JUDGMENT Vinay Joshi, J. - This criminal appeal has been filed against the judgment and order of conviction dated 16/12/2015 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur in Sessions Case No.152 of 2013 arising out of Crime No.110/2013 registered at Police Station Ghuggus, Tahsil and District Chandrapur, whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted appellant/accused Vitthal Lahuji Chaudhari for the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. The learned Additional Sessions Judge also accorded the benefit of set off to the accused in terms of section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since he was in jail from 04/08/2013 till conclusion of trial. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that the accused was married of five years with Sadhana and at relevant time both were living together at Wandhari Fata. On the fateful day i.e. on 15/07/2013 around 8.30 to 9.00 p.m. Sadhana sustained burn injuries as a result she was initially admitted to Government Hospital, Chandrapur and then shifted to Poddar Hospital. Sadhana sustained near about 93% burn injuries in consequence she succumbed to burn injuries on 29/07/2013. While Sadhana was admitted to Dr. Poddar s Hospital, on 17.07.2013 the Executive Magistrate i.e. Naib Tahsildar of Chandrapur was called by the Police for recording statement of Sadhana (since deceased) i.e. her dying declaration. In turn Naib Tahsildar Shri Santosh Khandre went to Dr.Poddar s Hospital, met the then Dr.Poddar and enquired about the mental fitness of Sadhana for recording her statement. Since Dr.Poddar on examination of Sadhana expressed that she is in fit condition to give statement, Shri Khandre proceeded in recording her statement. During course of statement, ailing Sadhana disclosed that she was continuously subjected to ill-treatment at the hands of her husband i.e. accused. On the date of occurrence, accused poured kerosene on her person and set her ablaze. The Executive Magistrate Shri Khandre accordingly recorded Sadhana''s statement, obtained her right toe impression as well as doctor s signature on the statement. 3. Sadhana''s hospitalization was informed to her brothers viz. Prakash Kshirsagar and Raju Kshirsagar on which they rushed to the Government Hospital, Chandrapur. The Executive Magistrate Shri Khandre accordingly recorded Sadhana''s statement, obtained her right toe impression as well as doctor s signature on the statement. 3. Sadhana''s hospitalization was informed to her brothers viz. Prakash Kshirsagar and Raju Kshirsagar on which they rushed to the Government Hospital, Chandrapur. They learnt that Sadhana was shifted to Poddar Hospital, hence they went and enquired with her about the happenings, on which she disclosed that her husband i.e. accused, by pouring kerosene at her person set her on fire by the aid of matchstick. After death of Sadhana, her brother viz. Raju Kshirsagar went to concerned Ghuggus Police on 30/07/2013 and lodged report, on the basis of which the Police registered offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code against accused. The aforesaid case was investigated by the Police and on completion of investigation and finding sufficient material against accused, the Investigating Officer submitted final report in terms of section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the accused for commission of offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. After receipt of charge-sheet, the concerned Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial. The charge against the accused was framed at Exhibit-3. The charge was read over and explained to accused to which he pleaded not guilty and put the prosecution to the task of establishing levelled charges with requisite standard of proof. To substantiate the case, the prosecution has examined in all eleven witnesses. The prosecution witnesses mainly consist of recorder of dying declaration i.e. Executive Magistrate PW-8 Santosh Khandre, Medical Officer PW-7 Dr. Amal Poddar, who was allegedly present at the time of recording dying declaration. The next batch of witnesses is of two brothers of deceased viz. PW-5 Prakash Kshirsagar at Exhibit-32 and PW-6 Raju Kshirsagar at Exhibit-35 to whom the deceased allegedly disclosed the cause of death i.e. in other words to whom there was oral dying declaration. The rest of the witnesses are of formal nature i.e. panch witnesses to the panchnama of the scene of offence, inquest panchanama, Medical Officer who conducted autopsy on the dead-body and the Police persons who received the report of cognizable offence as well as carried the investigation. The statement of the accused was recorded in terms of section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The statement of the accused was recorded in terms of section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The defence of accused is of total denial of occurrence by claiming to be innocent. The accused merely explained in his statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that, he himself had admitted Sadhana to the hospital after sustaining burns. Besides that no specific defence nor any alternate probability regarding burns of Sadhana has been canvassed by the appellant/accused. 