JUDGMENT : Rajeev Misra, J. 1. This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the accused applicants challenging the summoning order dated 12.4.2018, the consequential order dated 11.5.2018 (whereby non bailable warrants have been issued against the applicants) passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Sonbhadra in Sessions Trial No. 23/2016 State Vs. Ram Dayal and Others, under Section 376 D, 506 IPC, Section 5(6) 6 POCSO Act and Section 3(2)(5) SC/ST Act, Police Station Myorpur, District Sonbhadra as well as the entire proceedings of the above mentioned complaint case. 2. Mr. B.K. Srivastava, the learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Dhiraj Srivastava and Mr. Anjani Kumar Advocates for the applicants, the learned A.G.A. for the State and Mr. Piyush Tripathi Advocate, for the complainant opposite party No.2 have been heard at length and in detail. 3. The facts necessary for the present adjudication portray that an incident is alleged to have occurred on 20.12.2014 in which Manju Kumari the daughter of the complainant opposite party No.2 aged about 13 years is alleged to have been gang raped by the applicants. According to the opposite party No.2 inspite of the best efforts made by him, the F.I.R. in respect of the said incident was not registered. Consequently, the opposite party No.2 after the expiry of 17 days from the date of the alleged incident, filed an application dated 7.1.2015, in terms of Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C before the Magistrate concerned. The said application came to be allowed on 11.12.2014. As a result of the aforesaid, an FIR dated 31.12.2014 came to be registered at Police Station Myorpur, District Sonbhadra as Case Crime No. 228 of 2014, under Section 376 (d) IPC, Section 5(6), 6 POCSO Act and Section 3(2)5 SC/ST Act. 4. The Investigating Officer commenced the statutory investigation of the aforesaid case crime no. in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XII Cr.P.C. The prosecutrix was got medically examined on 7.1.2015 i.e. after 17 days of the alleged incident by a lady doctor namely, Dr. Geeta Jaiswal. She submitted the medical report dated 7.1.2015. This was followed by a report of the radiologist who submitted the radiological report dated 7.1.2015. Thereafter, the statement of the prosecutrix was got recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. on 12.1.2015. The pathological report dated 15.1.2015 was prepared in respect of the pathological test undertaken regarding the prosecutrix. Geeta Jaiswal. She submitted the medical report dated 7.1.2015. This was followed by a report of the radiologist who submitted the radiological report dated 7.1.2015. Thereafter, the statement of the prosecutrix was got recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. on 12.1.2015. The pathological report dated 15.1.2015 was prepared in respect of the pathological test undertaken regarding the prosecutrix. On the basis of the radiological report as well as the pathological report pertaining to the prosecutrix the lady doctor namely Dr. Geeta Jaiswal who had medically examined the prosecutrix on 7.1.2015 submitted the supplementary medical report dated 10.2.2015. 5. While the aforesaid exercise was being carried out the Investigating Officer who was no one else but a Deputy Superintendent of Police was proceeding with the Investigating of the above mentioned case crime no. He recorded the statements of Sawaroo, Panchbahadur, Nandu Prajapati, Shiv Kumar and Dr. Geeta Jaiswal under section 161 Cr.P.C, and also visited the place of occurrence. 6. On the basis of the material collected by the Investigating Officer during the course of Investigation i.e. the medical reports referred to above as well as the statement of the witnesses he came to the conclusion that the incident as alleged by the complainant opposite party no. 2 does not appear to have occurred. Accordingly, in line with the aforesaid, the Investigating Officer submitted the final report dated 25.3.2015. 7. After the expiry of a period of more than three years from the date of submission of the final report dated 25.3.2015, opposite party No.2 father of the prosecutrix filed a protest petition dated 3.4.2018 against the aforesaid final report. The same was registered as Misc Application No. 23116 of 2018. The court concerned thereafter rejected the final report dated 25.3.2015 and proceeded with the case as a complaint case. The same was registered as Misc Application No. 23116 of 2018. The court concerned thereafter rejected the final report dated 25.3.2015 and proceeded with the case as a complaint case. Accordingly, the Court below, directed the complainant to adduce himself in evidence under section 200 Cr.P.C. and further produce the witnesses for being examined under section 202 Cr.P.C. The court concerned appears to have taken cognizance under Section 190 (1)(a) Cr.P.C. Consequently, the statement of the complainant Patiraj as well as the witnesses adduced by him namely, Manju Kumari and Ram Kali were recorded on 9.4.2018 in terms of sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. It may be noted at this stage that while Manju Kumari is the prosecutrix, Ramkali is alleged to have seen and met the prosecutrix when she is alleged to be lying in the bush after the alleged incident. None of the two witnesses who were adduced under section 202 Cr.P.C. i.e. the complainant and Ramkali are eye witnesses of the alleged occurrence. On the basis of the aforesaid, the Court concerned came to the conclusion that the criminality alleged in the protest petition prima facie appears to be true and therefore, summoned the present applicants by means of the summoning order dated 12.4.2018. As the applicants failed to appear before the court below on the date fixed in the summoning order dated 12.4.2018, the court concerned vide order dated 11.5.2018 issued non bailable warrants against the applicants. Feeling aggrieved by the summoning order dated 12.4.2018, the consequential order dated 11.5.2018 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Sonbhadra as well as the entire proceedings of the above mentioned complaint case, the applicants have now approached this Court by means of the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 8. Mr. B.K. Srivastava, the learned Senior Counsel, in challenge to the summoning order dated 12.4.2018 as well as the entire proceedings of the above mentioned complaint case, submits that the Investigating Officer who was of the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police upon completion of the investigation of the aforesaid case crime number formed an opinion to submit a final report as the prosecution case was not found to be true. No grievance was raised by the complainant regarding the manner in which the investigation was conducted. No grievance was raised by the complainant regarding the manner in which the investigation was conducted. No malafide was alleged against the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation nor in the protest petition filed by the opposite party No.2. As such, there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the final report. Therefore, it is urged that the Court below erred in law and fact in ignoring the aforesaid and rejecting the final report. 9. It is then submitted that the material collected by the Investigating Officer during the course of Investigation has evidentiary value for deciding the protest petition filed against the final report submitted by the Investigating Officer. Therefore, the Court below while deciding the protest petition was either way duty bound to look into the said material, which admittedly has not been done, as there is no recital to that effect in the impugned summoning order. According to the learned Senior Counsel, there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, which prohibits the Court from looking into the material collected by the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation, at the time of considering the protest petition filed by the complainant against the final report. As such, the Court below has not exercised it's jurisdiction with due diligence and thereafter the impugned summoning order is liable to be set aside. 10. As a corollary to the aforesaid submission, it is urged that one of the witness namely, Ramkali, has not been examined by the I.O. under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and there is no explanation why she was not got examined by the Investigating Officer at the time of Investigation of the above mentioned case crime number. 11. Elaborating his submissions further, he submits that the medical evidence on record i.e. the medical report, the radiological report, the pathological report as well as the supplementary medical report, do not even remotely suggest that the alleged offence was committed. As such the medical evidence does not support the ocular version. Consequently, the summoning of the appellants inspite of the aforesaid is unsustainable in law and fact as the consequential trial would be a futile exercise. 12. As such the medical evidence does not support the ocular version. Consequently, the summoning of the appellants inspite of the aforesaid is unsustainable in law and fact as the consequential trial would be a futile exercise. 12. Raising the plea of alibi, the learned Senior Counsel contends that the applicant no.1 Ram Dayal was not even present in the District in which the alleged crime is alleged to have been committed as he was in Haryana at the time of the alleged incident, which fact is established from the call detail report pertaining to the mobile phone of the applicant no.1. Therefore, it is contended that the applicant No.1 could not be prosecuted for the alleged offence in view of the alibi of the applicant No.1 as is established by the aforesaid impeccable evidence. 13. Challenging the prosecution of the applicants in the above mentioned sessions trial, the learned Senior Counsel then submits that the filing of the protest petition by the complainant opposite party No.2 after the expiry of a period of more than three years from the date of the submission of the final report dated 25.3.2015, clearly speaks of the malafide on the part of the opposite party no.2 to falsely prosecute the applicants on account of political rivalry as no man of even ordinary prudence would wait for such a long period in filing the protest petition regarding the alleged crime particularly when the complainant was the first informant himself and also the father of the prosecutrix. On the strength of the averments made in the protest petition, it is submitted that from the perusal of the protest petition, it is apparent that the complainant has deliberately omitted to plead the date of knowledge as well as the mode of knowledge of the final report submitted by the Investigating Officer. As such the present criminal proceedings are wholly malicious and therefore liable to be quashed. 14. Lastly, it is urged that only on the basis of the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. without there being any medical evidence to support the ocular version, no conviction of the applicants for the alleged criminality is possible. The trial of the applicants therefore will be a futile exercise, as such the criminal proceedings so initiated against the applicants are liable to be quashed. 15. The trial of the applicants therefore will be a futile exercise, as such the criminal proceedings so initiated against the applicants are liable to be quashed. 15. On the cumulative strength of the aforesaid submissions, it is thus vehemently urged by the learned Senior Counsel that the summoning order as well as the entire proceedings of the above mentioned complaint case being malicious and also an abuse of the process of the Court, are liable to be quashed by this Court. 16. To lend support to his submissions, the learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon the judgements of the Apex Court in the Case of Sunil Bharti Mittal Vs. C.B.I. 2015 (4) SCC 609 , Harshendra Kumar D. V s. Revti lata Oley, 2011 (3) SCC 351 and Meenu Kumar and Another Vs. State of Bihar and Others, AIR 2006 SC 1937 and Vineet Kumar and Others Vs. State of U.p. and Another, 2017 (13) SCC 369 . 17. In the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal Vs. C.B.I. 2015 (4) SCC 609 , the Apex Court dealt with the power of Magistrate under section 200 to 204 Cr.P.C. along with sections 190, 173 (2) and 319 Cr.P.C. In the above case, the issue was regarding the summoning of the Director of the company and the Court held that the Directors can be roped in only if (a) there is sufficient incriminating evidence against them coupled with criminal intent or (b) the statutory regime attracts the doctrine of vicarious liability. Therefore, the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The next case relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant is Harshendra Kumar D. V s. Revti lata Oley, 2011 (3) SCC 351 . The aforesaid case deals with the power of the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. The Apex Court has observed that the High Court can quash the complaint if the material relied upon by the accused is beyond suspicion of doubt or which are in the nature of public documents and are uncontroverted. There can be no quarrel with the proposition laid down by the Apex Court. There can be no quarrel with the proposition laid down by the Apex Court. However, the issue in the present case is that except for the fact that the medical evidence does not support the ocular version, there is no other such impeccable evidence on the basis of which the complaint case can be said to be false. How far the sad judgment will benefit the applicants shall be dealt with in the later part of the judgment. In the case of Meenu Kumar and Another Vs. State of Bihar and Others, AIR 2006 SC 1937 , the Apex Court dealt with the inherent power of the High Court to quash the criminal proceeding. However, in paragraph 19 of the said judgment, the Apex Court has cautioned that inherent jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself i.e. (I) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Whether the proceedings of the complaint case impugned in the present application under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be quashed or not will depend upon the subsequent discussion that shall take place. The last judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants i.e. Vineet Kumar and Others Vs. State of U.p. and Another, 2017 (13) SCC 369 shall be appropriately dealt with in the later part of this judgment itself. 18. Mr. Piyush Tripathi, the learned counsel for the complainant-opposite party No.2 submits that the present application filed by the applicants is not maintainable as the applicants have the remedy of filing an appeal under Section 14 (a) of the S.C./S.T. Act as they have been summoned under Section 3(2)(5) SC/ST. Act also. He, next submits that the applicant No.1 has criminal history and has referred to the written arguments filed by him which contains the details of the criminal history pertaining to the applicant No.1. The following has been stated in respect of the criminal history of the applicant No. 1: (i) Case Crime No. 18 of 2003 under sections 147, 148, 323, 325, 307 IPC. The following has been stated in respect of the criminal history of the applicant No. 1: (i) Case Crime No. 18 of 2003 under sections 147, 148, 323, 325, 307 IPC. (ii) Case Crime No. 197 of 2012 under sections 147, 323, 504, 506 IPC and 3 (1) 10 of S.C./S.T. Act. (iii) Case Crime No. 75 of 2016 under sections 147, 323, 325 IPC and 3 (1) 10 of S.C./S.T. Act. (iv) Case Crime No. 35 of 2015 under section Goonda Act. 19. According to the learned counsel for the complainant, the summoning order passed by the Court below is perfectly legal as the statement of the complainant opposite party No.2 and the witnesses clearly implicates the present applicants in the commission of the crime in question. He further contends that the statements recorded under Section 200/202 Cr.P.C. are not liable to be disbelieved at this stage in the absence of any impeccable evidence on the record, which may even remotely suggest to the contrary. Lastly, he submits that the material collected during the course of investigation by the Investigating Officer cannot be looked into at the stage of the summoning of the present applicant as the cognizance has been taken by the court concerned under Section 190 (1)(a) Cr.P.C. It is thus strenuously urged that the present application does not merit the indulegence of this Court and therefore the same is liable to be dismissed. 