ORDER : This Civil Revision Petition involves an interesting question of law as to the powers of the Executing Court under the provisions of Order XXI Rule 32(5) of the Civil Procedure Code. 2.1. The decree holder is the revision petitioner herein. The facts in a nutshell are that the revision petitioner had filed a suit in O.S.No.413 of 1991 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Tiruttani for the following reliefs: “(a) declaring the Plaintiff's right and title to the Schedule property or in the alternative declaring the classification of the schedule property as Anadeenam as null and void. (b) restraining the defendants, their men and agents permanently from interfering with plaintiff's possessions and enjoyment of the Schedule property.” 2.2. The suit was in respect of 1.80 Acres in Survey Nos.155/1 & 153/4 in Sathrunjayapuram Village, Tiruttani Taluk. By judgment and decree dated 25.08.1992, the learned District Munsif, Tiruttani was pleased to declare the plaintiff's title to the schedule property and grant an order of injunction restraining the respondents, their men and agents by means of an injunction from interfering with petitioner's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property. 2.3. It appears that, after the decree, by an order dated 08.11.1994, the Tahsildar, Tiruttani gave effect to the decree in O.S.No.413 of 1991. However, instead of granting Patta in respect of the entire extent of 1.80 Acres in Survey No.155/1A, the Tahsildar had only granted Patta in respect of 1.30 Acres. From the Execution Petition filed in the typed set of papers, it appears that the revision petitioner had filed an earlier Execution Petition with the decree copy and order of the second respondent dated 08.11.1994 and this petition was rejected but the petitioner was not issued with a copy of that order for want of a speaking order. From the Execution Petition filed in the typed set of papers, it appears that the revision petitioner had filed an earlier Execution Petition with the decree copy and order of the second respondent dated 08.11.1994 and this petition was rejected but the petitioner was not issued with a copy of that order for want of a speaking order. Therefore, the impugned execution proceedings was filed within two years of the earlier Execution Petition under Order XXI Rule 32(1) & 32(5) of C.P.C. The relief claimed in the said execution proceedings were as follows: “to order the 2nd J.D. as representative of the 1st J.D. and deemed 2nd defendant in the suit within the meaning of Section 47 C.P.C to not interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the Schedule property carrying the administrative correction of the classification by deleting 'anadeenam' and inserting my name as owner in respect of the E.P. Schedule property u/O.21 R.32 32(5) Explanation and in default order arrest of the 2nd JD u/O.21 R.32(1) CPC and pass such other or further order as deemed fit in the circumstances.” 2.4. The learned District Munsif, Tiruttani by her order dated 17.03.2010, dismissed the execution proceedings holding that the same was barred by limitation and the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree. The learned District Munsif relying upon the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the cases of C.Gangacharan Vs. C.Narayanan and Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi Vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and Others passed the following order: “In view of the above said dictum stated in detail supra, the executing court cannot go behind decree and execute it has it stands even if there are mistake. Hence the execution petition beside being barred by limitation and the relief prayed by limitation and the relief prayed for is beyond the jurisdiction of the executing court this execution petition is dismissed as could not be maintainable and sustainable.” Aggrieved by the said order, the revision petitioner is before this Court. 3.1. Heard Mr.J.James, learned counsel for the revision petitioner. He would contend that the relief claimed in the Execution Petition is well-within the provisions of Order XXI Rule 32(5) C.P.C and further the Execution Petition being in the nature seeking enforcement of a decree for perpetual prohibitory injunction was not subject to any period of limitation as per Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 3.2. He would contend that the relief claimed in the Execution Petition is well-within the provisions of Order XXI Rule 32(5) C.P.C and further the Execution Petition being in the nature seeking enforcement of a decree for perpetual prohibitory injunction was not subject to any period of limitation as per Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 3.2. The learned counsel would also submit that the judgment passed by the Orissa High Court in W.P.(C) No.5029 of 2011 in the case of Chakradhar Paital (Dead) After him, his L.Rs & Ors. Vs. Gelhi Bewa (Dead) After him, his L.Rs & Ors. in support of his contention wherein the learned Judge has observed as follows: “9. This execution case had been filed in 2009 when the judgment-debtors disobeyed the decree of permanent injunction by encroaching upon the suit land and dispossessing the decree holders. Explanation to Sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order 21, C.P.C came into force with effect from 01.07.2002 and this execution case having been filed after the Explanation came into force, sub-rule (5) will have application and the decree of prohibitory injunction in question can be enforced by way of recovery of possession where the judgment-debtors have disobeyed the said decree. This Court also in the decision reported in (2006) (II) CLR - 368; Sabitri Khuntia and others Vs. Ram Avatar Modi has held that a decree for prohibitory injunction can be executed taking recourse to sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 by removing a cowshed raised by the judgment-debtors in violation of the decree. It is also held in the decision reported in AIR 2009 PUNJAB AND HARYANA 188; Kapoor Singh Vs. Om Prakash that in the event of violation of a decree for prohibitory injunction by way of dispossession of the decree holder by the judgment-debtors, the executing court has jurisdiction to restore possession in favour of the decree holder, who cannot be compelled to file another suit. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that sub-rule (5) with its Explanation has no application to a decree for prohibitory injunction therefore fails.” 4. Mr.A.Dev Narendran, the learned Government Advocate who appeared on behalf of the respondents would submit that the revision petitioner is seeking to obtain a relief which was beyond the scope of the decree and therefore, the Executing Court was right in rejecting the application. Mr.A.Dev Narendran, the learned Government Advocate who appeared on behalf of the respondents would submit that the revision petitioner is seeking to obtain a relief which was beyond the scope of the decree and therefore, the Executing Court was right in rejecting the application. He relied on the judgment in Narendra Kumar Vs. Mrs.Sumathi reported in CDJ 2012 MHC 131 wherein this Court has held as follows: “12. Undoubtedly, the Executing Court does not have jurisdiction to go behind the decree, unless, there was lack of inherent jurisdiction and the Executing Court cannot go behind the decree in cases of erroneous exercise of jurisdiction. The only remedy in cases of erroneous exercise of jurisdiction is to challenge the same by filing an appeal. The Executing Court cannot travel beyond the decree under execution and an erroneous decree cannot be said to be a nullity nor can a decree based on an error be a nullity.” 5. Heard both parties. Before dealing with the case on hand, it is necessary to extract the Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which reads as follows: “Article 136 - For the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any Civil Court - Period of Limitation is Twelve years - (when) the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place. Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation.” The provisions of Order XXI Rule 32(5) of C.P.C which is extracted herein below also requires scrutiny. “5. Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation.” The provisions of Order XXI Rule 32(5) of C.P.C which is extracted herein below also requires scrutiny. “5. Where a decree for the specific performance of a contract or for an injunction has not been obeyed, the Court may, in lieu of or in addition to all or any of the processes aforesaid, direct that the act required to be done may be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court, at the cost of the judgment-debtor, and upon the act being done the expenses incurred may be ascertained in such manner as the Court may direct and may be recovered as if they were included in the decree.” 6. A reading of the decree dated 25.08.1992 in O.S.No.413 of 1991 would indicate that the learned District Munsif had declared the right of the plaintiff to the suit property which was an extent of 1.80 Acres in Survey No.155/1A and also the lands in Survey No.153/4. For the case at hand we are only concerned with the lands in S.No.155/1A, it is seen that pursuant to the decree, the second respondent had deleted 1.30 Acres from the Classification of 'Anadeenam' and granted Patta with reference to the same in compliance of the decree in O.S.No.413 of 1991. The order of the second respondent dated 08.11.1994 makes it clear that the second respondent was aware about the judgment and decree in O.S.No.413 of 1991 and that he was complying with the same. However, instead of granting Patta with reference to the entire extent of 1.80 Acres, the second respondent has granted Patta only with reference to 1.30 Acres. This is in my opinion appears to be a mistake, however, the subsequent action of the second respondent indicates that he was attempting to justify the non-inclusion of the 0.50 cents in the said order. It also appears that the revision petitioner had filed an earlier Execution Petition which was dismissed without been numbered. But, however, copy of the order of this unnumbered Execution Petition has not been furnished to the revision petitioner as there was no reasoned order. Immediately, thereafter, the present Execution Petition came to be filed. 7. It also appears that the revision petitioner had filed an earlier Execution Petition which was dismissed without been numbered. But, however, copy of the order of this unnumbered Execution Petition has not been furnished to the revision petitioner as there was no reasoned order. Immediately, thereafter, the present Execution Petition came to be filed. 7. A reading of the provisions of Order XXI Rule 32(5) makes it clear that purport of Rule 32(5) was to give effect to the order of the Court by directing the act required to be done may be done as far as practicable by the decree holder or by some other person appointed by the Court. 8. An explanation was also added with effect from 01.07.2002 by the Amendment Act 22 of 2002 which states as follows: “For removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression, 'the acts required to be done' covers prohibitory as well as mandatory injunction.” 