JUDGMENT : D.N. PATEL, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner whose writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 3569 of 2013 has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 27th October, 2016 and therefore, the original petitioner has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that this appellant is an original petitioner. He was working as a Lecturer or Assistant Professor on contractual basis with Kartik Oraon College, Gumla in the Faculty of Education. 3. It further appears from the facts of the case that contractual employment was continued from 2005 to 2011. 4. Looking to the facts of the case, it appears that respondent no. 3 was made Incharge Principal of the aforesaid college for 15 days during summer vacation and he put remarks for this appellant which is known as Confidential Character Remarks that this appellant is having a grudge for other caste people. 5. The aforesaid remarks made for the services of this appellant was never conveyed to this appellant by the concerned college. Later on after lot of correspondences and after approaching under Right to Information Act, this remarks made by respondent no. 3, who was Incharge Principal just for couple of days during summer vacation, was given by Ranchi University. The remarks was made on 28th May, 2011 and the said adverse remarks was conveyed to this appellant on 4th February, 2013 (Annexure-15 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal). When the representation was preferred, no satisfactory reply was given by the college nor by the University and the counsel for the University submitted that they are not concerned with this remarks even if it is expunged or maintained as it is. 6. Thus, looking to the facts of the case, it appears that respondent no. 3 who made this remarks was Incharge Principal for two weeks in the summer vacation i.e. in the month of 2011. This contractual employee-appellant was working from 2005 for whom the remarks was made and without giving any reason and without giving any explanation or without passing any order this type of remarks has been made which has no basis. 3 who made this remarks was Incharge Principal for two weeks in the summer vacation i.e. in the month of 2011. This contractual employee-appellant was working from 2005 for whom the remarks was made and without giving any reason and without giving any explanation or without passing any order this type of remarks has been made which has no basis. Looking to the facts and circumstances, neither any reason nor any basis has been pointed for making this remarks which is mentioned at Annexure-15 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal. For ready reference the said remarks reads as under: “Suffers from superiority complex. Harmful for Harijan/Adibasi society.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. This remarks has no basis and arbitrarily this remarks has been made. We therefore, quash and set aside this remarks made by respondent no. 3 which is dated 28th May, 2011. Arbitrariness in any format is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Arbitrariness and equality are sworn enemies of each other. When arbitrariness is present equality is absent and when equality is present arbitrariness is absent. 8. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dev Dutt vs. Union of India and Others, (2008) 8 SCC 725 , especially in paragraph nos. 16, 17, 18 and 41 as under: “16. In our opinion if the office memorandum dated 10/11.9.1987, is interpreted to mean that only adverse entries (i.e. “poor” entry) need to be communicated and not “fair” “average” or “good” entries, it would become arbitrary (and hence illegal) since it may adversely affect the incumbent’s chances of promotion, or to get some other benefit. For example, if the benchmark is that an incumbent must have “very good” entries in the last five years, then if he has “very good” (or even “outstanding”) entries for four years, a “good” entry for only one year may yet make him ineligible for promotion. This “good” entry may be due to the personal pique of his superior, or because the superior asked him to do something wrong which the incumbent refused, or because the incumbent refused to do sycophancy of his superior, or because of caste or communal prejudice, or to for some other extraneous consideration. 17. This “good” entry may be due to the personal pique of his superior, or because the superior asked him to do something wrong which the incumbent refused, or because the incumbent refused to do sycophancy of his superior, or because of caste or communal prejudice, or to for some other extraneous consideration. 17. In our opinion, every entry in the ACR of a public servant must be communicated to him within a reasonable period, whether it is a poor, fair, average, good or very good entry. This is because non-communication of such an entry may adversely affect the employee in two ways: (1) had the entry been communicated to him he would know about the assessment of his work and conduct by his superiors, which would enable him to improve his work in future. (2) he would have an opportunity of making a representation against the entry if he feels it is unjustified, and pray for its upgradation. Hence, non-communication of an entry is arbitrary, and it has been held by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India that arbitrariness violates Article 14 of the Constitution. 18. Thus, it is not only when there is a benchmark but in all cases that an entry (whether it is poor, fair, average, good or very good) must be communicated to a public servant, otherwise there is violation of the principle of fairness, which is the soul of natural justice. Even an outstanding entry should be communicated since that would boost the morale of the employee and make him work harder. 