JUDGMENT : 1. The present writ application preferred under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India calls in question legality and validity of an Order dated 16th March 2006 passed by the Joint Secretary [Disputes], Revenue Department, Gandhinagar confirming the Order dated 24th September 2005 passed by the Collector, District-Porbandar terming the same as erroneous and against the provisions of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. 2. Brief facts of the case are that – the petitioner-firm had purchased a piece of land admeasuring A3-19 gunthas, situated at Mouje-Adityana, Survey No. 149/paiki by a registered sale deed from Shri Sagar Lakhman Meera and others on 1st March 1979. The said sale deed was entered in the village records, by way of an Entry No. 3481/20/5/79 and got mutated in the revenue records vide revenue entry no. 3481, which was certified on 17th July 1979. The said entry came to be challenged by the respondents no. 3 & 4 herein before the District Collector, Porbandar very belatedly on 21st October 2003 and the reason for preferring the said application was that the petitioner-firm had not at the relevant point of time obtained permission for purchase of agricultural land by a non-agriculturist, and therefore, the said agricultural land cannot be held in the name of a partnership firm. Thus, by invoking the powers under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code by the Collector, the respondents no. 3 & 4 herein have sought cancellation of the revenue entry no. 3481 which was registered way back in the year 1979 [i.e., twenty four years after its mutation] by a non-interested persons. Eventually, the District Collector allowed the said revision application by an order dated 24th September 2005, ordering cancellation of entry no. 3481. 3. Aggrieved petitioner challenged the said Order dated 24th September 2005 before the Revenue Secretary [Disputes], Revenue Department, which too went against the petitioner-firm vide Order dated 16th March 2006, and hence, the present writ petition. 4. Heard learned advocate Ms. Mohini Bhavsar for Mr. Bharat Jani, learned advocate for the petitioner and Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, learned Asstt. Government Pleader for the respondent no. 2 and Shri. RC Kakkad, learned advocate for the respondents no. 3 & 4. 5. 4. Heard learned advocate Ms. Mohini Bhavsar for Mr. Bharat Jani, learned advocate for the petitioner and Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, learned Asstt. Government Pleader for the respondent no. 2 and Shri. RC Kakkad, learned advocate for the respondents no. 3 & 4. 5. It is submitted by the learned advocate for the petitioner-firm that the Revenue Entry No. 3481 mutated in favour of the petitioner was registered way back in the year 1979 in respect of the land admeasuring A3-19 gunthas of Survey No. 149/Paiki of village Adityana. It is submitted that the land in dispute was purchased by the petitioner from Shri Sagar Lakhman Mera and others by a registered sale deed on 1st March 1979 and the said deal was mutated in the village record, by way of Entry No. 3481/20/5/79 and certified on 17th July 1979. 6. It is further submitted that the revision application preferred by the respondents no. 3 & 4 on the ground that the petitioner-firm had not obtained permission for purchase of agricultural land, and said land cannot be held by a partnership firm, being non-agriculturists, they had prayed before the Collector to cancel the said entry in exercise of powers under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code [“BLRC” for short]. That, the said revision application was filed before the respondent no. 2 herein on 21st October 2003, while the revenue entry was made in the year 1979. That, the said revision application was preferred by the non-interested persons, and that too, after a period of 24 years. That, the order passed by the learned Collector as well as the respondent no. 1 herein are against the provisions of land and settled principles of law. 7. Learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner pointed out that the powers under Section 211 of the BLR Code cannot be exercised after a reasonable period. That, the entry which was certified way back in the year 1979 cannot be called under challenge by a non interested person after passing of 24 years and the respondents no.1 & 2 cannot exercise such power under Section 211 of BLRC, after a long period. 8. Learned advocate for the petitioner firm also pointed out that in fact, the petitioner-firm was registered in the year 1973 and members of the firm were registered partners of the petitioner-firm. 8. Learned advocate for the petitioner firm also pointed out that in fact, the petitioner-firm was registered in the year 1973 and members of the firm were registered partners of the petitioner-firm. That, the partners of the petitioner-firm were agriculturists at the relevant point of time when the said land was purchased and therefore, the partners in the petitioner-firm are not considered as a separate entity. The petitioner-firm is eligible to purchase agricultural land. 9. Learned advocate argued that the District Collector as well as the respondent no. 1 have clearly erred in ordering cancellation of Entry No. 3481, even though the relevant papers were not available before it. That the order passed by the respondent no. 2 cancelling entry, as confirmed by the respondent no. 1 is arbitrary, illegal and bad in law. That, the observations made by the respondent no. 2 in his order that the entry is in contravention of Section 55 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement & Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949 was without considering the fact that no papers were available while passing the order. That, only on presumption which is not permissible, this order was passed, which is erroneous and illegal. That, on the basis of entry made in the year 1979, the petitioner was granted lease by the Government for the purpose of mining and since then, the petitioner-firm is carrying on its business. That, the Government of Gujarat in Industries, Mines & Power Department, Gandhinagar has passed an order in favour of the petitioner-firm on 22nd January 1980, renewing the mining lease for chalk for twenty years. 10. In support of her submissions, learned advocate for the petitioner has relied upon two decisions of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Labhubhai Valjibhai Gajera v. Secretary [Appeals], Revenue Department, Gujarat State & Ors., 2011 [1] GLR 279 as well as in the case of Vitthalbhai M Patel & Ors. v. Deputy Collector, Kaira & Anr., 2011 [1] GLR 610, so also two decisions rendered by learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of [a] Ratilal Maganlal Intwala since deceased through Heirs & Ors. vs. Special Secretary [Appeals] & Ors., 2013 [3] GLR 2520 and [b] Dudhiben Muljibhai Patel & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., 2016 [2] GLR 1786. 11. Per contra, learned AGP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri appearing on behalf of the respondents no. vs. Special Secretary [Appeals] & Ors., 2013 [3] GLR 2520 and [b] Dudhiben Muljibhai Patel & Anr. vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., 2016 [2] GLR 1786. 11. Per contra, learned AGP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri appearing on behalf of the respondents no. 1 & 2 strongly opposed the submissions made by learned advocate for the petitioner and urged that the petitioner-firm is a partnership firm and the land in dispute is an agricultural land. That, the partners of the petitioner-firm were given sufficient opportunity by the authorities below, nevertheless they failed to produce any document showing that they were agriculturists. That, there was a clear breach of provisions of Section 55 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement & Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949 as no permission was obtained prior to the land in question came to be purchased by the petitioner-firm. It is further submitted by her that from the beginning, act of the petitioner was completely wrong as the sale deed was not permissible on the agricultural land purchased by the petitioner-firm, so also mutation of entry in this connection made in the Revenue records, being entry no. 3481, which was certified on 17th July 1979. That, both these acts were clearly illegal and erroneous, and therefore, the learned advocate for the respondents no. 1 & 2 urged that the respondent no. 2 has rightly exercised powers under Section 211 of the BLRC which was confirmed by the respondent no. 1. 12. It is further submitted by her that no illegality was committed by the respondent no. 2 in cancelling the impugned entry made in favour of the petitioner-firm as there was no bar of limitation; as argued for and on behalf of the petitioner. That, when in a case where the petitioner-firm was not at all entitled to purchase agricultural land and get it mutated in the revenue records, the respondent no. 2 has rightly exercised power under Section 211 of the Code which cannot be said to be illegal or invalid, and therefore, it was requested by her to dismiss the petition. 13. In support of her arguments, learned AGP appearing on behalf of the respondent-State has placed reliance upon a decision of Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Orissa & Ors. vs. Brundaban Sharma & Anr., reported in 1995 Suppli. [3] SCC 249 [particularly Note B]. 14. 13. In support of her arguments, learned AGP appearing on behalf of the respondent-State has placed reliance upon a decision of Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Orissa & Ors. vs. Brundaban Sharma & Anr., reported in 1995 Suppli. [3] SCC 249 [particularly Note B]. 14. Learned advocate Shri R.C. Kakkad appearing on behalf of the respondents no. 3 & 4 supported the arguments advanced by learned AGP Ms. Jirga Jhaveri appearing on behalf of the respondent-State and contended that though sufficient opportunities were given to the petitioner-firm to produce necessary documents to show that the members/partners of the firm were agriculturists, however, they were not able to prove/produce such thing; as they were not agriculturists. It is further submitted that without permission under Section 55 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement & Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949, the petitioner-firm cannot purchase agricultural land. That, for the persons/firm who not are entitled to purchase the land, in such a situation, there cannot be any limitation of time to exercise power under Section 211 of BLRC. He has also placed reliance upon a decision of Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Orissa & Ors. vs. Brundaban Sharma & Anr. [Supra]; more particularly, para 16 thereof. 