JUDGMENT : The instant petition has been filed at the instance of the delinquent who was charged for the misconduct which he had committed in discharge of duties and after held guilty in a disciplinary inquiry conducted against him under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for short CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965) punished with a penalty of removal from service by the disciplinary authority under its order (Annexure-P/7) dt. 3rd October, 2012, on departmental appeal being preferred by the delinquent-petitioner while upholding the guilt the appellate authority converted the punishment from removal from service to compulsory retirement from service under its order impugned dt. 29th April, 2015, which is the subject matter of challenge in the instant petition. 2. The facts in brief can be delineated for the present purpose are that the petitioner-delinquent was appointed as a Rifleman under the Tripura State Rifles (TSR for short) on 26th November, 2008. For the alleged misconduct which he committed on 21st April, 2012, he was placed under suspension in contemplation of enquiry vide order dt. 23.04.2012 and a memorandum along with statement of article of charges was served upon him dt. 11th May, 2012. It may be appropriate to quote the statement of the article of charge in reference to which a disciplinary inquiry under CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 was held against him: “Statement of article of charge framed against No. 08120404 RFN(GD) L. Sundarajan of D CO. 13th Bn. TSR. ARTICLE-I That said No.08120404 Rfn (GD) L. Sundarajan D-Coy while deployed at Thal Charra Post of 13th Bn. TSR committed a gross misconduct on 21.04.2012 by using un-parliamentary language on violent manner with No. 97040606 Hav (GD) Samir Das. CHM of D-Coy and physically assaulted him which is prejudice to good order and discipline being a member of the Rifles. His act constitutes misconduct under Sections 10(a), 11(e), 10(b) & 1291) of TSR Act, 1983. ARTICLE-II That said No. 08120404 Rfn (GD) L. Sundarajan D-Coy, while deployed at Thal Charra Post of 13th Bn. TSR committed a gross misconduct on 21.04.2012 by opening fire on No. 97040606 Hav (GD) Samir Das. CHM of D-Coy with his service weapon 7.62 SLR and fired 05(five) Rds. With an intention to kill him which is prejudice to good order and discipline being a member of the Rifles. TSR committed a gross misconduct on 21.04.2012 by opening fire on No. 97040606 Hav (GD) Samir Das. CHM of D-Coy with his service weapon 7.62 SLR and fired 05(five) Rds. With an intention to kill him which is prejudice to good order and discipline being a member of the Rifles. His act constitutes a misconduct under Sections 10(a), 11(e), 10(b) & 1291) of TSR Act, 1983.” 3. It may be relevant to note that the nature departmental punishments for the misconduct being committed by the member of rifles (minor/major) would be inflicted upon the member of the rifles as specified u/Sec.12 of the TSR Act, 1983 and Sub-Sec. 6 of Sec.12 for the restriction in regard to the punishment specified in Clause-G to J can be inflicted upon the member of the rifles after holding an inquiry held in a manner as may be prescribed. 4. Indisputedly, the punishment inflicted upon the petitioner-delinquent is one of the major punishments specified u/Sec.12 G to J of the Act, 1983 and under Chapter-4 of departmental proceedings the procedure has been provided for award of major punishment u/R.40 of the Tripura State Rifles (Discipline, Control, Service Conditions Etc.) Rules, 1986 which envisaged that for imposing major penalties the procedure mutatis mutandis as prescribed for the Govt. employee under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 as modified from time to time, has to be followed. 5. In the instant case, since the matter pertains to imposition of major penalty as specified u/Sec.12 G-J of the Act, 1983, the respondents followed the procedure for imposing of major penalties as contemplated under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, which is applicable mutatis mutandis to the Govt. servants. 6. It reveals from the record that after the petitioner submitted his reply to the charge sheet served upon him, inquiry officer was appointed to conduct the inquiry at the same time on a criminal complaint an FIR came to be registered against the petitioner at Chawmanu Police Station case No. 03 of 2012 on 24.04.2012 for offence committed u/Sec. 353/307/324 of the IPC read with Sec.27 of the Arms Act. 7. 7. In the criminal proceedings instituted against the petitioner, he was acquitted from the charges for the offence committed u/Sec.307 and 324 IPC and u/Sec.27 of the Arms Act, as the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt, in the domestic inquiry which was independently held for the alleged misconduct after adopting the procedure prescribed under Rules, 1965, holding the petitioner guilty and punished with a penalty from removal from service vide order dt. 3rd October, 2012, that came to be challenged by the petitioner earlier without availing the remedy of appeal provided under Rule-46 of the Rules, 1986 in WP(C) No. 155 of 2013 but that came to be dismissed at the motion stage vide order dt. 22.08.2013, in view of availability of an effective alternative remedy of appeal available under the Rules, 1986 with a further observation made by this Court that if an appeal is being preferred within 30 days from the order of the Court i.e. 22nd August, 2013, the same shall be treated within limitation and be disposed of within 3(three) months from the date of receipt of the appeal. 