JUDGMENT 1. We have heard Mr. Menezes appearing on behalf of the petitioner. 2. He has raised two contentions while challenging the proceedings for eviction of the petitioner initiated under a specific Chapter of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994. The said Act has been amended by Act 43 of 2003 with effect from 1st July, 2004. Chapter V-A is titled as "Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants. Etc. of Airport Premises". 3. The petitioner is in receipt of a notice of eviction in terms of the powers conferred on the Eviction Officer by this Chapter of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 (for short "the Act of 1994"). 4. On such notice of eviction being served, the appointment of the Eviction Officer made, the petitioner is contesting the proceedings. During the course of such proceedings, the petitioner filed four applications. They raised an objection and stated to be of jurisdiction of the Eviction Officer to initiate and continue the proceedings. It is stated that the Eviction Officer is one Ms. K. Hemlatha. She was also on the Board of Directors of the petitioner and it is submitted that she attended certain Board meetings. She may have been on the Board in her capacity of a public official, namely, Regional Executive Director of the respondent, but she was clearly biased and prejudiced. In any event, she acted in a dual capacity which she could not have. That is how the proceedings initiated by her are null and void. They are bad in law since inception. 5. Secondly, the impugned order passed during the course of the proceedings refers to a lease agreement of February, 1996 and there is no such agreement. The eviction notice refers to the agreements of October 1983. There is no agreement of the year 1982 as erroneously mentioned in the notice. For these reasons, according to Mr. Menezes, the objections go to the root of the matter. Mr. Menezes submits that even if an interlocutory order passed during the course of eviction proceedings is challenged in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the challenge is permissible. The Hon''ble Supreme Court has held, according to him, in several decisions that if the proceedings are bad in law and from inception, then, a challenge of the present nature can be raised without awaiting for the final outcome. Now, according to Mr. The Hon''ble Supreme Court has held, according to him, in several decisions that if the proceedings are bad in law and from inception, then, a challenge of the present nature can be raised without awaiting for the final outcome. Now, according to Mr. Menezes, the outcome is certain and known. The eviction order is bound to be passed. In such circumstances, he would submit that we should entertain the petition. 6. With Mr. Menezes''s assistance, we have perused the common order dated 3rd October, 2018, impugned in this writ petition. We have also perused a copy of the show cause notice served on the petitioner. 7. It is evident from the order that is impugned in this writ petition that the proceedings are underway. They are yet to be concluded. The Eviction Officer has been empowered to pass an order in terms of section 28D of the Act of 1994. For passing such an order he has to be satisfied that the Airport premises are in unauthorized occupation and the persons in occupation, therefore, need to be evicted therefrom. It is this eviction order which would be passed and, if passed in the present proceedings, the petitioner has an appellate remedy. That is provided by section 28K of the Act of 1994. Presently, we cannot proceed on the footing that an eviction order is bound to be passed. In the event it is passed, the petitioner can, while challenging it, also impugn the common order dated 3rd October, 2018, questioned in this petition. At that time, the contentions raised by Mr. Menezes before us can very well be raised. We do not see any reason in our extraordinary, equitable and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, to interfere with the proceedings at this stage. Given the importance and nature of the proceedings, we do not think that in writ jurisdiction we should interfere by restraining the Eviction Officer from proceeding to adjudicate the show cause notice. All the more, when the petitioners'' remedies are kept intact by us. We express no opinion on the contentions raised by Mr. Menezes and equally the stand of the respondent to the contrary. 8. All contentions of both sides are kept open. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of.