JUDGMENT : MANOJ K. TIWARI, J. 1. This is tenant’s revision under Section 25 of Provincial Small Cause Court Act against the judgment and decree dated 31.01.2014 passed by Judge, Small Causes Court/IV Additional District Judge, Dehradun in S.C.C. Case No. 20 of 2003. 2. Sri Madho Ram Sharma (landlord) filed a suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent against the tenant (Sri Kalyan Singh) before the Judge, Small Cause Court, which was registered as S.C.C. Case No. 20 of 2003. 3. In the plaint, it was inter alia pleaded that Sri Kalyan Singh was a tenant in respect of shop Nos. 1 and 2 situated in 78 Aaraghar, Dehradun at the rate of Rs. 1400/- per month; he has defaulted in payment of rent since October, 2002; the shop in question was constructed in the year 1990, therefore, provisions of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 are not applicable and landlord had sent a notice for terminating the tenancy on 29.04.2003, which was served upon the defendant/tenant on 30.04.2003. 4. A written statement was filed by the tenant (Sri Kalyan Singh) stating that originally rent for the two shops was Rs.700/- per month, which was later enhanced to Rs.1400/- per month. The tenant further contended that he had paid Rs.90,000/- as advance to the landlord in the year 1990 and thereafter, in the year 1995 again, he demanded Rs. 40,000/-, which was paid in cash to the landlord. It was further pleaded by the tenant that the shop in question was constructed in the year 1985 and ten years thereafter, provisions of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 became applicable to the shop in question, in the year 1995. He denied receipt of notice by stating that the envelope which he received, contained blank papers and further that he has paid the entire rent up to October, 2003 in cash to the landlord, however, receipt regarding such rent was not issued to him. 5. Based on pleadings of parties, learned Trial Court framed as many as seven points for determination (hereinafter referred to as “points”), which are as follows:- (i) Whether landlord - tenant relationship exists between plaintiff and the defendant? (ii) Whether defendant defaulted in payment of rent to the plaintiff, if yes, then its effect? (iii) Whether plaintiff had terminated the tenancy of the defendant vide notice dated 29.04.2003? (ii) Whether defendant defaulted in payment of rent to the plaintiff, if yes, then its effect? (iii) Whether plaintiff had terminated the tenancy of the defendant vide notice dated 29.04.2003? (iv) Whether provisions of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 are attracted to the case particularly in view of proviso to Section 2 thereof, in respect of buildings constructed on or after 26.04.1985? (v) Whether the notice dated 29.04.2003 was validly served upon the defendant? If not, its effect. (vi) Whether plaintiff is entitled to damages, both pendatalite and future from the defendant? (vii) Relief. 6. Learned Trial Court considered point Nos. 1, 2 and 3 together and regarding point No.1 held that relationship of landlord and tenant exists between plaintiff and defendant. Regarding point No.2, it was held that there is no evidence on record to show that defendant has paid rent from October, 2002 to 30.05.2003. Regarding point No.3, learned Trial Court held that the tenancy was terminated by a notice, which was sent on 29.04.2003. Point No.4 was considered in detail by learned Trial Court and after considering the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shri Mundri Lal Vs. Smt. Sushila Rani and Another, learned Trial Court held that that provisions of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 are not applicable to the case. Regarding point No.5, learned Trial Court held that notice was validly served upon the tenant (defendant). 7. Learned Trial Court decreed the suit vide judgment dated 31.01.2014 and defendant was directed to hand over vacant possession of the premises in question to the plaintiff within 30 days and it was further provided that defendant shall pay rent from October, 2002 till date of decision, at the rate of Rs. 1400/- per month. In case of default in vacating the shops within stipulated period, tenant was made liable to pay Rs.2000/- per month as damages. 8. Thus, feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 31.01.2014, tenant has filed this revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act. Sri Siddhartha Singh, learned counsel for the revisionists has assailed the judgment rendered by learned Court below, on following four grounds:- (1) Learned Court below erred in not framing points of determination at the time of hearing of the suit and the same were framed while dictating the judgment. Sri Siddhartha Singh, learned counsel for the revisionists has assailed the judgment rendered by learned Court below, on following four grounds:- (1) Learned Court below erred in not framing points of determination at the time of hearing of the suit and the same were framed while dictating the judgment. (2) Finding recorded by the learned Court below on applicability of Rent Control Act is erroneous inasmuch as the building was constructed before 1985 and the contrary finding recorded by learned Court below, by ignoring evidence of DW2, is unsustainable. (3) There is no such notice dated 29.04.2003 available on record, which was relied by the plaintiff and the suit was also decreed on the basis of the said notice. (4) Learned Court below wrongly shifted the burden of proof upon the defendant on issue No.2. i.e. regarding applicability of Rent Control Act. 9. Per contra, Sri Neeraj Garg, learned counsel for the respondent has supported the order passed by learned Court below and refuted the contention made by learned counsel for the revisionists. 