8. After the order came to be passed by this Court on 22nd August, 2013 appeal was preferred by the petitioner under Rule, 46 of the Rules, 1986 but that came to be dismissed on the ground of limitation vide order dt. 5th October, 2013 that again came to be challenged by the petitioner in WP(C) No. 31 of 2014 and that was decided at the motion stage by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dt. 7th April, 2015 setting aside the order passed in appeal dt. 5th October, 2013 with a further direction that the appeal preferred by the petitioner-delinquent shall be heard by some other officer not below the rank of Inspector General of Police and shall consider all points raised in the appeal and be decided in accordance with law. 9. In compliance of the order of the Division Bench dt. 7th April, 2015 the order came to be passed on appeal preferred by the petitioner-delinquent by the appellate authority dt. 9. In compliance of the order of the Division Bench dt. 7th April, 2015 the order came to be passed on appeal preferred by the petitioner-delinquent by the appellate authority dt. 29th April, 2015 and while upholding the guilt and taking note of the submission made by the petitioner-delinquent, the appellate authority taking note of the nature of charge and commensurating the allegation found prove considered appropriate to convert the punishment of removal from service to compulsory retirement from service under order dt. 29th April, 2015 and that is the subject matter of challenge in the instant petition. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that almost the selfsame allegations were leveled against the petitioner in the criminal case instituted against him and after facing trial he was acquitted by the competent Court of jurisdiction vide judgment dt. 22nd August, 2013. In the given facts and circumstances, the finding of guilt and consequential punishment of compulsory retirement from service impugned dt. 29th April, 2015 are not sustainable in law and in support of his submission placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and Others, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446 . 11. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that under Rule, 36 of the Rules, 1986 an offence fall in u/Sec.10 or 11(A) of the Act, all facts of the case has to be first placed before the appellate authority for taking a decision whether a delinquent member of the rifles is to be tried by Rifles Court or is to be dealt with departmentally and the mandate of law as envisaged under Rule.36 of the Rules, 1986 was not complied with by the respondents and the case was never placed before the appellate authority before any decision would be taken as to whether the delinquent member has to be tried by Rifles Court or be dealt with departmentally and in the absence of any action being taken by the appellate authority as contemplated under Rule. 36 of the Rules, 1986, the very charge sheet served upon the petitioner and further consequential action being taken in conducting a departmental inquiry and in passing of the final order inflicting penalty upon him stands vitiated and the petitioner deserves indulgence of this Court to be reinstateted in service. 12. 36 of the Rules, 1986, the very charge sheet served upon the petitioner and further consequential action being taken in conducting a departmental inquiry and in passing of the final order inflicting penalty upon him stands vitiated and the petitioner deserves indulgence of this Court to be reinstateted in service. 12. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that in the instant case a preliminary inquiry was conducted as reveals from the record of departmental inquiry but the person who conducted the preliminary inquiry never appeared in the disciplinary inquiry as a departmental witness and since the preliminary inquiry has been relied upon, the petitioner has been deprived of to cross examine the author of the preliminary inquiry and that has caused prejudice to the petitioner. 13. Counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents justifying the action for which the departmental inquiry was conducted against the petitioner and after holding the procedure as prescribed under the Rules, 1965 the petitioner was held guilty and earlier punishment with a penalty of removal from service under order of the disciplinary authority vide order dt. 3rd October, 2012, but in the departmental appeal while upholding the guilt and the finding recorded by the inquiry officer and confirmed by the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority considered appropriate to convert the punishment of removal from service to compulsory retirement from service under order dt. 29th April, 2015. 14. Counsel submits that it is not the case of the petitioner that he has been deprived of affording opportunity of hearing or there is any violation of principles of natural justice or the procedure prescribed under the Rules, 1965 has not been followed or any prejudice has been caused to the petitioner in the course of inquiry while decision being taken by the disciplinary/appellate authority in passing of the order impugned and it is also not the case of the petitioner that the finding which has been recorded by the inquiry officer holding the charged proved and confirmed by the disciplinary authority, is either perverse or not supported by the legal evidence on record and this Court is not sitting as a court of appeal and in the given facts and circumstances, Court may not like to interfere with the limited scope of the judicial review u/Art.226 of the Constitution of India. 15. 15. Counsel further submits that no such plea was raised by the petitioner during the course of the disciplinary proceeding regarding the mandate of Rule-36 of the Rules, 1986 not being complied with by the authority even it has not been pleaded in the writ petition and that apart the acquittal in the criminal case from the offence u/Sec.307/324 of the IPC and Sec.27 of the Arms Act is not even remotely related to the allegations leveled against the petitioner in the disciplinary inquiry which was independently based on the evidence led during the course of the domestic inquiry and after held guilt order came to be passed inflecting penalty by the disciplinary/appellate authorities and the judgment of the Apex Court the petitioner placed reliance reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446 , even remotely has no application in the instant case. 16. I have heard counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the material available on records. 17. The legal proposition is no more res-integra after being settled by the Apex Court by the consistent judgments that the standard of proof in both the proceedings is quite different in a judicial enquiry the charge has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt at the same time in the departmental proceedings the allegation has to be proved on the preponderance of probabilities and acquittal of an employee in a criminal case cannot be made the basis of taking away the effect of departmental proceedings, nor such an action of the department be termed as double jeopardy as held by the Apex Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Another, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 based on the rules of universal application, it is further held that facts, charges and nature of evidence, etc. involved in an individual case would determine as to whether decision of acquittal would have any bearing on the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry. 18. involved in an individual case would determine as to whether decision of acquittal would have any bearing on the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry. 18. It is also settled that the purpose of departmental enquiry is to enquire into the truth of the charges leveled against the delinquent for alleged disobedience, neglect of duty, remissness in discharge of duty, misconduct or misbehavior done by the alleged delinquent in the capacity of being public servant as such, if the charges are sustained the delinquent may be punished depending on gravity of offence/misconduct and the only purpose to hold domestic enquiry is to help the punishing authority to come to a definite conclusion regarding guilt of the delinquent and the disciplinary proceedings being quasi judicial in nature, technical rule of criminal trial do not apply in such cases and based on principles of preponderance of probabilities the charge could be held proved in the disciplinary enquiry, subject to providing him a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and principles of natural justice is also be kept in mind at all stages during the departmental proceedings, which is in the instant case has gainfully complied with at the same time in the criminal trial the charge has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 19. The three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 had noticed the scope of judicial review with regard to disciplinary proceedings and the observations have been made in paras 12 and 13 the relevant extract is quoted ad-infra:- “25. 12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re- appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co- extensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 781], this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued”. 20. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [(1964) 4 SCR 781], this Court held at page 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence, reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued”. 20. The scope of judicial review of this Court u/Art.226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the findings recorded in the departmental inquiry has been later further considered by the Apex Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police and Others, reported in (1999) 2 SCC 10 . The relevant extract is quoted ad-infra: “6. It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the Enquiry Officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the Appellate Authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictate of the superior authority.” 21. In the light of the above principles it emerges that it is not open for this Court under its limited scope of judicial review u/Art.226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the findings of fact recorded in the domestic enquiry unless it is being established from the material on record that the finding of guilt is based on no evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no person with reasonable prudence would act upon it, indeed in that situation the order would be perverse and at the same time some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever compendious it may be the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 22. 