9. The decision of this Court in Ondipudur Weavers Co-operative Production and Sales Society Ltd. Vs. Velumani reported in (1997) 2 M.L.J 19 is a case where the decree was granted for a declaration of his right to use the road called Colony Road and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the use of the road. The Execution Petition was filed complaining that the judgment debtor had disobeyed the decree for injunction and therefore seeking for the appointment of a Commissioner to remove the thorny bushes that had grown over the pathway and for arresting the judgment debtors for disobedience of the decree. The Executing Court did not direct arrest but had however appointed a Commissioner for removing the thorny bushes. This order was challenged by the judgment debtor before the lower Appellate Court which upheld the order of the Executing Court. This order was later taken up in Appeal before this Court. The main contention that was raised therein was that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 32(5) of C.P.C could be invoked only in cases where there is a disobedience of mandatory injunction and not in respect of the decree for prohibitory injunction. This order was later taken up in Appeal before this Court. The main contention that was raised therein was that the provisions of Order XXI Rule 32(5) of C.P.C could be invoked only in cases where there is a disobedience of mandatory injunction and not in respect of the decree for prohibitory injunction. This Court held as follows: “Order XXI Rule 32(5) of the code is not invoked by the decree holders on the ground that the appellants as judgment debtors have not performed any positive act directed by the Court but that they are preventing the clearance of the shrubs by the decree holders for the proper use of the pathway. Such interference in the clearance of the thorny bushes is an indirect attempt on the part of the judgment debtors to interfere with the compliance of the plaintiffs user of the pathway.” 10. This Court went on to uphold the invocation of provisions of Order XXI Rule 32(5) by the decree holders in the case of Jai Dayal Vs. Krishnan Lal reported in (1997) 2 L.W.548, dealing with the question arising under Order XXI Rule 32 of the C.P.C relating to the prohibitory injunction and mandatory injunction restraining the defendants from blocking the passage and removal of obstruction, the Honourable Supreme Court observed as follows: “.......If a judgment-debtor has suffered the decree, no attempt to circumvent the perpetual injunction and mandatory injunction, can be permitted. If the decree-holder makes any construction clubbing the other adjacent property, property which is part of the subject-matter in the earlier suit, a party cannot and should not, by his action, be permitted to drive the decree-holder for another round of adjudication of the rights in the second suit to be started a fresh. In other words, giving such a liberty will amount to encouraging persons to take the law into their own hands and drive the decree-holder to another suit. It can never be facilitated to circumvent the law and relegate the party for tardy process of the civil action. What is needed is an opportunity to obey the injunction. Non-compliance is a continuing disobedience entailing penal consequences. A separate fresh suit is barred under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 11. The above referred judgments have been quoted with approval by this Court in the case of Kanakamma Vs. What is needed is an opportunity to obey the injunction. Non-compliance is a continuing disobedience entailing penal consequences. A separate fresh suit is barred under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 11. The above referred judgments have been quoted with approval by this Court in the case of Kanakamma Vs. Kamalam reported in 2000 (II) M.L.J 237 where this Court observes that asking plaintiffs to file a separate suit will be unjust and the Court also will be pleading its helplessness to plaintiffs when they come to Court with genuine reasons. To shorten the litigation and also consider the interest of justice, the Executing Court was right in applying the provisions of Order XXI Rule 32(5) to remove the obstructions caused on the 10 ft. wide suit cart track to implement the decree for permanent injunction. 12. Coming to the case on hand, the learned District Munsif, Tiruttani had decreed the suit by declaring the plaintiff's right to the entire extent of 1.80 Acres in Survey No.155/1 and also restraining the respondents from interfering with the revision petitioner in possession and enjoyment of his property. By not granting a Patta for the extent of 50 cents and declaring it as an 'Anadeenam' land, the respondents/judgment debtors are in effect attempting to interfere in the possession and enjoyment of the extent of the suit property, which is a clear disobedience of the decree for permanent injunction. Therefore, applying the provisions of Order XXI Rule 32(5) and relying upon the aforesaid judgments, it is clear that the order passed by the Executing Court in E.P.No.4 of 2009 is erroneous. 13. As regards the finding that the Execution Petition is barred by limitation as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner it is a decree for permanent injunction which the decree holder is seeking to enforce and as per Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, there is no period of limitation for enforcing a decree for perpetual injunction. 14. In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the order of the learned District Munsif, Tiruttani in E.P.No.4 of 2009 dated 17.03.2010 is set aside. 14. In the result, this Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the order of the learned District Munsif, Tiruttani in E.P.No.4 of 2009 dated 17.03.2010 is set aside. The respondents are directed to rectify the Patta in respect of Survey No.155/1A of Sathrunjayapuram Village, Thiruttani Taluk by granting Patta to the revision petitioner for the entire extent of 1.80 Acres in keeping with the decree in O.S.No.413 of 1991 within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. However, there shall be no order as to costs.