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwar Dayal Vs. Banda (Dead) Through His Lrs. And Another reported in (1993) 1 SCC 531 has held that Small Causes Court while giving ex-parte judgment is also required to frame point for determination. Paragraph Nos.18, 19 and 20 of the said judgment are extracted below:- 18. We have already pointed out earlier that the Small Cause Court has not even noticed the matters in controversy between the appellant and the respondent, and consequently, there has been no adjudication or decision on the said matters. There is thus no 'formal expression of adjudication........ conclusively determining the rights of the parties with regard to.......... the matters in controversy in the suit". 19. It must be remembered in this connection that Rules 4 (1) and 5 of order 20 of the Code are applicable to the judgments of the Small Cause Court. The Rules are as follows: "4. Judgment of Small Cause Courts.- (1) Judgments of a Court of Small Causes need not contain more than the points for determination and the decision thereon. (2) Judgments of other Courts.- Judgments of other courts shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision. 5. Judgment of Small Cause Courts.- (1) Judgments of a Court of Small Causes need not contain more than the points for determination and the decision thereon. (2) Judgments of other Courts.- Judgments of other courts shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision. 5. Court to state its decision on each issue.- In suits in which issues have been framed, the Court shall state its finding or decision, with the reasons therefore, upon each separate issue, unless the finding upon any one or more of the issue is sufficient for the decision of the suit.” “Points for determination" referred to in Rule 4(1) are obviously nothing but 'issues’ contemplated by Rules 1 and 3 of Order 14 of the Code. The present decision of the Small Cause Court which has not even stated the points for determination and given finding thereon, is obviously not a judgment within the meaning of Section 2(9) of the Code. Since the matters were in controversy between the parties, it is only a judgment which could have given rise to a decree. The so-called decision of the Small Causes= Court, therefore, does not amount to a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) read with Section 2(9) and Rules 4(1) and 5 of Order 20 of the Code. 20. It is not disputed that in view of the provisions of Section 17 (1) of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act, the Code is applicable to Small Causes Court except where it is otherwise provided either by the Code or the said Act. Apart from Rules 4 (1) and 5 of Order 20 of the Code, on this count also, it was obligatory for the Small Causes Court, in the present case, to state the points for determination and give its finding or decision on each of the said points. Hence the present decision of the Small Causes court is not a judgment and a decree in the eye of law and is, therefore, non est as far as the respondent is concerned.” 11. Sri Siddhartha Singh, learned counsel for the revisionists has relied upon a judgment rendered by Allahabad High Court in the case of Akhil Kumar Jain Vs. Hence the present decision of the Small Causes court is not a judgment and a decree in the eye of law and is, therefore, non est as far as the respondent is concerned.” 11. Sri Siddhartha Singh, learned counsel for the revisionists has relied upon a judgment rendered by Allahabad High Court in the case of Akhil Kumar Jain Vs. Smt. Sharda Devi reported in 2011(2) ARC 311, in support of his submission, that it was necessary for the Small Causes Court to frame issues before proceeding with the trial. Paragraph No.3 of the said judgment, on which heavy reliance has been placed, is extracted below:- “3. Learned counsel for the revisionist submitted that Order XX, Rule 4 of the CPC provides that the judgments of a Court of Small Causes need not contain more than points for determination and the decision thereon. The word “Point for determination” has been interpreted by the Apex Court in the case of Rameshwar Dayal Vs. Banda (dead) through his Legal Representatives and another, reported in 1993 ARC(I) 249 wherein it has been held that the “Point for determination” referred to in rule 4(1) are obviously nothing but issues contemplated by Rules 1 and 3 of Order XIV of the Code. Therefore, before proceeding with the case, the issue ought to have been framed.” 12. Sri Neeraj Garg, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has placed reliance upon another judgment rendered by Allahabad High Court in the case of Krishna Kumar Gupta Vs. Subhash Chand Surana reported in 2013 0 Supreme (AII) 727. There, the view taken was that Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwar Dayal Vs. Banda (Dead) Through His Lrs. And Another has although held that ‘points for determination’ are synonymous with issues, but neither it has been observed in the said judgment, nor it can be inferred that procedure and stage prescribed by order 14 of Code of Civil Procedure for framing/settlement of issues is to be followed by the Judge, Small Cause Court as well, while trying a suit in the Provincial Small Cause Court Act. Thus, the view taken in this judgment was that the opinion expressed in the case of Akhil Kumar Jain Vs. Thus, the view taken in this judgment was that the opinion expressed in the case of Akhil Kumar Jain Vs. Smt. Sharda Devi (supra) that it is mandatory to frame issue before proceeding with the suit is against the ratio of the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwar Dayal Vs. Banda (Dead) Through His Lrs. And Another. Paragraph Nos. 12, 13 and 14 of