JUDGMENT A.M. Dhavale, J. - The aggrieved original defendant has filed this second appeal to challenge the concurrent findings against him. Regular Civil Suit No. 249 of 1982 filed by the respondents herein against the appellants was decreed by judgment dated 15th March, 1990 by First Joint Civil Judge Junior Division, Satara and decree for specific performance of re-conveyance deed, for possession and mesne profit was passed. The same was confirmed by Additional District Judge, Satara in Regular Civil Appeal No. 188 of 1990 by judgment dated 10th April, 1997. 2. Heard learned advocate Shri. V.S. Talkute for the appellants and Shri Dilip Bodake for the Respondents. In order to decide this appeal, the material facts are essential: i) Land at Survey No. 60, Hissa No. 10/B plus Hissa No.10/A at Angapur Tarf-Targaon, Taluka and District Satara admeasuring 1 Acre 37 Guntha bearing Gat No. 491 admeasuring 79-R is the subject matter of the suit and is more particularly described in para 1 of the plaint. Admittedly, the land was belonging to the plaintiff. On 24/01/1963 he has purportedly executed Sale Deed Exh. 26 and thereby sold the suit land to the defendant for consideration of Rs.4,000/-. ii) Thereafter, on 20th May, 1968 the plaintiff purportedly executed another Sale Deed of the same land in favour of the defendant whereby he recorded that the earlier Sale Deed was a mortgage deed and in addition to the earlier consideration there was payment of Rs.2,000/- and the suit land was sold to the defendant for Rs.6,000/-. On the same day the defendant purportedly executed a Deed of Re-conveyance of the same land (exhibit 56) whereby he agreed to re-convey the suit land in the name of plaintiff subject to refund of Rs.6,000/-. No time limit was fixed. It was recorded that at the end of any year on payment of Rs.6,000/-, the suit land would be re-conveyed. 3. According to the case of the plaintiff the first Sale Deed was in fact a mortgage transaction. The defendant has accepted the said fact and has executed fresh Sale Deed along with Deed of Re-conveyance. The plaintiff was put in possession of the suit land at the time of 2nd Sale Deed. No time limit was fixed for re-conveyance. The plaintiff by notice dated 7th March, 1982 called upon the defendant to execute the re-conveyance. The defendant by reply dated 8thg March, 1982 declined. The plaintiff was put in possession of the suit land at the time of 2nd Sale Deed. No time limit was fixed for re-conveyance. The plaintiff by notice dated 7th March, 1982 called upon the defendant to execute the re-conveyance. The defendant by reply dated 8thg March, 1982 declined. Hence, the plaintiff has filed the suit for re-conveyance. The defendant by written statement Exhibit 36 claimed that the said transaction dated 24th January, 1963 was real sale transaction and he has not executed Sale Deed dated 20th May, 1968 and reconveyance deed of the same date. He was in possession of the suit land from 1963. He has developed the said property and since the price of the suit land was considerably increased, due to development the plaintiff has filed false suit. 4. The plaintiff examined himself and one witness, while the defendant examined himself and three witnesses. The learned Civil Judge held that the transaction dated 24th January, 1963 was a mortgage. There was sale transaction in 1968 coupled with agreement for re-conveyance. The plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his contract. The suit was decreed. In the appeal, learned District Judge formulated only single point whether the decree of specific performance of agreement of re-conveyance is sustainable. He answered it in the affirmative and dismissed the appeal. 5. The learned trial Court was very much impressed with the false defence and false answers given by the defendant in which he went on to deny even his signatures on admitted documents like vakalatnama, written statement and Sale Deed of 1963 etc. She held that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. She relied on the term in the re-conveyance deed that at any time at the end of the year amount can be paid and Sale Deed can be obtained. She further relied on fact that notice Exh. 27 dated 07.03.1982 was issued and the consideration amount was deposited in Court to hold issue of readiness and willingness in favour of plaintiff. 6. She used discretion to grant specific performance without discussion. She therefore decreed the suit by judgment dated 16th March, 1990. 7. Learned Additional District Judge without framing specific issues adopted a shortcut to frame the issue whether the decree for specific performance of agreement is sustainable. He answered it in the affirmative. 