15. According to the learned advocate Shri Kakkad appearing on behalf of the respondents no. 3 & 4 that long lapse of time in a case of fraud committed by the petitioner-firm cannot be a ground pleaded, or argued out not to cancel the impugned entry. That, the petitioner-firm was not entitled to purchase agricultural land and mutate entry thereof in the revenue records, when it was brought to the notice of the respondent no. 2 through the respondents no. 3 & 4 and entries were cancelled by the respondent no. 2, confirmed by the respondent no. 1, it cannot be said that any error was committed by them, while exercising their revisional powers under Section 211 of the BLRC. It is further submitted that earlier, the respondents no. 3 & 4 were owners of the impugned land, purchased by the petitioner-firm, and therefore, they have locus standi to file revision application before the respondent no. 2, and hence, it was requested to dismiss the petition. 16. It is further submitted that earlier, the respondents no. 3 & 4 were owners of the impugned land, purchased by the petitioner-firm, and therefore, they have locus standi to file revision application before the respondent no. 2, and hence, it was requested to dismiss the petition. 16. Having considered facts of the case, submissions made by learned advocates for the respective parties and material placed on record, it is not in dispute that the land in question was purchased by the petitioner-firm from Shri Sagar Lakhman Mera and others on 1st March 1979 by a registered sale deed and the sale deed was entered in the village records by way of entry no. 3481/20/5/79. It appears that the said entry was certified on 17th July 1979. It also appears that on 22nd January 1980, the Government of Gujarat in Industries, Mines & Power Department, Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar was pleased to grant mining lease for chalk to the petitioner-firm for a period of twenty years in respect of the areas in the Junagadh district; subject to certain conditions. It appears that the said period was over in the year 2000. However, it has been submitted by learned advocate for the petitioner that the mining lease was renewed thereafter and the business of the petitioner continues as usual. Nothing contrary is placed on the record by the respondents to challenge the version of the petitioner-firm. 17. It is true that permission under Section 55 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed, Tenancy Settlement & Agricultural Lands Ordinance, 1949 was not received by the petitioner, while purchasing the land in question in the year 1979, however, it is equally true that the respondents no. 3 & 4 have preferred revision application before the respondents no. 2 after a period of twenty four years from the date of certification of the revenue entry in favour of the petitioner-firm. The respondent no. 2 was pleased to allow the said revision by an order dated 24th September 2005. The said order was challenged by the present petitioner before the respondent no. 1 and by an order dated 20th March 2006, the respondent no. 1 dismissed the revision application preferred by the petitioner. 18. It is undisputed that the land in question was purchased by the petitioner by a registered sale deed dated 1st March 1979 and got mutated in the village records by way of entry no. 1 and by an order dated 20th March 2006, the respondent no. 1 dismissed the revision application preferred by the petitioner. 18. It is undisputed that the land in question was purchased by the petitioner by a registered sale deed dated 1st March 1979 and got mutated in the village records by way of entry no. 3481/20/5/79, which was certified by the revenue authorities on 17th July 1979. Thus, for the first time, after a period of twenty four years, the respondents no. 3 & 4 raised a grievance by filing revision application before the District Collector pointing out that the petitioner-firm had not obtained necessary permission for purchase of agricultural land. Thus, a moot question which is required to be answered in the present writ petition is whether the respondent no. 2, on a revision application preferred by the respondents no. 3 & 4, can exercise powers under Section 211 of the Code, after an inordinate delay of 24 years ? 19. It is pertinent to note that entry in the revenue records of the purchase of land in question was made in the year 1979, which was known to the respondents no. 1 & 2. No suo motu proceedings were initiated by any of these respondents then, though they were having knowledge about the purchase of the land by the petitioner-firm by a registered sale deed on 1st March 1979. Not only that, the respondents no. 3 & 4 have not challenged the registered sale deed of the land in question which was purchased by the petitioner-firm on 1st March 1979, till filing of the revision application in the year 2003. Further, respondents no. 3 & 4 are unable to show that they were previously owner of the land in question. No material is produced on the record by them in support of their contention. 20. In the case of Dudhiben Muljibhai Patel & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [Supra], it is held that exercise of power by authority after inordinate delay is not permissible. The Court further held that mutation entry is duly supported by subsequently registered sale deed, which is not a nullity. It is also held that as to the fraud, Revenue authorities are bound by registered sale deed till the same is set-aside by the Civil Court. 21. The Court further held that mutation entry is duly supported by subsequently registered sale deed, which is not a nullity. It is also held that as to the fraud, Revenue authorities are bound by registered sale deed till the same is set-aside by the Civil Court. 