5. After hearing the parties, and perusing the record, the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentenced accused as detailed above. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence, the appellant/accused has filed this appeal. 6. The point for consideration in the appeal is as to whether the prosecution has been able to bring home the charge levelled against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt or not. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant/ accused strenuously argued that the order of conviction is based on conjunctures and surmises. In absence of cogent and reliable evidence, the learned Trial Court has drawn inference of guilt. It is argued that the learned Trial Court totally erred in relying on the dying declaration Exhibit-41 which does not inspire confidence at all. He would submit that the dying declaration is quite doubtful piece of evidence, as it creates strong suspicion about the consciousness and mental fitness of the victim while recording her statement. It is highlighted that neither the recorder of dying declaration nor the Medical Officer has ascertained the mental fitness of injured before recording statement. Primly he would submit that though the alleged disclosure in the shape of dying declaration was on 17/07/2013 still F.I.R. was registered after 15 days i.e. on 30/07/2013 which itself creates a strong suspicion. According to him, the inordinate delay in lodgment of F.I.R. casts serious doubt on the whole prosecution case as well as it strongly surfaces the possibility of concoction and false implication of accused in the crime. 8. On the other hand, it is submitted by the learned A.P.P. for the State that prosecution witnesses on the point of written dying declaration as well as in oral form, are trustworthy and reliable. There is evidence of Medical Officer about mental fitness of the injured at the time of recording statement. 8. On the other hand, it is submitted by the learned A.P.P. for the State that prosecution witnesses on the point of written dying declaration as well as in oral form, are trustworthy and reliable. There is evidence of Medical Officer about mental fitness of the injured at the time of recording statement. It is argued that the accused has not explained the alternate possibility as to how his wife sustained burns, though they were living together. Lastly, it is canvassed that there was no enmity between the accused either with Executive Magistrate or Medical Officer, therefore, there is no possibility of false implication. In short, it is submitted that the learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence available on record and passed the impugned judgment and order of conviction. Therefore, the sentence is to be upheld and this appeal being without substance is liable to be dismissed. 9. At the inception, we may quote some admitted facts of the case for which there is no quarrel between the parties. Accused Vitthal married with deceased Sadhana five years preceding to the incident and at relevant time both were living together at Wandhari Fata. Undisputedly, on 15/07/2013 at around 8.30 p.m. while Sadhana was at her house, she sustained burns to the extent of 93% for which she was initially admitted to Government Hospital, Chandrapur from where she was shifted to Dr.Poddar s Hospital. Undisputedly, again she was shifted to Civil Hospital, Chandrapur where she breathed last on 29/07/2013. There is no dispute that PW-5 Prakash and PW-6 Raju were real brothers of deceased Sadhana, who were living elsewhere at the time of occurrence. It is also not in dispute that Sadhana died due to extensive burns i.e. 93% burns at Civil Hospital, Chandrapur and the cause of death was as burn injury (93%) with shock . In this background, the evidence requires assessment to find out the sustainability of leveled charges. No doubt the prosecution case is totally based on three dying declarations viz. one written (Exhibit41) and two oral dying declarations allegedly made by deceased Sadhana to her brothers viz. PW-5 Prakash and PW-6 Raju. The learned Trial Court believed the evidence of dying declaration and ultimately recorded the finding of guilt against the appellant/ accused. No doubt the prosecution case is totally based on three dying declarations viz. one written (Exhibit41) and two oral dying declarations allegedly made by deceased Sadhana to her brothers viz. PW-5 Prakash and PW-6 Raju. The learned Trial Court believed the evidence of dying declaration and ultimately recorded the finding of guilt against the appellant/ accused. The learned Trial Court expressed that from these dying declarations, it is clear that the appellant/accused poured kerosene on the person of deceased Sadhana and set her on fire. 10. While arriving on the finding of guilt, it is expressed that no enmity is brought on record by accused to show that Medical Officer and Executive Magistrate has reason for false implication. So also accused failed to explain the occurrence though both were living within four walls. The learned Trial Court also referred the provisions of section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, while concluding the guilt of accused. It reveals from the impugned judgment that both sides have placed reliance on several judgments on the point of appreciation and admissibility of the evidence on dying declaration before learned Trial Court. The impugned judgment discloses that learned Trial Court has reproduced the citations referred by both sides in verbatim and preferred to express in omnibus form that the citations relied by defence would not help but the citations relied by the prosecution required to be applied to the present case. Rather, the learned Trial Court ought to have pained to express in clear terms about applicability or non-applicability of the precedents instead of concluding in one line as stated above. 