ORDER : 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India lias been filed by the petitioner who is contractual employee seeking quashment of the order of termination of his service dated 16-2-2017 Annexure P-14 and the order dated 4-8-2017 Annexure P-17 passed by the Appellate Authority rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner. 2. The facts which are not in dispute in the present case that the petitioner was initially appointed vide order dated 3-11-2007. His appointment was extended on year to year basis and the last extension was as per order dated 18-7-2016. The services of the petitioner was terminated as per order dated 16-2-2017 vide Annexure P-14 on the basis of a complaint received from Smt. Vijaykanti Patel, member of Congress Committee, 30 Anand Colony, Baldevbag, Jabalpur. On the said complaint, a committee was constituted for a preliminary enquiry, wherein it was found that under the MANREGA scheme, for the financial year 2015-16, payment of Rs. 161.04 lakhs were made to the firm which was not active and situated at the present address. The enquiry report further contemplates that the petitioner along with two other officers were found involved, therefore, they are held guilty, hence their services were forthwith terminated. The order of termination do not contain that any show cause notice was issued or an opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner prior to passing the impugned order. Against the said order, an appeal was preferred before the Additional Commissioner, Jabalpur, Division Jabalpur who while passing the order Annexure P-16 referred the same argument while admitting the appeal but while deciding the appeal by the order impugned Annexure P-17 the issue of granting opportunity has not been dealt, and in fact on the basis of the advice given by the Chief Executive Officer/Additional District Project Coordinator, referred that after hearing the petitioner, the order impugned has been passed by the Appellate Authority confirming the order of termination of the petitioner. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has filed their reply inter alia contending that the petitioner is a contractual employee and two other employees who were regularly appointed found guilty in the same preliminary enquiry, therefore, their services have been terminated by issuing notice and affording an opportunity to them. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has filed their reply inter alia contending that the petitioner is a contractual employee and two other employees who were regularly appointed found guilty in the same preliminary enquiry, therefore, their services have been terminated by issuing notice and affording an opportunity to them. The petitioner being a contractual employee not required to issue show cause notice and opportunity of hearing has been afforded by the Appellate Authority however no prejudice has been caused to him, therefore, the order of termination do not warrant interference. It is further his contention that in a preliminary enquiry, the misappropriation of lakhs of rupees were found, therefore also he do not deserve an opportunity of hearing. At last, it is urged that his services were extended as per order dated 18-6-2016 for a period of one year and his tenure is going to be completed on 31-3-2017, therefore, he cannot be reinstated, as, it would amount to extension of the contract. In view of the foregoing submissions, it is urged that this petition filed by the petitioner may be dismissed. 4. After having heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of both the parties, in the present case judgment in the case of Rahul Tripathi v. Rajeev Gandhi Shiksha Mission, Bhopal, reported in 2001 (3) M.P.L.J. 616 : 2001 (3) MPHT 397 is relevant wherein this Court held as under: “10. The present factual matrix is to be tested on the aforesaid enunciation of law. To find out whether the order of termination is a termination simpliciter or punitive in nature it is apposite to refer to the order contained Annexure P/18. The present factual matrix is to be tested on the aforesaid enunciation of law. To find out whether the order of termination is a termination simpliciter or punitive in nature it is apposite to refer to the order contained Annexure P/18. The relevant portion of the same reads as under:- ^^Jh jkgqy f=ikBh vkRet Jh chŒdsŒ f=ikBh dks fodkl [k.M cYnsox<+ esa [k.M L=ksr dsUnz leUo;d ds :i esa jktho xka/kh ÁkFkfed f'k{kk fe'ku ds varxZr ,d o"kZ dh lafonk fu;qfDr vkns'k Øekad MhŒihŒbZŒihŒ@fu;qfDr@95@22@6 fnukad 21-8-1995 }kjk nh xbZ Fkh] ftldh vof/k fu;ekuqlkj fnukad 20-8-1996 dks gks xbZ FkhA bl vof/k dh lekfIr ds mijkar dk;kZy;hu vkns'k Øekad 839] fnukad 6-9-1996 }kjk Jh f=ikBh dks lafonk fu;qfDr dh 'krksZ ij gh iqu% vkxkeh vkns'k rd inLFk fd;k x;k Fkk fdUrq Jh f=ikBh ds fo:} xaHkhj foRrh; vfu;ferrkvksa ,oa ofj"B dk;kZy;ksa ds vkns'kksa dh vogsyuk dh f'kdk;rsa ÁkIr gqbZA f'kdk;rksa ds lEcU/k esa bl dk;kZy; ds i= Øekad 710 fnukad 25-11-1997] Øekad 858@1] fnukad 23-12-1997] Øekad 983@1] fnukad 21-1-1998] Øekad 1120] fnukad 18-12-1998] Øekad 1156 fnukad 2-12-1998 }kjk Li"Vhdj.k pkgk x;k fdUrq Jh f=ikBh }kjk Li"Vhdj.k ,oa mlesa mYysf[kr vkjksiksa dk dksbZ lek/kkudkjd mRrj ÁLrqr ugha fd;k x;kA fodkl [k.M f'k{kk vf/kdkjh cYnsox<+ }kjk Hkh fodkl [k.M L=ksr dsUnz cYnsox<+ esa Jh f=ikBh }kjk foRrh; vfu;ferrk fd, tkus ,oa vius drZO;ksa dk fuoZgu