JUDGMENT : 1. Heard the parties. 2. This appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred by the appellants/plaintiffs being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 08.04.1991 passed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Gumla in Title Appeal No.52 of 1982. 3. The case of plaintiffs in brief is that the recorded tenant of Khata No.26 namely Mosst. Kondo Rautiain transferred the suit land to the plaintiff No.1 and the father of plaintiff Nos.2 to 4 and put them in possession of the land by a registered “Hibanama bill ewaj” in the year 1936. The plaintiff No.1 and father of plaintiff Nos.2 to 4 were looking after Mosst. Kondo Rautiain and all her immovable and movable properties till her death and also performed her last rites. The plaintiff No.1 and the father of plaintiff Nos.2 to 4 were the cousin grandsons of Kondo Rautiain. The defendants obtained some collusive land revenue receipts of the disputed land and claimed the suit land before the survey authority. 4. The case of the defendants on the other hand is that Mosst. Kondo Rautiain was not competent to transfer the suit land and she was a limited owner and she did not execute any “Hibanama bill ewaj” in favour of the plaintiff No.1 and the father of plaintiff Nos.2 to 4. It is the further case of the defendants that after the death of Mosst. Kondo Rautiain in 1937 when the plaintiffs demanded share in her land in the year 1948, there was a village panchayati in which by mutual agreement suit land mentioned in the schedule A (5.09 acres of land) of the written statement, were allotted to the share of the defendants and rest of the lands mentioned in schedule B (4.01 acres of land) were given to the plaintiffs and accordingly, the mutation was allowed in the names of the defendants and since then the parties have been in exclusive and separate possession. 5. In view of the rival pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court held that Mosst. Kondo Rautiain was competent to transfer the land being a limited owner and the document “Hibanama bill ewaj” was a valid document. 5. In view of the rival pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court held that Mosst. Kondo Rautiain was competent to transfer the land being a limited owner and the document “Hibanama bill ewaj” was a valid document. The trial court further held that the plaintiffs are having subsisting right, title and interest only to the extent of 4.01 acres of land mentioned in schedule B of the written statement of the defendants and decreed the suit in part. 6. The plaintiffs being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 15.05.1982 passed by the learned Munsif, Gumla filed an appeal and the same was numbered as Title Appeal No.52 of 1982. The learned first appellate court after submission of the rival pleadings of the parties formulated the following points for determinations:- (i) Whether Mosst. Kondo Rautiain was a limited owner or an absolute owner of the suit land? (ii) Whether she was competent to execute the “Hibanama bill ewaj”dated 1.12.1936 in favour of the plaintiffs transferring the entire lands of khata no.26? (iii) Whether the suit is barred by section 34 of the specific relief Act? 7. The learned first appellate court came to a conclusion that Mosst. Kondo Rautiain has no absolute right to transfer the suit land in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants and she was not competent to execute “Hibanama bill ewaj” dated 1.12.1936 and also held that the suit is not barred by provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. 8. At the time of admission of this second appeal vide order dated 25.09.1991, the following substantial question of law was framed in this appeal:- “Whether in view of the fact that the plaintiff’s suit was decreed in part, namely to the extent of 4.01 acres of land out of 9.10 acres of land, whether the learned court below could have dismissed the entire suit of the plaintiffs, although no appeal was preferred by the defendant/respondent.” 9. Mr. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants/plaintiffs relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Banarsi and Others versus Ram Phal reported in (2003) 9 SCC 606 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India while discussing the scope of power of the appellate court has in paragraphs-15, 18 and 22 held as under:- 15. “Rule 4 seeks to achieve one of the several objects sought to be achieved by Rule 33, that is, avoiding a situation of conflicting decrees coming into existence in the same suit. The above said provisions confer power of the widest amplitude on the appellate court so as to do complete justice between the parties and such power is unfettered by consideration of facts like what is the subject-matter of the appeal, who has filed the appeal and whether the appeal is being dismissed, allowed or disposed of by modifying the judgment appealed against. While dismissing an appeal and though confirming the impugned decree, the appellate court may still direct passing of such decree or making of such order which ought to have been passed or made by the court below in accordance with the findings of fact and law arrived at by the court below and which it would have done had it been conscious of the error committed by it and noticed by the appellate court. While allowing the appeal or otherwise interfering with the decree or order appealed against, the appellate court may pass or make such further or other, decree or order, as the case would require being done, consistently with the findings arrived at by the appellate court. The object sought to be achieved by conferment of such power on the appellate court is to avoid inconsistency, inequity, inequality in reliefs granted to similarly placed parties and unworkable decree or order coming into existence. The overriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice. Wider the power, higher the need for caution and care while exercising the power. The object sought to be achieved by conferment of such power on the appellate court is to avoid inconsistency, inequity, inequality in reliefs granted to similarly placed parties and unworkable decree or order coming into existence. The overriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice. Wider the power, higher the need for caution and care while exercising the power. Usually the power under Rule 33 is exercised when the portion of the decree appealed against or the portion of the decree held liable to be set aside or