11. Be that as it may, after reading entire impugned judgment, we are unable to find the material requirement i.e. observations of the learned Trial Court about the reasons for acceptance of the dying declaration. The vital issue which always falls for consideration in cases of dying declaration is about satisfaction regarding declaration that it is true voluntarily and given in the condition of mental fitness. Rather, the said important aspects is missing in the judgment of Trial Court. The learned Trial Court unfortunately has not dealt with the matter with a view to satisfy himself about mental fitness and capacity of declarant for giving statement and the truthfulness thereof. 12. Undeniably, the prosecution case as referred above is totally based on the evidence of dying declaration. The learned Trial Court unfortunately has not dealt with the matter with a view to satisfy himself about mental fitness and capacity of declarant for giving statement and the truthfulness thereof. 12. Undeniably, the prosecution case as referred above is totally based on the evidence of dying declaration. No doubt it is settled law that a dying declaration if inspires full confidence can form the basis for conviction. There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. Needless to say that if Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary, it can base conviction on it without corroboration. Before going to award conviction against the accused, learned Trial Court must be mindful of the fact that there should be no room to suspect the evidence led by the prosecution on which conviction is being awarded. As a general rule, while appreciating evidence in a criminal case, the Court should bear in mind that it is not the quantity, but the quality of evidence that is material. It is the duty of the Court to consider the trustworthiness of the dying declaration and whether the same inspires full confidence so as to accept and act upon before recording conviction. In this regard we may profitably quote the observations of Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Harijana Thirupala and Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad , (2002) 6 SCC 470 . In our administration of criminal justice an accused is presumed to be innocent unless such a presumption is rebutted by the prosecution by producing the evidence to show him to be guilty of the offence with which he is charged. Further if two views are possible on the evidence produced in the case, one indicating to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view favourable to the accused is to be accepted. In cases where the court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused the benefit of such doubt should go in favour of the accused. At the same time, the court must not reject the evidence of the prosecution taking it as false, untrustworthy or unreliable on fanciful grounds or on the basis of conjectures and surmises. The case of the prosecution must be judged as a whole having regard to the totality of the evidence. At the same time, the court must not reject the evidence of the prosecution taking it as false, untrustworthy or unreliable on fanciful grounds or on the basis of conjectures and surmises. The case of the prosecution must be judged as a whole having regard to the totality of the evidence. In appreciating the evidence the approach of the court must be integrated not truncated or isolated. In other words, the impact of evidence in totality on the prosecution case or innocence of accused has to be kept in mind in coming the conclusion as to the guilt or otherwise of the accused. In reaching a conclusion about the guilt of the accused, the court has to appreciate, analyse and assess the evidence placed before it by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic value and the animus of witnesses. It must be added that ultimately and finally the decision in every case depends upon the facts of each case. 13. At this juncture, we may note that the prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. The accused has a profound right not to be convicted for an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The law does not permit the Court to convict the accused based on suspicion or on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. No doubt the reasonableness of a doubt must be practical one and not on an abstract theoretical hypothesis. 