case of State of Punjab v. Dr. P.L. Singla, reported in (2008) 8 SCC 469 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paragraph No. 14 held as under: “14. Where the employee who is unauthorisedly absent does not report back to duty and offer any satisfactory explanation, or where the explanation offered by the employee is not satisfactory, the employer will take recourse to disciplinary action in regard to the unauthorised absence. Such disciplinary proceedings may lead to imposition of punishment ranging from a major penalty like dismissal or removal from service to a minor penalty like withholding of increments without cumulative effect. The extent of penalty will depend upon the nature of service, the position held by the employee, the period of absence and the cause/explanation for the absence. Where the punishment is either dismissal or removal, it may not be necessary to pass any consequential orders relating to the period of unauthorised absence (unless the rules require otherwise). Where the punishment awarded for the unauthorised absence, does not result in severance of employment and the employee continues in service, it will be necessary to pass some consequential order as to how the period of absence should be accounted for and dealt with in the service record. If the unauthorised absence remains unaccounted it will result in break in service, thereby affecting the seniority, pension, pay, etc. of the employee. Any consequential order directing how the period of absence should be accounted, is an accounting and administrative procedure, which does not affect or supersede the order imposing punishment.” (emphasis supplied) (xxx) In the case of Bank of Baroda v. Anita Nandrajog, reported in (2009) 9 SCC 462 , the Hon’ble Supreme court in Paragraph No. 9, 10 and 13 held as under: “9. It may be noted that the management had been extremely lenient to the respondent by condoning her absence on the first occasion from 4-8-1986 to 29-3-1987, that is, for a period of over seven months when she was absent without leave, and then again from 20-7-1987 to 10-4-1988, that is, for a period of about seven months. Thus the respondent was absent for a very long period without leave. The Bank taking a lenient view condoned the absence without leave. Thus the respondent was absent for a very long period without leave. The Bank taking a lenient view condoned the absence without leave. However, it seems that the respondent thought that she could do whatever she liked and remain absent whenever she liked for whatever period she liked. She again sent an application dated 22-8-1988 for leave for 60 days, which was not sanctioned. However, she remained absent without leave and she kept sending letters for extension of leave although she was on unauthorised absence. 10. In the Bank’s letter dated 26-6-1989 copy of which is as Annexure P-1 to the appeal, it is clearly mentioned in Clause 4 that the respondent did not have any leave remaining to her credit and she had remained on unauthorised leave for a period of more than 150 days continuously and it appeared that she has no intention of joining duty. She was asked to report for duty within 30 days, failing which it would be deemed that she has taken voluntary retirement from service. In reply she wrote a letter dated 27-7-1989 that she will be joining duty by the last week of August 1989, but again she wrote another letter dated 22-8-1989 for extension of leave till April 1990 on account of domestic problems. In our opinion such a behaviour on the part of an employee is clearly unfortunate and highly improper. 13. The behaviour of the respondent remaining absent without leave for such long periods was clearly regrettable and unfortunate. We are fortified by the view we are taking by the decision of this Court in Syndicate Bank v. Staff Assn. as well as the decision in Punjab & Sind Bank v. Sakattar Singh. No establishment can function if it allows its employees to behave in such a manner. We, therefore, uphold the order of the appellant Bank dated 25-8-1989 terminating the service of the respondent as a voluntary cessation of her job, and we set aside the award of the Tribunal dated 5-6-1996 and the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 22-9-2003. Appeal allowed. No order as to costs.” (emphasis supplied) (xxxi) In the case of Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, reported in (2011) 14 SCC 682 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paragraph No. 7, 13 and 14 held as under: “7. Appeal allowed. No order as to costs.” (emphasis supplied) (xxxi) In the case of Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, reported in (2011) 14 SCC 682 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paragraph No. 7, 13 and 14 held as under: “7. The first contention that is raised by the counsel appearing for the appellant is regarding non-furnishing of the absence report. The submission is that it was not furnished to the appellant at all during the proceeding and, therefore, the enquiry proceeding was vitiated. The aforesaid submission is untenable. The appellant himself was fully conscious and aware that he was absent from duties for 39 days. The said fact was mentioned in the charge-sheet and he had full opportunity to defend himself against the said allegation of unauthorised absence for 39 days. Therefore, no prejudice was caused to the appellant even assuming that such a report was not furnished by the departmental authorities. 