JUDGMENT D.N. Patel, J. - This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner whose Writ Petition being C.W.J.C. No. 5111 of 2000(P) was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 12th December, 2014 and, hence, the original petitioner has preferred present Letters Patent Appeal. The learned Single Judge has not interfered with the order of punishment of dismissal, passed by the respondent-Management because of grave misconduct committed by this appellant-delinquent. 2. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that this appellant is an original petitioner. He was working as Assistant Store Keeper. On 13th January, 1990, an order was issued for supply of Rail Electric Poles and on 28th March, 1990, this appellant (original petitioner) received Rail Electric Poles. 3. It appears that out of total quantity of 141.30 MT of Rail Electric Poles, 12.945 MT of Rail Electric Poles were found as deficit, value whereof is Rs.1,14,498-52 Paise. 4. As this appellant (original petitioner) was Assistant Store Keeper and as he has not properly verified the receipt of total quantity of Rail Electric Poles and as there was huge deficit of 12.945 MT of Rail Electric Poles, a charge-sheet was issued on 7th/10th November, 1994 (Annexure-13). 5. Enquiry was conducted and after taking evidences on record, the Enquiry Officer has given his report on 30th December, 1998 (Annexure-21 Series) and it has been held by the Enquiry Officer that the charges levelled against this appellant (original petitioner) have been proved. 6. For the ready reference, the charges levelled against this appellant, which are proved, read as under: "He was authorised by the then E.S.E. PESU (Sri S.S. Rekhi) to take delivery of rail poles from the stockyard of the steel authority of India at Rajendra Nagar, Patna against the following delivery orders and transport them to the various work sites as per the allocation made by the E.S.E. in the allotment Order No.5 dated 13.1.90. 1. Office Order No.4389 dt. 6.10.89. 2. O.O. No.4912 dt. 9.1.90. 3. O.O. No.4778 dt. 19.12.89. According to the receipted challan of the Steel Authority of India he received a total of 141.30 Tonnes of rails out of which the transported 128.355 Tonnes of rails only to the various work sites. 1. Office Order No.4389 dt. 6.10.89. 2. O.O. No.4912 dt. 9.1.90. 3. O.O. No.4778 dt. 19.12.89. According to the receipted challan of the Steel Authority of India he received a total of 141.30 Tonnes of rails out of which the transported 128.355 Tonnes of rails only to the various work sites. Thus he could not deliver all the rails received from the Steel authority of India and misappropriated 12.945 Tonnes of rails worth Rs.1,14,498.52/- only." (emphasis supplied) Thus, the charges of misappropriation have been held as proved. 7. Second show-cause notice was also given to this appellant (original petitioner) dated 12th June, 1999. The Disciplinary Authority, on the basis of the Enquiry Officer''s report and on the basis of reply given to the second show-cause notice by this appellant, imposed punishment of dismissal vide order dated 24th August, 1999, which is at Annexure-23. 8. Thereafter, this appellant (original petitioner) challenged the said order of the Disciplinary Authority before the departmental Appellate Authority. After giving adequate opportunity of being heard to this appellant, the departmental Appellate Authority dismissed the departmental appeal vide order dated 18th March, 2000. 9. This appellant challenged the order of the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority in a Writ Petition being C.W.J.C. No. 5111 of 2000(P), which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 12th December, 2014 and, hence, this Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner. 10. Much has been argued out by the learned counsel for the appellant that in a criminal case being Special Case No. 25 of 1993, Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna has acquitted this appellant (original petitioner) from the charges levelled against him under Sections 13(1)(d) to be read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as well as this appellant has been exonerated from the charges levelled under Sections 409, 468, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, vide order dated 24th May, 2016. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Enquiry Officer has not properly appreciated the evidences on record. In fact, had there been proper evaluation of the evidences, then the Enquiry Officer would not have come to the conclusion that the charges levelled against this appellant are proved. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Enquiry Officer has not properly appreciated the evidences on record. In fact, had there been proper evaluation of the evidences, then the Enquiry Officer would not have come to the conclusion that the charges levelled against this appellant are proved. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Assistant Electrical Engineer, namely, Lal Bachcha Singh has given evidence, against whom also there are allegations of misappropriation. His evidence could not have been appreciated by the Enquiry Officer. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that neither the Enquiry Officer nor the Disciplinary Authority has given any reason for rejection of explanation given by this appellant. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that paramount goal of the enquiry is to find out truth and not to punish this appellant. Lastly, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is delayed evaluation of stock yard. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the Enquiry Officer. Reasons: 11. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there is no substance in the arguments canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant and none of the above arguments are helpful to this appellant (original petitioner). It appears that there is conceptual error on the part of the appellant. Clumsy, complex and unnecessary arguments have been canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant. We are not sitting in appeal against the Enquiry Officer''s report. Looking to the Enquiry Officer''s report, which is at Annexure-21 Series to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal, it cannot be said that it is based upon no evidence. The proof of charge depends upon subjective satisfaction of the Enquiry Officer, which is based upon objective evidence, placed and proved before him. We cannot reevaluate those evidences nor are we sitting in appeal while exercising powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As per Enquiry Officer''s report, charges levelled against this appellant (original petitioner) are proved. 