JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri V.K. Singh, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Prakhar Tandon, learned counsel for appellant, learned Standing Counsel for respondents and perused the record. 2. This intra-Court appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 1952") has arisen from judgment dated 12.05.2005 passed by learned Single Judge dismissing appellant's writ petition no.30437 of 2005. 3. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that appellant was engaged on contract basis but when vacancies were available, he was not regularized giving preferential treatment. However, when questioned, he could not dispute that there is no provision applicable to Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “U.P.S.R.T.C.”), which may confer any right upon appellant to claim regularization or even preferential right of regularization or absorption. It is also not disputed that recruitment and conditions of service of employees of U.P.S.R.T.C. are governed by statutory provision namely U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Employees (other than officers) Service Regulation, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as “Regulation, 1981”), which has been framed under Section 45(2) (c) of Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1950”). 4. Admittedly, appellant was engaged on contractual basis. Thus, employment and engagement of appellant is clearly in the realm of pure contract. If contract was for a fixed tenure, it comes to an end by efflux of time on expiry of period for which the same was executed. Even continuance of appellant thereafter would not confer any right upon him particularly when it is not pursuant to any letter or appointment or agreement. If contract itself does not provide any tenure, still parties to the contract can terminate the same in terms of conditions of appointment, and, in such a case, general provisions of Contract Act are applicable. 5. Considering the nature of contractual appointment and right of contractual appointee and also what rights and in what manner he can enforce in a Court of law, this Court in Vivek Kumar Misra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Others, 2008 (4) ESC 2811 , has held : “From the nature of appointment of the petitioners, it is thus evident that it was a contract appointment for a fixed tenure with condition therein that the same may be renewed subject to good performance and mutual agreement. Vs. State of U.P. & Others, 2008 (4) ESC 2811 , has held : “From the nature of appointment of the petitioners, it is thus evident that it was a contract appointment for a fixed tenure with condition therein that the same may be renewed subject to good performance and mutual agreement. The existing contract being time bound, came to an end by efflux of time on expiry of the period for which the same was executed. Thereafter, continuance of the petitioners, if any, would not be pursuant to any letter of appointment or agreement. The right of the petitioners to continue in service in the absence of any letter of appointment is neither vested in them nor they can claim as an existing right moreso in the absence of an appointment letter issued by the employer. This Court cannot provide an appointment letter to the petitioners though the employer has chosen not to appoint them after the period of appointment is over. The appointment made for a limited period came to an end by efflux of time needs no order of termination. This is what has been held by the Apex Court in Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. v. Pushpa Srivastava (Smt.) 1992(4) SCC 33 where dealing with a similar kind of contractual appointment, the Court held that it would end automatically by efflux of time.” (emphasis added) 6. In Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Uma Devi and Ors., JT 2006(4) SC 420, in para 34 of judgment, a Constitution Bench has observed : “If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued.” (emphasis added) 7. Learned Counsel for appellant, however, submitted that on account of wide-spread unemployment and lack of bargaining power, appellant is not in a condition to negotiate with respondents on equal terms and therefore, had no option but to agree whatever conditions are imposed upon him by respondents for giving employment. He said, if a condition of employment is ex-facie, unreasonable and exploitative, the same should not be adhered to and the respondents be directed to continue with the agreement. 8. In our view, submission cannot be accepted for more than one reason. He said, if a condition of employment is ex-facie, unreasonable and exploitative, the same should not be adhered to and the respondents be directed to continue with the agreement. 8. In our view, submission cannot be accepted for more than one reason. However, instead of adding in our words, we find it appropriate to refer Uma Devi (Supra), where rejecting a similar contention, Constitution Bench, in para 36 of judgment, has observed : “It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with eyes open. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain-not at arms length-since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground done, it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the Court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the Court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succour to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term.” (emphasis added) 9. In other words, even while accepting the employment, the person concerned knows the nature of his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the real sense of the term.” (emphasis added) 9. A Division Bench of this Court in Alok Kumar Singh (Dr.) and 15 Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., 2002 (2) ESC 427 (All) considering similar kind of tenure appointment on contract basis, has held that petitioners cannot claim right to continue in service beyond the period of appointment provided in the letter of appointment. This has been followed by subsequent Division Bench in Sarvesh Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. and Ors. writ petition No. 25849 decided on 11.5.2006; and Amar Nath Tiwari v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2006(6) ADJ 678 : 2006(3) ESC 2015 (DB). 