JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 23-12-2013 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Khowai in Title Appeal No. 4 of 2012 dismissing the appeal against the judgment and decree dated 7-7-2012 of the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Khowai, West Tripura in Title Suit No. 7 of 2010 decreeing the suit. 2. The facts giving rise to this second appeal may be briefly noticed at the outset. The predecessor of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1(a), 1(b), 1(c) (Late Hemendra Narayan Datta) and the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 had jointly instituted Title Suit No. 7 of 2001 before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Court No.2, Agartala, West Tripura for ejectment of the appellants (the defendants in that suit) from the suit land. In that suit, the plaintiffs had, inter alia, stated in the plaint that the suit premises were let out to the deceased father of the appellants (Late Monoranjan Gupta) more than 30 years ago for running footwear business on a monthly rent of Rs. 200/- per month, which was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 250/- per month and alleged that the appellants did not comply with the terms of the newly settled monthly rent fixed at the intervention of the Market Committee and did not pay the monthly rent for four months and that the suit premises was required for establishing a business by the son of the plaintiff No. 1. This prompted the plaintiffs to issue notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (“the Act” for short) on 1-10-2000 to vacate the rented premises on the expiry of 30 days. The appellants contested the suit, which was dismissed by the trial court by the judgment and decree dated 3-6-2003 on the ground of want of notice. The appeal, i.e. Title Appeal No. 4 of 2003 preferred by the predecessor of the plaintiffs before the learned Additional District Judge, Khowai was also dismissed by the judgment and decree dated 14-10-2004 by affirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. 3. The appeal, i.e. Title Appeal No. 4 of 2003 preferred by the predecessor of the plaintiffs before the learned Additional District Judge, Khowai was also dismissed by the judgment and decree dated 14-10-2004 by affirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. 3. The predecessor of the plaintiffs-respondent No. 1(a), 1(b), 1(c) and the plaintiff No. 2 subsequently instituted a fresh suit, i.e. Title Suit No. 7 of 2010 against the appellants before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Khowai for their ejectment from the same rented premises on the ground that the suit premises were required for setting up a business by one of the sons of the plaintiff No. 1, for which a fresh notice under Section 106 of the Act was served upon the appellants. The plaintiffs alleged in the plaint that they had earlier instituted Title Suit No. 7 of 2001, which had been dismissed on hyper-technical ground. The appellants contested the suit and filed their written statement on 10-9-2010 by annexing a copy of the plaint and the written statement filed in the earlier suit. The trial court by the judgment and decree dated 7-7-2012 decreed the suit for the ejectment of the appellants from the suit premises. Title Appeal No. 4 of 2012 preferred by the appellants before the learned Additional District Judge, Khowai, West Tripura challenging the said judgment and decree was dismissed by the judgment dated 23-12-2013. Aggrieved by this, the appellants are preferring this second appeal. 4. According to the appellants, the suit premises admittedly belonged to the late Harendra Narayan Datta alone, who had inducted the late Monoranjan Gupta, the predecessor of the appellants in the year 1959 as a permanent tenant. After the death of the said Harendra Narayan Datta in or about the year 1962, the suit premises was inherited by his sons, namely, late Hirendra Narayan Datta and Shri Hemendra Narayan Datta and his daughters, namely, Smriti Datta (respondent No. 2), Smt. Ratna Datta (Majumder), now deceased, Smt. Shipra Datta (Biswas) and Smt. Uma Datta (Das). At this stage, it may be noted that the late Ratna Datta (Majumder) has been substituted by the respondent No. 3(a) and respondent No. 3(b) as her legal heirs. At this stage, it may be noted that the late Ratna Datta (Majumder) has been substituted by the respondent No. 3(a) and respondent No. 3(b) as her legal heirs. According to the appellants, the plaintiffs did not implead all the legal heirs of the late Hirendra Narayan Datta such as Uma Datta (Das), who died prior to the institution of T.S. No. 7 of 2010 leaving behind her husband, Keshab Das and her two sons, Tarun Kanti Das and Amit Das though they are necessary parties. 5. At the time of admitting the appeal, this Court had formulated the following questions as substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the findings of the Courts below that the suit does not suffer from non-joinder of necessary parties, is perverse? 2. Whether the suit is barred by res judicata in view of the decision in the earlier suit, i.e. T.S. No. 07 of 2001? 