6. She used discretion to grant specific performance without discussion. She therefore decreed the suit by judgment dated 16th March, 1990. 7. Learned Additional District Judge without framing specific issues adopted a shortcut to frame the issue whether the decree for specific performance of agreement is sustainable. He answered it in the affirmative. In para 18, he has dealt with the issue of readiness and willingness and held that the plaintiff was ready and willing. He also did not consider whether discretion u/s 20 can be exercised in favour of the plaintiff or not. 8. Shri Talkute, learned advocate for the appellant admitted that there are concurrent findings against the defendant regarding the nature of transaction. There is no cross objections to the findings that the Sale Deed of 1963 was in fact a mortgage. However, he argued that in case of agreement of reconveyance time is the essence of contract and even in cases where no time limit has been framed, the suit must be filed within a reasonable time. Besides the plaintiff should have shown continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract which was not there. He argued that the Sale Deed Exh. 25 is not signed by the defendant. It is only signed by the plaintiff. The original reconveyance deed is not produced with contention that it is lost in fire. The suit has been filed after 14 years. It cannot be called as a reasonable time and therefore, the suit ought to have been dismissed. He relied on number of rulings which will be considered in due course. 9. Per contra, Learned advocate Shri Bodake argued that the plaintiff was financially poor and the defendant has taken undue advantage of the same. He first obtained Sale Deed against him which was in fact mortgage and again obtained another Sale Deed for additional sum of Rs. 2,000/- and that time he has executed agreement of re-conveyance deed. No time limit was fixed in the said agreement. When the plaintiff could raise the money he called upon the defendant to execute the Sale Deed. He has deposited the amount in the Court to show his readiness and willingness. Both the learned Courts have properly appreciated the evidence and have arrived at concurrent findings. Those cannot be disturbed in second appeal even if erroneous. When the plaintiff could raise the money he called upon the defendant to execute the Sale Deed. He has deposited the amount in the Court to show his readiness and willingness. Both the learned Courts have properly appreciated the evidence and have arrived at concurrent findings. Those cannot be disturbed in second appeal even if erroneous. On merits he pointed out that though the Sale Deed of 1968 Exh. 25 is not signed by the defendant, it was presented by the defendant before the Sub-Registrar and his signature is there for presentation. The earlier Sale Deed of 1963 was also not signed by the defendant as purchaser. That was the practice of that locality at the relevant time. The re-conveyance deed is a registered document which carries presumptive value about the genuineness of the contents. The plaintiff had attempted to bring the attesting witnesses but inspite of service of summons they did not come to the Court. There is no perversity in the findings. Hence, no interference is called for. He also relied upon number of rulings which will be considered in due course. 10. By order dated 24th July, 1997 ground (d) was framed as substantial question of law which reads as follows : (i) Assuming that there was an agreement of reconveyance executed in 1968, whether the demand for specific performance can be said to be within reasonable time under Section 46 of Indian Contract Act and whether the Court have exercised discretion to grant specific performance? (ii) In exercise of powers under Section 100(5) CPC, I have framed following additional substantial qeustion of law; Whether both the lower Courts erred in not considering the issue of readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract ? My findings are as follows :- (i) In the negative. (ii) In the affirmative. I allow the appeal and set aside both judgment and decree of lower Courts and dismiss the suit. REASONS: 11. The plaintiff has admittedly executed Sale Deed dated 24th January, 1963 of the suit land in favour of the defendant (Exh.26). The defendant has not produced the original Sale Deed. The certified copy of the Sale Deed is produced. It shows that the Sale Deed was signed only by the plaintiff and it was presented before the Sub-Registrar by the defendant in presence of two witnesses. The defendant has not produced the original Sale Deed. The certified copy of