xaHkhjrk ls u djus lEcU/kh Áfrosnu ÁLrqr fd;k gS] ftlls cYnsox<+ fodkl [k.M esa fe'ku dk;Z vR;ar ÁHkkfor gqvk gSA vr% mijksDr dkj.kksa dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, Jh f=ikBh dks rRdky ÁHkko ls fodkl [k.M L=ksr dsUnz leU;od cYnsox<+ in ls i`Fkd fd;k tkrk gSA bUgsa uksfVl u fn, tkus ds dkj.k fu;ekuqlkj ,d ekg dk osru ns; gksxkA ¼dysDVj ,oa ftyk fe'ku lapkyd }kjk vknsf'kr½** On a bare glance at the aforesaid order it becomes graphically clear that the petitioner's appointment was extended from time to time but during his continuance serious allegations with regard to financial irregularities were received. The order also reflects that the petitioner was asked to show cause in number of correspondences but the petitioner could not explain the charges levelled against him. It has also been mentioned in the order as the petitioner has committed financial irregularities and has not performed his duties with sincerity the work of the Mission has been affected and accordingly he has been removed. It has also been mentioned in the order as the petitioner has committed financial irregularities and has not performed his duties with sincerity the work of the Mission has been affected and accordingly he has been removed. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to refer to the counter affidavit wherein it has been also mentioned that against the petitioner there were serious financial irregularities and he was asked to show cause but his reply was not found satisfactory. The return filed by the respondent No. 3 also reflects the same. On a scrutiny of the entire factual scenario, there remains no scintilla of doubt that the order of termination passed against the petitioner is stigmatic and cannot be regarded as a termination simpliciter. The allegations incorporated in the order clearly establish that stigma has been cast and it will affect the future prospects of the petitioner. Accordingly, the order contained in Annexure P/18 deserves to be quashed and accordingly, 1 so do. Needless to emphasise the petitioner shall reap all the consequential benefits.” 5. The judgment in the case of Jitendra v. State of M.P., reported in 2008 (4) M.P.L.J. 670 : 2008 (5) MPHT 146 and Rajendra Tiwari alias Raju Advocate, Second Additional Government Prosecutor and Pleader, Rewa v. State of M.P., reported in 2005 (1) M.P.L.J. 204 : 2005 (3) MPHT 69 and also referred in the case passed in W.P. No. 16309/2015, Shriram Verma v. State of M.P. decided on 16-3-2017 [2017 MPLJ Online 13] has held in paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 as under: “6. Having considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties as well as in view of the above cited judgments, this Court is of the view that the impugned termination orders being stigmatic in nature alleging misconduct involving moral turpitude, the same could not have been passed without holding regular enquiry. The impugned termination orders would certainly create hurdle in his future employment. In the circumstances, before passing such an stigmatic order, regular enquiry ought to have been conducted. 7. As a result, the impugned orders are hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to reinstate with consequential benefits. However, liberty is granted to the respondents to proceed against the petitioner afresh in accordance with law, if so advised.” 6. In view of the said legal position, the factual matrix of the present case is required to be examined. 7. As a result, the impugned orders are hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to reinstate with consequential benefits. However, liberty is granted to the respondents to proceed against the petitioner afresh in accordance with law, if so advised.” 6. In view of the said legal position, the factual matrix of the present case is required to be examined. The order impugned Annexure P-14 has been passed relying upon the preliminary enquiry report, conducted by enquiry Committee. Nothing is available on record that the enquiry was conducted in the presence of the petitioner. The order itself do not contemplates that preliminary enquiry report was prepared in the presence of petitioner and on the basis of the said report by issuing any show cause notice, and affording an opportunity of hearing the order of termination is passed. The impugned order states that after receiving the enquiry report, petitioner along with two other persons were found guilty for the misconduct as alleged in the complaint, therefore, the services of the petitioner is being terminated with immediate effect. 7. It is not in dispute that petitioner is a contractual employee and his services are governed by the terms and conditions as specified in the contract. Clause 14 of the contract deals the issue of termination of contract employment in a case of a misconduct against the contract employee which is reproduced as thus:- ^^lafonk ij fu;qDr O;fDr ds dnkpkj ;k fdlh vkijkf/kd fØ;kdyki esa lafyIr ik;s tkus ij fu;qfDr Ákf/kdkjh mls lquokbZ dk ;qfDr;qDr volj nsus ds i'pkr ,slh lafonk fu;qfDr lekIr dj ldsxkA** 8. After going through the said clause, it is clear that if any allegation of misconduct or any criminal activity was found proved against the contract employee, then appointing authority upon affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the said contract employee, may terminate his services. As stated hereinabove, either in the order of termination or in the reply filed by the respondents, it is nowhere stated that a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner alleging his misconduct attaching the report of the enquiry and affording him an opportunity, passed the order impugned. 