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2018 DIGILAW 258 (GAU)

ADESH KUMAR JAIN v. STATE OF ASSAM

2018-02-12

HITESH KUMAR SARMA

body2018
JUDGMENT/ORDER : 1. This is an application, filed under Section 482 of the Cr.PC, praying for setting aside and quashing the FIR in All Women Police Station Case No. 134/2014, under Section 376 of the IPC, arising out of CR Case No. 3379C/2014, filed under Section 156 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. I have heard Mr. A. Bhattacharya, learned counsel for the accused-petitioner, and Mr. B.J. Dutta, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam, representing the State respondent No. 1. None appeared for the respondent No. 2/informant. 3. As both the parties are heard at length at the admission stage itself, in accordance with the order, dated 23-01-2018, this Court proposes to dispose of this matter by this judgment. 4. The fact leading to the registration of the All Women Police Station case is that, a petition, registered as Case No. 3379C/2014, was filed, under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. seeking direction to the All Women Police Station, Panbazar, Guwahati, to register the case, investigate into the same and submit a report in full form by the present respondent No. 2. 5. The accusations against the present accused-petitioner in the said complaint is that the informant/respondent No. 2, a widow, while coming from New Jalpaiguri (NJP), in the year 2011, the accused-petitioner met her in the train. During such meeting, the informant/respondent No.2 narrated to him her miserable condition and hearing about her condition, he assured her of his help and he developed intimacy with her. In the month of June, 2011, when the accused-petitioner came to Guwahati, he offered a mobile phone to her telling her that she is like his sister and he would be happy if she accepted the mobile phone telling her further that she could communicate to him any problem without any hesitation. The informant/respondent No. 2 accepted the mobile phone. Thereafter, since the month of July, 2011, the accused-petitioner started to come to her house and his intention was bad. In her house, he used to tell her that life is long and a widow faces much difficulty to lead her life in a society and therefore she should marry him. The accused-petitioner also assured her that he would marry her and give her the status of his wife. In her house, he used to tell her that life is long and a widow faces much difficulty to lead her life in a society and therefore she should marry him. The accused-petitioner also assured her that he would marry her and give her the status of his wife. The informant/respondent accepted the proposal of the accused-petitioner and she offered herself to him and in the month of July, 2011 itself, the accused-petitioner cohabited with her. Thereafter, on several occasions the accused-petitioner had physical relation in that month itself till the month of May, 2014. She was assured by the accused-petitioner that in the month of August, 2014, he would marry her. Since the month of June, 2014, the accused-petitioner stopped contacting the informant/respondent No. 2 and when she tried to contact him over phone, he did not receive her phone call. 6. Therefore, the informant/respondent alleged commission of rape on her by the accused-petitioner. It has been specifically stated in the complaint, referred to above, that she had approached the All Women Police Station to lodge the FIR, but she was told to approach the Hon’ble Court; therefore, she has filed the complaint, aforesaid, before the learned Court praying for directions, mentioned above. 7. The complaint is supported by an affidavit wherein it has been stated, in paragraph-2, that the statement made in the complaint petition are true to the best of her knowledge and belief. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner, referring to the contents of the petition as well as the grounds for quashment taken therein, submitted that, prima facie, no offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC is made out from the FIR/complaint and that the informant/respondent No. 2 has never averred in her complaint before the Court, seeking the direction, as above, that after refusal by the All Women Police Station, Panbazar, Guwahati, she approached the Superintendent of Police, Guwahati city, under Section 154 (3) of the Cr.P.C. which is a sine quo non for taking cognizance under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C., as the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in number of cases as well as the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Priyanka Srivastava and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (2015) 6 SCC 287 . 9. 9. The learned Magistrate, sent the complaint filed before him to the Officer-in-Charge of the All Women Police Station, Panbazar, Guwahati, under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. vide his order, dated 18-12-2014. This order dated 18-12-2014, reads as follows : "Complainant is present. Heard her on (sic) person. Perused the case record. On perusal of it, I have found that proper investigation is required in this case. Therefore, this is forwarded to O/C of All Women PS of Panbazar to register a case under appropriate section of law and investigate the matter and also to submit F.F. in due course. Let the case record be sent immediately." 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the aforesaid order passed by the learned Magistrate was without application of mind and without any reason. He has referred to the paragraph-29 of the Priyanka Srivastava (supra) aforesaid. He has submitted that exercise of power by the learned Magistrate under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. warrants application of judicial mind since a litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. He has put stress on the fact that the order of the learned Magistrate, referred to above, does not speak of application of judicial mind for directing the All Women Police Station to register a case and to investigate into the same. Paragraph-29 of Priyanka Srivastava (supra) reads as follows: "29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156 (3) warrants application of judicial mind. A Court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the Code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellow citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same." 