the Sale Deed is produced. It shows that the Sale Deed was signed only by the plaintiff and it was presented before the Sub-Registrar by the defendant in presence of two witnesses. This Sale Deed from the language is outright sale. 12. When there was Sale Deed executed by the plaintiff, there was no necessity to again obtain Sale Deed (Exh.25) on 20th May, 1968. The defendant has denied in the written statement the execution of the Sale Deed of 1968 and reconveyance. There are concurrent findings of the Court below that the transaction of 1963 was a mortgage transaction and said transaction was converted in 1968 into sale transaction. There is also concurrent findings that the plaintiff has executed agreement of re-conveyance Exh. 56 registered simultaneously with the Sale Deed. No substantial question has been framed on this point. 13. The learned Judges of the Courts below have relied on the admission in Sale Deed Exh. 25 that the earlier transaction was mortgage. 14. The denial of execution of second Sale Deed of 1968 Exh. 25 and agreement of re-conveyance by the defendant at the first blush looks probable. However, learned advocate Mr. Bodake has relied on the reply to the notice given by the defendant (Exh. 28). In his reply the defendant had taken a stand that on 20th May, 1968 the plaintiff had again taken from him Rs.2,000/- and under the guise of giving acknowledgement, he was taken by the plaintiff to the Sub-Registrar office and his signatures were obtained on various papers. In fact he had not executed Sale Deed Exh. 25 and agreement of re-conveyance Exh. 56. The story put up by the defendant in his written statement is quite contrary to the stand taken by him in the notice reply. Apart from it, in the evidence, credibility of the defendant was shattered in the cross examination. When he was shown various admitted documents signed by him like Vakalatnama, written statement, first Sale Deed, he denied his signature in each of such documents. It is obvious that he was telling lies and was suppressing material facts. Apart from it, in the evidence, credibility of the defendant was shattered in the cross examination. When he was shown various admitted documents signed by him like Vakalatnama, written statement, first Sale Deed, he denied his signature in each of such documents. It is obvious that he was telling lies and was suppressing material facts. In the light of these facts, no substantial question of law can be framed regarding the concurrent findings of both the Courts below that there was an execution of Sale Deed by the defendant in 1968 along with agreement of re-conveyance. 15. Be that as it may. The plaintiff''s case cannot be considered as a transaction of money lending and the reconveyance was to be obtained as and by way of redemption of mortgage. The case to be considered is only of approved sale transaction along with agreement of re-conveyance. 16. Learned Advocate Mr.Bodake for the plaintiff raised preliminary objection that there are concurrent findings of both the courts below and this court cannot interfere in concurent findings even if those findings are erroneous. In Ishwar Dass Jain Vs. Sohan Lal , (2000) AIR SC 426, wherein it is observed as follows :- But the question is whether on the facts of this case, the reason given by the defendant in his evidence for treating the mortgage as a sham document, can be accepted. When there are concurrent findings of both the Courts and the evidence on record has been considered, it is not open to reconsider the same in the second appeal, unless there is error of such magnitude as it gives rise to substantial question of law. 17. Reliance is placed on Madamaiichi Rainappa Vs. Muthualuru Bojjappa , (1963) AIR SC 1633, wherein it is laid down that, the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain second appeal on the ground of erroneous findings of facts, however, gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be and the High Court has no power to add or enlarge the grounds specified in Section 100. I rely upon following rulings to show that this Court in peculiar fats has jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent findings on facts. 18. In Haryana State Vs. I rely upon following rulings to show that this Court in peculiar fats has jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent findings on facts. 