41. In our opinion, non-communication of entries in the annual confidential report of a public servant, whether he is in civil, judicial, police or any other service (other than the military), certainly has civil consequences because it may affect his chances for promotion or get other benefits (as already discussed above). Hence, such non-communication would be arbitrary, and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Abhijit Ghosh Dastidar vs. Union of India, (2009) 16 SCC 146 especially in paragraph no. 8 as under: “8. Coming to the second aspect, that though the benchmark “very good” is required for being considered for promotion, admittedly the entry of “good” was not communicated to the appellant. 8 as under: “8. Coming to the second aspect, that though the benchmark “very good” is required for being considered for promotion, admittedly the entry of “good” was not communicated to the appellant. The entry of “good” should have been communicated to him as he was having “very good” in the previous year. In those circumstances, in our opinion, non-communication of entries in the annual confidential report of a public servant whether he is in civil, judicial, police or any other service (other than the armed forces), it has civil consequences because it may affect his chances of promotion or getting other benefits. Hence, such non-communication would be arbitrary and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The same view has been reiterated in the abovereferred decision (Dev Dutt case, SCC p. 738, para 41) relied on by the appellant. Therefore, the entries “good” if at all granted to the appellant, the same should not have been taken into consideration for being considered for promotion to the higher grade. The respondent has no case that the appellant had ever been informed of the nature of the grading given to him.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sukhdev Singh vs. Union of India and Others, (2013) 9 SCC 566 especially in paragraph no. 6 and 8 as under: “6. We are in complete agreement with the view in Dev Dutt particularly paras 17, 18, 22, 37 and 41 as quoted above. We approve the same. 8. In our opinion, the view taken in Dev Dutt that every entry in ACR of a public servant must be communicated to him/her within a reasonable period is legally sound and helps in achieving threefold objectives. First, the communication of every entry in the ACR to a public servant helps him/her to work harder and achieve more that helps him in improving his work and give better results. Second and equally important, on being made aware of the entry in the ACR, the public servant may feel dissatisfied with the same. Communication of the entry enables him/her to make representation for upgradation of the remarks entered in the ACR. Third, communication of every entry in the ACR brings transparency in recording the remarks relating to a public servant and the system becomes more conforming to the principles of natural justice. Communication of the entry enables him/her to make representation for upgradation of the remarks entered in the ACR. Third, communication of every entry in the ACR brings transparency in recording the remarks relating to a public servant and the system becomes more conforming to the principles of natural justice. We, accordingly, hold that every entry in ACR-poor, fair, average, good or very good-must be communicated to him/her within a reasonable period.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. In the facts of the present case, remarks made by respondent no. 3 as stated hereinabove at Annexure-15 is absolutely arbitrary in nature. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while deciding writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 3569 of 2013 vide judgment and order dated 27th October, 2016. We therefore, quash and set aside the said judgment to the extent to which it affects the aforesaid remarks of respondent no. 3, which is at Annexure-15 dated 28th May, 2011. 12. So far as the prayer for reinstatement is concerned, it cannot be granted by this Court mainly for the following facts and reasons: (i) This appellant (original petitioner) was never employed upon a sanctioned post. (ii) The regular process of the employment was never followed. (iii) It was a contractual employment for a limited period. No sooner did, the contractual period is over his services can be terminated. (iv) Even if the contract is terminated prematurely, the remedy available with this appellant is to get the damages and not the employment, especially looking to Annexure-6 to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal and condition no. 2 thereof. 13. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others vs. Umadevi and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 especially in paragraph nos. 43 and 47 as under: “43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. The High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularisation, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because an employee had continued under cover of an order of the court, which we have described as “litigious employment” in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. 47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognised by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post.” (Emphasis supplied) In view of these facts, the prayer for reinstatement is hereby, rejected. 14. With these observations, this Letters Patent Appeal is partly allowed.