11. To substantiate his such submission of non-application of judicial mind by the Magistrate he has also referred a decision of this Court in the case of Tarun Dev Sarma & Anr. vs. State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2015 (4) GLT 413 and taken this Court to paragraph-110 thereof. To substantiate his such submission of non-application of judicial mind by the Magistrate he has also referred a decision of this Court in the case of Tarun Dev Sarma & Anr. vs. State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2015 (4) GLT 413 and taken this Court to paragraph-110 thereof. The relevant part of paragraph-110 of the said decision reads as follows : "The provision, prescribed by Section 156 (3) cannt be read in isolation. The same has to be read along with the provisions prescribed by Section 154 and 155 Cr.P.C. The decision held in the case of Sakiri Basu (supra) makes it abundantly clear that prior compliance of the provison, prescribed by Section 154 (1) and 154 (3) Cr.P.C. is necessary. A careful reading of the said statutory provision indicates that before invoking the power under Section 156 (3), the party has to take resort to the provisions prescribed by Section 154 and 155 Cr.P.C. A Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint under Section 156 (3) cant act as a post office and just forward the complaint to the Police for investigation. Any direction or order made by a Judicial Officer, in discharge of judicial work, must be a reasoned order. Therefore, as held by the Supreme Court, in the case of Priyanka, a Magistrate exercising power under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. has to apply his mind and record reasons justifying the need to send the complaint to Police for investigation. It is also the duty of the Magistrate to ascertain as to whether the complainant has taken resort to the provisions prescribed by Section 154 (1) and 154 (3) Cr.P.C." 12. Paragraph-112 of the Tarun Dev Sarma (supra) reads as follows : "112. In the case of Sakiri Vasu (supra), the Supreme Court held that an aggrieved person, if his FIR is not registered by police u/s. 154 Cr.P.C., may approach the Supdt. Of police u/s. 154 (3) Cr.P.C. and even if the FIR is not registered than he can file application u/s. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. and in that case the Magistrate can direct proper investigation. The decision in this case was rendered much prior to the filing of the present complaint." 13. Of police u/s. 154 (3) Cr.P.C. and even if the FIR is not registered than he can file application u/s. 156 (3) Cr.P.C. and in that case the Magistrate can direct proper investigation. The decision in this case was rendered much prior to the filing of the present complaint." 13. In Tarun Dev Sarma (supra), the learned Magistrate passed an order on a complaint directing the O/C, Jalukbari Police Station, to register a case, to investigate the same and to submit a report, in full form, at the earliest. 14. This Court in the decision of Tarun Dev Sarma (supra) specifically held, referring to the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sakiri Vasu vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in (2008) 2 SCC 409 , that any direction or order made by a judicial officer, in discharge of judicial work, must be a reasoned order. Therefore, in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava (supra), a Magistrate exercising power under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. has to apply his mind and record reasons justifying the need to send the complaint to police for investigation. 15. In the instant case, the order passed by the learned Magistrate, as reproduced above, appears to be cryptic with no reasons recorded therein justifying the need to send the complaint to police for investigation. 16. On the other hand, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the accused-petitioner that the informant/respondent not only prima facie not established that she approached the All Women Police Station with FIR, which was not registered by the said Police Station and; rather, told her to approach the learned Court, but also fails to establish that she had taken recourse to Section 154 (3) of the Cr.P.C. In this context, he has referred to paragraph-31 of Priyanka Srivastava (supra), which reads as follows: "31. We have already indicated that there has to be prior applications under Section 154 (1) and 154 (3) while filing a petition under Section 156 (3). Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application under Section 156 (3) be supported by an affidavit is to that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. Both the aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The warrant for giving a direction that an application under Section 156 (3) be supported by an affidavit is to that the person making the application should be conscious and also endeavour to see that no false affidavit is made. It is because once an affidavit is found to be false, he will be liable for prosecution in accordance with law. This will deter him to casually invoke the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156 (3). That apart, we have already stated that the veracity of the same can also be verified by the learned Magistrate, regard being had to the nature of allegations of the case. We are compelled to say so as a number of cases pertaining to fiscal sphere, matrimonial dispute/family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption cases and the cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, as are illustrated in Lalita Kumari are being filed. That apart, the learned Magistrate would also be aware of the delay in lodging of the FIR." (Lalita Kumari vs. State of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 ." 