18. In Haryana State Vs. Gram Panchayat Village Kalehri , (2016) 11 SCC 374 , there were concurrent findings of the facts and the Punjab and Hariyana High Court dismissed the second appeal holding that there was no substantial question of law involved. In the facts situation, it was observed that whether the Courts below were justified in properly interpreting the documents/exhibits relied upon by the parties for determining the ownership rights over the suit lands, gave rise to substantial question of law. It was observed "in other words, we are of the view that where the court is required to properly interpret the nature of the documents, it does not involve any issue of fact as such but it only involves legal issue based on admitted documents. It is, therefore, obligatory upon the High Court to decide the legality and correctness of such findings as to which party''s documents are to be preferred for conferring title over the suit land. In this case, the High Court could do so only when it had first admitted the appeal and framed substantial questions. (i) Abdul Raheem Vs. Karnataka Electricity Board , (2007) 14 SCC 138 . Though issue of readiness and willingness is a question of fact if the trial Court or Appellate Court has considered irrelevant facts, not considered relevant facts, or vital documents are ignored, it can lead to substantial question of law. (ii) Kondiba Kadam Vs. Savitribai , (1999) 3 SCC 722 If the findings are erroneous being contrary to mandatory provisions of applicable law, contrary to law pronounced by the Apex Court or based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence, it raises Substantial Question of Law. The object is to ensure that no injustice is done, minimize litigation, ensure fair trial in accordance with the acceptable principles of natural justice and expedite the disposal and fair deal to poor. Factual format cannot be Substantial Question of Law. (iii) Chandna Impex Vs. Commissioner of Customs , (2011) 7 SCC 289 When the findings of fact is based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence, or admissible evidence is ignored or settled legal principles have not been followed or the evidence has been misread, Substantial Question of Law is raised. Factual format cannot be Substantial Question of Law. (iii) Chandna Impex Vs. Commissioner of Customs , (2011) 7 SCC 289 When the findings of fact is based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence, or admissible evidence is ignored or settled legal principles have not been followed or the evidence has been misread, Substantial Question of Law is raised. Hence, this Court has jurisdiction to consider the evidence even in cases of concurrent findings of fact. SECTION 20 - USE OF DISCRETION - REASONABLE TIME. 19. Learned advocate Mr. Talkute brought my attention to the plaint which is silent with regard to inaction from 1968 to 1992 and the reasons for delay in filing and claiming reconveyance, except to the extent that the plaintiff had stated that he could not raise the funds. The plaint is also silent with regard to the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. It is drafted on assumption that the right to obtain reconveyance as per the terms was continuous with no time limits. It was argued on behalf of the defendant that no specific plea has been raised in the written statement about absence of readiness and willingness, but since the condition of readiness and willingness is statutory condition under Section 16(1)(c) the absence of specific plea by the defendant is not material. Mr. Talkute relied on following judgments to submit that in case of agreement of re-conveyance, the time is always essence of the contract. (i) Bismillah Begum Vs. Rahimtullah Khan , (1998) AIR SC 970 Time of three years fixed for reconveyance. Held, the time was always essence in case of reconveyance. (ii) Gauri Shankar Prasad Vs. Brahma Nand Singh , (2008) 8 SCC 287 Time fixed of three years. It was held, time is always essence in case of reconveyance. (iii) Parshuram Dhumal Vs. Shamrao Dhumal Second Appeal No. 37/1993 (Bombay, dt. 08.06.2018 By Dr. Shalini Phansalkar-Joshi, J.) In re-conveyance, time is essence. No readiness and willingness when there was no action for 10 years and for three years even after notice. 20. Mr. Bodake relied on Shri Kalagonda Patil (D) Thr.L.Rs.Vs. Shri Sidgonda Subhane Patil (D) Thr. L.Rs. & Ors. 2017 (7) ALL MR. This is with regard to the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. In this case the plaintiff had issued notice to the defendant before expiry of period mentioned in the agreement of re-conveyance. Payment was offered. 20. Mr. Bodake relied on Shri Kalagonda Patil (D) Thr.L.Rs.Vs. Shri Sidgonda Subhane Patil (D) Thr. L.Rs. & Ors. 2017 (7) ALL MR. This is with regard to the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff. In this case the plaintiff had issued notice to the defendant before expiry of period mentioned in the agreement of re-conveyance. Payment was offered. The notice was not replied. It was held that the readiness and willingness was proved. 