20. To give legal support to the aforesaid submissions, he has relied upon the following judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal Vs. C.B.I., 2015 (4) SCC 609 , Radhakrishna Nagesh Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2013) 11 SCC 688 and Rafiq Vs. State of U.P., 1981 AIR 559 S.C. 21. Learned A.G.A. has adopted the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the opposite party No.2. He, however, submits that the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. clearly implicates the applicants in the alleged criminality. The prosecutrix is a young and innocent girl aged about 13 years of age and there is no reason to doubt her statement which has been recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. According to the learned A.G.A., there is no such material on record on the basis of which the same could be disbelieved or discarded at this stage. The prosecutrix is a young and innocent girl aged about 13 years of age and there is no reason to doubt her statement which has been recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. According to the learned A.G.A., there is no such material on record on the basis of which the same could be disbelieved or discarded at this stage. No malice has been alleged against her for giving the statement under section 164 Cr.P.C. implicating the present applicants. Lastly, it is contended that in the light of the aforesaid, the innocence of the applicants as suggested by the learned counsel for the applicants can more appropriately be examined by the Court below in the trial. Thus, it is urged by the learned A.G.A. that the present criminal misc. application is liable to be dismissed by this Court. 22. From the pleadings raised by the parties and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, the following issues arise for consideration in the present case. (i) What is the nature and scope of powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (ii) What is the evidentiary value of the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (iii) Whether the Magistrate while taking cognizance in terms of section 190 (1)(a) Cr.P.C. can look into the material collected by the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation, which forms part of the case record. (iv) Whether the medical evidence supports the prosecution case. (v) Whether on the ground of malafide the proceedings of the Court below are liable to be quashed by this Court. (vi) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the proceedings of the sessions trial, giving rise to the present application under section 482 Cr.P.C., can be quashed or not 23. To begin with, the first point is taken first. The new Cr.P.C. came into force in the year 1973. The nature and scope of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as well as the parameters regarding the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have been the constant matter of debate. 24. To begin with, the first point is taken first. The new Cr.P.C. came into force in the year 1973. The nature and scope of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as well as the parameters regarding the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have been the constant matter of debate. 24. The issue came up for consideration in the case of Nagawwa vs Veeranna Shivallngappa Konjalgi, AIR 1976 SC 1947 , wherein the following was observed by the Apex Court in paragraph 5 of the judgment:- "Thus, it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside: (1) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) Where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) Where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) Where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash Proceedings." 25. In the case of Sharda Prasad Sinha Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1754 , the Apex Court made the following observations in paragraph 2 of the judgment: "It is, now settled law that where the allegations set out in the complaint or the charge-sheet do not constitute any offence, it is competent to the High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the order passed by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence." 26. Subsequently, the Apex Court examined the nature of power under section 482 Cr.P.C. in the case of Kurukshetra University vs. State of Haryana, reported in 1977 (4) SCC 451 . Subsequently, the Apex Court examined the nature of power under section 482 Cr.P.C. in the case of Kurukshetra University vs. State of Haryana, reported in 1977 (4) SCC 451 . The following was observed in paragraph 2 of the judgment:- "2. It surprises, us in the extreme that the High Court thought that in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, it could quash a First Information Report. The police had not even commenced investigation into the complaint filed by the Warden of the University and no proceeding at all was pending in any court in pursuance of the F.I.R. It ought to be realized that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases." 27. At this stage, reference be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the Case of Sardar Trilok Singh And Others Vs. Satya Deo Tripathi, reported in AIR 1979 SC 850 , wherein the Apex Court quashed the criminal proceedings by observing as follows in paragraphs 5 and 6: "5. We are clearly of the view that it was not a case where any processes ought to have been directed to be issued against any of the accused. On the well-settled principles of law if was very suitable case where the criminal proceeding ought to have been quashed by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power. The dispute raised by the respondent was purely of a civil nature even assuming the facts stated by him to be bstantially correct. Money must have been advanced to him and his partner by the financier on the basis of some terms settled between the parties. Even assuming that the agreement entered on 29th March, 1973 was not duly filled up and the signature of the complainant was obtained on a blank form, it is to be noticed that the amount of the two monthly installments admittedly paid by him was to the tune of Rs. 3, 566/-exactly @ Rs. 1,783/-per month. The complaint does not say as to when these two monthly installments were paid. In the First Information Report which he had lodged he had not, stated that the third monthly installment was payable on July 31, 1973. 3, 566/-exactly @ Rs. 1,783/-per month. The complaint does not say as to when these two monthly installments were paid. In the First Information Report which he had lodged he had not, stated that the third monthly installment was payable on July 31, 1973. Rather, from the statement in the First Information Report it appears that the installment had already become due on 28-7-1973 when the complainant went out of Kanpur according to his case. The question as to what were the terms of the settlement and whether they were duly incorporated In the printed agreement or not were all questions which could be properly and adequately decided in a civil court. Obtaining signature of a person on blank sheet of paper by itself is not an offence of forgery or the like. It becomes an offence when the paper is fabricated into a document of the kind which attracts the relevant provisions of the Penal Code making it an offence or when such a documents is used as a genuine document. Even assuming that the appellants either by themselves or in the company of some others went and seized the truck on 30-7-1973 from the house of the respondent they could and did claim to have done so in exercise of their bonafide right of seizing the truck on the respondent's failure to pay the third monthly instalment in time. It was therefore, a bona fide civil dispute which led to the seizure of the truck. On the face of the complaint petition itself the highly exaggerated rated version given by the respondent that the appellants went to his house with a mob aimed with deadly weapons and committed the offence of dacoity in taking away the truck was so very unnatural and untrustworthy that it could not sake the matter out of the realm of civil dispute. No body on the side of the respondent was hurt. Even a scratch was cot given to any body. 6. In our opinion on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the criminal prosecution deserves to be quashed. On behalf of the respondent is was argued that the appellants' filing petition in the High Court for quashing the proceeding before issuance of the summons was pre mature and the high Court could not have quashed it. 6. In our opinion on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the criminal prosecution deserves to be quashed. On behalf of the respondent is was argued that the appellants' filing petition in the High Court for quashing the proceeding before issuance of the summons was pre mature and the high Court could not have quashed it. In our opinion the point is so wholly with out substance that it has been stated merely to be rejected. Since the parties during the course of the hearing in this appeal showed their inclination to settle up and end all their disputes and quarrels in relation to the matter in question after we indicated our view that we are going to allow the appeal and quash the proceeding, we have not thought it necessary to elaborately give other reasons in support of our order. " 28. The exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as well as the contours of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was again the subject matter of consideration in the case of Raj Kapoor and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, 1980 (1) SCC 43 , wherein the following was observed in paragraph 10: "Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law when a specific provision is made: easy resort to inherent power is not right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code." 29. Taking note of some of the aforesaid judgments, the Apex Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, 1983 (1) SCC 1 , laid down the test to be used by the Courts for quashing the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Paragraph 10 of the said judgment is relevant for the controversy in hand which is as under : "It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting any thing, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code. " 30. Then again in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Purshotam Das Jhunjunwala and Others, repoted in 1983 (1) SCR 895 , the Apex Court set aside the judgment of the High Court, which had quashed the proceedings and restored that of the trial court. Following was observed in the paragraph quoted hereunder:- "From a perusal of the various clauses of the complaint, including para 5, it is quite clear that a prima facie case for summoning the accused has been made out and the High Court was absolutely wrong in holding that the allegations made in para 5 are vague. The High Court failed to consider that the allegations were quite clear and explicit so as to be sufficient for taking cognizance of the offence against the accused." 31. Thereafter the Apex Court in the case of Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and Others VS. ShambhaJirao Chandrojirao Angre and others, reported in 1988 (1) SCC 692 observed as follows in paragraph 7 of the judgment:- "7. The legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage." 32. The matter did not rest here and in the case of Dhanalakshmi V. R. Prasanna Kumar, reported in 1990 Supp SCC 686, the Apex Court observed as follows in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the judgment:- 3. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent powers to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the pro-ceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482. It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticu-lous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the state-ment on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexa-tious. in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. 4. The High Court without proper application of the princi-ples that have been laid down by this Court in Sharda Prasad Sinha v. State of Bihar, [1977] 2 SCR 357; Trilok Singh and Others v. Satya Deo Tripathi, [1980] 86 CRL. LJ 882-- AIR 1979 SC 850 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Purshotam Dass Jhunjunwala and Others, [1983] 1 SCR 895 proceeded to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all the probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrived at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed against all the respondents. The High Court was clearly in error in assessing the material before it and concluding that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. We find there are spe-cific allegations in the complaint disclosing the ingredi-ents of the offence taken cognizance of. It is for the complainant to substantiate the allegations by evidence at a later stage. The High Court was clearly in error in assessing the material before it and concluding that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. We find there are spe-cific allegations in the complaint disclosing the ingredi-ents of the offence taken cognizance of. It is for the complainant to substantiate the allegations by evidence at a later stage. In the absence of circumstances to hold prima facie that the complaint is frivolous when the complaint does disclose the commission of an offence there is no justification for the High Court to interfere. 33. Thereafter in the case of Jantadal Vs. H.S. Chaudhri 1992 (4) SCC 305 , the Apex Court gave the following caution regarding exercise of inherent jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C. which are contained in paragraphs 132, 133, 134, 135, 136 and 137 of the judgment:- 132. The criminal Courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the Courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. 133. The Judicial Committee in (1) Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad and (2) Lala Jai Ram Das v. Emperor has taken the view that Section 561-A of the old Code gave no new powers but only provided that those which the Court already inherently possessed should be preserved. This view holds the field till date. 134. This Court in Dr. Raghubir Sharon v. The State of Bihar had an occasion to examine the extent of inherent power of the High Court and its jurisdiction when to be exercised. Mudholkar, J speaking for himself and Raghubar Dayal, J after referring a series of decisions of the Privy Council and of the various High Courts held thus: ...every High Court as the highest court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a State has inherent power to make any order for the purpose of securing the ends of justice.... Mudholkar, J speaking for himself and Raghubar Dayal, J after referring a series of decisions of the Privy Council and of the various High Courts held thus: ...every High Court as the highest court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a State has inherent power to make any order for the purpose of securing the ends of justice.... Being an extraordinary power it will, however, not be pressed in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a subordinate Court to is powers.... 135. See Talab Hazi Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar and Anr. [1958] SCR 1226 and Pampapathy v. State of Mysore [1966] (Supp.) SCR 477. 136. Thus, the inherent power under this Section can be exercised by the High Court (1) to give effect to any order passed under the Code; or (2) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court; or (3) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In relation to exercise of inherent powers of the High Court, it has been observed in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra that the power in not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision inthe Code for the redress of grievance of the aggrieved party and that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. Vide (1) Talab Hazi Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam ; (2) Khushi Ram v. Hashim and Ors. AIR 1959 SC 542 ; and (3) State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala. 137. This inherent power conferred by Section 482 of the Code should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally retrain from giving a premature decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved whether factual or legal are of great magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to quashing the proceedings at any stage. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to quashing the proceedings at any stage. This Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [1990] 3 Supp. SCR 256 to which both of us were parties have dealt with this question at length and enunciated the law listing out the circumstances under which the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction in quashing proceedings. We do not, therefore, think it necessary in the present case to extensively deal with the import and intendment of the powers under Sections 397, 401 and 482 of the Code. 34. The issue with regard to quashing of the proceedings again came up for consideration in the Case of P.S. Rajya Vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1996 (9) SCC 1 , wherein the Apex Court observed as follows in paragraphs 20 and 23:- "20. At the risk of repetition, we may state that the charge had not been proved and on that basis the appellant was cleared of departmental enquiry. In this connection, we may also usefully cite a decision of this Court in State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others (1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335). This Court after considering almost all earlier decisions has given guidelines relating to the exercise of the extra ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure for quashing an F.I.R. or a complaint. This Court after considering almost all earlier decisions has given guidelines relating to the exercise of the extra ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure for quashing an F.I.R. or a complaint. This Court observed as follows ; "In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prime facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegation in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR donot disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the ode except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the ode. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- ongnzable offence, no investigation is permitted by a magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private an personal grudge. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an-arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." ...... 23. Even though all these facts including the Report of the Central Vigilance Commission were brought to the notice of the High Court, unfortunately, the High Court took a view that the issues raised had to be gone into in the final proceedings and the Report of the Central Vigilance Commission, exonerating the appellant of the same charge in departmental proceedings would not conclude the criminal case against the appellant. We have already held that for the reasons given, on the peculiar facts of this case, the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant cannot be pursued. Therefore, we do not agree with the view taken by the High Court as stated above. These are the reasons for our order dated 27.3.1996 for allowing the appeal and quashing the impugned criminal proceedings and giving consequential reliefs." 35. The parameters of jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C. were again considered in the Case of State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, reported in 2005 (1) SCC 568 . These are the reasons for our order dated 27.3.1996 for allowing the appeal and quashing the impugned criminal proceedings and giving consequential reliefs." 35. The parameters of jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C. were again considered in the Case of State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, reported in 2005 (1) SCC 568 . Paragraph 22 of the aforesaid judgment is relevant for the present controversy and is reproduced herein below:- Reliance has also been placed on decision in the case of P.S.Rajya v. State of Bihar [ (1996) 9 SCC 1 ] where this court rejected the contention urged on behalf of the State that the points on which the accused was seeking quashing of criminal proceedings could be established by giving evidence at appropriate time and no case had been made out for quashing the charge itself. The charge was quashed by this Court. In this case too only on peculiar facts of the case, this Court came to the conclusion that the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant-accused could not be pursued. Those peculiar facts have been noticed in paragraphs 14, 17, 18 and 19 of the decision. The contention of the accused based on those peculiar facts has been noticed in para 15 and that of respondent that the CBI was entitled to proceed on the basis of the material available and the mere allegations made by the accused cannot take the place of proof and that had to be gone into and established in the final hearing, has been noticed in para 16. After noticing those contentions and the decision in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 (Suppl.1) 335] laying down the guidelines relating to the exercise of extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code for quashing an FIR or a complaint, this Court, on the peculiar facts, came to the conclusion that the case of the appellant could be brought under more than one head given in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) without any difficulty so as to quash the proceedings. In this background, observations were made in para 23 on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the accused whereby rejecting the contention of the State as noticed in para 16, the Court came to the conclusion that the criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed. In this background, observations were made in para 23 on which reliance has been placed on behalf of the accused whereby rejecting the contention of the State as noticed in para 16, the Court came to the conclusion that the criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed. In this case too the question was not about the right of the accused to file material at the stage of framing charge but was about quashing of proceedings in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code. The decision in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. MohanLal Soni [ (2000) 6 SCC 338 ] sought to be relied upon on behalf of the accused is also of no assistance because in that case an earlier order of the High Court wherein trial court was directed to take into consideration the documents made available by the accused during investigation while framing charge had attained finality since that order was not challenged and in that view this Court came to the conclusion that the trial court was bound and governed by the said direction of the High Court which had not been followed." 36. The issue regarding the parameters of the power under section 482 Cr.P.C. did not rest here but again cropped up for consideration in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Ravi Shankar Srivastava, IAS and Another, reported in 2006 (7) SCC 188 . Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 of the aforesaid judgment are relevant for the controversy in hand and are quoted herein below:- 7. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 8. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 8. In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ) this Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 9. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) 335). A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows:" (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 10. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary ( 1992 (4) SCC 305 ), and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1964 SC 1 ). It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. (See: Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar (1990 Supp SCC 686), State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma ( AIR 1996 SC 309 ), Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill ( 1995 (6) SCC 194 ), State of Kerala v. O. C. Kuttan ( AIR 1999 SC 1044 ), State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma ( 1996 (7) SCC 705 ), Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada ( 1997 (2) SCC 397 ), Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) ( AIR 1996 SC 2983 ), Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi ( 1999 (3) SCC 259 ) and in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and Another ( 2002 (3) SCC 89 ). 37. of NCT of Delhi) ( AIR 1996 SC 2983 ), Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi ( 1999 (3) SCC 259 ) and in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and Another ( 2002 (3) SCC 89 ). 37. However, a departure was made by the Apex Court from the traditional view as noted above in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami and Anr. Vs. State of Uttaranchal and Ors. reported in 2007 (12) SCC 1 , wherein the following has been observed in paragraphs 23 to 38 of the judgment:- 23. This court in a number of cases has laid down the scope and ambit of courts powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised: (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 24. Inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. Discussion of decided cases 25. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the courts have consistently taken the view that they must use this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v. DPP [1964] AC 1254, Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. It is generally agreed that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its process from abuse. In Connelly v. DPP [1964] AC 1254, Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial. Lord Salmon in DPP v. Humphrys [1977] AC 1 stressed the importance of the inherent power when he observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and vexatious that the judge has the power to intervene. He further mentioned that the courts power to prevent such abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be jealously preserved. 26. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 , this court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 27. The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy; more so, when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. 28. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. 28. This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Others (1977) 2 SCC 699 observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The court observed in this case that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts. 29. In Chandrapal Singh & Others v. Maharaj Singh & Another (1982) 1 SCC 466 , in a landlord and tenant matter where criminal proceedings had been initiated, this Court observed in para 1 at page 467 as under:- 30. A frustrated landlord after having met his waterloo in the hierarchy of civil courts, has further enmeshed the tenant in a frivolous criminal prosecution which prima facie appears to be an abuse of the process of law. The facts when stated are so telling that the further discussion may appear to be superfluous. The court noticed that the tendency of perjury is very much on the increase. Unless the courts come down heavily upon such persons, the whole judicial process would come to ridicule. The court also observed that chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by cheaply invoking jurisdiction of the criminal court. 31. This court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Others (1988) 1 SCC 692 observed in para 7 as under: 7. The court also observed that chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustration by cheaply invoking jurisdiction of the criminal court. 31. This court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Others (1988) 1 SCC 692 observed in para 7 as under: 7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage. 32. In State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajan Lal & Others 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, this court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, this court made it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 33. This court in Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary & Others (1992) 4 SCC 305 observed thus: 132. The criminal courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plentitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. 34. The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plentitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. 34. In G. Sagar Suri & Another v. State of UP & Others (2000) 2 SCC 636 , this court observed that it is the duty and obligation of the criminal court to exercise a great deal of caution in issuing the process particularly when matters are essentially of civil nature. 35. This court in Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala (2000) 8 SCC 590 observed thus:- 18. It is well settled that the power under section 482 Cr.P.C has to be exercised by the High Court, inter alia, to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Where criminal proceedings are initiated based on illicit material collected on search and arrest which are per se illegal and vitiate not only a conviction and sentence based on such material but also the trial itself, the proceedings cannot be allowed to go on as it cannot but amount to abuse of the process of the court; in such a case not quashing the proceedings would perpetuate abuse of the process of the court resulting in great hardship and injustice to the accused. In our opinion, exercise of power under section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings in a case like the one on hand, would indeed secure the ends of justice. 36. This court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Others v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Another (2005) 1 SCC 122 observed thus:- It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 37. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. & Others (2006) 6 SCC 736 , this court again cautioned about a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. The court noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. The court further observed that 13............any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. 38. The question before us is-whether the case of the appellants comes under any of the categories enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra)? Is it a case where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, do not make out a case against the accused under Sections 420, 467 and 120B IPC? For determination of the question it becomes relevant to note the nature of the offences alleged against the appellants, the ingredients of the offences and the averments made in the FIR/complaint. 38. The Apex Court reconsidered the issue relating to the parameters of powers of the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. in the case of Hamidia Vs. Rashid reported in 2008 (1) SCC 474 . The following was observed in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9:- 6. We are in agreement with the contention advanced on behalf of the complainant appellant. The Apex Court reconsidered the issue relating to the parameters of powers of the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. in the case of Hamidia Vs. Rashid reported in 2008 (1) SCC 474 . The following was observed in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9:- 6. We are in agreement with the contention advanced on behalf of the complainant appellant. Section 482 Cr.P.C. saves the inherent powers of the High Court and its language is quite explicit when it says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A procedural Code, however exhaustive, cannot expressly provide for all time to come against all the cases or points that may possibly arise, and in order that justice may not suffer, it is necessary that every court must in proper cases exercise its inherent power for the ends of justice or for the purpose of carrying out the other provisions of the Code. It is well established principle that every Court has inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone it exists or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. As held by the Privy Council in Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18 with regard to Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Section 482 Cr.P.C. is a verbatim copy of the said provision) gives no new powers. It only provides that those which the Court already inherently possesses shall be preserved and is inserted, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Code and that no inherent power had survived the passing of the Act. 7. It is well established principle that inherent power conferred on the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases and that too to correct patent illegalities or when some miscarriage of justice is done. 7. It is well established principle that inherent power conferred on the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases and that too to correct patent illegalities or when some miscarriage of justice is done. The content and scope of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. were examined in considerable detail in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1978 SC 47 and it was held as under : "The following principles may be stated in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court-(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code." In State v. Navjot Sandhu (2003) 6 SCC 641 (para 29), after a review of large number of earlier decisions, it was held as under : "29. The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the Court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing the ends of justice. The inherent power must be exercised very sparingly as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The most common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out herein above fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment." 9. This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment." 9. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. (1999) 6 SCC 146 the High Court had entertained a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. after an order of conviction had been passed by the Sessions Judge and before the sentence had been awarded and further proceedings in the case had been stayed. In appeal this Court set aside the order of the High Court after reiterating the principle that it is well settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code. It was further observed that the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to prefer statutory appeal against conviction of the offence and intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial. The order of the High Court was accordingly set aside on the ground that a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could not have been entertained as the accused had an alternative remedy of an appeal as provided in the Code. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with other decisions of this Court as the consistent view throughout has been that a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be entertained if there is any other specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party." 39. The matter was again considered in the case of Divine Retreat Centre V. State of Kerala, 2008 (3) SCC 542 , wherein the Apex Court made the following observations in paragraph 27 of the judgment:- "27. In our view, there is nothing like unlimited arbitrary jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. The power has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution only where such exercise is justified by the tests laid down in the Section itself. It is well settled that Section 482 does not confer any new power on the High Court but only saves the inherent power which the court possessed before the enactment of the Code. The power has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution only where such exercise is justified by the tests laid down in the Section itself. It is well settled that Section 482 does not confer any new power on the High Court but only saves the inherent power which the court possessed before the enactment of the Code. There are three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice." 40. In the case of R.Kalyani Versus Janak C. Mehta reported in 2009 (1) SCC 516 , the Apex Court laid down the following proposition regarding the nature and exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. "15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions are: (1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a first information report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence. (2) For the said purpose the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence. (3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the Court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus. (4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue. 16. It is furthermore well known that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down. Each case has to be considered on its own merits. The Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, although would not interfere with a genuine complaint keeping in view the purport and object for which the provisions of Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been introduced by Parliament but would not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction in appropriate cases. The Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, although would not interfere with a genuine complaint keeping in view the purport and object for which the provisions of Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been introduced by Parliament but would not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction in appropriate cases. One of the paramount duties of the superior courts is to see that a person who is apparently innocent is not subjected to persecution and humiliation on the basis of a false and wholly untenable complaint." 41. Again in the case of Iridium India Telecom Ltd.v. Motorola Inc. [ (2011) 1 SCC 74 ], the following was observed by the Apex Court in paragraph nos. 39 to 51 regarding the nature and scope of powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.: "39. The contours within which the High Court would exercise its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding has been dilated upon, and well defined by this Court in a catena of judgments. We may make a reference here only to a few representative cases. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi [ (1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507] considering the limits within which the Magistrate is required to conduct an inquiry under Section 202 CrPC, this Court observed that the scope of such inquiry is (SCC pp. 740-41, para 4) "extremely limited--limited only to the ascertainment of the truth or falsehood of the allegations made in the complaint--(i) on the materials placed by the complainant before the court; (ii) for the limited purpose of finding out whether a prima facie case for issue of process has been made out; and (iii) for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. In fact it is well settled that in proceedings under Section 202 the accused has got absolutely no locus standi and is not entitled to be heard on the question whether the process should be issued against him or not." 40. It has been further held as follows: (Nagawwa case [ (1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507], SCC p. 741, para 5) "5.... It has been further held as follows: (Nagawwa case [ (1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507], SCC p. 741, para 5) "5.... Once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court, or even this Court, to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. These considerations, in our opinion, are totally foreign to the scope and ambit of an inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which culminates into an order under Section 204 of the Code. Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside: (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like." 41. The aforesaid examples are of course purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate the contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings. 42. This Court in Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana [ (1977) 4 SCC 451 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 613] again stated the principle regarding the exercise of the inherent powers conferred by Section 482 CrPC. Chandrachud, J. speaking for the Bench observed as follows: (SCC p. 451, para 2) "2.... It ought to be realised that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. Chandrachud, J. speaking for the Bench observed as follows: (SCC p. 451, para 2) "2.... It ought to be realised that inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases." 43. In MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi [ (1983) 1 SCC 1 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 115], SCC pp. 4-5, para 7 this Court reiterated the legal position with regard to the limits of the power under Section 482, as stated in Raj Kapoor v. State [ (1980) 1 SCC 43 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 72] wherein Krishna Iyer, J. observed as follows: (Ram Kishan case[ (1983) 1 SCC 1 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 115], SCC pp. 4-5, para 7) "7.... ''10.... Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law when a specific provision is made: easy resort to inherent power is not right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code.' [Ed.: As observed in Raj Kapoor v. State, (1980) 1 SCC 43 , SCC p. 47, para 10.] " 44. This Court also reiterated the four propositions of law which were said to be illustrative in Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi [ (1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507]. It was further held as follows: (Ram Kishan case [ (1983) 1 SCC 1 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 115], SCC p. 6, para 10) "10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code." 45. The aforesaid proposition of law was again reiterated by this Court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [ (1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234] in the following words: (SCC p. 695, para 7) "7. The aforesaid proposition of law was again reiterated by this Court in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [ (1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234] in the following words: (SCC p. 695, para 7) "7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage." 46. The aforesaid ratio of law was further elaborately discussed in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], wherein this Court had formulated certain principles pertaining to the exercise of such power in the following words: (SCC pp. 378-79, paras 102-03) "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice." 47. The aforesaid ratio of law was further reiterated in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [ (1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36] in the following words: (SCC pp. 355-56, paras 132, 134 & 137) "132. The criminal courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. 134. This Court in Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [ AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1] had an occasion to examine the extent of inherent power of the High Court and its jurisdiction when to be exercised. Mudholkar, J. speaking for himself and Raghubar Dayal, J. after referring to a series of decisions of the Privy Council and of the various High Courts held thus: (AIR p. 11, para 31) ''31.... every High Court as the highest court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a State has inherent power to make any order for the purpose of securing the ends of justice.... every High Court as the highest court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a State has inherent power to make any order for the purpose of securing the ends of justice.... Being an extraordinary power it will, however, not be pressed in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a subordinate court of its powers....' 137. This inherent power conferred by Section 482 of the Code should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a premature decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved whether factual or legal are of great magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage." 48. Adverting to the scope of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482, this Court in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [ (2005) 1 SCC 568 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] again reiterated as follows: (SCC p. 578, para 21) "21. It is evident from the above that this Court was considering the rare and exceptional cases where the High Court may consider unimpeachable evidence while exercising jurisdiction for quashing under Section 482 of the Code. In the present case, however, the question involved is not about the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code where along with the petition the accused may file unimpeachable evidence of sterling quality and on that basis seek quashing, but is about the right claimed by the accused to produce material at the stage of framing of charge." 49. Again, upon a very elaborate examination of the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, this Court in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal [ (2007) 12 SCC 1 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 259] very clearly observed that the aforesaid powers are very wide and the very plentitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. It is clearly observed that the High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. At the same time, it is also observed that the inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy, more so, when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Reiterating the observations made by this Court in Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. [ (2006) 6 SCC 736 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188], the Court again cautioned about a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. The Court reiterated that any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. 50. The limits within which the jurisdiction under Section 482 can be exercised was again precisely stated in Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala [ (2008) 3 SCC 542 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 9] as follows: (SCC p. 557, para 27) "27. In our view, there is nothing like unlimited arbitrary jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. The power has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution only where such exercise is justified by the tests laid down in the section itself. It is well settled that Section 482 does not confer any new power on the High Court but only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. There are three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely,(i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice." (emphasis supplied) 51. There are three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely,(i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice." (emphasis supplied) 51. In M.N. Ojha v. Alok Kumar Srivastav [ (2009) 9 SCC 682 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] this Court was dealing with a situation where the SDJM had issued process mechanically and without any application of mind. Furthermore, the High Court had dismissed a petition for quashing the order of the SDJM by a cryptic and non-speaking order. In such circumstances, this Court observed: (SCC pp. 686-88, paras 25 & 27-30) "25. Had the learned SDJM applied his mind to the facts and circumstances and sequence of events and as well as the documents filed by the complainant himself along with the complaint, surely he would have dismissed the complaint. He would have realised that the complaint was only a counterblast to the FIR lodged by the Bank against the complainant and others with regard to the same transaction. *** 27. The case on hand is a classic illustration of non-application of mind by the learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate did not scrutinise even the contents of the complaint, leave aside the material documents available on record. The learned Magistrate truly was a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning the appellants. 28. The High Court committed a manifest error in disposing of the petition filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Code without even adverting to the basic facts which were placed before it for its consideration. 29. It is true that the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot go into the truth or otherwise of the allegations and appreciate the evidence if any available on record. Normally, the High Court would not intervene in the criminal proceedings at the preliminary stage/when the investigation/enquiry is pending. 30. Interference by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can only be where a clear case for such interference is made out. Normally, the High Court would not intervene in the criminal proceedings at the preliminary stage/when the investigation/enquiry is pending. 30. Interference by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can only be where a clear case for such interference is made out. Frequent and uncalled for interference even at the preliminary stage by the High Court may result in causing obstruction in the progress of the inquiry in a criminal case which may not be in the public interest. But at the same time the High Court cannot refuse to exercise its jurisdiction if the interest of justice so required where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no fair-minded and informed observer can ever reach a just and proper conclusion as to the existence of sufficient grounds for proceeding. In such cases refusal to exercise the jurisdiction may equally result in injustice more particularly in cases where the complainant sets the criminal law in motion with a view to exert pressure and harass the persons arrayed as accused in the complaint." 