21. In a decision, rendered in the case of of Ratilal Maganlal Intwala [Since deceased] thro' Heirs & Ors. vs. Special Secretary [Appeals] & Ors., the Court was considering delay in exercise of suo motu revision power by the authorities, wherein, the Court, while quashing and setting aside the order passed by the Court & Special Secretary [Appeals] held that such power can be exercised within a reasonable time, however, seven year's period cannot be held to be a reasonable time. 22. In another decision rendered by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Labhubhai Valjibhai Gajera v. Secretary [Appeals], Revenue Department, Gujarat State & Ors. [Supra], in a proceedings for declaring that the sale of land was contrary to provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation & Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947, which was initiated after delay of more than three years, when there were no allegation of suppression of facts by the purchasers nor any plea raised by the authorities that they were not aware about the transaction, the Court held that the impugned proceedings and the orders arising therefrom were liable to be set-aside. 23. In yet another decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Vitthalbhai M Patel & Ors. vs. Deputy Collector, Kaira & Anr. [Supra], the Court, while allowing the appeal and quashing and setting aside the orders passed by the authorities below, held that, “..even the valid transaction under Section 9 [1] if allowed to remain effective for considerably long period, the authority named therein will be precluded from initiating proceedings to annul it.” In the case before the Bench, there was an inordinate delay of 12 years, which was not even explained. 24. Here also, it is not the case of respondents no. 2, 3 and 4 that they were not aware of the fact of entry having been mutated in the revenue record way back in the year 1979, as the land in question was purchased by the petitioner-firm in the same year. Further, no proceedings were initiated; as discussed above, by the respondents no. 2, 3 and 4 that they were not aware of the fact of entry having been mutated in the revenue record way back in the year 1979, as the land in question was purchased by the petitioner-firm in the same year. Further, no proceedings were initiated; as discussed above, by the respondents no. 3 & 4 for cancellation or setting aside the sale deed by filing a civil suit against the present petitioner-firm. More so, when revenue entry made in the year 1979 came to be challenged in the year 2003 ie., after lapse of 24 years by the respondents no. 3 & 4. 25. In the case of State of Orissa & Ors. vs. Brundaban Sharma & Anr. [Supra], the Apex Court observed and held that, “..when the revisional power was conferred to effectuate a purpose, it is to be exercised in a reasonable manner which inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. Absence of limitation is an assurance to exercise the power with caution or circumspection to effectuate the purpose of the Act, or to prevent miscarriage of justice or violation of the provisions of the Act, or misuse or abuse of the power by the lower authorities or fraud or suppression. Length of time depends on the factual scenario in a given case. Take a case that patta was obtained fraudulently in collusion with the officers and it comes to the notice of the authorities after a long lapse of time. Does it lie in the mouth of the party to the fraud to plead limitation to get away with the order ? Does lapse of time an excuse to refrain from exercising the revisional power to unravel fraud and to set it right ? The answer would be no.” 26. Here, there is no case of fraud having been committed by the petitioner-firm in collision of any officer of the respondent no. 2. It was well within the knowledge of revenue authorities that the sale deed was registered on 1st March 1979 and it was duly certified in the month of July 1979. No attempt was made by any of the respondents to challenge the revenue entry made in the year 1979 in favour of the petitioner-firm till 2003. Prima facie, there is no suppression on the part of the petitioner-firm in the matter of execution of sale deed in its favour. No attempt was made by any of the respondents to challenge the revenue entry made in the year 1979 in favour of the petitioner-firm till 2003. Prima facie, there is no suppression on the part of the petitioner-firm in the matter of execution of sale deed in its favour. Moreover, there is a mining lease granted in favour of the petitioner for a period of twenty years in the year 1980. Under the circumstances, the aforestated judgment, relied upon by learned AGP and learned advocate for the respondents no. 3 & 4, is of no assistance to them. 27. For the foregoing reasons, this writ application stands allowed. The impugned Order dated 16th March 2006 passed by the Joint Secretary [Disputes], Revenue Department [respondent no. 1 herein] as well as the Order dated 24th September 2005 passed by the District Collector, Porbandar are hereby quashed and set-aside, as the registered sale deed dated 1st March 1979 was duly executed in respect of the land in question in favour of the petitioner-firm. However, the same shall abide by the proceedings which may be competently taken out by the parties, or private parties; as the case may be, if they are so advised. 28. Rule nisi made absolute to the aforestated extent. Interim relief; if any, stands confirmed. No order as to costs.