21. However, in the present case no time limit is fixed and therefore, these judgments are not relevant for deciding this appeal. 22. Mr Talkute argued that even when no time limit is fixed, the suit must be filed within a reasonable time and the suit filed after 14 years could not have been decreed. The discretion under section 20 could not have been exercised in such case. Mr Talkute however, relied on following judgments on the point of use of discretion u/s 20, in suits filed belatedly. (i) In Manjunath Vs. Tammansasa , (2003) AIR SC 1391, wherein the agreement to sell was executed on 1st October, 1978 and suit was filed after six years. It was held to be not in reasonable time. (iii) In K. S. Vidyanandam Vs. Vairavan , (1997) AIR SC 1751, "The plaintiff must perform his part of the contract within a reasonable time and reasonable time should be determined by looking at all surrounding circumstances including the express terms of the contract and the nature of the property." (iii) Reliance was also placed on Veeravee Ammal Vs. Seeni Ammal , (2001) AIR SC 2920, wherein similar view has been taken. In this case delay of six years in seeking specific performance was held to be unreasonable and it was held that in such cases the discretion under Section 20 should not have been exercised. (iv) In A. C. Arulappan Vs. Ahalya Naik , (2001) AIR SC 2783, the facts were different. There was specific date fixed for execution of sale deed. The agreement was dated 1st May, 1977 and sale deed was to be executed on or before 16th January, 1978. Other circumstances were considered to hold that there would be unfair advantage to the plaintiff and specific performance was refused. (v) In Nanjappan Vs. Ramasamy , (2015) 3 AllMR 408, the agreement to sell was executed on 30/09/1987. It was extended from time to time for various reasons. Other circumstances were considered to hold that there would be unfair advantage to the plaintiff and specific performance was refused. (v) In Nanjappan Vs. Ramasamy , (2015) 3 AllMR 408, the agreement to sell was executed on 30/09/1987. It was extended from time to time for various reasons. As the vendor did not shift to other house execution of sale deed could not be obtained before 1993. The trial court by judgment dated 21st December, 2001 declined to grant specific performance. There was also issue of price of the land. In the agreement it was shown as 45,000/- but it was claimed that actually it was 3,00,000/-. When the matter went to th Apex Court in 2011, it was held that the agreement was executed 27 years back. In view of passage of time and escalation of value of the property, grant of relief of specific performance would give an unfair advantage to the respondents. Plaintiffs whereas the performance of the contract would involve great hardship to the appellant/defendant and his family members. Hence relief of specific performance was refused. (vi) K Narenra Vs. Riviera Apartments , (1999) AIR SC 2309, Agreement of lease of 1917. The suit was filed in 1979. The suit was decreed in 1990, but sanction was granted in 1991. It was held that this decree should not be held in reasonable time. (x) Nakubai Valu Dhokane Vs. Bhagwansingh Prakash Chandra , (2008) 5 AllMR 1 , It was held that in absence of agreement, reasonable period should be held to be three years (xi) Annarao Vs. Gopal Rao (Kalburgi Bench) No time was fixed. It was held that period of nine years taken for filing suit was unreasonable. (xii) S.H. Muniyappa Vs. Sri Subba , (2014) ILR(Kar) 1014, Suit filed after 11 years was held to be not in reasonable time. 23. Both the courts below erred in ignoring the material facts that the plaint was silent with regard to inaction of the plaintiff from 1968 to 1982 in taking action for claiming reconveyance. Only reason shown is that the plaintiff could not raise funds. The plaint has been drafted on assumption that right to obtain re-conveyance as per the terms was continuous with no time limits. It is not material whether defence of readiness and willingness is taken or not. Since proof of readiness and willingness is statutory under section 16 (1) . Only reason shown is that the plaintiff could not raise funds. The plaint has been drafted on assumption that right to obtain re-conveyance as per the terms was continuous with no time limits. It is not material whether defence of readiness and willingness is taken or not. Since proof of readiness and willingness is statutory under section 16 (1) . I agree with Mr. Talkute that in the light of Apex Court Judgment referred above, the