the judgment rendered by Allahabad High Court in the case of Krishna Kumar Gupta (Supra) are extracted below:- “12. The Apex Court further held that it was obligatory for the Small Causes Court to set the points for determination and give its finding each on the said points. Nowhere in the entire judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has made any such observation which makes it mandatory upon the Judge, Small Causes Court trying a suit under the Provincial Small Causes Court Act to frame issues in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Order XIV of the Code. May be the 'issues to be framed' in civil suit and 'points for determination' in a suit under Small Cause Courts Act may in effect mean the same i.e. proposition of fact or law affirmed by one party and denied by other on which adjudication is to be made but the same does not necessarily imply that procedure and stage of framing issues in a suit provided under Order XIV CPC is to be followed in a suit under Small Cause Courts Act. 13. The matter can be viewed from another angle. Legislature in Order XIV of the Code has used the words 'framing of issues', whereas in Order XX Rule 4 pertaining to Small Causes the words used are 'points for determination and decision thereon'. The provision of Order XIV relating to 'Settlement of issues' having been expressly excluded from its application in suits and proceedings before the Judge, Small Causes under the provisions of Small Cause Courts Act by virtue of Order 50 Rule 1(b) by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that it is mandatory upon the Judge, Small Cause Court while trying a suit under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act to frame issues as per the procedure prescribed by Order XIV and non-compliance of the said provision would vitiate the proceeding. In view of use use of two different expression by the legislature namely, 'framing and settlement of issues' and 'points for determination' it cannot be held that the procedure prescribed for framing of issues are to be adhered to or followed by a Judge, Small Causes Court. 14. It is well settled that when in relation to the same subject matter different words are used in the same Statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the same sense unless it leads to unreasonable or irrational results. No doubt the Hon'ble Apex Court had observed in the case of Rameshwar Dayal (Supra) that points for determination referred to in Rule 4(1) are nothing but 'issues' contemplated by Rule 1 & 3 of Order XIV of the Code but neither it has been observed specifically nor it can be inferred that procedure and stage prescribed by Order 14 of the Code for framing/settlement of issues is to be followed by the Judge, Small Causes as well while trying a suit under the Provincial Small Causes Court Act. Thus the view taken by learned single Judge in the case of Akhil Kumar Jain (Supra) that it is mandatory to frame issues in suit being tried under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is against the ratio of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Rameshwar Dayal (Supra).” 13. In a subsequent judgment rendered by Allahabad High Court in the case of Kammo Vs. Chandra Shekhar Gupta reported in (2013) 3 ARC 515 , Allahabad High Court further held that Small Cause Court is not required to frame issue on the exchange of pleadings and it is only required to state points for determination in the judgment. It was further held that Order 14 of Code of Civil Procedure, which provides for settlement of issue, will not apply to a Small Causes Court because the purpose of Provincial Small Cause Court Act is to ensure expeditious disposal of the matters cognizable by such Courts. In paragraph No.43 of the said judgment, it was held that Hon’ble Supreme Court has nowhere stated that a Small Cause Court is duty bound, as contemplated under Order 14, Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure, to frame issue immediately after exchange of pleadings. Paragraph Nos. 30, 42, 43 and 44 of the said judgment are extracted below:- “30. In paragraph No.43 of the said judgment, it was held that Hon’ble Supreme Court has nowhere stated that a Small Cause Court is duty bound, as contemplated under Order 14, Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure, to frame issue immediately after exchange of pleadings. Paragraph Nos. 30, 42, 43 and 44 of the said judgment are extracted below:- “30. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that trial court had not framed issues. This point does not arise as there was no written statement on record, taking notice whereof issues could be framed. Moreover, Small Cause Court is not required to frame issues on the exchange of pleadings, it is required to state points for determination in the judgment. Judgment of trial court shows that all the relevant points for determination were framed. 42. It is, thus, apparent that Order 14 CPC which provides for settlement of issues will not apply to the Judge, Small Cause Courts Act. Purpose of Small Cause Courts' Act is to ensure expeditious disposal of the matters cognizable by such courts. 43. In the circumstances, joint reading of both the enactment will show that Judge Small Cause Court is not bound to frame issues. However, its judgment must contain points for determination and the findings thereon. If judge Small Cause Courts framed issues in a particular case, there is no illegality but if he has not framed any issue but his judgments contains points for determination, it cannot be said that judgment suffers from any error of law. The Apex Court in the case of Rameshwar Dayal specifically observes that it is obligatory for small cause court to state points for determination and give its finding or its decision on each of said point. Apex Court has nowhere stated that court is duty bound as contemplated under Order 14 Rule (5) of the CPC to frame issues immediately after exchange of pleadings. A reference may also be made to this decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Advaitanand Vs. Judge Small Cause Court, Meerut 1995 (3) SCC 407 . 