14. The maxim nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire means no one at the point of death is presume to lie is a philosophy in law underlying to admit the evidence of dying declaration. The learned Trial Court referred the said philosophy (para-35 of the impugned judgment) but one has to turn to the fact whether such normal rule would apply. Needless to mention that the finding of guilt must base on cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence and not on some philosophical proposition. The Court has to be extremely careful while dealing with dying declaration as the maker thereof is not available for the cross-examination, which poses a great difficulty to the defence. In short, before relying on dying declaration, the Court is duty bound to satisfy himself that the dying declaration was a voluntary and truthful version of the maker. The Court has to be extremely careful while dealing with dying declaration as the maker thereof is not available for the cross-examination, which poses a great difficulty to the defence. In short, before relying on dying declaration, the Court is duty bound to satisfy himself that the dying declaration was a voluntary and truthful version of the maker. If the Court is fully satisfied on these issues, then there is no difficulty to base conviction nor Court is required to look for corroborative evidence. At this juncture, we may refer the judgment of Ho ble Apex Court in the case of Puran Chand v. State of Haryana , (2010) 6 SCC 566 , as under: 15. The Courts below have to be extremely careful when they deal with a dying declaration as the maker thereof is not available for the cross-examination which poses a great difficulty to the accused person. A mechanical approach in relying upon a dying declaration just because it is there is extremely dangerous. The Court has to examine a dying declaration scrupulously with a microscopic eye to find out whether the dying declaration is voluntary, truthful, made in a conscious state of mind and without being influenced by the relatives present or by the investigating agency who may be interested in the success of investigation or which may be negligent while recording the dying declaration. 15. We may also refer the observations of Hon''ble Apex Court in case of Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of Maharashtra , (2006) 13 SCC 165. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross- examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. 16. Way back the Hon ble Supreme Court in off quoted judgment in case of Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay , (1958) AIR SC 22, laid down the principles regarding appreciation of evidence on dying declaration which are as follows:- (16) On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court, aforesaid, (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human, memory and human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view the. circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties. (17) ......... . the Court, after examining the dying declaration in all its aspects, and testing its veracity, has come to the conclusion that it is not reliable by itself, and that it suffers from an infirmity, then, without corroboration it cannot form the basis of a conviction. Thus, the necessity for corroboration arises not from any inherent weakness of a dying declaration as a piece of evidence, as held in some of the reported cases, but from the fact that the Court, in a given case, has come to the conclusion that that particular dying declaration was not free from the infirmities, referred to above or from such other infirmities as may be disclosed in evidence in that case. 17. On the same line we find it relevant to note following observations of Hon''ble Supreme Court in case of Vikas v. State of Maharashtra , (2008) 2 SCC 516 . 45. The Court, referring to earlier case law, summed up principles governing dying declaration as under: (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (ix) Normally the Court in Order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eye witness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. 18. It would be appropriate here to remind ourself that generally, there are two issues with respect to a dying declaration. The first one would be, whether the declaration was actually made. Naturally, this would be assessed on the basis of the evidence of the witnesses, who claim that such declaration was made and witnessed by them. There would be a question of accuracy of the record of such declaration, if made or maintained by such witnesses. If the evidence in that regard is satisfactory, the Court would come to a conclusion that a particular statement was, indeed, made by the deceased; but that the statement was, indeed, made, is not the end of the matter. The Court thereafter would be required to decide whether such statement made by the deceased was true. In other words, the fact of having made the statement and the truthfulness of the said statement are both required to be established before a declaration is termed as reliable. Now, for ascertaining the truthfulness of the statement of a dying person, the parameters, which are applied to the witnesses while judging reliability of their evidence, must be applied. In other words, the fact