42. The Apex Court in the case of Lee-Kun-Hee Vs. State of U.P, 2012 (3) SCC 132 made the following observations in paragraphs 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59: 55. To the credit of the learned counsel representing the appellants, we must place on record, that reliance was placed on legal precedent to substantiate the aforesaid submissions. We are however of the view that it is not necessary for us at the present juncture to deal with any of the aforesaid submissions in view of the legal position expressed by this Court in its recent judgment in Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc. [ (2011) 1 SCC 74 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201], wherein while examining a matter similar to the one in hand, this Court examined at great length not only the scope of interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (including that under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India) but also the culpability of a body corporate/company, including its functionaries, in respect of criminal charges. The only difference between the present controversy and the one adjudicated upon by this Court in Iridium India Telecom Ltd. case [ (2011) 1 SCC 74 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201] is that while in the present controversy the accused have approached this Court consequent upon the denial of reliefs sought from the High Court in Iridium India Telecom Ltd. case[ (2011) 1 SCC 74 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201] the claim raised by the accused had been accepted by the High Court whereupon the complainant had approached this Court. 56. The submissions which came to be dealt with by this Court in Iridium India Telecom Ltd. case [ (2011) 1 SCC 74 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201], at the behest of the complainant party, are summarised in para 23, which is being reproduced hereunder: (SCC p. 85) "23. The submissions made by Mr Jethmalani although very elaborate, may be summed up as follows: (i)The power to quash a criminal complaint that too at the stage of cognizance, is an extreme power, which must be exercised very sparingly and with abundant caution; that too in the rarest of rare cases. (ii) In exercise of its power under Section 482, the High Court has to consider the complaint as a whole, without examining the merits of the allegations i.e. genuineness of the allegations is not to be examined at this stage. (iii) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, proceedings should not be quashed. (iv) Quashing of a complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out an offence; that it would be a miscarriage of justice to permit the proceedings to continue. (v) In support of the aforesaid submissions, Mr Jethmalani has relied on the following judgments of this Court: Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi[ (1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507],MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi [ (1983) 1 SCC 1 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 115],Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar [1990 Supp SCC 686 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 142] and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426]." 57. In paras 24 to 30, this Court in Iridium India Telecom Ltd. case [ (2011) 1 SCC 74 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201] noticed the facts pertaining to the controversy, and the emerging legal technicalities canvassed at the hands of the appellants. In paras 31 to 37, this Court recorded the response thereto, at the behest of the accused. Thereupon, this Court in Iridium India Telecom Ltd. case [ (2011) 1 SCC 74 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201] made the following observations in para 38: (SCC p. 89)" 38. We have considered the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel. A bare perusal of the submissions would be sufficient to amply demonstrate that this cannot be said to be an ''open and shut' case for either of the parties. There is much to be said on both sides. The entire scenario painted by both the sides is circumscribed by ''ifs' and ''buts'. A mere reading of the 1992 PPM would not be sufficient to conclude that the entire information has been given to the prospective investors. Similarly, merely because there may have been some gaps in the information provided in the PPM would not be sufficient to conclude that the respondents have made deliberate misrepresentations. In such circumstances, we have to examine whether it was appropriate for the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings at the stage when the Magistrate had merely issued process against the respondents." 58. In paras 39 to 51, this Court in Iridium India Telecom Ltd. case [ (2011) 1 SCC 74 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201] examined the parameters of the scope of exercise of jurisdiction in proceedings initiated to quash criminal charges/proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (and/or under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India). In this behalf, reliance was placed on past precedent including the decision rendered by this Court in State of Haryana v.Bhajan Lal[1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (SCC pp. 378-79, paras 102-03) "102. In this behalf, reliance was placed on past precedent including the decision rendered by this Court in State of Haryana v.Bhajan Lal[1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (SCC pp. 378-79, paras 102-03) "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." 59.While dealing with the various judgments rendered by this Court on the subject reference was also made to the decision in M.N. Ojha v. Alok Kumar Srivastav [ (2009) 9 SCC 682 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 101]. In M.N. Ojha case [ (2009) 9 SCC 682 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 101] similar views as in Bhajan Lal case [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] came to be recorded in the following words: (M.N. Ojha case[ (2009) 9 SCC 682 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 101], SCC pp. 686-88, paras 25 & 27-30) "25. Had the learned SDJM applied his mind to the facts and circumstances and sequence of events and as well as the documents filed by the complainant himself along with the complaint, surely he would have dismissed the complaint. He would have realised that the complaint was only a counterblast to the FIR lodged by the Bank against the complainant and others with regard to the same transaction. 27. He would have realised that the complaint was only a counterblast to the FIR lodged by the Bank against the complainant and others with regard to the same transaction. 27. The case on hand is a classic illustration of non-application of mind by the learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate did not scrutinise even the contents of the complaint, leave aside the material documents available on record. The learned Magistrate truly was a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning the appellants. 28. The High Court committed a manifest error in disposing of the petition filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Code without even adverting to the basic facts which were placed before it for its consideration. 29. It is true that the Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot go into the truth or otherwise of the allegations and appreciate the evidence if any available on record. Normally, the High Court would not intervene in the criminal proceedings at the preliminary stage/when the investigation/enquiry is pending. 30. Interference by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can only be where a clear case for such interference is made out. Frequent and uncalled for interference even at the preliminary stage by the High Court may result in causing obstruction in the progress of the inquiry in a criminal case which may not be in the public interest. But at the same time the High Court cannot refuse to exercise its jurisdiction if the interest of justice so required where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no fair-minded and informed observer can ever reach a just and proper conclusion as to the existence of sufficient grounds for proceeding. In such cases refusal to exercise the jurisdiction may equally result in injustice more particularly in cases where the complainant sets the criminal law in motion with a view to exert pressure and harass the persons arrayed as accused in the complaint." 43. Then came the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Arun Bhandari Vs. In such cases refusal to exercise the jurisdiction may equally result in injustice more particularly in cases where the complainant sets the criminal law in motion with a view to exert pressure and harass the persons arrayed as accused in the complaint." 43. Then came the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Arun Bhandari Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in 2013 (2) SCC 801 , wherein the Apex Court laid down the methodology to be adopted by the courts for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the parameters regarding the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in paragraphs 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33 : 29. We have referred to the aforesaid decisions in the field to highlight about the role of the court while dealing with such issues. In our considered opinion the present case falls in the category which cannot be stated at this stage to be purely civil in nature on the basis of the admitted documents or the allegations made in the FIR or what has come out in the investigation or for that matter what has been stated in the protest petition. We are disposed to think that prima facie there is an allegation that there was a guilty intention to induce the complainant to part with money. We may hasten to clarify that it is not a case where a promise initially made could not be lived up to subsequently. It is not a case where it could be said that even if the allegations in entirety are accepted, no case is made out. Needless to emphasise, the High Court, while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 CrPC, has to adopt a very cautious approach. 30.In CBI v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava[ (2006) 7 SCC 188 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 233] the Court, after referring to Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [ (1992) 4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36] and Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar [ AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1], has observed that the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles and such inherent powers should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. This Court has further stated that it is not proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It has been further pronounced that it would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint could not be proceeded with. The Bench has opined that the meticulous analysis of the case is not necessary and the complaint has to be read as a whole and if it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. 31. In R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta [ (2009) 1 SCC 516 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 567], after referring to the decisions in Hamida v. Rashid [ (2008) 1 SCC 474 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 234] and State of Orissa v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo [ (2005) 13 SCC 540 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 272], this Court eventually culled out the following propositions: (R. Kalyani case [ (2009) 1 SCC 516 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 567], p. 523, para 15) "15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions are: (1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a first information report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence. (2) For the said purpose the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence. (3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. (2) For the said purpose the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence. (3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the Court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus. (4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue." It is worth noting that it was observed therein that one of the paramount duties of the superior court is to see that a person who is absolutely innocent is not subjected to prosecution and humiliation on the basis of a false and wholly untenable complaint. 32. Recently in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [ (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988] a three-Judge Bench has observed that: (SCC pp. 339-40, para 55) "55. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal maximquando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection." 33. Applying the aforesaid parameters we have no hesitation in coming to hold that neither the FIR nor the protest petition was mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. It is also not a case where there is no substance in the complaint. Applying the aforesaid parameters we have no hesitation in coming to hold that neither the FIR nor the protest petition was mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. It is also not a case where there is no substance in the complaint. The manner in which the investigation was conducted by the officer who eventually filed the final report and the transfer of the investigation earlier to another officer who had almost completed the investigation and the entire case diary which has been adverted to in detail in the protest petition prima facie makes out a case against the husband and the wife regarding collusion and the intention to cheat from the very beginning, inducing the appellant to hand over a huge sum of money to both of them. Their conduct of not stating so many aspects, namely, the power of attorney executed by the original owner, the will and also the sale effected by the wife in the name of Monika Singh on 28-7-2008 cannot be brushed aside at this stage. 44. In the case of Rajiv Thapar and Ors. Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, 2013 (3) SCC 330 , the Apex Court expressed its anxiety regarding the continuation of such proceedings which are manifestly illegal. The Apex Court cautioned the High Courts as well as the subordinate Courts in the following terms: "30.Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC (i). Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? (ii) Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? (iii) Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? (iii) Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? (iv) Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused." 45. The aforesaid judgment was followed by the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 2017 SC 4843 . Paragraph nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 are relevant for the purpose and are quoted herein-below: 11. Section 482 is prefaced with an overriding provision. The statute saves the inherent power of the High Court, as a superior court, to make such orders as are necessary (i) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court; or (ii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In Gian Singh [Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988] a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court adverted to the body of precedent on the subject and laid down guiding principles which the High Court should consider in determining as to whether to quash an FIR or complaint in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. The considerations which must weigh with the High Court are: (SCC pp. 342-43, para 61) "61.... the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. The considerations which must weigh with the High Court are: (SCC pp. 342-43, para 61) "61.... the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." 12. In Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54], Dr Justice A.K. Sikri, speaking for a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court observed that in respect of offences against society, it is the duty of the State to punish the offender. In consequence, deterrence provides a rationale for punishing the offender. Hence, even when there is a settlement, the view of the offender and victim will not prevail since it is in the interest of society that the offender should be punished to deter others from committing a similar crime. On the other hand, there may be offences falling in the category where the correctional objective of criminal law would have to be given more weightage than the theory of deterrence. In such a case, the court may be of the opinion that a settlement between the parties would lead to better relations between them and would resolve a festering private dispute. The court observed that the timing of a settlement is of significance in determining whether the jurisdiction under Section 482 should be exercised: (SCC p. 484, para 29.7) "29.7.... In such a case, the court may be of the opinion that a settlement between the parties would lead to better relations between them and would resolve a festering private dispute. The court observed that the timing of a settlement is of significance in determining whether the jurisdiction under Section 482 should be exercised: (SCC p. 484, para 29.7) "29.7.... Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits...." This Court held, while dealing with an offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code that the following circumstances had weighed with it in quashing the first information report: (SCC p. 485, para 33) "33. We have gone through the FIR as well which was recorded on the basis of statement of the complainant/victim. It gives an indication that the complainant was attacked allegedly by the accused persons because of some previous dispute between the parties, though nature of dispute, etc. is not stated in detail. However, a very pertinent statement appears on record viz. "respectable persons have been trying for a compromise uptil now, which could not be finalised". This becomes an important aspect. It appears that there have been some disputes which led to the aforesaid purported attack by the accused on the complainant. is not stated in detail. However, a very pertinent statement appears on record viz. "respectable persons have been trying for a compromise uptil now, which could not be finalised". This becomes an important aspect. It appears that there have been some disputes which led to the aforesaid purported attack by the accused on the complainant. In this context when we find that the elders of the village, including Sarpanch, intervened in the matter and the parties have not only buried their hatchet but have decided to live peacefully in future, this becomes an important consideration. The evidence is yet to be led in the Court. It has not even started. In view of compromise between parties, there is a minimal chance of the witnesses coming forward in support of the prosecution case. Even though nature of injuries can still be established by producing the doctor as witness who conducted medical examination, it may become difficult to prove as to who caused these injuries. The chances of conviction, therefore, appear to be remote. It would, therefore, be unnecessary to drag these proceedings...." 13. In State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi [State of Maharashtra v.Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 563], a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court explained the earlier decisions and the principles which must govern in deciding whether a criminal proceeding involving a non-compoundable offence should be quashed. In that case, the respondents were alleged to have obtained letters of credit from a bank in favour of fictitious entities. The charge-sheet involved the offences under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. Bogus beneficiary companies were alleged to have got them discounted by attaching fabricated bills. Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) emphasised that the case involved an allegation of forgery; hence the Court was not dealing with a simple case where "the accused had borrowed money from a bank, to divert it elsewhere". The Court held that the manner in which letters of credit were issued and funds were siphoned off had a foundation in criminal law: (SCC p. 42, para 26) "26.... availing of money from a nationalised bank in the manner, as alleged by the investigating agency, vividly exposits fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The Court held that the manner in which letters of credit were issued and funds were siphoned off had a foundation in criminal law: (SCC p. 42, para 26) "26.... availing of money from a nationalised bank in the manner, as alleged by the investigating agency, vividly exposits fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandi as narrated in the charge-sheet cannot be put in the compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It is a social wrong and it has immense societal impact. It is an accepted principle of handling of finance that whenever there is manipulation and cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of these kind of benefits it cannot be regarded as a case having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil character. The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates a hazard in the financial interest of the society. The gravity of the offence creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation." The judgment of the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings was hence set aside by this Court. 14. The same principle was followed in CBI v. Maninder Singh [CBI v. Maninder Singh, (2016) 1 SCC 389 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 292] by a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court. In that case, the High Court had, in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 quashed proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While allowing the appeal filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation Mr Justice Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that the case involved allegations of forgery of documents to embezzle the funds of the bank. In such a situation, the fact that the dispute had been settled with the bank would not justify a recourse to the power under Section 482: (SCC p. 394, para 17) "17.... In economic offences the Court must not only keep in view that money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are concerned was well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are concerned was well planned and was committed with a deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of consequence to the society at large. To quash the proceeding merely on the ground that the accused has settled the amount with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the prosecution against the economic offenders are not allowed to continue, the entire community is aggrieved." 15. In a subsequent decision in State of T.N. v. R. Vasanthi Stanley [State of T.N. v. R. Vasanthi Stanley, (2016) 1 SCC 376 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 282], the Court rejected the submission that the first respondent was a woman "who was following the command of her husband" and had signed certain documents without being aware of the nature of the fraud which was being perpetrated on the bank. Rejecting the submission, this Court held that: (SCC p. 387, paras 14-15) "14.... Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are certain provisions in CrPC relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 437, etc. therein but that altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of documents, cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the ground of her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid argument. The offence is gender neutral in this case. We say no more on this score. 15.... A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on the ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that when the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the load on the system...." 16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions: (I)Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves (II)The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. (iii).In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power. (iv). While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court. (v). The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated. (vi). In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences. (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned. (viii).Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute. (ix). In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and .There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance. 46. There is another line of judgments, which also deal with the quashing of the criminal proceedings/F.I.R. i.e. (i) R.P. Kapur Versus State of Punjab; AIR 1960 SC 866 , (ii) State of Haryana & Ors. Versus Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors.;1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335, (iii) State of Bihar & Anr. Versus P.P. Sharma & Anr.; 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 and (iv) Zandu Pharmaceuticals Works Ltd. & Ors. Versus Mohammad Shariful Haque & Anr.; 2005 (1) SCC 122 , M. N. Ojha Vs. Alok Kumar Srivastava, 2009 (9) SCC 682 . 47. In the case of R.P. Kapur (Supra), the following has been observed by the Apex Court in paragraph 6: "Before dealing with the merits of the appeal it is necessary to consider the nature and scope of the inherent power of the High Court under s. 561-A of the Code. Alok Kumar Srivastava, 2009 (9) SCC 682 . 47. In the case of R.P. Kapur (Supra), the following has been observed by the Apex Court in paragraph 6: "Before dealing with the merits of the appeal it is necessary to consider the nature and scope of the inherent power of the High Court under s. 561-A of the Code. The said section saves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. There is no doubt that this inherent power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. In the present case the magistrate before whom the police report has been filed under s. 173 of the Code has yet not applied his mind to the merits of the said report and it may be assumed in favour of the appellant that his request for the quashing of the.proceedings is not at the present stage covered by any specific provision of the Code. It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the a11egations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no ques-tion of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under s. 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. In exercising its jurisdiction under s. 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magis-trate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and' contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point (Vide: In Re: Shripad G. Chandavarkar AIR 1928 Bom 184, Jagat Ohandra Mozumdar v. Queen Empress ILR 26 Cal 786), Dr. Shanker Singh v. The State of Punjab 56 Pun LR 54 : (AIR 1954 Punj 193), Nripendra Bhusan Ray v. Govind Bandhu Majumdar, AIR 1924 Cal 1018 and Ramanathan Chettiyar v. K. Sivarama Subrahmanya Ayyar ILR 47 Mad 722: (AIR 1925 Mad 39)." 48. In the case of State of Haryana (Supra), the following has been observed by the Apex Court in paragraph 102: 105. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. 1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 49. In the case of State of Bihar (Supra), the following has been observed by the Apex Court in paragraph 22. :- "The question of mala fide exercise of power assumes significance only when the criminal prosecution is initiated on extraneous considerations and for an unauthorised purpose. There is no material whatsoever is this case to show that on the date when the FIR was lodged by R.K. Singh he was activated by bias or had any reason to act maliciously. :- "The question of mala fide exercise of power assumes significance only when the criminal prosecution is initiated on extraneous considerations and for an unauthorised purpose. There is no material whatsoever is this case to show that on the date when the FIR was lodged by R.K. Singh he was activated by bias or had any reason to act maliciously. The dominant purpose of registering the case against the respondents was to have an investigation done into the allegations contained in the FIR and in the event of there being sufficient material in support of the allegations to present the charge sheet before the court. There is no material to show that the dominant object of registering the case was the character assassination of the respondents or to harass and humiliate them. This Court in State of Bihar v J.A.C. Saldhana and Ors., [1980] 2 SCR 16 has held that when the information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation which decides the fate of the accused person. This Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., J.T. 1990 (4) S.C. 650 permitted the State Government to hold investigation afresh against Ch. Bhajan Lal inspite of the fact the prosecution was lodged at the instance of Dharam Pal who was enimical towards Bhajan Lal. " 50. In the case of Zandu Pharmaceuticals Works Ltd. (Supra), the following has been observed by the Apex Court in paragraphs nos. 8 to 12: "8. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 9. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 9. In R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab ( AIR 1960 SC 866 ) this Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. 10. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. 11. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. 11. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) 335). A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows: "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary ( 1992 (4) SCC 305 ), and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1964 SC 1 ). It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. (See: Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar (1990 Supp SCC 686), State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma ( AIR 1996 SC 309 ), Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill ( 1995 (6) SCC 194 ), State of Kerala v. O. C. Kuttan ( AIR 1999 SC 1044 ), State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma ( 1996 (7) SCC 705 ), Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada ( 1997 (2) SCC 397 ), Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) ( AIR 1996 SC 2983 ) and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi ( 1999 (3) SCC 259 . 12. The above position was recently highlighted in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and Another ( 2002 (3) SCC 89 ). 51. of NCT of Delhi) ( AIR 1996 SC 2983 ) and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi ( 1999 (3) SCC 259 . 12. The above position was recently highlighted in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and Another ( 2002 (3) SCC 89 ). 51. Thereafter, in the case of M.N. Ojha Vs. Alok Kumar Srivastava, reported in 2009 (9) SCC 682 has made observations in paragraphs 25, 27, 28, 29 and 30 regarding the exercise of power under section 482 Cr.P.C. as well as the principles governing the exercise of such jurisdiction:- "25. Had the learned SDJM applied his mind to the facts and circumstances and sequence of events and as well as the documents filed by the complainant himself along with the complaint, surely he would have dismissed the complaint. He would have realized that the complaint was only a counter blast to the FIR lodged by the Bank against the complainant and others with regard to same transaction. 26. This Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. [ (1998)5 SCC 749 held: "28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused." 27. The case on hand is a classic illustration of non-application of mind by the learned Magistrate. The case on hand is a classic illustration of non-application of mind by the learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate did not scrutinize even the contents of the complaint, leave aside the material documents available on record. The learned Magistrate truly was a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning the appellants. 28. The High Court committed a manifest error in disposing of the petition filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Code without even adverting to the basic facts which were placed before it for its consideration. 29. It is true that the court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot go into the truth or otherwise of the allegations and appreciate the evidence if any available on record. Normally, the High Court would not intervene in the criminal proceedings at the preliminary stage/when the investigation/enquiry is pending. 30. Interference by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure can only be where a clear case for such interference is made out. Frequent and uncalled for interference even at the preliminary stage by the High Court may result in causing obstruction in progress of the inquiry in a criminal case which may not be in the public interest. But at the same time the High Court cannot refuse to exercise its jurisdiction if the interest of justice so required where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no fair-minded and informed observer can ever reach a just and proper conclusion as to the existence of sufficient grounds for proceeding. In such cases refusal to exercise the jurisdiction may equally result in injustice more particularly in cases where the Complainant sets the criminal law in motion with a view to exert pressure and harass the persons arrayed as accused in the complaint." 