ORDER : Heard Mr. Mokhtar Khan, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner assisted by Mr. Niranjan Kumar, Advocate. 2. Heard Mr. Vishal Kumar Tiwary, counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent nos. 1 and 4. 3. This writ petition has been filed for the following relief: “a) For quashing the order dated 10/07/2006 passed by the Court of Hon’ble Commissioner Santhal Pargana, Division at Dumka in R.M.R. Case No.394 of 85-86 whereby and whereunder the Hon’ble Commissioner was pleased to upheld the order passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Officer, Jamtara (SP) on 04/10/1983 in R.E. Case No.111 of 1975/76 in which learned Sub-Divisional Officer had pleased to direct the petitioner to hand over the possession of Land bearing Plot Nos. 1521, 1523 situated at Mouza Bhaiyadih Jamtara.” 4. Counsel for the petitioner submits as under: (a) The property involved in this case was settled in favour of the petitioner by the then Zamindar as back as in the year 1938 which was subsequently followed by a khurfa of the year 1938 itself. (b) He submits that that there was a proceeding under Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure in which the petitioner was found in possession of the property and the property was mutated in favour of the petitioner in Mutation Case No. 10 of 1974-75. (c) Counsel submits that the application for restoration of the land involved in this case was filed under Section 42 of Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 and the Sub-Divisional Officer, Jamtara vide order dated 04.10.1983 directed for eviction of the petitioner. (d) Against the order of eviction dated 04.10.1983, an appeal was filed which was numbered as R.M.R. Case No. 394 of 1985-86 and the appellate authority dismissed the appeal, which is also impugned in this writ petition. (e) Counsel submits that the authority has not considered the fact that the petitioner was in possession of the property by virtue of the aforesaid settlement and subsequent khurfa and accordingly, the proceeding itself was barred by limitation. (f) He further submits that the property involved in this case was in continuous possession of the petitioner and they had developed the property for agricultural purposes and this aspect of the matter has not been properly considered by the authorities below. 5. (f) He further submits that the property involved in this case was in continuous possession of the petitioner and they had developed the property for agricultural purposes and this aspect of the matter has not been properly considered by the authorities below. 5. Counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondents on the other hand submits as under: (a) The claim of settlement and khurfa which is being made by the petitioners was admittedly never registered and as per the case of the petitioner himself (though not admitting the case of the petitioner), the khurfa was executed in the year 1938. (b) He further submits that even if the case of the petitioner is assumed to be correct, then also the petitioner had not completed 12 years of alleged possession prior to coming into force of Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 which came into force with effect from 01.11.1949. He submits that Section 42 of the aforesaid Act of 1949 does not provide for any limitation and accordingly as the petitioner had not completed 12 years of possession, even as per his case, prior to 01.11.1949 and had accordingly not perfected his title by way of adverse possession under regulation III of 1872, the petitioner has been rightly directed to be evicted under Section 42 of the aforesaid Act of 1949. (c) He further submits that the matter involved in this case is that of illegal possession of the petitioner and it is not a case of illegal transfer. The claim of the petitioner is not based on any registered document and accordingly the so called Khurfa as claimed by the petitioner and disputed by the respondents, cannot be taken into account and the petitioner has failed to prove his possession from 1938. (d) He further submits that the law is well settled in this regard that a person who has completed 12 years of possession prior to coming into force of the aforesaid Act of 1949 may only claim adverse possession under the Regulation III of 1872. For this the counsel relies upon judgement reported in AIR 1973 Patna 1 (Bhauri Lal Jain and Anr. Vs. Sub-Divisional Officer and Ors.) 6. For this the counsel relies upon judgement reported in AIR 1973 Patna 1 (Bhauri Lal Jain and Anr. Vs. Sub-Divisional Officer and Ors.) 6. After hearing the counsel for the parties and after considering the materials on record, this Court finds as under: (a) The petitioner is claiming possession of the property by virtue of settlement and subsequent khurfa of the year 1938, which was admittedly unregistered. As per the case of the petitioner the mutation was carried out in Mutation Case No. 10 of 1974-75. (b) This Court further finds that even if the best possible case of the