of having made the statement and the truthfulness of the said statement are both required to be established before a declaration is termed as reliable. Now, for ascertaining the truthfulness of the statement of a dying person, the parameters, which are applied to the witnesses while judging reliability of their evidence, must be applied. The reliability of a version of a witness would depend on several factors including opportunity available to witness to know physical and mental capacity of patient to convey, kind of treatment which patient was undergoing, chances of tutoring, relation of witness with patient and so on. The law does not afford to take a risk of blindly relying the statement only because it has been recorded by Executive Magistrate. Usual scrutiny from every possible angle is must and evidence of Executive Magistrate must withstood to the test of reliability. 19. We may recall the Full Bench decision of this Court in case of Ganpat Bakaramji Lad v. State of Maharashtra , (2018) 2 MhLJ 786 , wherein this Court while answering reference said that, dying declaration cannot be rejected merely because the same is not read over to the declarant and the declarant admitted the same to have been correctly recorded. This Court also observed that absence of endorsement by a doctor regarding fitness of mind of declarant cannot be a reason to discard dying declaration if the Court is otherwise satisfied that such dying declaration inspires confidence. The Court added that, it will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It will be cumulative effect of the facts and circumstances of the case which will determine such issue. The presence or absence of a particular fact or circumstance or a situation in a given case may become significant, whereas it may become insignificant in another case. 20. Coming to the facts, it would be convenient for us to directly turn to the evidence of written dying declaration (Exhibit41) which in fact, is the foundation of prosecution case as well as the cause for recording the finding of guilt. In this regard, the prosecution has examined PW-8 Santosh Khandre, Executive Magistrate, who was called by concerned Police on 17/07/2013 for recording the statement of burn patient Sadhana. He testified that on receipt of requisition letter by Police, he went to Hospital on 17/07/2013. In this regard, the prosecution has examined PW-8 Santosh Khandre, Executive Magistrate, who was called by concerned Police on 17/07/2013 for recording the statement of burn patient Sadhana. He testified that on receipt of requisition letter by Police, he went to Hospital on 17/07/2013. Dr.Poddar examined Sadhana and conveyed that she is in fit state to give statement. Then he recorded the statement of Sadhana in question and answer form in which she stated about the role of accused in setting her ablaze. Contextually, we may turn towards the evidence of PW-7 Dr.Amal Poddar, who allegedly examined Sadhana at relevant time. It has come in his evidence that Executive Magistrate issued him memo to inform whether Sadhana was fit to give statement. On examination, he found that she was in fit condition to give statement and hence, he put his signature upon the memo issued by Executive Magistrate. He deposed that thereafter Executive Magistrate recorded statement of Sadhana in his presence. At this juncture it needs to have a look to the crucial document i.e. dying declaration Exhibit-41, which is in printed pro-forma. Admittedly, neither at the beginning of the statement nor at the end of statement there is endorsement of Medical Officer about consciousness and mental fitness of the declarant while giving statement. Normally, in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration, one has to look upon the medical opinion. 21. Though PW-7 Dr.Amal Poddar in his evidence stated that deceased was in a fit condition to give statement, however, the same does not reflect in dying declaration Exhibit-41. At this juncture one must take a note of the decision of Hon''ble Supreme Court in reported case of Mayur Panabhai Shah v. State of Gujarat reported in , (1983) AIR SC 66, wherein it is ruled that even where a doctor has deposed in court, his evidence has got to be appreciated like the evidence of any other witness and there is no irrebuttable presumption that a doctor is always a witness of truth. It is apparent that on printed pro-forma at the top and below, signatures of Medical Officer was obtained from which one cannot definitely come to the conclusion that at the time of recording statement, Medical Officer has examined the patient and vouched about the mental fitness of the declarant for giving statement. It is apparent that on printed pro-forma at the top and below, signatures of Medical Officer was obtained from which one cannot definitely come to the conclusion that at the time of recording statement, Medical Officer has examined the patient and vouched about the mental fitness of the declarant for giving statement. True certificate of Medical Officer about mental fitness of injured is not sine quo non for accepting and relying dying declaration since it is only legal requirement that the recorder must be satisfied about the consciousness and mental fitness of deponent. In absence of endorsement of doctor on certificate, it is important to find out whether recorder has satisfied himself about mental fitness so as to rely on the said piece of evidence. Absence of certification of doctor about fitness of mind would have been insignificant if the recorder has ascertained about fitness of state of mind of victim. 