52. Apart from the above mentioned two lines of cases, dealing with the parameters, nature and scope of jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C., there is a third line of cases, wherein the proceedings of the criminal case has been quashed by the Apex Court by relying upon documents produced by the accused on the ground that they fall in the category of unimpeccable evidence. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of the Apex Court in the following cases: (i) Rajiv Thapar and Ors. Vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, 2013 (3) SCC 330 . (ii) Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and Others Vs. State of U.P. And Another, 2013 (80) ACC 988. (iii) Ajoy Kumar Ghose Vs. State of Jharkhand and Another, 2009 (14) SCC 115 . (iv) State of Orissa Vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, 2005 (1) SCC 568 . (v) Harshendra Kumar D Vs. Rebatilata Koley Etc, 2011 (3) SCC 351 . 53. Having taken notice of the parameters as well as the contours of the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as explained by the Apex Court the inescapable conclusion is that criminal proceedings can be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. provided the same falls within the parameters noted herein-above. 54. The issue regarding the evidentiary value of the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. has been considered by the Apex Court in the case of Vineet Kumar and Others Vs. State of U.P., repoted in 2017 (13) SCC 369 . In paragraph 35, the following observations have been made:- "35. The fact is that no medical examination was got done on the date of incident or even on the next day or on 07.11.2015, when IO asked the complainant and her husband to get done the medical examination. Subsequently it was done on 20.11.2015, which was wholly irrelevant. Apart from bald assertions by the complainant that all accused have raped, there was nothing which could have led the Courts to form an opinion that present case is fit a case of prosecution which ought to be launched. We are conscious that statement given by the prosecutrix/complainant under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is not to be lightly brushed away but the statement was required to be considered along with antecedents, facts and circumstances as noted above. Reference to the judgment of this Court in Prashant Bharti vs. State(NCT of Delhi), 2013 (9) SCC 293 , is relevant for the present case. In the above case the complainant lady aged 21 years lodged an FIR under Section 328 and 354 IPC with regard to the incident dated 15.02.2007. She sent a telephonic information on 16.02.2007 and on her statement FIR under Sections 328 and 354 IPC was registered against the appellant. In the above case the complainant lady aged 21 years lodged an FIR under Section 328 and 354 IPC with regard to the incident dated 15.02.2007. She sent a telephonic information on 16.02.2007 and on her statement FIR under Sections 328 and 354 IPC was registered against the appellant. After a lapse of five days on 21.02.2007 she gave a supplementary statement alleging rape by the appellant on 23.12.2006, 25.12.2006 and 01.01.2007. Statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. of the prosecutrix was recorded. Police filed charge-sheet under Section 328, 324 and 376 IPC. Charge-sheet although mentioned that no proof in support of crime under Section 328/354 could be found. However, on the ground of statement made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. charge-sheet was submitted. Paragraph 10 of the judgment which notes the charge-sheet is as follows: "10. On 28.6.2007, the police filed a charge-sheet under Sections 328,354 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code. In the charge-sheet , it was clearly mentioned, that the police investigation, from different angles, had not yielded any positive result. However, the charge-sheet was based on the statement made by the complainant/prosecuterix before the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was found to be sufficient for the charges alleged-against the appellant-accused. A relevant extract of the charge-sheet depicting the aforesaid factual position, is being reproduced below:- "I the Inspector, tried my best from all angles to recover the intoxicating substance/Pepsi/Pepsi glass and undergarments worn at the time of the rape. But nothing could be recovered and for this reason, the blood sample of accused could not be sent to FSL. As from the investigation so far conducted, no proof could be found in support of the crime under Section 328/354 IPC and even the position of accused Prashant Bharti is not available at Lodhi Colony at the date and time as his mobile phone ill. However, prosecuterix Priya Porwal made statement on 21.2.2007 and on 27.2.2007 under Section 164 Cr.P.C. which is sufficient in support of his challan for the offence under Section 376IPC." (emphasis supplied)" 55. The statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is not a substantive piece of evidence but a supporting piece of evidence. However, prosecuterix Priya Porwal made statement on 21.2.2007 and on 27.2.2007 under Section 164 Cr.P.C. which is sufficient in support of his challan for the offence under Section 376IPC." (emphasis supplied)" 55. The statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is not a substantive piece of evidence but a supporting piece of evidence. The person who made the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. if resiles from the same is liable to be punished but certainly no conviction can be awarded on the ground of the recital contained in the statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. 56. From the discussions made herein above, the inescapable conclusion is that the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. can only be used for the purposes of corroboration. Secondly, simply on the basis of the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., no conviction is possible. 57. This takes me to the third issue involved in the case as to whether the Magistrate while taking cognizance in terms of section 190 (1)(a) Cr.P.C. is required to look into the material collected during the course of investigation or has to simply base his judgment on the statements of the complainant and the witnesses adduced by him. He fairly submits that there is no case law either of this Court or of the Apex Court dealing with the said issue. He has, however, referred to the judgment of the Kerala High Court in the Case of Kader/Moidunni Vs. State of Kerala, reported in 1999 Law Suit (KER) 140 : 1999 Cr.L.J. 4151, wherein, the following has been observed in paragraphs 6 and 7 which are relevant in the context of the issue referred to above:- "6. The main question that has to be decided in the case is whether in the nature of the case, the final report filed by the police in Crime No. 147/92 aforementioned should have been taken into account before taking cognizance of; the case. No decision of this Court or of the Supreme Court has been placed before me which will throw light on the above aspect. But the learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance of the decision in Daleep Singh v. Smt. Magan' 1996 Cri LJ 190 (Raj). No decision of this Court or of the Supreme Court has been placed before me which will throw light on the above aspect. But the learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance of the decision in Daleep Singh v. Smt. Magan' 1996 Cri LJ 190 (Raj). The contention raised in that case was that the Magistrate was bound to send for the report of the S. H. O. in the matter of final report filed based on the information given by the complainant in the private complaint before taking cognizance. The learned Judge of the Rajasthan High Court who decided the case dealt with the same in some extenso. The court noted that the scope of enquiry under Section 202 is the ascertainment of the truth or falsity of the allegations made in the complaint on the materials placed by the complainant before the Court for the limited purpose of finding out whether the prima facie case for issue of process has been-made out and for deciding the question purely from the point of view of the complainant without at all adverting to any defence that the accused may have. Nevertheless, the court has a duty to protect the interest of the absent accused also because at the particular stage, the accused has no say in the matter and the matter is decided without notice to him. It is, therefore, open to the Magistrate to scrutinise carefully the allegations made in the complaint with a view to prevent the accused therein from being called upon to face obviously frivolous complaint and to find what material there is to support the allegations made in the complaint. The Magistrate has a duty not only to bring to book a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made in the complaint but also to protect the interest of the absent accused in such matters. What all matters he should take into consideration to arrive at the conclusion that he should take cognizance of the offence, will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. He has necessarily to consider the allegations made in the complaint and the statement of the complainant recorded under Section 200, Cr. P. C. as also of the witnesses examined under Section 202 of the Cr. He has necessarily to consider the allegations made in the complaint and the statement of the complainant recorded under Section 200, Cr. P. C. as also of the witnesses examined under Section 202 of the Cr. P. C. Along with that, he has also to consider the result of enquiry or investigation, if any, held by the police. It cannot be said that the said data is not an essential factor. The consideration of the materials under Section 202 of the Cr. P. C. is not art empty formality and cannot be done in a perfunctory or mechanical manner or by adopting a superficial approach." 58. I do not find any good ground nor any justifiable reason to differ from the view taken by the Kerala High Court. However, the summoning of the present applicants cannot be set aside simply on the ground that the Court below while taking cognizance has not referred to the material collected by the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation of the concerned case crime number in which the final report was submitted. The reason for the same is apparent as the order by which the Court below after rejecting the final report so submitted, proceeded to deal with the protest petiton as a complaint case with a direction to the complainant to adduce himself and his witnesses under section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., has not been challenged before me. 59. Now coming to the question; Whether on the basis of the medical evidence on the record i.e. the medical report dated 7.1.2015, the radiological report dated 7.1.2015, the pathological report dated 15.1.2015 and the supplementary medical report dated 10.2.2015, the criminality alleged against the applicants stands proved by the medical evidence on the record. 60. Before proceeding to consider the medical evidence on the record, it is imperative to take notice of the fact that the incident occurred on 20.10.2014, whereas the prosecutrix was medically examined for the first time on 7.1.2015 i.e. after 17 days. Her radiological test was conducted on 7.1.2015 and the samples for the pathological test were also taken on 7.1.2015, whereas the report of the pathological test so undertaken was submitted on 15.1.2015. On the basis of the same the supplementary medical report dated 10.2.2015 was submitted. Thus, the prosecutrix was examined medically for the first time after 17 days of the occurrence. On the basis of the same the supplementary medical report dated 10.2.2015 was submitted. Thus, the prosecutrix was examined medically for the first time after 17 days of the occurrence. The samples of the prosecutrix were taken for the pathological test after 17 days of the occurrence. 61. The Lady Doctor, who conducted the examination of the prosecutrix on 7.1.2015, opined that no mark of external injury was found on the body of the prosecutrix. The Lady Doctor further opined that the Hymen was old torn and rest of the parts required to be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the offence under Section 376 I.P.C. were normal. There was no haemorrhage or other discharge. 62. The Radiologist, who submitted the radiological report, opined that Epiphysis at elbow joint is fused. Epiphysis at wrist and elbow joint partially fused. The age of the prosecutrix was stated to be 16-17 years. No definite opinion regarding the commission of an offence under Section 376 I.P.C. upon the prosecutrix was stated. (page 11 of the Supplementary Affidavit) 63. The Pathologist who conducted the pathological tests of the samples taken from the prosecutrix suggested that no spermatozoa was seen. 64. On the strength of the aforesaid, the Lady Doctor, who had examined prosecutrix on 07.01.2005 submitted the supplementary medical report dated 15.1.2015 and concluded that no definite opinion can be given about rape. 65. From the aforesaid, it is apparent that no definite opinion has come forward in the medical examination of the prosecutrix regarding the offence alleged against the applicants under Section 376 (d) IPC. Reference at this stage may also be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vineet Kumar and Others Vs. State of U.P. And Another, 2017 (13) SCC 369 , wherein the Apex Court has quashed the proceedings on the ground that the medical evidence does not support the prosecution case. Following has been observed in paragraphs 17, 18, 21, 35, 36 of the judgment:- "17. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that criminal proceedings initiated by the complainant in the facts of the present case was malafide and falsely initiated to save complainant, her husband and son from making repayment of the amount taken by them with regard to which complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act by the accused were already filed and pending. After registration of case on Application filed by the complainant under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the IO conducted thorough investigation by recording the statements of complainant, her husband as well as husband's brother and brother's wife. Various affidavits were also received by the IO and after conducting investigation there was sufficient materials to come to the conclusion that a story of alleged rape was wholly false and no such incident had taken place as alleged by the complainant. He has submitted a Final Report in the case which ought to have been accepted by the learned Magistrate. It is contended that Protest Petition has been allowed without adverting to the material collected by the IO. The fact that the Application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. itself was filed after 8 days of alleged rape, there is no medical report to prove the alleged rape, these were sufficient to discard the allegations made by the complainant. Summoning of the accused of such serious offence cannot be a mechanical exercise in the facts and circumstances of the case and material collected during investigation which were part of the Final Report were required to be adverted to by the Court while rejecting the Final Report. Learned counsel submits that prosecution in the present case is a clear abuse of the process of the Court and deserves to be set aside in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the High Court. 18. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.2 refuting the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants contended that no error has been committed by the Courts below in summoning the accused, there was statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. of the complainant where she reiterated her case of rape by accused No.1 and 3. It is submitted that at this stage the Court was not required to marshal the evidence and examine the charge on merit and the High Court has rightly refused to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. 21. It is submitted that at this stage the Court was not required to marshal the evidence and examine the charge on merit and the High Court has rightly refused to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. 