total inaction on the part of the appellant for 14 years was totally unreasonable. During this period, the prices rocketed upwords. The value of rupees has gone down. The Courts below have not followed the settled principles of law with regard to use of discretion u/s 20 of Specific Performance. Act. In these circumstances, the discretion under section 20 for execution of re-conveyance cannot be exercised after 14 years. Hence, substantial question No. 1 is answered in the negative. Point No. 2 : Readiness and willingness : 24. Mr Talkute argued that the findings regarding readiness and willingness of the learned lower courts are perverse and both the courts have not considered the aspect of exercise of discretion in the light of huge delay of 14 years. 25. Per contra, Learned advocate Mr. Bodake has pointed out that the defendant has taken contrary stand. His stand in the notice reply was that a sale deed of 1968 and agreement of reconveyance were obtained from him by deceit. He had not disputed the signature thereon and in WS he claimed that he has not executed this document at all. In the cross examination he has been thoroughly discredited. He has denied his signatures even on admitted documents like Vakalatnama, Written Statement etc. Mr. Bodake relied on the terms of Deed of reconveyance Exh. 56 and argued that no time limit was fixed; as the plaintiff is a poor person when he could raise necessary funds, he has sought the specific performance of contract. 26. As per the terms of the contract, the contract exhibit -56 the sale deed was to be re-conveyed by paying Rs. 6000/- at the end of any year, no specific period is shown in the reconveyance deed. Admittedly, the appellant has filed suit after 14 years. The plaint shows no explanation for the delay. 27. 26. As per the terms of the contract, the contract exhibit -56 the sale deed was to be re-conveyed by paying Rs. 6000/- at the end of any year, no specific period is shown in the reconveyance deed. Admittedly, the appellant has filed suit after 14 years. The plaint shows no explanation for the delay. 27. Even in case of agreement of re-conveyance, it is mandatory to plead and prove the continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract by the plaintiff. In Bal Krishna Vs. Bhagwan Das , (2008) AIR SC 1786, grand mother of the minor plaintiff executed registered Sale deed on 19th July, 1952 with agreement of re-conveyance. The plaintiff issued notice on 9th May, 1973 and when the defendant failed to comply it, the suit came to be filed. The stand was taken that from 1st February, 1955 to 10th May, 1973 no suit was filed and no steps were taken by the plaintiff on their part to show their readiness and willingness. It was held that the plaintiff must aver continuous readiness and willingness to perform, his part of contract.}. The plaintiff No.1 kept quiet for almost 18 years and plaintiff No. 2 for 7 years which is indicative of callous in difference and willful negligence on the part of the plaintiffs and therefore they were not entitled for equitable relief of specific peformance of contract. 28. (I) In Raj Kishore Vs. Prem Sing , (2011) AIR SC 382, it is held that the provisions of section 16 (1) (c) are mandatory. It is held in para 19 are as under : 19. More importantly, in a case where the parties have entred into a transaction of sale and also executed an agreement for re-conveyance of the property sold, time stipulated for re-conveyance is the essence of the contract. The law on the subject is fairly well-settled by the decisions of this Court in Chunchun Jha v. Ebadat Ali , (1954) AIR SC 345, Bismillah Begum (Smt) Dead by LRs. v. Rahmtullah Khan (Dead) by LRs. , (1998) 2 SCC 226 : ( AIR 1998 SC 970 ) and Gauri Shankar Prasad and Ors. v. Brahma Nand Sing , (2008) 8 SCC 287 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 917). v. Rahmtullah Khan (Dead) by LRs. , (1998) 2 SCC 226 : ( AIR 1998 SC 970 ) and Gauri Shankar Prasad and Ors. v. Brahma Nand Sing , (2008) 8 SCC 287 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 917). Relying upon the decision of Federal Court in Shanmugam Pillai v. Annalakshmi Ammal,1950 AIR F.C. 38, this Court in Caltex (India) Ltd. v. Bhagwan Devi Marodia , (1969) AIR SC 405, held that in contracts relating to re-conveyance of property time is always the essence of the contract. This Court observed: " At common law stipulation as to time in a contract giving an option for renewal of a lease of land were considered to be of the essence of the contract even if they were not expressed to be so and were construed as conditions precedent. Equity followed the common law rule in respect of such contracts