44. In view of the above, it is apparent that Small Cause Court is not supposed to frame issues after exchange of pleadings. It is duty bound to frame points for determination and give finding thereon in the judgment. Case referred by counsel for revisionist [Akhil Kumar Jain Vs. Judge Small Cause Court, Meerut 1995 (3) SCC 407 . 44. In view of the above, it is apparent that Small Cause Court is not supposed to frame issues after exchange of pleadings. It is duty bound to frame points for determination and give finding thereon in the judgment. Case referred by counsel for revisionist [Akhil Kumar Jain Vs. Smt. Sharda Devi {2011(88) ALR 682}] is distinguishable on facts as in that case application to frame issues was rejected. I am supported by a decision of this Court reported in 2013(2) ARC 376 (Yasin and another Vs. Murari Lal).” 14. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sayeda Akhtar Vs. Abdul Ahad reported in (2003) 7 SCC 52 has held that in a case, where particular issues were not framed, but the parties not only adduced evidence in that behalf, but also advanced their respective submissions in relation thereto, therefore, it was held that no prejudice was caused, nor were the proceedings vitiated and it would not be proper to remand the case back in view of decision reported in AIR 1963 SCC 884. Paragraph No. 10 of the said judgment is extracted below:- “10. Furthermore, as indicated hereinbefore, the plaintiff sought for a decree for eviction against the defendant also on the ground of commission of nuisance. It is true that the trial court did not frame any specific issue therefore but a bare perusal of the judgment passed by the learned trial court will clearly demonstrate that the parties were aware thereabout and not only adduced evidence in that behalf but also advanced their respective submissions in relation thereto. The court of appeal formulated two specific questions, for determination of the appeal, one of them being: “Whether the appellant had created nuisance in the premises in question?” It was held: “On the point of nuisance, though, no issue was framed by the lower court, yet it is clear on the basis of relevant pleadings and evidence produced that the parties were well familiar with the existence of the said issue. Under the circumstances, in face of the want of framing of issues, prejudice was not caused nor were the proceedings vitiated, it is not proper to remand the case back in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported as Nedunuri Kameswaramma V. Sampati Subba Rao.” 15. Under the circumstances, in face of the want of framing of issues, prejudice was not caused nor were the proceedings vitiated, it is not proper to remand the case back in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported as Nedunuri Kameswaramma V. Sampati Subba Rao.” 15. Order 50 of Code of Civil Procedure deals with Provincial Small Cause Court and provides that the provisions contained in Order 50 shall not extend to such Courts. Order 50, Rule 1(a)(iii) further makes it clear that the provisions regarding settlement of issues contained in Code of Civil Procedure will not apply to the Small Causes Court. Proviso to Order 5, Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure dealing with summons provides that in case of a Small Cause Court, the summon issued to a defendant shall be for the final disposal of the suit. In case of Civil Court, the court has to determine whether the summon has to be issued for the settlement of issues or for the final disposal of the suit. Order 5, Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure is extracted below:- 5. Summons to be either to settle issues or for final disposal.—The Court shall determine, at the time of issuing the summons, whether it shall be for the settlement of issues only, or for the final disposal of the suit; and the summons shall contain a direction accordingly: Provided that, in every suit heard by a Court of Small Causes, the summons shall be for the final disposal of the suit. 16. From perusal of Order 5, Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure, the legislative intent can be gathered that the procedure to be followed by Small Cause Court is a summary procedure and with a view to simplify procedure and to avoid delay, provision contained in Order 14, Rule 1(5) are not made applicable to the suit pending before Small Cause Court, which are required to frame point for determination under Order 20, Rule 4 (1). 17. In such view of the matter, the provisions contained in Order 20, Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to trial of suit before Small Cause Court. 18. 17. In such view of the matter, the provisions contained in Order 20, Rule 5 of Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to trial of suit before Small Cause Court. 18. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that it is not mandatory for the Small Cause Court to frame points for determination immediately after exchange of pleadings and it would suffice, if points for determination are formulated at some later stage. Therefore, the first contention of learned counsel for the revisionist cannot be accepted. 19. The second contention made by learned counsel for the revisionist is that learned Court below erred in recording the finding that the building was constructed after 1985, while there was material on record to show that major portion of the building was constructed before 1985. He further submits that testimony of DW-2, was discarded without any rhyme or reason. 