22. Reverting to the evidence of Executive Magistrate PW-8 Santosh Khandre, it reveals that his evidence is totally silent about his own satisfaction regarding the consciousness and mental fitness of patient to give statement. He never stated that he put some preliminary questions or at least satisfied himself that patient was in well oriental state and mentally fit to give statement. The satisfaction of recorder is a key aspect in like cases which is totally missing in the case at hand. Moreover, the absence of doctor s endorsement on statement necessitates to adopt the cautious approach and to see whether at least recorder himself has satisfied about fitness but the same is missing in the evidence of recorder. 23. Herein the recorder has not stated about his own mental satisfaction about consciousness and mental fitness of the deponent. Evidence of doctor is silent about his examination of patient before and after the statement. He merely stated that he noticed that patient was fit to given statement. No doubt doctor''s endorsement is not a must to rely on statement, but in that case normally there must be clear and convincing evidence of doctor to that effect which is missing. If doctor''s evidence is trustworthy and if he gave detail account then it would fulfill the requirement. On perusal of evidence of Medical Officer P.W.-7, it reveals that he never stated about consciousness of Sadhana throughout her entire statement. If doctor''s evidence is trustworthy and if he gave detail account then it would fulfill the requirement. On perusal of evidence of Medical Officer P.W.-7, it reveals that he never stated about consciousness of Sadhana throughout her entire statement. His evidence is not specific that throughout the statement he was present and Sadhana was conscious and fit during said entire period. He never deposed that before recording statement he examined her and again at the end he examined her and satisfied about her mental fitness. Particularly when deceased was under 93% burns the Court should be more careful and cautious while accepting this piece of evidence i.e. of dying declaration. No doubt in such precarious condition also a victim can make statement regarding cause of death but then it should be beyond any entertainable doubt. 24. Besides written dying declaration Exhibit-41, the prosecution relied on two oral dying declarations made by deceased to her brothers i.e. PW-5 Prakash and PW-6 Raju. Informant PW-6 Raju deposed that when he asked injured Sadhana about the cause of burns, the later disclosed that accused poured kerosene at her person and set her on fire with the aid of matchstick. Pertinent to note that PW-5 Prakash, who is another brother of deceased Sadhana, stated somewhat inconsistent story in his evidence. He deposed that Sadhana disclosed that accused thrown the lamp of kerosene oil on her. Though both have stated about the author i.e. accused, however these inconsistencies are to be appreciated on the background of written dying declaration which has inherent weaknesses as spilled above. Inasmuch as there are material improvements in the evidence of PW-5 Prakash about the act of accused throwing kerosene lamp and harassment meted out by the accused to deceased. These improvements are duly proved by defence through the evidence of Investigating Officer PW-10, Police Inspector Achewar. 25. Coming to the vital aspect which in true sense shatters the prosecution case is about inordinate delay in lodgment of F.I.R. The learned counsel appearing for appellant/accused rightly pointed out that though there was alleged disclosure about involvement of accused on 17/07/2013 itself, still for next 15 days the law was not set into motion. Undeniably F.I.R. was lodged on 30/07/2013 i.e. after death of Sadhana which occurred on 29/07/2013. 26. Undeniably F.I.R. was lodged on 30/07/2013 i.e. after death of Sadhana which occurred on 29/07/2013. 26. Informant Raju PW-6 made a feeble attempt to explain the delay by stating that they were under hope that their sister may survive, hence they did not lodge report on the very day. Notably it is prosecution case itself that accused was harassing to deceased even prior to incident. In such background and particularly when she was under extensive 93% burns, it is quite improbable that still two brothers of deceased kept mum despite alleged disclosure. 