ORDER Gupta, C.J. -- 1. The challenge in the present petition is to the condition of different age limits for the candidates of domicile of State of Madhya Pradesh and candidates from outside Madhya Pradesh in the matter of appointment to the post of Assistant Professor in the Department of Higher Education, Government of Madhya Pradesh vide Advertisement No.07/2017 dated 12th December, 2017. The relevant clause in the advertisement reads as under : (H) Age Limit For the candidates domicile of Madhya Pradesh Who have completed 21 years of age but not completed 40 years of age. For the candidates outside Madhya Pradesh Who have completed 21 years of age but not completed 28 years of age. (As per Circular No.C 3-8/2016/3-1, dated 12th May, 2017 of General Administration Department) 2. In the return filed, the State has referred to Madhya Pradesh Educational Service (Collegiate Branch) Recruitment Rules, 1990 (for short “the Rules”) as amended on 27th August, 2015 whereby the upper age limit was contemplated to be as admissible in accordance with the directions/ instructions issued by the General Administration Department of the State Government from time to time. The relevant note to Schedule-III of the said Rules reads as under : “SCHEDULE-III (See rule 8) *** *** *** Note: The upper age limit for all concerning cadres shall be admissible in accordance with the directions/instructions issued by the General Administration Department from time to time.” 3. The reliance of the State is on the instructions issued by the General Administration Department on 12th May, 2017 wherein, in respect of post to be filled up by Madhya Pradesh Public Service Commission against the gazetted and non-gazetted post, the minimum/maximum age is 21 to 28 years and in respect of candidates who are domicile of Madhya Pradesh, the age is as under : 2. Maximum relaxation in age-limit for the domicile of Madhya Pradesh: (1) Male Candidate (Unreserved category) 28+12= 40 25+15=40 (2) Female Candidate (Unreserved category) 28+17=45 25+20=45 (3) Male/Female Candidate (Government/ 28+17=45 25+20=45 Corporation/Board/ Employees of Autonomous Bodies and Home Guard) (4) Male/Female Candidate (Reserved 28+17=45 25+20=45 Category- Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe/Other Backward Class) (5) Male/Female Candidate (Reserved 28+17=45 25+20=45 Category (Government/ Corporation/ Board/ Employees of Autonomous Bodies and Home Guard) (6) For Differently Abled Candidates 28+17=45 25+20=45 In any case, the relaxation in maximum age-limit shall not be granted to candidates from outside the State.” 4. It is, in this background, the learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the action of the State in fixing different age limit for the candidates who are domicile of State of Madhya Pradesh and the candidates from other States is discriminatory and arbitrary in view of the provisions of Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported as (1984) 3 SCC 654 (Dr. Pradeep Jain and others v. Union of India and others) to contend that there cannot be any discrimination on the basis of place of birth or residence for a public employment but place of residence can be considered for admission to the professional colleges. The relevant extract of the said decision reads as under : “5. We may point out at this stage that though Article 15(2) bars discrimination on grounds not only of religion, race, caste or sex but also of place of birth, Article 16(2) goes further and provides that no citizen shall on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them be ineligible for or discriminated against in State employment. So far as employment under the State or any local or other authority is concerned, no citizen can be given preference nor can any discrimination be practised against him on the ground only of residence. It would thus appear that residential requirement would be unconstitutional as a condition of eligibility for employment or appointment to an office under the State and having regard to the expansive meaning given to the word ‘State’ in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and others [ (1979)3 SCC 489 ], it is obvious that this constitutional prohibition would also cover an office under any local or other authority within the State or any corporation, such as a public sector corporation which is an instrumentality or agency of the State. But Article 16(3) provides an exception to this rule by laying down that Parliament may make a law “prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under the government of, or any local or other authority, in a State or Union Territory, any requirement as to residence within that State or Union Territory prior to such employment or appointment”. Parliament alone is given the right to enact an exception to the ban on discrimination based on residence and that too only with respect to positions within the employment of a State Government. But even so, without any parliamentary enactment permitting them to do so, many of the State Governments have been pursuing policies of localism since long and these policies are now quite wide spread. Parliament has in fact exercised little control over these policies States. The only action which Parliament has taken under Article 16(3) giving it the right to set residence requirements has been the enactment of the Public Employment (Requirement as to Residence) Act, 1957 aimed at abolishing all existing residence requirements in the States nd enacting