10. When an appointment, even if legal and valid, but contractual one, is governed by certain terms and conditions thereof, parties are bound to adhere to those conditions and cannot travel beyond that. 11. The consequences followed in a tenure appointment made clear in Director, Institute of Management Development U.P. Vs. Pushpa Srivastava (Smt.), 1992(4) SCC 33 , where Court has said that tenure appointment comes to an end by efflux of time and it does not require even an order of termination after expiry of the period. The incumbent ceased to have right to work on the expiry of the period for 12. Even otherwise, appellant's appointment was contractual hence it could not be enforced in a Court of law and that too in a writ petition. In other words, when right to continue is not based either on the statute or the Constitution or otherwise in law; then a writ of mandamus compelling the authorities to continue appellant in employment cannot be issued since for issuance of writ of mandamus, condition precedent is the existence of a legal right upon the aggrieved person and a legal obligation corresponding upon the authorities concerned. In Uma Devi (Supra), Apex Court, considering the question as to when a writ of mandamus can be issued by the Court directing employer either to absorb the employee in permanent service or to allow him to continue, has held : “In order to that a mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that the statute imposes a legal duty on the authority and the aggrieved party had a legal right under the statute or rule to enforce it.” (emphasis added) 13. Even otherwise, enforcement of contract of personal service in a writ jurisdiction is not permissible except of certain limited circumstances. In Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1889 , drawing distinction between employment under a contract and status, it was held that there is no vested contractual right in regard to terms of service where employment is one of the status. The origin of Government service is contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in every case. But once appointed to the post or office, the Government servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of both parties, but by statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by Government. In other words, legal position of a Government servant is more one of status than of contract. The hall-mark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by public law and not by mere agreement of the parties. The relationship between the Government and the Servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different, something in the nature of status. In the language of jurisprudence, status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. 14. Thus, in the cases where appointment and conditions of service are governed by statute, the relationship is that of status and not mere a contract. However, in other cases, it is purely a contract of service resulting in a relationship of ordinary master and servant. In the present case, it cannot be said that the appellant's employment is that of a status since it is not governed by statutory provisions in any manner. However, in other cases, it is purely a contract of service resulting in a relationship of ordinary master and servant. In the present case, it cannot be said that the appellant's employment is that of a status since it is not governed by statutory provisions in any manner. It is purely and simply an ordinary contract of service between master and servant. In such cases, where the contract of service is not governed by statutory provisions, it is well-settled that contract of service cannot be sought to be enforced by seeking reinstatement or continuance in employment since such a relief is barred under the Specific Relief Act. In Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation, Lucknow v. C.K. Tyagi, AIR 1970 SC 1244 , considering question as to when such a relief is granted, Court observed: “Under the common law the Court will not ordinarily force an employer to retain the services of an employee whom he no longer wishes to employ. But this rule is subject to certain well-recognised exceptions. It is open to the Courts in an appropriate case to declare that a public servant who is dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 continues to remain in service, even though by doing so the State is in effect forced to continue to employ the servant whom it does not desire to employ. Similarly under the Industrial Law, jurisdiction of the Labour and Industrial Tribunals to compel the employer to employ a worker whom he does not desire to employ, is recognised. The Courts are also investigated with the power to declare invalid the act of a statutory body, if by doing the act the body has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by statute,...” 15. Again in para 25 of the judgment, Court held: “The position in law is that no declaration to enforce a contract of personal service will be normally granted. But there are certain well-recognized exceptions to this rule and they are: To grant such a declaration in appropriate cases regarding (1) a public servant, who has been dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311. (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3). A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute.” (emphasis added) 16. (2) Reinstatement of a dismissed worker under Industrial law by Labour or Industrial Tribunals. (3). A statutory body when it has acted in breach of a mandatory obligation, imposed by statute.” (emphasis added) 16. The above view has been reiterated in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and Ors. v. Lakshmi Narain and Ors., AIR 1976 SC 888 (paras 9, 10, 13 and 17); Smt. J. Tiwari v. Smt. Jawala Devi Vidya Mandir and Ors., AIR 1981 SC 122 ; Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd. and Ors., AIR 1986 SC 1370 (paras 101, 102). Similar view has been taken by this Court also in A.K. Home Chaudhary v. National Textile Corporation U.P. Ltd., Kanpur, 1984 UPLBEC 81 and B.M. Varma v. State of U.P. and Ors., 2004 (4) AWC 2866 . 17. Following the above authorities, same view has been expressed and reiterated by this Court subsequently also in State of U.P. & Others Vs. Anil Kumar Singh Yadav & Others (2013) 2 UPLBEC 1588 and Writ Petition (Writ-A) No. 36854 of 2001 (Rajesh Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. and others) decided on 09.05.2016. 18. Recently also, in Kailash Singh Vs. The Managing Committee, Mayo College, Ajmer and others. (2018) 10 SCALE 638, where dispute related to termination of an employee of Mayo College, Court held that employment was governed by simple contract of employment and, hence, no relief of reinstatement can be granted, but employee, if wrongfully terminated, may claim damages. 19. In view of above exposition of law as also in absence of any statutory right of appellant to claim regularization or absorption, only on the ground that he was engaged on contract basis, we do not find any such direction, as prayed for, can be issued by Court. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the order passed by learned Single Judge. 20. Dismissed.