12. We cannot reevaluate those evidences nor are we sitting in appeal while exercising powers of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As per Enquiry Officer''s report, charges levelled against this appellant (original petitioner) are proved. 12. It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India reported in , (1995) 6 SCC 749 , in paragraph 12, which reads as under: "12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case." (emphasis supplied) 13. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case." (emphasis supplied) 13. It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of U.P. SRTC v. Har Narain Singh reported in , (1998) 9 SCC 220 , which reads as under: "A disciplinary enquiry was held against the respondent who was a bus conductor in the appellant''s Corporation. The Assistant Regional Manager of the appellant himself conducted the enquiry and found that the charges against the respondent are proved. He issued a show-cause notice on punishment to the respondent. After considering the reply given by the respondent he imposed a punishment of dismissal from service on the respondent. The respondent preferred an appeal before the Regional Manager which was dismissed. The respondent then preferred a claim before the Labour Tribunal. The Labour Tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction in the matter. Thereafter, the respondent preferred a petition before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal at Lucknow. The Tribunal dismissed the respondent''s petition and held that there is no illegality in the conduct of the enquiry. It also held that the reasons given by the enquiry officer cannot be said to be perverse or against merit on record. From this judgment and order of the Tribunal dated 11-10-1985 the respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. A Single Judge of the High Court reappreciated the evidence led in the enquiry and quashed the order passed by the Tribunal as also the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority. The High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in doing so because the High Court was not sitting in appeal over the findings given by the disciplinary authority. The re-examination of the evidence led in the disciplinary proceedings was not warranted. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court are, therefore, set aside and the order of the Tribunal is restored. The appeal is allowed accordingly." (emphasis supplied) 14. It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya reported in , (2011) 4 SCC 584 , in paragraphs 7 and 9, which read as under: "7. The appeal is allowed accordingly." (emphasis supplied) 14. It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya reported in , (2011) 4 SCC 584 , in paragraphs 7 and 9, which read as under: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil.) 9. Several witnesses were examined to prove the charge. One of them was H.S. Sharma who conducted the preliminary enquiry and to whom the respondent had made a statement broadly admitting the facts which constituted the subject-matter of the second charge. I.M. Rawal, who was the cashier and I.C. Ojha, the officiating Branch Manager were also examined. Based upon their evidence, the enquiry officer found the respondent to be guilty of the second charge and that has been accepted by the disciplinary authority. The High Court has interfered with the said finding without expressly holding that the said finding of guilt was erroneous. The High Court has proceeded as if it was sitting in appeal over the departmental enquiry and interfered with the finding on a vague assumption that the respondent must have acted bona fide in an "increasing customer-friendly atmosphere". The High Court has interfered with the said finding without expressly holding that the said finding of guilt was erroneous. The High Court has proceeded as if it was sitting in appeal over the departmental enquiry and interfered with the finding on a vague assumption that the respondent must have acted bona fide in an "increasing customer-friendly atmosphere". There was no justification for the Division Bench to interfere with the finding of guilt." (emphasis supplied) 15. It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of SBI v. Narendra Kumar Pandey reported in , (2013) 2 SCC 740 , in paragraph 25, which reads as under: "25. The High Court, in our view, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not justified in interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the appointing authority after a full-fledged inquiry, especially when the Service Rules provide for an alternative remedy of appeal. It is a wellaccepted principle of law that the High Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an appellate authority. Of course, its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct an error of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of the principles of natural justice. In SBI v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde this Court held that the High Court cannot reappreciate the evidence acting as a court of appeal. We have, on facts, found that no procedural irregularity has been committed either by the Bank, presenting officer or the inquiring authority. Disciplinary proceedings were conducted strictly in accordance with the Service Rules." (emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decisions, the arguments canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Enquiry Officer has not properly appreciated the evidences on record is of no help to this appellant. 