exceptions only in the case of the special instances of Andhra Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura and Himchal Pradesh. There is therefore at present no parliamentary enactment permitting preferential policies based on residence requirement except in the case of Andhra Pradesh, Manipur Tripura and Himachal Pradesh where the Central Government has been given the right to issue directions setting residence requirements in the subordinate services. Yet, in the face of Article 16(2), some of the States are adopting ‘sons of the soil’ policies prescribing reservation or preference based on domicile or residence requirement for employment or appointment to an office under the government of a State or any local or other authority or public sector corporation or any other corporation which is an instrumentality or agency of the State. Prima facie this would seem to be constitutionally impermissible though we do not wish to express any definite opinion upon it, since it does not directly arise for consideration in these writ petitions and civil appeal. 6. But, it is clear that so far as admissions to an educational institution such as a medical college are concerned, Article 16(2) has no application. If, therefore, there is any residence requirement for admission to a medical college in a State, it cannot be condemned as unconstitutional on ground of violation of Article 16(2). 6. But, it is clear that so far as admissions to an educational institution such as a medical college are concerned, Article 16(2) has no application. If, therefore, there is any residence requirement for admission to a medical college in a State, it cannot be condemned as unconstitutional on ground of violation of Article 16(2). Nor can Article 16(2) be invoked for invalidating such residence requirement because these clauses prohibits discrimination on ground of place of birth and not on ground of residence and, as pointed out by this Court in D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1955 SC 334 , residence and place of birth are “two distinct conceptions with different connotations both in law and in fact”. The only provision of the Constitution on the touchstone of which such residence requirement can be required to be tested is Article 14 and that is precisely the challenge which falls to be considered by us in these writ petitions.” 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents relies upon a Supreme Court judgment, reported as AIR 1955 SC 334 (Shri D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat and another) wherein the demand of capitation fee from the students from outside the State was not found to be discriminatory. It was held that such classification is not in contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The relevant extract of the said judgment reads as under : “14. It is next contended for the petitioner that the imposition of capitation fee on some of the students and not on others is discriminatory, and is in contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution, and therefore void. The impugned rule divides, as already stated, Self-nominees into two groups, those who are bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat and those who are not, and while it imposes a capitation fee on the latter, it exempts the former from the payment thereof. It thus proceeds on a classification based on residence within the State, and the only point for decision is whether the ground of classification has a fair and substantial relation to the purpose of the law, or whether it is purely arbitrary and fanciful.” 6. It thus proceeds on a classification based on residence within the State, and the only point for decision is whether the ground of classification has a fair and substantial relation to the purpose of the law, or whether it is purely arbitrary and fanciful.” 6. Reliance is also placed upon a Division Bench judgment of Chhattisgarh High Court passed in Writ Petition (S) No.4856/2009 (Hemanand Mani Tripathi and others v. State of Chhattisgarh and others) decided on 25th March, 2010 wherein the age relaxation given to the candidates of Chhattisgarh State was not interfered with. The relevant paragraph from the judgment passed in Hemanand Mani Tripathi (supra), is extracted as under : “19. If we examine the facts of the present case in the light of above principles of law laid down, we find that in the instant case, discrimination in prescribing maximum age limit for recruitment to the State Civil Services is not based solely on the ground of place of residence. The candidates of other States are also eligible to apply for the posts advertised provided they conform to the eligbility criteria prescribed under the Examination Rules. The candidates of Chhattisgarh have been given relaxation in upper age limit under the special circumstances. It has been contended by the respondents and not disputed by the petitioners that 1494 candidates of other States have been found to be eligible to participate in the Main Examination after result of the Preliminary Examination and therefore, we are unable to accept the challenge to the Circular of Annexure P-1 and fresh advertisement dated 20th September, 2008 issued on the basis of Circular of Annexure P-1 on the ground that it is violative of Article 16(2) of the Constitution.” 