petitioner is taken, then also the petitioner has no case as Santhal Pargana Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) 1949 came into force on 1.11.1949 and under section 42 of the said Act of 1949 there is no period of limitation. Admittedly 12 years prior to 01.11.1949 (i.e the date of coming into force of said Act of 1949) had not elapsed from the year 1938 and accordingly the petitioner cannot claim to have perfected his title by way of adverse possession under the provisions of Regulation III of 1872. (c) This issue is squarely covered by a judgement passed by full bench of Hon’ble Patna High Court in the case of Bhauri Lal Jain & Anr. Vs. Sub-Divisional Officer & Ors. Reported in AIR 1973 Patna 1 in which the constitutional validity of various provisions of the aforesaid Act of 1949 was under challenge and summary of the decision has been given in para 36 of the said judgement which is quoted for ready reference:- “36. From the aforesaid discussions, I have arrived at the following conclusions: (i) That there is no incidence of transferability of Raiyati holdings in Santal Parganas. (ii) That Section 20 of the Act is not ultra vires on the ground of its being violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. (iii) That Section 42 of the Act is a legislation in respect of Entry No. 21 of List II -- State List, of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, and is not violative of being repugnant to the provisions of the Limitation Act, Central Legislation, dealing with acquisition of right by adverse possession. (iii) That Section 42 of the Act is a legislation in respect of Entry No. 21 of List II -- State List, of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, and is not violative of being repugnant to the provisions of the Limitation Act, Central Legislation, dealing with acquisition of right by adverse possession. (iv) That the Limitation Act was applied to the District of Santal Parganas under Regulation III of 1872, and adverse possession could be acquired under an invalid transfer, in contravention of Section 27 (1) of the Regulation. Those, who did not acquire title by adverse possession under Regulation III of 1872, could be evicted under the old Section 20 (5) or Section 42 of the Act, even after the repeal of Section 27 (3) of the Regulation, as the Act Was supplemental to the Regulation. (v) That Section 20 of the Act was prospective and that there could not be acquisition of title by adverse possession in case of transfer or settlement etc., in contravention of Section 20 (1) and (2) of the Act. (vi) That Section 42 of the Act is a valid piece of legislation. (vii) That Section 20 (5) of the Act, as amended, is a valid piece of legislation and is not ultra vires the Constitution on the grounds urged by Mr. Sinha.” (d) This judgement of Full bench in connection with the point of limitation with respect of section 42 of the Act of 1949 was further explained in the case of Deonarayan Singh versus Commissioner reported in 1985 PLJR 1 (FULL BENCH) in para 20 (ii) as follows: “20 (ii) A transfer in contravention of Section 27 of Regulation III of 1872 with regard to which the prescriptive period of 12 years has not elapsed on the 1st of November, 1949. In such a case time for perfecting title by adverse possession would in law stop running from the date of the enforcement of the Act on November 1, 1949, and if the prescriptive period of 12 years is not completed before that the right or title would remain inchoate and cannot be perfected thereafter by virtue of adverse possession. This would follow from proposition (iv) of the Full Bench in Bhaurilal Jain’s case (supra). This would follow from proposition (iv) of the Full Bench in Bhaurilal Jain’s case (supra). In such a case the Deputy Commissioner under section 42 of the Act read with the other relevant provisions may at any time on his own motion or on an application made to him pass an order ejecting the transferee holding the transfer in contravention of the statute.” (e) Considering the facts and circumstances of this case , this Court finds that the petitioner is claiming possession of the property by way of Khurfa of the year 1938 and in view of the ratio of the aforesaid judgements the period of 12 years having not elapsed on 01.11.1949, the petitioner cannot be said to have perfected his title by way of adverse possession under regulation III of 1872 prior to coming into force of the aforesaid Act of 1949 and accordingly the petitioner has been rightly evicted under the provisions of section 42 of the Act of 1949. which does not prescribe any period of limitation. (f) This Court finds that the petition under Section 42 of the aforesaid Act of 1949 was decided in favour of the private respondents against which the petitioner filed an appeal which was also dismissed. (g) Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order dated 10.07.2006 passed in RMR Case No. 394 of 1985-86 as contained in Annexure – 1 to this writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.