21. This Court time and again has examined scope of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and laid down several principles which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699 , held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In paragraph 7 of the judgment following has been stated: "7....In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction." 35. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction." 35. The fact is that no medical examination was got done on the date of incident or even on the next day or on 07.11.2015, when IO asked the complainant and her husband to get done the medical examination. Subsequently it was done on 20.11.2015, which was wholly irrelevant. Apart from bald assertions by the complainant that all accused have raped, there was nothing which could have led the Courts to form an opinion that present case is fit a case of prosecution which ought to be launched. We are conscious that statement given by the prosecutrix/complainant under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is not to be lightly brushed away but the statement was required to be considered along with antecedents, facts and circumstances as noted above. Reference to the judgment of this Court in Prashant Bharti vs. State(NCT of Delhi), 2013 (9) SCC 293 , is relevant for the present case. In the above case the complainant lady aged 21 years lodged an FIR under Section 328 and 354 IPC with regard to the incident dated 15.02.2007. She sent a telephonic information on 16.02.2007 and on her statement FIR under Sections 328 and 354 IPC was registered against the appellant. After a lapse of five days on 21.02.2007 she gave a supplementary statement alleging rape by the appellant on 23.12.2006, 25.12.2006 and 01.01.2007. Statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. of the prosecutrix was recorded. Police filed charge-sheet under Section 328, 324 and 376 IPC. Charge-sheet although mentioned that no proof in support of crime under Section 328/354 could be found. However, on the ground of statement made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. charge-sheet was submitted. Paragraph 10 of the judgment which notes the charge-sheet is as follows: "10. On 28.6.2007, the police filed a charge-sheet under Sections 328,354 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code. In the charge-sheet , it was clearly mentioned, that the police investigation, from different angles, had not yielded any positive result. Paragraph 10 of the judgment which notes the charge-sheet is as follows: "10. On 28.6.2007, the police filed a charge-sheet under Sections 328,354 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code. In the charge-sheet , it was clearly mentioned, that the police investigation, from different angles, had not yielded any positive result. However, the charge-sheet was based on the statement made by the complainant/prosecuterix before the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was found to be sufficient for the charges alleged-against the appellant-accused. A relevant extract of the charge-sheet depicting the aforesaid factual position, is being reproduced below:- "I the Inspector, tried my best from all angles to recover the intoxicating substance/Pepsi/Pepsi glass and undergarments worn at the time of the rape. But nothing could be recovered and for this reason, the blood sample of accused could not be sent to FSL. As from the investigation so far conducted, no proof could be found in support of the crime under Section 328/354 IPC and even the position of accused Prashant Bharti is not available at Lodhi Colony at the date and time as his mobile phone ill. However, prosecuterix Priya Porwal made statement on 21.2.2007 and on 27.2.2007 under Section 164 Cr.P.C. which is sufficient in support of his challan for the offence under Section 376 IPC." (emphasis supplied)" 36. Writ petition was filed by the accused for quashing the FIR which was dismissed by the High Court on 27.08.2007. Thereafter, charges were framed on 01.12.2008. Dissatisfied with the framing of charges Criminal Revision Petition was filed which was dismissed by Delhi High Cort on 16.01.2009. The order of Additional Sessions Judge has been extracted by this Court in paragraph 14 which is quoted below: "14. Dissatisfied with the action of the trial Court in framing charges against him, the appellant-accused filed Criminal Revision Petition no. 08 of 2009, whereby he assailed the order dated 1.12.2008 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi. The Delhi High Court dismissed the revision petition on 16.1.2009, by inter alia observing as under:- "12. Truthfulness or falsity of the allegations, essentially pertains to the realm of evidence and the same cannot be pre-judged at this initial stage. I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order. The Delhi High Court dismissed the revision petition on 16.1.2009, by inter alia observing as under:- "12. Truthfulness or falsity of the allegations, essentially pertains to the realm of evidence and the same cannot be pre-judged at this initial stage. I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order. Consequently, this Revision Petition is dismissed in limine while making it clear that anything herein shall not be construed as an opinion on merits at trial." 66. In view of the observations made herein above, this Court finds that in the present case the medical examination of the prosecutrix was conducted but the Doctor who gave the medical opinion, opined that no definite opinion can be given regarding the commission of rape upon the prosecutrix. Therefore, the logical conclusion is that the medical evidence does not support the prosecution case. However, as noted in paragraph 36 of the judgment referred to above, this Court is handicapped to evaluate the veracity of the statement made by the prosecutrix alleging the commission of rape upon her by the accused applicants. 67. Thus the issue which requires consideration is whether this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under section 482 Cr.P.C. can quash the proceedings by weighing the evidence which is on the record particularly when the case in hand does not fall in the third category of cases i.e. there is no evidence in which the proceedings can be quashed as per the judgment of the Apex Court in R.P. Kapoor's case (Supra). 68. Another submission urged by learned counsel for the applicant is regarding the malicious prosecution of the present applicants. Mr. B.K. Srivastava, the learned Senior Counsel, submits that since the prosecution of the present applicant is wholly malicious, it amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court and hence liable to be quashed. The argument appears to be attractive at the first flush but on deeper scrutiny it is devoid of substance. It is well settled that allegations of malafide against the informant/complainant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. The argument appears to be attractive at the first flush but on deeper scrutiny it is devoid of substance. It is well settled that allegations of malafide against the informant/complainant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. Reference in this regard be made to the following judgments of the Apex Court:- "Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar (1990 Supp SCC 686), State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma ( AIR 1996 SC 309 ), Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill ( 1995 (6) SCC 194 ), State of Kerala v. O. C. Kuttan ( AIR 1999 SC 1044 ), State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma ( 1996 (7) SCC 705 ), Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada ( 1997 (2) SCC 397 ), Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) ( AIR 1996 SC 2983 ), Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi ( 1999 (3) SCC 259 ) and in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and Another ( 2002 (3) SCC 89 ). 69. One of the charge alleged against the applicants is regarding an offence punishable under Section 376 (d) IPC and Section 5 (6), 6 POCSO Act. There is no room of doubt that the complainant/opposite party No.2 Sri Patiraj in his statement under section 200 Cr.P.C. and the witnesses adduced by him namely, Manju Kumari, the prosecutrix and Ramkali wife of Vishwanath who were examined under Section 202 Cr.P.C., have clearly supported the prosecution case. Apart from the above, there is also on the record the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. wherein the prosecutrix has clearly implicated the applicants for the criminality alleged against them. It may be noticed here that neither the complainant Patiraj nor Ramkali are the eye witnesses of the occurrence. As such, their testimony is based on here-say. 70. Apart from the aforesaid few circumstances which are glaring on the record also need to be taken note of. The incident is alleged to have occurred on 20.10.2014. The application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. was filed by the complainant opposite party No.2 on 7.11.2014 i.e. 17 days after the occurrence for which there is no explanation on the record. Apart from the aforesaid few circumstances which are glaring on the record also need to be taken note of. The incident is alleged to have occurred on 20.10.2014. The application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. was filed by the complainant opposite party No.2 on 7.11.2014 i.e. 17 days after the occurrence for which there is no explanation on the record. The Investigating Officer had submitted the final report dated 25.3.2015 and after the expiry of a period of three years, the protest petition dated 3.4.2018 was filed by the opposite party No.2. There is no pleading in the protest petition regarding the date of service of notice on the final report submitted by the Investigation Officer nor there is any averment regarding the date of knowledge of the final report submitted by the Investigating Officer. As already noticed above, the place and time of occurrence is village Raspahri and the timing of the occurrence is at about 6:30 pm in the evening of an October month. The place of incident is said to be near a school. There is nothing on the record to suggest that the place of occurrence is an isolated place. 71. Thus, on the one hand is the statement of the prosecutrix, the complainant and Ramkali who support the prosecution case, whereas on the other hand are the glaring circumstances that there is no eye witness of the occurrence, the place of occurrence is not an isolated place, but situate in the midst of a village, the timing of the incident is around 6:30 pm of October month, when the streets cannot be said to be deserted, the statement of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., have not supported the prosecution case, the investigation was conducted by an officer of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Investigation conducted by him was never doubted by the complainant, during the entire period of investigation, the absence of the consideration of the material on the record which was collected by the Investigating Officer during the course of Investigation before rejecting the final report or summoning the accused applicants, creates a conundrum before the Court. How to weigh the two is the complex issue before the Court. 72. The word 'probable' is of high significance in criminal jurisprudence. This term is relative. How to weigh the two is the complex issue before the Court. 72. The word 'probable' is of high significance in criminal jurisprudence. This term is relative. As such, the significance of the term in a given situation will depend upon the magnitude of the evidence on the record. 73. Examined in the light of the aforesaid, the following undisputed facts emerge before the Court. Firstly, except for the prosecutrix, there is no eye witnesses account of the occurrence in question. The complainant-opposite party no.2 in his statement under Section 200 Cr.P.C. has stated that the occurrence was witnessed by Ram Kali who has been examined as P.W.-2. However, Ram Kali in her testimony has clearly stated that when she arrived at the place of occurrence the prosecutrix alone was lying at the place of occurrence. She did not state that she has witnessed the occurrence. Secondly, the Investigating Officer who was no one else but an officer of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police upon completion of the Investigation under Chapter 12 C.P.C. submitted the final report and during the entire period of investigation neither the credibility of the Investigating Officer was doubted nor the manner in which the matter was investigated was questioned. Therefore, in the absence of any such allegation the final report submitted by such an Investigating Officer is not easily liable to be brushed aside. Thirdly, except for the statement of the prosecutrix and the statements of the complainant and Ramkali, which is based upon here-say evidence, there is no other material to support the ocular version. The complainant is the father of the prosecutrix, as such, a highly partition and interested witness. Fourthly, the lady Doctor, who conducted the examination of the prosecutrix has submitted the medical report as well as the supplementary medical report, has stated that no definite opinion could be given regarding the commission of rape upon the deceased. Lastly, apart from the aforesaid statements as well as the statement of the prosecutrix as recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., there is nothing on the record to make the prosecution case probable. 74. Thus, the only question which survives for consideration is whether this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction, under section 482 Cr.P.C. can weigh the testimony of a witness even when a full fledged trial is yet to take place. 74. Thus, the only question which survives for consideration is whether this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction, under section 482 Cr.P.C. can weigh the testimony of a witness even when a full fledged trial is yet to take place. The issue so involved is no longer res-integra and stands considered by the Apex Court in the case of State of Orissa and Another Vs. Saroj Kumar Sahoo, reported in 2005 (13) SCC 540 , wherein the following has been observed in paragraphs 10 and 11:- "10. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp 1 335. A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows: "(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Cr.P.C. except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Cr.P.C.. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Cr.P.C. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Cr.P.C. or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 11. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary, [1992] 4 SCC 305, and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, AIR (1964) SC 1). It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. (See: Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, [1990] Supp SCC 686, State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma, AIR (1996) SC 309, Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, [1995] 6 SCC 194, State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan, AIR (1999) SC 1044, State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma, [1996] 7 SCC 705, Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, [1997] 2 SCC 397, Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi, AIR (1996) SC 2983 and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhil, [1999] 3 SCC 259)." 75. In view of the discussion made herein above, this Court is handicapped to examine the veracity of the statement of the prosecutrix as recorded under section 202 Cr.P.C. There is no such other impeccable evidence on the record on the basis of which this Court may discard the statement of the prosecutrix. It is for the trial court to weigh the statement of the prosecutrix in the light of the attending circumstances referred to above, and then arrive at its own conclusion as to whether the applicants are guilty or not. 76. In view of the discussions made herein-above, the present application fails. Accordingly, the prayer prayed for in the present application is refused. 77. The alleged occurrence has taken place on 20.12.2014, i.e. more than three years and nine months, and the applicants were not arrested during this period. Apart from the above, the accused persons were also exonerated by the Investigating Officer, who submitted the final report which leads to the inference that no evidence was found against the applicants. The success/failure of the prosecution will now depend upon the evidence, which may be adduced by the opposite party No.2. In view of the aforesaid, the cause of justice shall stand protected by directing the trial court to release the applicants on interim bail immediately and thereafter on regular bail during the pendency of the trial. With the aforesaid directions, the present criminal misc. application stands finally disposed of.