13. There is yet one more factor which stands against the appellant herein. It is indicated from the counter-affidavit filed by Respondents 1 to 4 that the appellant had also been punished earlier to the aforesaid incident with a punishment for leave without pay for a total of 527 days on different occasions in service as per details below: 13-11-1965 to 5-1-1966 - 54 days 25-7-1973 to 28-7-1973 - 4 days 4-10-1977 to 12-1-1978 - 120 days 13-1-1978 to 9-5-1978 - 118 days 25-10-1979 to 31-10-1979 - 6 days 10-2-1981 to 14-8-1981 - 185 days 13-10-1984 to 22-11-1984 - 40 days 14. Therefore, it is established that the appellant was a habitual absentee without leave and, therefore, he does not deserve any sympathy from this Court. In terms of the aforesaid order, we hold that there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed but leaving the parties to bear their own costs.” (emphasis supplied) (xxxii) In the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paragraph No. 23 to 27 and 31 to 33 held as under: “23. We have quoted in extenso as we are disposed to think that the Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar case has, while dealing with the charge of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant, expressed the aforestated view and further the learned Judges have also opined that there may be compelling circumstances which are beyond the control of an employee. That apart, the facts in the said case were different as the appellant on certain occasions was prevented to sign the attendance register and the absence was intermittent. Quite apart from that, it has been stated therein that it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to come to a conclusion that the absence is wilful. On an apposite understanding of the judgment Krushnakant B. Parmar case we are of the opinion that the view expressed in the said case has to be restricted to the facts of the said case regard being had to the rule position, the nature of the charge levelled against the employee and the material that had come on record during the enquiry. It cannot be stated as an absolute proposition in law that whenever there is a long unauthorised absence, it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to record a finding that the said absence is wilful even if the employee fails to show the compelling circumstances to remain absent. 24. In this context, it is seemly to refer to certain other authorities relating to unauthorised absence and the view expressed by this Court. In State of Punjab v. P.L. Singla the Court, dealing with unauthorised absence, has stated thus: (SCC p. 473, para 11) “11. Unauthorised absence (or overstaying leave), is an act of indiscipline. Whenever there is an unauthorised absence by an employee, two courses are open to the employer. The first is to condone the unauthorised absence by accepting the explanation and sanctioning leave for the period of the unauthorised absence in which event the misconduct stood condoned. The second is to treat the unauthorised absence as a misconduct, hold an enquiry and impose a punishment for the misconduct.” 25. Again, while dealing with the concept of punishment the Court ruled as follows: (P.L. Singla case, SCC pp. 473-74, para 14) “14. The second is to treat the unauthorised absence as a misconduct, hold an enquiry and impose a punishment for the misconduct.” 25. Again, while dealing with the concept of punishment the Court ruled as follows: (P.L. Singla case, SCC pp. 473-74, para 14) “14. Where the employee who is unauthorisedly absent does not report back to duty and offer any satisfactory explanation, or where the explanation offered by the employee is not satisfactory, the employer will take recourse to disciplinary action in regard to the unauthorised absence. Such disciplinary proceedings may lead to imposition of punishment ranging from a major penalty like dismissal or removal from service to a minor penalty like withholding of increments without cumulative effect. The extent of penalty will depend upon the nature of service, the position held by the employee, the period of absence and the cause/explanation for the absence.” 26. In Tushar D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat, the appellant therein had remained unauthorisedly absent for a period of six months and further had also written threatening letters and conducted some other acts of misconduct. Eventually, the employee was visited with order of dismissal and the High Court had given the stamp of approval to the same. Commenting on the conduct of the appellant the Court stated that he was not justified in remaining unauthorisedly absent from official duty for more than six months because in the interest of discipline of any institution or organisation such an approach and attitude of the employee cannot be countenanced. 27. Thus, the unauthorised absence by an employee, as a misconduct, cannot be put into a straitjacket formula for imposition of punishment. It will depend upon many a factor as has been laid down in P.L. Singla. 28. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxx xxxxxxx 29. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxx xxxxxxx 30. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxx xxxxxxx 31. It is apt to note here that in the said Mukul Kumar Choudhuri case the respondent had remained unauthorisedly absent from duty for six months and admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he neither had any intention nor desire to disobey the order of superior authority or violate any of the rules or regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control. Regard being had to the obtaining factual matrix, the Court interfered with the punishment on the ground of proportionality. Regard being had to the obtaining factual matrix, the Court interfered with the punishment on the ground of proportionality. The facts in the present case are quite different. As has been seen from the analysis made by the High Court, it has given emphasis on past misconduct of absence and first time desertion and thereafter proceeded to apply the doctrine of proportionality. The aforesaid approach is obviously incorrect. It is tell-tale that the respondent had remained absent for a considerable length of time. He had exhibited adamantine attitude in not responding to the communications from the employer while he was unauthorisedly absent. As it appears, he has chosen his way, possibly nurturing the idea that he can remain absent for any length of time, apply for grant of leave at any time and also knock at the doors of the Court at his own will. 32. The learned counsel for the respondent has endeavoured hard to impress upon us that the respondent had not been a habitual absentee. We really fail to fathom the said submission when the respondent had remained absent for almost one year and seven months. The plea of absence of “habitual absenteeism” is absolutely unacceptable and, under the obtaining circumstances, does not commend acceptation. We are disposed to think that the respondent by remaining unauthorisedly absent for such a long period with inadequate reason had not only shown indiscipline but also made an attempt to get away with it. Such a conduct is not permissible and we are inclined to think that the High Court has erroneously placed reliance on the authorities where this Court had interfered with the punishment. We have no shadow of doubt that the doctrine of proportionality does not get remotely attracted to such a case. The punishment is definitely not shockingly disproportionate. 33. Another aspect needs to be noted. The respondent was a Junior Engineer. Regard being had to his official position, it was expected of him to maintain discipline, act with responsibility, perform his duty with sincerity and serve the institution with honesty. This kind of conduct cannot be countenanced as it creates a concavity in the work culture and ushers in indiscipline in an organisation. In this context, we may fruitfully quote a passage from Govt. of India v. George Philip: (SCC p. 14, para 18) “18. This kind of conduct cannot be countenanced as it creates a concavity in the work culture and ushers in indiscipline in an organisation. In this context, we may fruitfully quote a passage from Govt. of India v. George Philip: (SCC p. 14, para 18) “18. In a case involving overstay of leave and absence from duty, granting six months’ time to join duty amounts to not only giving premium to indiscipline but is wholly subversive of the work culture in the organisation. Article 51-A(j) of the Constitution lays down that it shall be the duty of every citizen to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. This cannot be achieved unless the employees maintain discipline and devotion to duty. Courts should not pass such orders which instead of achieving the underlying spirit and objects of Part IV-A of the Constitution have the tendency to negate or destroy the same.” We respectfully reiterate the said feeling and restate with the hope that the employees in any organisation should adhere to discipline for not only achieving personal excellence but for collective good of an organisation. When we say this, we may not be understood to have stated that the employers should be harsh to impose grave punishment on any misconduct. An amiable atmosphere in an organisation develops the work culture and the employer and the employees are expected to remember the same as a precious value for systemic development.” (emphasis supplied) 7. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, we hereby, quash and set aside the judgment and order delivered by learned Single Judge passed in W.P.(S) no. 3519 of 2003 dated 12.12.2003. This Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and disposed of with a cost of Rs.15000/- (fifteen thousand) which shall be deposited by the respondent before the Secretary, Women & Child Development and Social Welfare, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi towards Juvenile Justice Fund. This amount will be deposited in Bank Account no. 3734498462-5, Jharkhand Juvenile Justice Fund, State Bank of India, Project Bhawan, Hatia, Ranchi, either by cheque or Bank draft with a period of twelve weeks from today. This amount shall be utilized for the welfare of the juveniles, as per the duties assigned to the State under the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2015. 3734498462-5, Jharkhand Juvenile Justice Fund, State Bank of India, Project Bhawan, Hatia, Ranchi, either by cheque or Bank draft with a period of twelve weeks from today. This amount shall be utilized for the welfare of the juveniles, as per the duties assigned to the State under the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of Children) Act, 2015. 8. Copy of this order will be sent to: (a) The Secretary, Department of Women and Child Development & Social Welfare, Government of Jharkhand and (b) The Member Secretary, Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority, Nyay Sadan, Doranda, Ranchi. 9. This Letters Patent Appeal is allowed with costs. 10. The matter shall be listed on the board on 24.04.2019 only to verify, whether the costs imposed has been deposited by the respondent or not.