9. As stated hereinabove, either in the order of termination or in the reply filed by the respondents, it is nowhere stated that a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner alleging his misconduct attaching the report of the enquiry and affording him an opportunity, passed the order impugned. 9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent during course of hearing has referred the impugned order passed by the Commissioner, as per advice of the Chief Executive Officer/District Project Co-operator, wherein it is mentioned that one notice was given on 14-12-2016 to the petitioner, however it would be deemed to be a show cause notice given to the petitioner equating it to an opportunity of hearing. While in the reply it is said that because an opportunity of hearing has been afforded by the Appellate Authority to the petitioner while hearing the appeal, therefore there is no prejudice caused to him, however urged that the clause 14 has been complied with by the respondents. On careful perusal of record, 1 am not inclined to accept such contention of learned counsel of the respondents. In fact, it is a case wherein a complaint was received from a member of the Congress Committee, on which an enquiry committee was constituted. Nothing is available on record that which authority has constituted the Committee and whether such authority was having power under statute, in the enquiry what material has been brought on record, has not filed, whether petitioner was called during enquiry to give him an opportunity, is also not on record. After receiving the enquiry report, it has not been supplied to the petitioner asking his response. In absence thereto, looking to the terms and conditions of the contract employment, it is clear that the competent authority has not afforded an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. However, the argument advanced that Appellate Authority during hearing the appeal, afforded an opportunity, on receiving the advice of the Chief Executive Officer/District Project Co-ordinator, cannot be equated with an opportunity of hearing on a preliminary enquiry report of the Committee. Moreso, the advice received by the Appellate Authority relied upon in the order of appeal, has not been supplied to the petitioner asking his response, even at appellate stage. Moreso, the advice received by the Appellate Authority relied upon in the order of appeal, has not been supplied to the petitioner asking his response, even at appellate stage. In such circumstances, clause 14 of the terms and conditions of the contract employment has not been complied with, and the plea of not having any prejudice to the petitioner is of no substance. 10. So far as the reference of the notice, as argued during course of hearing in reference to para 17 is concerned, it is not stated in the reply that the said show cause notice was regarding the allegations of misconduct issued by the Appointing Authority. In absence thereto mere a stray reference made in the advice sent by the Chief Executive Officer is not sufficient to accept the contention of learned counsel for the respondents. 11. In view of the foregoing discussion, it can safely be concluded that clause 14 of the terms and conditions of the contractual employment has not been observed by the respondents, before terminating the services by the stigmatic order opportunity of hearing has not been afforded, therefore, the order of termination stand quashed. 12. So far as argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents that now the contract period has become over, therefore petitioner is not entitled to continue in the employment. In this regard, it is to observe here that after passing the order of termination, petitioner preferred an appeal and during pendency of the appeal, stay was granted by the Appellate Authority, and thereafter this Court has further granted the stay. On the basis of the said stay order petitioner is permitted to work in the employment. Prior to passing the stigmatic order of termination from employment, alleging misconduct, opportunity of hearing has not been afforded to the petitioner, therefore, even the contract employee cannot be terminated without opportunity of hearing as discussed hereinabove, therefore, the order of termination is hereby quashed. The order passed by the Appellate Authority without dealing all the contentions and issues and passing a three line order, is without due application of mind, therefore, it is set aside. 13. Accordingly, this petition succeeds and is hereby allowed, the orders Annexure P-14 dated 16-2-2017 and P-17 dated 4-8-2017 are hereby quashed. The order passed by the Appellate Authority without dealing all the contentions and issues and passing a three line order, is without due application of mind, therefore, it is set aside. 13. Accordingly, this petition succeeds and is hereby allowed, the orders Annexure P-14 dated 16-2-2017 and P-17 dated 4-8-2017 are hereby quashed. However it is open to the respondents to take recourse of law and to pass appropriate order in terms of the contract of the petitioner.