27. There are two aspects that it is not a case that only real brothers of deceased were made known about alleged involvement of accused in the occurrence. Notably on 17/07/2013 itself there was alleged disclosure in the shape of dying declaration to the Executive Magistrate, who is a public servant summoned by concerned Police. There is no trace as to where the dying declaration was lying or who was the custodian of the same from 17/07/2013 till lodgment of F.I.R. It is undisputed that on 17/07/2013 the concerned Police of Ghuggus Police Station called Executive Magistrate to record dying declaration meaning thereby the police were well aware about recording of statement of deceased. In the circumstances, it was quite natural for Police to register offence punishable under section 307 of The Indian Penal Code on receipt of dying declaration i.e. disclosure by victim about the role of accused. However, total inaction on the part of police of sitting over the dying declaration disclosing commission of cognizable offence creates serious doubt about the alleged disclosure as well as truthfulness of the witnesses. Not only the aspect of mental fitness of the deponent but the very act of recording her statement itself is under shadow. This vital circumstance adds suspicion rather made it quite unbelievable. The Investigating Officer has not thrown any light on this aspect. It reveals from the panchanama of the scene of offence Exhibit-19 that, at the instance of report No.4 of 2013 registered on 19/07/2013 spot panchanama was drawn on that day. Notably said report which is called in colloquial language as ''khabar'' has not been produced which again adds the suspicion. It reveals from the panchanama of the scene of offence Exhibit-19 that, at the instance of report No.4 of 2013 registered on 19/07/2013 spot panchanama was drawn on that day. Notably said report which is called in colloquial language as ''khabar'' has not been produced which again adds the suspicion. The role of police is not only to place the material on record which is favourable to prosecution but they are duty bound to place entire material before Court which was forthcoming during the course of investigation. 28. Apart from that though it is prosecution case that after sustaining burns, Sadhana came shouting out of the house and was shifted to the hospital by neighbours, but none of the neighbouring witness was examined by the prosecution. We may note at the cost of repetition that though corroborative evidence is not must however in some cases it is necessary to lend assurance. Since the evidence led by the prosecution does not inspire confidence, therefore, as a rule of prudence Court should search for corroboration so as to get assurance about truthfulness of the case. The learned Trial Court was much swayed by presumption laid down under section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. No doubt it is for accused to explain the circumstances which are within his special knowledge. However, the said statutory presumption does not shift or makes the burden of prosecution lighter nor in absence of cogent evidence merely on the basis of such presumption accused can be convicted. 29. To summarize the position, the evidence on the point of dying declaration does not inspire confidence so as to keep implicit faith on it. There is no reliable evidence to satisfy the judicial mind that the deponent was conscious and mentally fit at the time of giving statement rather the genesis of the case i.e. recording of statement of deceased itself has become doubtful since for next 15 days the police have not registered the offence. The inordinate delay in lodgment of F.I.R. is fatal to the prosecution. The possibility of concoction cannot be ruled out since the informant lost his sister. From the forthcoming material we are not satisfied about the truthfulness, voluntary nature of the dying declaration and fitness of the mind of deceased. Even it is difficult to believe that on 17.07.2013 dying declaration was came to be recorded. The possibility of concoction cannot be ruled out since the informant lost his sister. From the forthcoming material we are not satisfied about the truthfulness, voluntary nature of the dying declaration and fitness of the mind of deceased. Even it is difficult to believe that on 17.07.2013 dying declaration was came to be recorded. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we find and hold that the prosecution utterly and miserably failed to substantiate the charge leveled against the appellant/accused beyond all reasonable doubt by adducing consistent, cogent and reliable evidence. So the appellant/accused is legitimately entitled to avail benefit of doubt. Hence, the impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned Trial Judge would not withstand to legal position and requires to be set aside by acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against him. Consequently, appeal deserves to be allowed by setting aside impugned judgment and order of conviction. In view of that, following order. (I) The appeal stands allowed. (II) The judgment and order of conviction dated 16/12/2015 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur, in Sessions Case No.152 of 2013 stands quashed and set aside. (III) The appellant/accused, viz.Vitthal s/o Lahuji Chaudhari is acquitted of the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. (IV) The accused be released from Jail forthwith, if not required in any other offence. (V) The amount of fine, if deposited, be refunded to the accused. (VI) The seized muddemal property being worthless, be destroyed on expiry of period of appeal. (VII) R. & P. be sent back to the Trial Court.