JUDGMENT : 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the letter as contained in Reference No. Kr-Kanke/2018-19/01 dated 23.10.2018 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) issued by the respondent No.3 whereby the petitioner’s immovable property mortgaged to the respondent-Bank being Flat No. 1B, Vamtara Apartment, Kusum Bihar, Road No.4, Morabadi, Ranchi has been directed to be handed over to the respondent-Bank on or before 29.10.2018 for recovery of Rs.19,99,554/- as on 01.10.2016 from the petitioner. 2. The petitioner has filed I.A. No. 10150/2018 bringing on record the inventory and Panchnama prepared by the respondent-Bank in support of the fact that the respondent-Bank has already taken possession of the mortgaged property of the petitioner. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had initially taken loan of Rs.22,00,000/- from the respondent-Bank for purchase of the aforesaid flat on EMI spread over for 20 years. On 30.09.2016, the petitioner defaulted in making payment of three instalments in pursuance of which the respondent-Bank declared the said loan account as NPA. On 01.10.2016, a notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the SARFAESI Act, 2002’) for recovery of an amount of Rs.19,99,554/- was issued to the petitioner by the respondent-Bank intending to put the mortgaged property of the petitioner on auction sale. However, the petitioner deposited Rs.1,00,000/- in order to avoid the auction sale which according to him was the defaulted amount as on 06.02.2017. Despite the said fact, ignoring the procedures prescribed in the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules, 2002’], the respondent-Bank put the mortgaged property (flat) of the petitioner on auction sale through e-auction sale notice dated 23.02.2017 scheduled to be held on 27.03.2017, which compelled the petitioner to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi [in short ‘the learned Tribunal’] by filing S.A No. 27/2017 which was disposed of vide order dated 23.03.2017 as the petitioner agreed to pay Rs.50,000/- in the concerned loan account prior to the date and time of auction sale and also to pay Rs.3,00,000/- in the another Cash Credit (SME) Account within a period of one month from the date of the order passed by the learned Tribunal. The learned Tribunal thus directed that there is no need to put the petitioner’s mortgaged property (flat) on auction sale. After disposal of S.A No. 27/2017, the petitioner deposited Rs.50,000/- in the said loan account and also continued to pay further instalments. However, in August and September, 2018, the petitioner again defaulted in making payment of two instalments. On this occasion, the respondent-Bank issued the impugned letter dated 23.10.2018 calling upon the petitioner to deliver the physical possession of the secured assets before 29.10.2018. Subsequently, on 31.10.2018, the physical possession of the mortgaged property (flat) has been taken by the respondent-Bank with the help of the police force completely ignoring the procedures prescribed under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the Rules, 2002. Thus, the said action of the respondent-Bank is wholly illegal. 4. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank submits that earlier also the petitioner had moved before the learned Tribunal against the action of the respondent-Bank. On this occasion also the petitioner defaulted in making payment of the loan amount and hence the respondent-Bank has taken the physical possession of the property in question. The petitioner has got alternative/efficacious/statutory remedy to prefer an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 before the learned Tribunal. 5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors. reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 , has held as under: “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.” 6. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.” 6. So far as invoking of writ jurisdiction in the matters of realization of loan by the financial institutions are concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent judgment rendered in Civil Appeal No. 1281 of 2018 (Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore & Anr. Vs. Mathew K.C.) while considering the earlier judicial pronouncements made in this regard, has held thus: “16. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon (supra), has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order:- “46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” 17. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference.” 7. Considering the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the aforesaid judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court, I am not inclined to entertain the present writ petition at this stage. The same is, accordingly, dismissed as not maintainable. The petitioner is, however, at liberty to take recourse before the appropriate Forum, as provided under the law, against the impugned action of the respondent-Bank. 8. Consequently, I.A. No. 10150/2018 also stands disposed of.