17. The learned counsel for the accused-petitioner has relied upon the statement made in paragraph-8 of the complaint petition as well as the paragraph-2 of her affidavit accompanying the complaint. In paragraph-8 the informant/respondent stated that she approached the All Women Police Station but there she was told to approach the Hon’ble Court, and hence, she filed the petition/complaint. In paragraph-2 of the accompanying affidavit, she has stated that the statements made in her petition from paragraph-1 to 8 are true to the best of her knowledge and belief. There is no statement made by her either in the complaint petition or in the affidavit aforesaid that she approached the Superintendent of Police as provided in Section 154 (3) of the Cr.P.C. In paragraph-31 of Priyanka Srivastava (supra), referred to above, made it clear that prior application under Sections 154 (1) and 154 (3) of the Cr.P.C., while filing a petition under Section 154 (3), has to be there. It has also been spelt out in the said decision, rendered by Honble Supreme Court, that while filing a petition under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C., necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. It has also been spelt out in the said decision, rendered by Honble Supreme Court, that while filing a petition under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C., necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. The purpose for which such an application is required to be supported by an affidavit has also been spelt out in the said decision as indicated in paragraph-31, reproduced above. 18. Therefore, it has come out from the materials place before this Court including the complaint petition and the accompanying affidavit that provisions of Section 154 (3) of the Cr.P.C. was not complied with before approaching the learned trial Court for direction under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. even if it is presumed that Section 154 (1) of the Cr.P.C. was complied with. It deserves a mention here that as directed in Priyanka Srivastava (supra), no document was filed by the respondent No. 2 alongwith the complaint to substantiate that she approached the All Women Police Station before filing the petition under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.PC. 19. It deserves a mention here that although none appeared for the respondent No. 2 at the time of hearing yet on the next day of the date of hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted a written argument, which has been taken note of by this Court in the interest of justice. In his such written argument, he has submitted that even assuming that the complainant/respondent approached under the wrong forum, then also that cannot be a ground to set the accused-petitioner free from the alleged commission of offence of rape on the person of informant/respondent and she cannot be remediless. He has also submitted that the alleged offence committed by the accused-petitioner is a crime against the society at large. Therefore; it should not be quashed. 20. It has come out from the discussions above that the order of the learned trial Court was not a reasoned order and that the informant/respondent No. 2 clearly did not comply with the provisions of Section 154 (3) of the Cr.P.C. yet, whether these can be the grounds for quashing of the aforesaid FIR of the All Women Police Station Case No. 137/2014. The direction issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava (supra), in para-31 are mandatory. 21. The direction issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava (supra), in para-31 are mandatory. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also contended in the petition and in his submission that the accused-petitioner is not a resident of Guwahati and he is a resident of Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, the accusation is inherently absurd. He has further contended that the daughter of the accused-petitioner, Dipti, filed a case against her father-in-law, mother-in-law and other in-laws and her husband, wherein allegation of commission of rape on her person is also involved and the said case is registered, vide FIR No. 25/2014, dated 24-03-2014 in the Hajaratganj Police Station, Lucknow and at the instance of their in-laws, the present FIR has been filed by the informant/respondent No. 2 to put pressure on the daughter of the accused-petitioner to withdraw the complaint filed against her in-laws. He has further submitted that the uncontroverted statements made in the FIR and complaint does not make out a case, punishable under Section 376 of the IPC. On perusal of the FIR, it is found that the specific statement made therein is to the effect that the informant/respondent No. 2 surrendered her to the accused-petitioner because of his promise to marry her. There is also unexplained inordinate delay in lodging the complaint by the respondent No. 2. It is averred in the complaint under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.PC that the accused-petitioner had physical relation with her since the month of July, 2011 till the month of May, 2014 and he stopped contacting her since June, 2014. The complaint under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.PC was filed before the learned court by the respondent No. 2 on 15.12.2014. The accused-petitioner is alleged to have committed rape since July, 2011 and he stopped contacting her since June, 2014. Therefore, after about 6 months of the accused-petitioner stopped contacting her she alleged commission of rape on her person although she is admittedly a consenting party even if it is supposed that the accused-petitioner had sexual intercourse with her. On the other hand, neither in the complaint nor in the affidavit, the respondent No. 2 has stated as to when she had approached the All Women Police Station with her FIR not to speak of producing the FIR as a document with the complaint under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.PC. On the other hand, neither in the complaint nor in the affidavit, the respondent No. 2 has stated as to when she had approached the All Women Police Station with her FIR not to speak of producing the FIR as a document with the complaint under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.PC. Such facts, as indicated above, raises doubt about the veracity of the version of the complaint to which facts the learned Magistrate ought to have applied his mind before the order under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.PC, reproduced above, was passed. 22. In view of the facts narrated above, coupled with law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this court, referred to above, in the considered view of this court, continuance of all Women Police Station Case No. 134/2014 will be an abuse of the process of the court and would also be against the direction in Priyanka Srivastava (supra). 23. Therefore, the FIR in the All Women Police Station, Panbazar, Guwahati, Case No. 134/2014 is quashed. 24. Accordingly, the petition is allowed.