and did not regard the stipulation as to time as not of the essence of the bargain." (ii) In Bal Krishna Vs. Bhagwan Das , (2008) AIR SC 1786, it is held that the price was fixed at Rs.25,000/-,but the plaintiff claimed tht he was ready and willing to pay Rs. 10,000/-. It was held that this is not readiness and willingness. (iii) In P. Purushottam Reddy Vs. Pratap Steels Ltd. , (2002) AIR SC 771, it is held that readinessan willingness should be from the beginning till the end. (iii) In M.Shankar Nadar Vs. Deva Krishnan M A N U/TN/0185/2017 (Madras H.C.) - the Same view is taken. (iv) Parashram Sakharam Dhumal Vs. Shamrao Mahadeo Dhumal (Second Appeal No. 37/1993 (Bombay, dt. 08.06.2018 By Dr. Shalini Phansalkar-Joshi, J.), it was held that in case of re-conveyance, the readiness and willingness must be expressed by tendering the amount. (v) Hasam Malak Vs. Mohansingh , (1974) AIR Bombay 136, As pointed out by the Privy Council in Ardeshir v. Flora Sassoon , (1928) AIR PC 208, M A N U/PR/0149/1928 : in a case where the plaintiff claims specific performance of a contract of sale he must allege, and if the fact was traversed, he is required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part and the failure to make good that averment bring with it the inevitable dismissal of the suit. The readiness and willingness to perform the contract must be with reference to the true nature of the contract found between the parties and not reediness and willingness to perform the contract as the plaintiff understood it to be. (vi) Chand Rani Vs. Kamal Rani , (1993) AIR SC 1742 "In this case, it was observed that the obligation of the plaintiff to clear the mortgage and obtain income tax clearance certificate was to be performed only on the payment of Rs.98,000/-. The same was not paid. The defendant claimed that he was to pay Rs. 98,000/- only on receiving possession. After considering the facts and circumstances, though time was not fixed for performance of contract, as the plaintiff, in spite of the notice by defendant dated 16.09.1973 failed to pay Rs.98,000/- and insisted for payment of municipal taxes and delivery of possession as condition for repayment of Rs.98,000/-. It was held that plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract." 29. In the present case, as the plaintiff admittedly took period of 14 years and there are to proper pleadings of readiness and willingness to file suit for reconveyance, there was no continuous readiness and willingness. In the light of these facts, I hold that plaintiff failed to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of contract. Point No. 2 is answered accordingly. 30. In view of my above findings, the plaintiff is not entitled for specific performance of contract. 31. Mr. Bodake has also relied on the following Judgments : (i) Omprakash Berlia Vs. Unit Trust of India , (1983) AIR Bombay 1 (ii) Smt. Dayamati Bal Vs. K.M. Shaffii , (2004) AIR SC 4082 - These judgments are on the point of proof of documents. As I am assuming that the plaintiff have proved their documents, these judgments need not be considered. (iii) Ashok Pottdar Vs. Pawan Chamelia , (2017) 4 AllMR 381 (iv) Vimal Chand Jain Vs. Ramakant Jajoo , (2009) 5 SCC 713 . In this case, it is held that cardinal principle of appreciation of evidence is that, while considering as to whether the deposition of witness and parties are trustful or not. The Court may consider his conduct. The admission made by parties is admissible against him. These Judgments are not relevant as I am assuming that the documents produced by the defendants are duly proved. 32. The Court may consider his conduct. The admission made by parties is admissible against him. These Judgments are not relevant as I am assuming that the documents produced by the defendants are duly proved. 32. Both the Courts below erred in not considering this legal position and granted decree assuming that there was no period specified for obtaining the said re-conveyance. They have not followed the settled principles of law regarding seeking re-conveyance within reasonable time. Hence, the concurrent findings are not sustainable. Hence, I allow the appeal as follows:- ORDER (i) The appeal is allowed. (ii) The judgment and decree passed by both the courts are set aside. (iii) Regular Civil Suit No. 249 of 1982 shall stand dismissed. (iv) Both the parties shall bear their own costs throughout. (v) On the request of learned advocate for the Respondent, Mr. Bodake, learned advocate Mr. Talkute appearing for the Appellant makes a statement that Appellant will not create third party interest for a period of two months from today. Statement is accepted.