7. Learned counsel for the respondents-State also referred to a Corrigendum issued on 25th January, 2018 wherein those candidates who had applied in response to the advertisement dated 9th July, 2014 have been ordered to be considered to be eligible for appointment against the advertisement in question i.e. dated 12th December, 2017 in terms of an order passed by the Supreme Court on 25th August, 2017 in SLP (C) No.18244/2016 (Dr. Ashutosh Singh Gaur v. State of M.P. and others) and other identical cases. The relevant order reads as under : “Application for impleadment as petitioners is allowed. Delay condoned. Ashutosh Singh Gaur v. State of M.P. and others) and other identical cases. The relevant order reads as under : “Application for impleadment as petitioners is allowed. Delay condoned. Having considered the matter, we are of the view that the interest of justice would be served if the State is directed to consider all those candidates who become ineligible because of age limit in the next recruitment process as and when it occurs. We order accordingly. The candidates may pursue their remedies in law in relation to (i) discontinuance and (ii) pay scales). The special leave petitions are disposed of accordingly.” 8. Learned counsel for the respondents-State pointed out that relaxation in age for the candidates of Madhya Pradesh has been considered necessary for the reason that no recruitment could take place in the State since the year 1993. In these circumstances, the candidates of State of Madhya Pradesh were in disadvantageous position as against the opportunities of employment available to the candidates of the other States. Therefore, the age relaxation given in the advertisement on the basis of circular of the State Government dated 12th May, 2017 does not warrant any interference in the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 9. We have examined the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties and find that the discriminatory treatment given to the candidates on account of domicile in State of Madhya Pradesh in the face of Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India is not tenable in law. 10. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the Constitutional mandate with regard to prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth and for providing equality of opportunity in matters of public employment as enshrined under Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India respectively. The relevant provision reads as under : “15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. The relevant provision reads as under : “15. Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public. (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. *** *** *** 16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. (1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect or, any employment or office under the State.” *** *** *** 11. Sub-clause (1) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India contemplates that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. The advertisement in question is relating to employment under the State, therefore, all citizens of the Country have to be treated equally. Sub-clause (2) of Article 16 contemplates that no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State. Such mandate of the State is being violated when the place of birth or residence has been made basis for discrimination for the candidates belonging to outside the State of Madhya Pradesh. Therefore, there is apparent violation of the mandate of Sub-clauses (1) and (2) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. 12. Even Article 15 of the Constitution of India prohibits the State from discriminating any citizen on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Therefore, there is apparent violation of the mandate of Sub-clauses (1) and (2) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. 12. Even Article 15 of the Constitution of India prohibits the State from discriminating any citizen on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. However, in terms of sub-clause (3) of Article 15, the State is permitted to make special provision for women and children. Article 15 prohibits the State from creating any discrimination against any citizen inter alia on the ground of place of birth whereas Article 16 provides equality of opportunity for all citizens in the matters of employment under the State. Therefore, both, under Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India, the action of the State in granting relaxation in age only to the candidates who are domicile of the State of Madhya Pradesh is contrary to the Constitutional mandate. 13. The argument that the appointment under the State could not be carried out from the year 1993 onwards, therefore, the candidates of State of Madhya Pradesh were in disadvantageous position does not warrant any consideration. If the State is unable to make appointment for long number of years then it is the State alone, which has to be blamed. However, the Constitutional mandate of providing equality of opportunity and no discrimination on the basis of place of residence or place of birth cannot be permitted to be given a go-bye only for the reason that the State was not able to conclude the employment process in the State for large number of years. 14. The Supreme Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain’s case (supra), was considering the case of admission to the medical colleges and thus, was not a case for employment under Article 16 of the Constitution of India. The Court held that Article 15(2) bars discrimination on grounds not only of religion, race, caste or sex but also of place of birth. Article 16(2) goes further and provides that no citizen shall on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them be ineligible for or discriminated against in State employment. No citizen can be given preference nor can any discrimination be practised against him on the ground only of residence. The Supreme Court held as under : “4. No citizen can be given preference nor can any discrimination be practised against him on the ground only of residence. The Supreme Court held as under : “4. But, unfortunately, we find that in the last few years, owing to the emergence of narrow parochial loyalties fostered by interested parties with a view to gaining advantage for themselves, a serious threat has developed to the unity and integrity of the nation and the very concept of India as a nation is in peril. The threat is obtrusive at some places while at others it is still silent and is masquerading under the guise of apparently innocuous and rather attractive clap-trap. The reason is that when the Constitution came into operation, we took the spirit of nationhood for granted and paid little attention to nourish it, unmindful of the fact that it was a hard-won concept. We allowed ‘sons of the soil’ demands to develop claiming special treatment on the basis of residence in the concerned State, because recognising and conceding such demands had a populist appeal. The result is that ‘sons of the soil’ claims, though not altogether illegitimate if confined within reasonable bounds, are breaking asunder the unity and integrity of the nation by fostering and strengthening narrow parochial loyalties based on language and residence within a state. Today unfortunately, a citizen who has his permanent residence in a State entertains the feeling that he must have a preferential claim to be appointed to an office or post in the State or to be admitted to an educational institution within the State vis-a- vis citizen who has his permanent residence in another State, because the latter is an outsider and must yield place to a citizen who is a permanent resident of the State, irrespective of merit. This, in our opinion, is a dangerous feeling which, if allowed to grow, indiscriminately, might one day break up the country into fragments, though, as we shall presently point out, the principle of equality of opportunity for education and advancement itself may justify, within reasonable limits, a preferential policy based on residence.” 15. Similarly, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the Chattisgarh High Court in Hemanand Mani Tripathi’s case (supra), in view of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain’s case (supra). Similarly, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the Chattisgarh High Court in Hemanand Mani Tripathi’s case (supra), in view of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain’s case (supra). Similarly, the judgment in Shri D.P. Joshi’s case (supra), pertains to demand and claim of capitation fee. The argument was based upon equality before law as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was found that there is reasonable classification in the claim of capitation fee for the students outside the State. Therefore, such judgment rendered in the context of equality before law in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not relevant for determining the discrimination in age for the purpose of public appointment in terms of Article 15 and Article 16 of the Constitution. 16. The Corrigendum issued on 25th January, 2018 is that the candidates will not be declared ineligible if they were eligible in terms of earlier advertisement dated 9th July, 2014. The said corrigendum cannot make the candidates from outside the State eligible in view of the specific condition in the advertisement which is in terms of the Rules framed as per the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 17. In view of the above, we find that the condition in the advertisement for relaxation of the age up to the age of 40 years for the candidates who are domicile of the State of Madhya Pradesh is clearly unconstitutional, therefore, the same is set aside. However, we leave it open to the State to grant the age relaxation, if it considers appropriate, in nondiscriminatory manner to the candidates who are domicile of Madhya Pradesh and to the candidates outside the State of Madhya Pradesh in view of the Constitutional mandate enshrined in Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 18. The last date for submission of the application forms is 15th March, 2018. Therefore, learned counsel for the respondents-State seeks two days’ time to the State to take a suitable decision in respect of relaxation in age for the candidates, if any of non-discriminatory nature. 18. The last date for submission of the application forms is 15th March, 2018. Therefore, learned counsel for the respondents-State seeks two days’ time to the State to take a suitable decision in respect of relaxation in age for the candidates, if any of non-discriminatory nature. Let the needful be done on or before 12th March, 2018 so that the candidates in terms of revised condition may apply on or before 15th March, 2018 i.e. the last date for submission of the application forms for appointment under the State for which the State is bound to issue corrigendum for the benefit of the candidates seeking employment under the State. 19. As a result, the writ petition stands allowed to the extent indicated above.