ORDER : Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The present writ petition has been filed for issuance of show cause upon the respondent no.3 as to under what authority, the order dated 17.05.2017 has been passed in Sarfaesi File No. XXVII-214/2016-17 by reason of which, the possession of the land/building in question has been sought to be taken. A further prayer has been made for quashing the order dated 17.05.2017 passed by the respondent no.3 in Sarfaesi File No. XXVII-214/2016-17 by which the delivery of land/building from the possession of the petitioner has been sought to be taken. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the land in question is recorded in the name of the deceased mother of the petitioner namely Dipa Devi, wife of late Kapildev Giri. Dipa Devi also died on 10.07.2012. In support of the said fact, a death certificate has been annexed as Anneuxrre-2 to the writ petition. Thus, it would be evident that the respondent-Bank obtained the order of taking physical possession of the land/building without verifying the true facts. The petitioner being one of the successors of late Dipa Devi is entitled for proportionate share in the house property in question. It is further submitted that the petitioner came to learn that her brother (the respondent no. 10) had obtained a loan from the respondent bank and had offered equitable mortgage over the property in question. It is also submitted that the respondent no. 10 could not have mortgaged the entire land with building in favour of the respondent-bank. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Bank (respondent no.1) submits that the petitioner has not filed the writ petition with clean hands, as she does not reside in the house in question, which would be apparent from the fact that she has shown her residential address in the cause title of writ petition as “Nona Chandan Pukur, Jaffarpur (CT), Nonachandpukur, PO & PS Nonachandpukur, District-North 24 Parganas, West Bengal”. It is further submitted that the action of the respondent no. 3 is follow-up action taken by the Bank under Section 13 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets & Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 [ in short to be referred as “the SARFAESI Act”] and thus, the same is appealable under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. 5. 3 is follow-up action taken by the Bank under Section 13 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets & Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 [ in short to be referred as “the SARFAESI Act”] and thus, the same is appealable under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on going through the contents of the writ petition, it appears that the impugned order dated 17.05.2017 passed by the respondent no.3 is a consequential action taken by the respondent-bank under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 , at paragraphs 42and 43, has held as under:- “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.” 6. Further, in the case of Standard Chartered Bank Vs. Noble Kumar and others reported in (2013) 9 SCC 620 , the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph-27, has held as under: “27. The “appeal” under Section 17 is available to the borrower against any measure taken under Section 13(4). Taking possession of the secured asset is only one of the measures that can be taken by the secured creditor. Depending upon the nature of the secured asset and the terms and conditions of the security agreement, measures other than taking the possession of the secured asset are possible under Section 13(4). Alienating the asset either by lease or sale, etc. and appointing a person to manage the secured asset are some of those possible measures. On the other hand, Section 14 authorises the Magistrate only to take possession of the property and forward the asset along with the connected documents to the borrower (sic the secured creditor). Therefore, the borrower is always entitled to prefer an “appeal” under Section 17 after the possession of the secured asset is handed over to the secured creditor. Section 13(4)(a) declares that the secured creditor may take possession of the secured assets. It does not specify whether such a possession is to be obtained directly by the secured creditor or by resorting to the procedure under Section 14. We are of the opinion that by whatever manner the secured creditor obtains possession either through the process contemplated under Section 14 or without resorting to such a process obtaining of the possession of a secured asset is always a measure against which a remedy under Section 17 is available.” 7. We are of the opinion that by whatever manner the secured creditor obtains possession either through the process contemplated under Section 14 or without resorting to such a process obtaining of the possession of a secured asset is always a measure against which a remedy under Section 17 is available.” 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent judgment rendered in Civil Appeal No. 1281 of 2018 (Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another Vs. Mathew K.C.) while considering the earlier judicial pronouncements made in this regard, has held thus: “16. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon (supra), has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order:- “46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” 17. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference.” 8. Considering the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the aforesaid judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court, I am not inclined to entertain the present writ petition at this stage. The same is, accordingly, dismissed as not maintainable. The petitioner is, however, at liberty to take recourse before the appropriate forum as provided under the law, if so advised. 9. Pending I.A. no. 203 of 2018 also stands disposed of.