16. It appears from the facts of the case that in criminal case, there is acquittal of this appellant from the charges levelled against him under Section 13(1)(d) to be read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as well as there is exoneration from the charges under Section 409, 468, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code by the order of acquittal dated 24th May, 2016, delivered by the Special Judge, Vigilance, Patna. It ought to be kept in mind that even if, there is acquittal from the criminal charges, of the accused, a delinquent can be punished in a departmental proceeding because - (a) Charges levelled against the delinquent on criminal side and on civil side are entirely different. (b) In criminal side, the charges are under the Indian Penal Code or under the Prevention of Corruption Act, whereas, on civil side, the charges are mainly for deliberate violation of rules of discipline, loss of faith and confidence, breach of trust of the employer in delinquent, negligent approach of the delinquent, dereliction of duty and unbecoming conduct of the Government servant. (c) In the criminal side, the charges are to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, whereas, in the civil side, the charges are to be proved on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. 17. It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. M.G. Vittal Rao reported in , (2012) 1 SCC 442 , in paragraphs 11 and 24, which read as under: "11. The question of considering reinstatement after decision of acquittal or discharge by a competent criminal court arises only and only if the dismissal from services was based on conviction by the criminal court in view of the provisions of Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India, or analogous provisions in the statutory rules applicable in a case. In a case where enquiry has been held independently of the criminal proceedings, acquittal in a criminal court is of no help. The law is otherwise. Even if a person stood acquitted by a criminal court, domestic enquiry can be held, the reason being that the standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry and that in a criminal case are altogether different. In a criminal case, standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt while in a domestic enquiry it is the preponderance of probabilities that constitutes the test to be applied. 24. Thus, there can be no doubt regarding the settled legal proposition that as the standard of proof in both the proceedings is quite different, and the termination is not based on mere conviction of an employee in a criminal case, the acquittal of the employee in a criminal case cannot be the basis of taking away the effect of departmental proceedings. Nor can such an action of the department be termed as double jeopardy. The judgment of this Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony does not lay down the law of universal application. Facts, charges and nature of evidence, etc. involved in an individual case would determine as to whether decision of acquittal would have any bearing on the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry." (emphasis supplied) 18. It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram reported in , (2013) 1 SCC 598 , in paragraphs 23, 24, 25 and 26, which read as under: "23. We are of the view that the mere acquittal of an employee by a criminal court has no impact on the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Department. The respondent, it may be noted, is a member of a disciplined force and non-examination of two key witnesses before the criminal court that is Adiyodi and Peter, in our view, was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case by the prosecution. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the possibility of winning over PWs 1 and 2 in the criminal case cannot be ruled out. We fail to see, why the prosecution had not examined Head Constable Adiyodi (No. 1368) and Peter (No. 1079) of Tenkasi Police Station. It was these two Head Constables who took the respondent from the scene of occurrence along with PWs 1 and 2, husband and wife, to Tenkasi Police Station and it is in their presence that the complaint was registered. In fact, the criminal court has also opined that the signature of PW 1 (complainant husband) is found in Ext. P-1 complaint. Further, the doctor, PW 8 has also clearly stated before the enquiry officer that the respondent was under the influence of liquor and that he had refused to undergo blood and urine tests. That being the factual situation, we are of the view that the respondent was not honourably acquitted by the criminal court, but only due to the fact that PW 1 and PW 2 turned hostile and other prosecution witnesses were not examined. 24. The meaning of the expression "honourable acquittal" came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal. 24. The meaning of the expression "honourable acquittal" came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal. In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions "honourable acquittal", "acquitted of blame", "fully exonerated" are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression "honourably acquitted". When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 25. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India it was held that even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor which is as follows: (Raghava case, SLR p. 47, para 8) "8. ''The expression "honourably acquitted" is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term "honourably acquitted".''" (Robert Stuart case, ILR pp. 188-89) 26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term "honourably acquitted".''" (Robert Stuart case, ILR pp. 188-89) 26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so." (emphasis supplied) 19. It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Another v. Purushottam reported in , (2015) 3 SCC 779 , in paragraph 14, which reads as under: "14. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India the question before the Constitution Bench was that the petitioner therein had been suspended owing to the pendency of criminal proceedings against him which was challenged on the anvil of Article 314 of the Constitution. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India the question before the Constitution Bench was that the petitioner therein had been suspended owing to the pendency of criminal proceedings against him which was challenged on the anvil of Article 314 of the Constitution. Thus, this decision is not of much relevance for the resolution of the legal nodus before us, save for the observations that (AIR p. 792, para 9) "if the trial of the criminal charge results in conviction, disciplinary proceedings are bound to follow against the public servant so convicted, even in case of acquittal proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable". However, on this aspect of the law we need go no further than the recent decision in Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram, since it contains a comprehensive discourse on all the prominent precedents. This Court has concluded, and we respectfully think correctly, that acquittal of an employee by a criminal court would not automatically and conclusively impact departmental proceedings: 14.1. Firstly, this is because of the disparate degrees of proof in the two viz. beyond reasonable doubt in criminal prosecution contrasted by preponderant proof in civil or departmental enquiries. 14.2. Secondly, criminal prosecution is not within the control of the department concerned and acquittal could be the consequence of shoddy investigation or slovenly assimilation of evidence, or lackadaisical if not collusive conduct of the trial, etc. 14.3. Thirdly, an acquittal in a criminal prosecution may preclude a contrary conclusion in a departmental enquiry if the former is a positive decision in contradistinction to a passive verdict which may be predicated on technical infirmities. In other words, the criminal court must conclude that the accused is innocent and not merely conclude that he has not been proved to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt." (emphasis supplied) 20. It has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Management of Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited v. M. Mani reported in , (2018) 1 SCC 285 , in paragraph 20, 21, 22 and 33, which reads as under: "20. Similarly, in our considered view, the Labour Court failed to see that the criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings are two separate proceedings in law. Similarly, in our considered view, the Labour Court failed to see that the criminal proceedings and departmental proceedings are two separate proceedings in law. One is initiated by the State against the delinquent employees in criminal court and other i.e. departmental enquiry which is initiated by the employer under the Labour/Service Laws/Rules, against the delinquent employees. 21. The Labour Court should have seen that the dismissal order of the respondents was not based on the criminal court''s judgment and it could not be so for the reason that it was a case of acquittal. It was, however, based on domestic enquiry, which the employer had every right to conduct independently of the criminal case. 22. This Court has consistently held that in a case where the enquiry has been held independently of the criminal proceedings, acquittal in criminal court is of no avail. It is held that even if a person stood acquitted by the criminal court, domestic enquiry can still be held the reason being that the standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry and that in criminal case are altogether different. In a criminal case, standard of proof required is beyond reasonable doubt while in a domestic enquiry, it is the preponderance of probabilities. (See Karnataka SRTC v. M.G. Vittal Rao.) 33. In the case on hand, the appellant employer had conducted the departmental enquiry in accordance with law independently of the criminal case wherein the enquiry officer, on the basis of the appreciation of evidence brought on record in the enquiry proceedings, came to a conclusion that a charge of theft against the delinquent employees was proved. This finding was based on preponderance of probabilities and could be recorded by the enquiry officer notwithstanding the order of criminal court acquitting the respondents." (emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decisions, even if, the accused is exonerated from the criminal charges, he can be punished in the department proceedings, as a delinquent. 21. Much has been argued out by the learned counsel for the appellant that evidence of Lal Bachcha Singh has been appreciated by the Enquiry Officer though he was also involved in misappropriation. This is the conceptual error on the part of this appellant. Such type of evidences can always be brought in the departmental proceedings and can always be appreciated. Civil and criminal proceedings are entirely different. 22. This is the conceptual error on the part of this appellant. Such type of evidences can always be brought in the departmental proceedings and can always be appreciated. Civil and criminal proceedings are entirely different. 22. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that paramount goal of enquiry is to find out truth and not to punish the delinquent-appellant. This argument is of no help to the appellant because enquiry is to be conducted to find out the fact whether the delinquent has committed misconduct or not. In the facts of the present case, the Enquiry Officer''s report, which is at Annexure-21 Series to the memo of this Letters Patent Appeal dated 30th December, 1998, reveals that this appellant-delinquent (original petitioner) has committed misconduct of misappropriation of 12.945 MT of Rail Electric Poles worth Rs.1,14,498 -52 Paise. So far as other charges of delayed verification and non-acceptance of explanation given by this appellant are concerned, the same have also been appreciated, looking to the Enquiry Officer''s report dated 30th December, 1998 (Annexure-21 Series) to be read with Disciplinary Authority''s order dated 24th August, 1999 (Annexure23). 23. The aforesaid aspects of the matter have been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while dismissing the Writ Petition preferred by this appellant, being C.W.J.C. No. 5111 of 2000(P) vide judgment and order dated 12th December, 2014. We see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge. There is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal, the same is, hereby, dismissed with a cost of Rs.1,000/- (Rupees One Thousand). This amount will be deposited by this appellant before the President/ Secretary of the Advocates'' Association Welfare and Development Fund, Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi within a period of six weeks from today. 24. Registrar General of this Court is, hereby, directed to send a copy of this order to: (a) President, Advocates'' Association, Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi. (b) Secretary, Advocates'' Association, Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi.