ORDER : Aggrieved of the order dated 04.08.2016 passed in Execution Case No. 04 of 1977 and order dated 30.03.2012 passed in Misc. Case No. 27 of 2006 which was instituted in the Execution Case No. 04 of 1977, the petitioner/judgment-debtor has approached this Court. 2. Contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the Executing Court cannot altered/modify the decree and the decree as it stands only can be executed by the Executing Court. 3. Briefly stated, Title Suit No. 109 of 1969/35 of 1975 was instituted by the plaintiff-M/s Fertilizer Corporation of India Limited, Sindri against the defendant-Suraj Prasad Singh, who is father of the petitioner herein, for eviction and realization of arrears of rent and damages. This suit was decreed by judgment and decree dated 20.11.1975. Thereafter, Title Appeal No. 02 of 1976 was preferred by the defendant which was finally dismissed by the judgment dated 27.11.1979 and S.A No. 02 of 1980(R) preferred by the defendant before the Hon’ble Patna High Court, at Ranchi Bench was allowed on 15.09.1981, setting-aside the judgment and decree in appeal and remanded the matter for a fresh decision. During pendency of Title Appeal No. 02 of 1976, the original appellant died and his heirs and legal representatives namely, Smt. Motijhari Devi and others were substituted in his place. By judgment dated 20.09.2002, Title Appeal No. 02 of 1976 was dismissed. Against this judgment, Smt. Motijhari Devi and Others filed S.A. No. 365 of 2002 before this Court which was dismissed on 23.11.2004. 4. In Execution Case No. 04 of 1977, which was preferred after the disposal of Title Suit No. 109 of 1969/35 of 1975, the application of the petitioner/judgment-debtor filed under Section 47 CPC raising an objection on executability of the decree in Title Suit No. 109 of 1969/35 of 1975 was registered as Misc. Case No. 27 of 2006. This miscellaneous case has been dismissed by a cryptic order passed on 30.03.2012. Thereafter, the application filed by the decree-holder on 29.07.2016 for issuance of a writ of delivery of possession has been allowed, rejecting the objection of the petitioner, by an order dated 04.08.2016. This order has also been impugned by the petitioner through I.A. No. 6768 of 2016 which was allowed by this Court by order dated 10.05.2017. 5. Thereafter, the application filed by the decree-holder on 29.07.2016 for issuance of a writ of delivery of possession has been allowed, rejecting the objection of the petitioner, by an order dated 04.08.2016. This order has also been impugned by the petitioner through I.A. No. 6768 of 2016 which was allowed by this Court by order dated 10.05.2017. 5. Section 47 CPC provides that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which decree was passed and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. One of the objects behind Section 47 CPC is to avoid multiplicity of litigation. Powers of the Executing Court under Section 47 CPC is limited and execution of a decree can be resisted primarily on three counts: (i) the decree is not executable, (ii) the court which has passed the judgment lacked jurisdiction, and (iii) the decree has been passed against a dead person. In paragraph nos. 14, 19 and 21 of the plaint, the plaintiff- M/s Fertilizer Corporation of India Limited has pleaded that in breach of the compromise decree prepared in Title Suit No. 237 of 1953, the defendant made illegal constructions and inducted several tenants. Order dated 30.03.2012 by which the application under Section 47 CPC has been dismissed records in detail the constructions raised by the defendant/judgment-debtor and tenancy to several persons including Sahara India. The plaintiff has pleaded as under ; “14. That in addition to the aforesaid violation of the basic terms of the compromise the defendant has also sub-let the illegally constructed rooms to different persons who are illegally holding shops there. That in some of the rooms illegally sub-let by the defendant the occupiers are holding cycle repair shop, sweets stall, dry cleaner, snack shops, meat stall shop, washing clothes and numerous other kinds of business. That some of the persons who are occupying the said illegally constructed rooms by the defendants are Ramashis Bhujawalla, Iswar Lohar Mistry, Bhangania Chanawalla, Sitaram Dhobi, Gulab Dhobi, Purshottam Nayar, Tailor, Suleman Mian, Hari Prasad Ghose, S. Chakrabarty, S.K. Biswas and other persons. That the defendant is realizing rent from the said persons and thereby making illegal gain from the illegally constructed rooms. That the defendant is realizing rent from the said persons and thereby making illegal gain from the illegally constructed rooms. That as stated herein before the defendant has absolutely no right whatsoever to raise any construction and or to sub-let any portion of the land to any person without the express permission of the plaintiff. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 19. That the plaintiff submits that the very basic terms of the compromise decree were that the defendant would not let out any portion of the same nor would the defendant construct any room or building without the express permission in writing of the plaintiff. That all constructions, even if permitted by the plaintiff, must be in conformity with the specifications and plan approved by the plaintiff. That the plaintiff submits that the locality in which the land in Schedule A is situated is within the premises of the plaintiff’s factory area. That for systematic development of the site the plaintiff strictly adheres to construction of buildings and rooms in accordance with the plans approved by it. That the plaintiff also does not permit anybody to hold shops or carrying on business without a proper license from the plaintiff in as much as the plaintiff wants to have a strict control so far as selling of articles and holding business in the factory area in order to safeguard the interest of the numerous employees under the plaintiff company. That the defendant is deliberately violating all the aforesaid terms specifically mentioned in the compromise decree and as such the settlement made under the said decree stands cancelled. That by virtue of the aforesaid illegal action on the part of the defendant the plaintiff is entitled to re-enter the land described in Schedule A below. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 21. That although the plaintiff sent the notice intimating to the defendant its intention to determine the settlement which was received by the defendant on 9.4.69 the defendant has not made over vacant possession of the land described in Schedule A below nor has the defendant removed the illegal structures standing thereon. That on the other hand the defendant after about one month sent a reply through his Advocate stating therein untrue statements and allegations contrary to facts. That the contents of the said reply are absolutely without any foundation and vestige of truth.” 6. That on the other hand the defendant after about one month sent a reply through his Advocate stating therein untrue statements and allegations contrary to facts. That the contents of the said reply are absolutely without any foundation and vestige of truth.” 6. In the suit one of the issues settled was; has the defendant incurred forfeiture of tenancy by committing breach of the terms and conditions of the tenancy as incorporated in the compromise decree ? 7. The trial court, after an elaborate discussion, has held that the defendant was not liable for ejection on the ground of sub-letting and un-authorised constructions. 8. No doubt, the suit was decreed and the judgment and decree in Title Suit No. 109 of 1969/35 of 1975 have attained finality; challenge by the petitioner to the judgment and decree in Title Suit No. 109 of 1969/35 of 1975 has failed before this Court and also before the Supreme Court, it remains a matter of record that inspite of notice to the plaintiff that the defendant has raised constructions and inducted several tenants no corresponding relief was sought in the suit. The contention raised on behalf of the respondent- M/s Fertilizer Corporation of India Limited that, the decree for vacant possession of the suit land by evicting the defendant through process of the court would envelop in itself demolition of the illegal constructions and eviction of the tenants, is misconceived. Without seeking amendment in the plaint and a corresponding amendment in the decree, the decree-holder-M/s Fertilizer Corporation of India Limited was not entitled to khas possession of the suit land by demolition of the constructions thereon. No doubt, in execution proceeding essence of the decree can be gathered from pleading of the parties and the judgment in the suit, something which is not there in the decree cannot be added; the Executing Court cannot modify the decree. 9. The Executing Court in its order dated 30.03.2012, though recorded the aforesaid facts, has simply observed that the application under Section 47 CPC was not maintainable; the main reason given by the Executing Court is that the decree has attained finality. In view of the specific pleadings of the parties, I am of the opinion, approach of the Executing Court was contrary to the law and accordingly, the impugned order dated 30.03.2012 is liable to be set-aside. In view of the specific pleadings of the parties, I am of the opinion, approach of the Executing Court was contrary to the law and accordingly, the impugned order dated 30.03.2012 is liable to be set-aside. There can be symbolic possession but not demolition of the structures by virtue of the judgment and decree in Title Suit No. 109 of 1969/35 of 1975 (refer “108 Pujay Pad Advait Panch Parmeshwar Panchayati Akhara Bara Udasin Nirman Vs. Rameshwar Mandal” reported in 1984 PLJR 79 ). It is also pertinent to record that the objection of the petitioner to the application dated 29.07.2016 filed by the decree-holder for writ of delivery of possession has been rejected primarily on the ground that a similar objection was already rejected by the court by its order dated 30.03.2012. Therefore, on that count alone order dated 04.08.2016 has also become unsustainable. In view of the findings recorded by the trial court on issue no. 5 in the suit, the existing constructions could not have been demolished in execution of the decree in Title Suit No. 109 of 1969/35 of 1975, as it stands today. 10. In the above facts, the impugned orders dated 30.03.2012 and 04.08.2016 are set-aside. The petitioner shall have liberty to recourse to law, as available to him, consequent upon setting-aside of the impugned orders. 11. The writ petition stands allowed.