6. It is the contention of Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, the learned senior counsel for the appellants that after the death of the said Harendra Narayan Dutta, his two sons, the late Hirendra Narayan Dutta and Hemendra Narayan Dutta and his daughters, namely, the respondent No. 2, the deceased Ratna Datta (Majumder) pro forma defendant-respondent No. 1, the pro forma defendant-respondent No. 2 and Smt. Uma Dutta (Das), who died on prior to the filing of the suit, became the joint owners of the rented premises, but her legal heirs, namely, Keshab Das, Tarun Kanti Das and Amit Das were never impleaded as defendants in the suit and non-impleadment of these legal heirs, in the teeth of objection made by the appellants, vitiates the impugned judgment and decree. It is further argued by the learned senior counsel that the notice issued to the appellants under Section 106 of the Act by the Advocate on behalf of the plaintiffs is invalid. He also submits that the earlier suit instituted on the basis of the notice issued by the plaintiffs under Section 106 of the Act against the appellants for their ejectment from the same suit premises to enable one of their sons to set up business was dismissed by the trial court after trying the same on merit; the instant suit is barred by res judicata. According to the learned senior counsel, both the Courts below by overlooking this fundamental principle of law engrafted in Section 11, Civil Procedure Code has committed illegality and the suit ought to have been dismissed on the ground of res judicata. To fortify his submissions, the learned senior counsel relies on Smt. Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak and others, AIR 1977 SC 1599 and Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha, Jaipur (Trust) v. Mahant Ram Niwas and anr., AIR 2008 SC 2187 . On the other hand, Mr. D.K. Biswas, the learned counsel for the respondents supports the impugned judgment and submits that no substantial questions of law is involved in this second appeal, which is liable to be dismissed. He further contends that there is no arguable case either on the issue of non-impleadment of necessary party or on res judicata as those questions have been practically covered by the decisions of the Apex Court and the well-settled laws unanimously laid down by the various High Courts; the second appeal is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed. He presses into service the decisions of the Apex Court in Hero Vinoth (Minor) v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545 and Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai & ors, (2002) 6 SCC 16 to substantiate his submissions. 7. Before proceeding further, the principles propounded by the Apex Court in Hero Vinoth (Minor) case (supra) relating to Section 100 Civil Procedure Code may be referred to, which are in the following terms: “24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarized thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognized exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” (Underlined for emphasis) 8. The trial court has found, which is concurred by the appellate court, that the appellants side failed to prove that the notice dated 13-6-2009 issued by the plaintiff-respondent upon them was defective and that the lease of the suit premises was validly determined by the notice dated 13-6-2009 of the plaintiffs served through their counsel. The trial court has found, which is concurred by the appellate court, that the appellants side failed to prove that the notice dated 13-6-2009 issued by the plaintiff-respondent upon them was defective and that the lease of the suit premises was validly determined by the notice dated 13-6-2009 of the plaintiffs served through their counsel. The trial court and the appellate court also found that the plaintiffs are the actual owners of the suit premises along with the pro forma defendants and that the lease of the suit premises taken by the appellants had been terminated by the said notice dated 13-6-2009. Holding that the possession of the suit premises by the defendants/appellants to be unlawful due to the termination of the lease, the courts below decreed the suit for the ejectment of the appellants from the suit land. It may be noted that these findings are not challenged by the learned senior counsel in the course of hearing. It is only with respect to the substantial questions of law so formulated that the learned senior counsel confined his submissions as already noticed. 9. Coming now to the question of non-joinder of all the co-owners of the tenanted premises, the appellate court recorded the findings that the plaintiff filed the suit duly authorized by other legal heirs of the tenanted premises to institute the suit and that the plaintiff represented all the legal heirs of late Harendra Narayan Dutta and that it was not a matter to be looked into by the tenant whether there was any dispute among the co-owners with respect to the suit premises. As the defendant-appellant could not have any say on this issue, the suit did not suffer from non-joinder of necessary party. In my opinion, the findings so recorded by the appellate court do not suffer from any infirmity. Moreover, the Apex Court in Smt. Kanta Goel case (supra), held: “7. This Court in Sri Ram Pasricha clarified that a co-owner is as much an owner of the entire property as any sole owner of the property is: "Jurisprudentially, it is not correct to say that a co-owner of property is not its owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property.... He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property.... It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff, who is admittedly the landlord and co-owner of the premises, is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of Section 13(1)(f). It is not necessary to establish that the plaintiff is the only owner of the property for the purpose of Section 13(1)(f) as long as he is a co-owner of the property, being at the same time acknowledged landlord of the defendants". That case also was one for eviction under the rent control law of Bengal. The law having been thus put beyond doubt, the contention that the absence of the other co-owners on record disentitled the first respondent from suing for eviction, fails. We are not called upon to consider the piquant situation that might arise if some of the co-owners wanted the tenant to continue contrary to the relief claimed by the evicting co-owner.” 10. It is also contended by the learned senior counsel that the notice issued under Section 106 of the Act by the Advocate of the plaintiffs is not sufficient for the purpose of validity of the notice inasmuch as he was not authorized to do so by all the owners of the suit premises. This submission is noted only to be summarily rejected in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Mahendra Raghunathdas Gupta v. Vishvanath Bhikaji Mogul and others, (1997) 5 SCC 329 , which held that: “6. …… When the advocate had sent the notice on behalf of the respondent, obviously he acted as an agent on behalf of the respondents. We may in this connection refer to Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Requirement of the notice under this section is that it must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it. The notice sent by the lawyer on behalf of his client landlord would meet the requirement of Section 106 of the Act…..” 11. On the question of the applicability of res judicata, it may be noted that the earlier suit was dismissed on the ground that the notice issued under Section 106 of Act was invalid. The notice sent by the lawyer on behalf of his client landlord would meet the requirement of Section 106 of the Act…..” 11. On the question of the applicability of res judicata, it may be noted that the earlier suit was dismissed on the ground that the notice issued under Section 106 of Act was invalid. Subsequently, the plaintiffs issued another notice upon the defendants under Section 106 of the Act for quitting the suit premises. The law is now well-settled that in order that a matter may be said to have been heard and finally decided, the decision in the former suit must have been one on merit. As the former suit was not dismissed on merit but on the ground of invalid notice, the instant suit filed by the plaintiffs cannot be barred by res judicata. In this context, the observations made by the Apex Court in Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar, AIR 1966 SC 1332 come to mind: “16. This brings us to the main point that has been urged in these appeals, namely, that the High Court had not heard and finally decided the appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91. One of the appeals was dismissed on the ground that it was filed beyond the period of limitation while the other appeal was dismissed on the ground that the appellant therein had not taken steps to print the records. It is therefore urged that the two appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 had not been heard and finally decided by the High Court, and so the condition that the former suit must have been heard and finally decided was not satisfied in the present case. Reliance in this connection is placed on the well-settled principle that in order that a matter may be said to have been heard and finally decided, the decision in the former suit must have been on the merits. Reliance in this connection is placed on the well-settled principle that in order that a matter may be said to have been heard and finally decided, the decision in the former suit must have been on the merits. Where, for example, the former suit was dismissed by the trial court for want of jurisdiction, or for default of plaintiff's appearance, or on the ground of non-joinder of parties or mis-joinder of parties or multifarious-ness, or on the ground that the suit was badly framed, or on the ground of a technical mistake, or for failure on the part of the plaintiff to produce probate or letters of administration or succession certificate when the same is required by law to entitle the plaintiff to a decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs, or on the ground of improper valuation or for failure to pay additional court fee on a plaint which was undervalued or for want of cause of action or on the ground that it is premature and the dismissal is confirmed in appeal (if any), the decision not being on the merits would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit.” 12. In this view of the matter, there is no force in the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that the instant suit is barred by res judicata. The substantial questions of law formulated in this appeal have been answered in the manner indicated above. 13. For what has been stated in the foregoing, there is no merit in this second appeal, which is, accordingly, dismissed. No cost. Transmit the L.C. record forthwith.