20. Second proviso to Section 2(2), which was inserted by U.P. Act No.17 of 1985 w.e.f. 26.04.1985, exempts certain buildings from applicability of the U.P. Rent Control Act, construction whereof was done on or after 26.04.1985. He further submits that testimony of DW-2, was discarded without any rhyme or reason. 20. Second proviso to Section 2(2), which was inserted by U.P. Act No.17 of 1985 w.e.f. 26.04.1985, exempts certain buildings from applicability of the U.P. Rent Control Act, construction whereof was done on or after 26.04.1985. Section 2(2) of the said Act is extracted below:- Section 2(2) [Except as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12, sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, sub-section (2) of Section 24, Sections 24-A, 24-B, 24-C or sub-section (3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed]: [Provided that where any building is constructed substantially out of funds obtained by way of loan or advance from the State Government or the Life Insurance Corporation of India or a bank or a co-operative society or the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, and the period of repayment of such loan or advance exceeds the aforesaid period of ten years then the reference in this sub-section to the period of ten years shall be deemed to be a reference to the period of fifteen years or the period ending with the date of actual repayment of such loan or advance (including interest), whichever is shorter.]: “[Provided further that where construction of a building is completed on or after April 26, 1985 then the reference in this sub-section to the period of ten years shall be deemed to be a reference to a period of [forty years] from the date on which its construction is completed.] Explanation I.- [For the purposes of this section],- (a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of building subject to assessment , the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time: Provided that there may be different dates of completion of construction in respect of different parts of a building which are either designed as separate units or are occupied separately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by different tenants; (b) “construction” includes any new construction in place of an existing building which has been wholly or substantially demolished; (c) where such substantial addition is made to an existing building that the existing building becomes only a minor part thereof the whole of the building including the existing building shall be deemed to be constructed on the date of completion of the said addition. [Explation II.- The expression “bank” means- (i) a banking company, as defined in the Banking Regulation act, 1949; (ii) the State Bank of India constituted under the State Bank of India Act, 1955; (iii) a subsidiary bank, as defined in the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959; (iv) a corresponding new bank constituted under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (v) a financing bank or Central Bank (as defined in the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1965), not being a Land Development Bank; and (vi) any other financial institution notified by the State Government in the Gazette as a bank for the purpose of this Act; Explanation III.- A building shall be deemed to be constructed substantially out of funds obtained from sources mentioned in the proviso, if the funds obtained from one or more of such sources account for more than one-half of the cost of construction]; 21. Learned Court below has considered the documentary evidence filed by the tenant. None of the documents produced by the tenant indicates that the building was constructed before the year 1985. Learned Court below has considered and discussed all the documents produced by the tenant, which indicate that the landlord had applied for sanction of house plan first time on 26.2.1988. Thereafter, the compounding map was submitted on 18.04.1991 and the building was first assessed to Municipal Tax in the financial year 1990-91. Although, the tenant had taken a defense that the shop in question was in existence before 26.04.1985 and in support of his contention, he had examined one Sri Gambhir Singh Rawat as DW-2, who had stated that he continued as tenant in the shop in question upto the year 1990 and in the year 1990, when Sri Kalyan Singh was inducted as tenant, then he became partner with Sri Kalyan Singh. Learned Court below disbelieved the version of Sri Gambhir Singh by observing why did he vacate the shop in the year 1990, when he was to continue in the same business, as partner of Sri Kalyan Singh, upto the year 1995, Thus, an inference was drawn that Sri Gambhir Singh was an interested witness. 22. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Trilok Singh Chauhan Vs. Ram Lal (Dead) Thr. Lrs & Ors. 22. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Trilok Singh Chauhan Vs. Ram Lal (Dead) Thr. Lrs & Ors. reported in 2018 (2) SCC 566 has considered and discussed the scope of interference in SCC Revision under Section 25 of the Act. Paragraph Nos. 13 and 14 of the said judgment are extracted below:- “13. The scope of Section 25 of the Act, 1887 came for consideration before this Court on several occasions. In Hari Shankar & Ors. Vs. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698 , in Para Nos. 9 and 10, this Court laid down the following: ‘9. The section we are dealing with, is almost the same as Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. That section has been considered by the High Courts in numerous cases and diverse interpretations have been given. The powers that it is said to confer would make a broad spectrum commencing, at one end, with the view that only substantial errors of law can be corrected under it, and ending, at the other, with a power of interference a little better than what an appeal gives. It is useless to discuss those cases in some of which the observations were probably made under compulsion of certain unusual facts. It is sufficient to say that we consider that the most accurate exposition of the meaning of such sections is that of Beaumont, C.J. (as he then was) in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, (1938) 40 Bom LR 125: (AIR 1938 Bom 223) where the learned Chief Justice, dealing with Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, observed: "The object of Section 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, (1938) 40 Bom LR 125: (AIR 1938 Bom 223) where the learned Chief Justice, dealing with Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, observed: "The object of Section 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. The section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may interfere in revision, as does Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction, or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the Court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But, in may opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at. This observation has our full concurrence. 10. What the learned Chief Justice has said applies to Section 35 of the Act, with which we are concerned. Judged from this point of view, the learned single Judge was not justified in interfering with a plan finding of fact and more so, because he himself proceeded on a wrong assumption. 14. Another judgment which needs to be noted is judgment of this Court in Mundri Lal Vs. Sushila Rani(Smt) & Anr., (2007) 8 SCC 609 . This Court held that jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, 1887 is wider than the Revisional Jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C. But pure finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence may not be interfered with, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, 1887. The Court also explained the circumstances under which, findings can be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25. The Court also explained the circumstances under which, findings can be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25. There are very limited grounds on which there can be interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25; they are, when (i) Findings are perverse or (ii) based on no material or (iii) Findings have been arrived at upon taking into consideration the inadmissible evidences or (iv) Findings have been arrived at without consideration of relevant evidences. 23. Since, learned Court below has given cogent reason for disbelieving the testimony of Sri Gambhir Singh Rawat, DW2 and has recorded a finding of fact that the building in question was constructed after the year 1985 on the basis of documentary evidence, which was filed by the tenant himself, therefore, I do not find any reason to interfere with the said finding of learned Court below. 24. The third submission of learned counsel for the revisionist is that there is no notice dated 29.04.2003 on record and the landlord had issued two notices to the tenant firstly on 24.03.2003 and secondly on 24.04.2003. Learned counsel for the respondent has taken me through the lower court record. The postal receipt regarding the registered envelope, through which the notice was sent, bears the date of 29.04.2003 and it is the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that the notice was drafted by respondent’s counsel on 24.04.2003, which, however, was sent by registered post on 29.04.2003. Since, the notice was sent/dispatched on 29.04.2003, therefore in the plaint, date of dispatch was indicated as 29.04.2003 and not as 24.04.2003 when the notice was drafted by the counsel. From perusal of record, the submission of learned counsel for the respondent gets corroborated. Thus, the third submission of learned counsel for the revisionist is also without any substance. 25. Regarding the last submission of learned counsel for the revisionist that the burden of proof regarding applicability of Rent Control Act was shifted to the tenant/revisionist, it has to be borne in mind that in the present case, points for determination were not settled immediately after exchange of pleadings and they were formulated by the Court below at very late stage. Both the parties have gone to trial knowing fully well the case of the other side. Both the parties have gone to trial knowing fully well the case of the other side. Thus, the contention that due to the language of fourth point for determination framed by the learned Court below, the onus was shifted to the tenant, is not accepted. 26. In such view of the matter, there is no scope for interference in the present revision. As such, the revision filed by the tenant is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. 27. After dictation of the judgment, learned counsel for the revisionist prayed that some reasonable time may be given to his client to vacate the premises in question. In such view of the matter, tenant/revisionist is granted six months from today for vacating the premises in question, subject to the condition that he will give an undertaking before the learned Court below within two weeks from the date of production of certified copy of this order that he will vacate the premises on or before 11.11.2018 and will continue to pay mesne profits at the rate of Rs.1400/- per month on or before 7th day of each succeeding month.