22. In the light of the above principles, let us scrutinize the case in hand. The petitioner while serving as Rifleman he committed a gross misconduct in discharge of his duties on 21.04.2012 and a memorandum along with charge sheet dt. 11th May, 2012 on the substance of the imputation of misconduct, misbehavior in the form of statement of article of charges was served upon him and after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner at all stages, the inquiry officer held both the charges proved and after copy of the inquiry report dt. 14.09.2012 was furnished to the petitioner with proposed punishment and after affording opportunity of hearing and taking note of the explanation tendered by the petitioner delinquent, he was held guilty and punished with penalty of removal from service under order dt. 3rd October, 2012 and the departmental appeal preferred by the petitioner under Rule-46 of the Rules, 1986, came to be decided by the appellate authority to whom it was assigned under the order of this Court in WP(C) No. 31 of 2014 dt. 7th April, 2015 while upholding guilt took a lenient view in the matter while inflicting penalty upon him and converted the penalty of removal from service to compulsory retirement from service under order dt. 29th April, 2015. 23. As already observed, it is not the case of the petitioner that either the finding which has been recorded in the course of inquiry is perverse or not supported by legal evidence on record or there was any procedural error resulting manifest in delivering justice or violation of principle of natural justice. This is being a settled principles of law that this Court while exercising its power u/Art.226 of the Constitution of India, does not act as an appellate authority and its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct the error of law or procedural error and the petitioner has failed to point out any procedural irregularity if any being committed by the inquiry officer in the disciplinary proceedings or was not conducted in accordance with the procedure prescribed in CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and in due compliance of principle of natural justice. 24. 24. It can be further notice that not even the inquiry authority but the disciplinary authority and also the appellate authorities have elaborately considered & the record of enquiry and the findings are duly supported by the legal evidence on record and rightly held to be proved and once it has been accepted by the disciplinary authority holding him guilty and passing the order of punishment from removal from service although the finding of guilt has been confirmed by the appellate authority as well but has converted the punishment of removal from served to compulsory retirement from service under its order dt. 29th April, 2015. Nothing has been pointed out of an error being committed in the decision making process adopted by the respondents in the course of inquiry held under Rules, 1965 which may call for any interference. 25. The submission of the petitioner’s counsel that the order of acquittal passed by the criminal court of competent jurisdiction dt. 22nd April, 2013 in itself was sufficient to drop the departmental proceedings, is wholly without substance, for the reason that the standard of proof in both the proceedings is quite different in a judicial proceeding the charge has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt at the same time in the departmental proceedings the allegation has to be proved on the preponderance of probabilities and acquittal of an employee in a criminal case cannot be made the basis of taking away the effect of departmental proceedings. 26. Apart from the settled principles of law the allegation leveled against the petitioner for which a domestic inquiry was held against him from the very imputation of article of charges No. I and II it is not even remotely related to the allegation which has been examined by the criminal court and as already observed the departmental inquiry was independently held based on the evidence recorded in the course of the disciplinary inquiry and the charges were held proved and held guilty, punished with the penalty of compulsory retirement from service by the appellate authority in accordance with the scheme of Rules, 1965. 27. 27. Further submission made by counsel for the petitioner of Rule-36 of Rules, 1986 not being complied with suffice to say it was neither being raised by the petitioner during the course of the domestic inquiry nor before the disciplinary/appellate authority and neither pleaded before this Court in the writ petition and that apart, if a decision has been taken by the authority to examine the allegation of the alleged misconduct by holding a disciplinary inquiry which is one of the mode prescribed under Rule-36, no inference can be drawn to the contrary other than to presume that after decision by the appellate authority as referred to under Rule-36, disciplinary inquiry was initiated under the Rules, 1965. 28. Further submission of the counsel for the petitioner that the person who conducted the preliminary inquiry was not produced as departmental witness and that has caused prejudice to him, is wholly without substance. The preliminary inquiry report was only for the disciplinary authority in taking its decision as to whether for the nature of misconduct which had been committed by the delinquent in discharge of duties deserves to be examined in a regular departmental inquiry and after the charge sheet came to be served, the inquiry has been independently held and based on the evidence recorded during the course of inquiry the charge was held proved against the petitioner-delinquent. Thus, person who conducted the preliminary inquiry even if has not appeared in the departmental witness, in no manner would vitiate the departmental proceedings, as prayed for by the petitioner. Consequently, the writ petition being devoid of merit stands dismissed. No costs.