interfered by the appellate court is so inseparably connected with the portion not appealed against or left untouched that for the reason of the latter portion being left untouched either injustice would result or inconsistent decrees would follow. The power is subject to at least three limitations: firstly, the power cannot be exercised to the prejudice or disadvantage of a person not a party before the court; secondly, a claim given up or lost cannot be revived; and thirdly, such part of the decree which essentially ought to have been appealed against or objected to by a party and which that party has permitted to achieve a finality cannot be reversed to the advantage of such party. A case where there are two reliefs prayed for and one is refused while the other one is granted and the former is not inseparably connected with or necessarily depending on the other, in an appeal against the latter, the former relief cannot be granted in favour of the respondent by the appellate court exercising power under Rule 33 of Order 41. 18. In Harihar Prasad Singh v. Balmiki Prasad Singh the following statement of law made by Venkatarama Aiyar, J. (as His Lordship then was) in the Division Bench decision in Venukuri Krishna Reddi v. Kota Ramireddi was cited with approval which clearly brings out the wide scope of power contained in Rule 33 and the Illustration appended thereto, as also the limitations on such power: (SCC p. 236, para 36) “Though Order 41 Rule 33 confers wide and unlimited jurisdiction on courts to pass a decree in favour of a party who has not preferred any appeal, there are, however, certain well-defined principles in accordance with which that jurisdiction should be exercised. Normally, a party who is aggrieved by a decree should, if he seeks to escape from its operation, appeal against it within the time allowed after complying with the requirements of law. Where he fails to do so, no relief should ordinarily be given to him under Order 41 Rule 33. But there are well-recognised exceptions to this rule. One is where as a result of interference in favour of the appellant it becomes necessary to readjust the rights of other parties. A second class of cases based on the same principle is where the question is one of settling mutual rights and obligations between the same parties. A third class of cases is when the relief prayed for is single and indivisible but is claimed against a number of defendants. In such cases, if the suit is decreed and there is an appeal only by some of the defendants and if the relief is granted only to the appellants there is the possibility that there might come into operation at the same time and with reference to the same subject-matter two decrees which are inconsistent and contradictory. This, however, is not an exhaustive enumeration of the class of cases in which courts could interfere under Order 41 Rule 33. Such an enumeration would neither be possible nor even desirable.” 22. For the foregoing reasons we are of the opinion that the first appellate court ought not to have, while dismissing the appeals filed by the defendant-appellants before it, modified the decree in favour of the respondent before it in the absence of cross-appeal or cross-objection. The interference by the first appellate court has reduced the appellants to a situation worse than in what they would have been if they had not appealed. The High Court ought to have noticed this position of law and should have interfered to correct the error of law committed by the first appellate court.” (Emphasis Supplied) 10. The interference by the first appellate court has reduced the appellants to a situation worse than in what they would have been if they had not appealed. The High Court ought to have noticed this position of law and should have interfered to correct the error of law committed by the first appellate court.” (Emphasis Supplied) 10. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants further submits that the learned first appellate court ought not have dismissed the entire suit filed by the plaintiff-appellants, while dismissing the appeal by ignoring the admission of the defendants that consequent upon a settlement in a panchayati, the schedule B land of the written statement, was allotted to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs are the owners in respect of those lands and thereby gave up their claim over the schedule B land of the written statement, more so when no cross appeal or cross objection was filed by the defendants challenging the said portion of the judgment. 11. Mr. P.D. Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand defended the impugned judgment and submitted that in appropriate cases, in absence of any appeal or cross objection, the appellate court would not be powerless to dismiss the entire suit but fairly submits that it is the admitted case of the defendants that the schedule B land of the written statement of the defendants, has been given to the plaintiffs by way of a settlement in a panchayati and the defendants do not have any claim over those land and this is the reason for which they have not filed any cross appeal or cross objection in respect of the judgment and decree of the trial court. 12. 12. In view of the discussions made above, this Court is of the considered view that the learned first appellate court erred by dismissing the entire suit of the plaintiffs when it was the admitted case of the defendants that the plaintiffs are the owners being in possession of the schedule B land of the written statement of the area 4.01 acres and thereby gave up their claim over the schedule B land of the written statement and though such part of the decree which essentially ought to have been appealed against or objected to by the defendants but which the defendants have permitted to achieve a finality cannot be reversed to the advantage of the defendants when there was no cross appeal or no cross objection, this substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 13. In view of the answer to the substantial question of law, the impugned judgment and decree dated 08.04.1991 passed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Gumla in Title Appeal No.52 of 1982 is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court being the Munsif Gumla in Title Suit No.18 of 1980 is restored. 14. In the result, this appeal is allowed on contest but in the circumstances without any cost. 15. Let the lower court records along with a copy of this judgment be sent to the learned court below forthwith.