JUDGMENT : S.S. SHINDE, J. 1. This Appeal is directed against the Judgment and order dated 26th April, 2012, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune in Sessions Case No.64 of 2009, thereby convicting Appellant/Accused No.2 Ravindra Narayan Gore for the offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (for short "IPC") and sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three months. The trial Court also convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months. Both the sentences were directed to be run concurrently. 2. Before the Trial Court, there were in all three accused i.e. Accused No.1 Narayan Dhaku Gore (father-in-law of Manisha), Accused No.2 Ravindra Narayan Gore (husband of Manisha) and Accused No.3 Manisha Subhash Kale (sister-in-law of deceased Manisha). After considering the evidence on record, the Trial Court has acquitted Accused No.1 Narayan and Accused No.3 Manisha from all the offences with which they were charged and convicted and sentenced Accused No.2 Ravindra for the offence punishable under Sections 498-A and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Hence the present appeal is filed by Appellant/Accused No.2 challenging his conviction and sentence. 3. The prosecution case, in nut-shell, is as under:- (A) The marriage of the victim deceased Manisha was solemnized with accused Ravindra somewhere in the year 2004. After marriage, Manisha started performing her marital obligations at Chikalhol, Tahsil Khanapur, District Sangli. Initially, for two years Manisha was treated well. During that period, the couple was blessed by a female child. However thereafter, her father-inlaw Accused No.1 Narayan, her mother-in-law Sou Taibai and sister-in-law Accused No.3 Manisha Kale, married sister of accused Ravindra, were harassing deceased Manisha and picking up quarrel with her on the ground that she was not working on wages outside and she was being ill treated and made to starve. During her visit to parental house, Manisha used to make complaint regarding the same. But all the while her parents used to pacify her. (B) Prior to three months of incident dated 18th August, 2009, Accused Ravindra, husband of Manisha had taken her to Pune. During her visit to parental house, Manisha used to make complaint regarding the same. But all the while her parents used to pacify her. (B) Prior to three months of incident dated 18th August, 2009, Accused Ravindra, husband of Manisha had taken her to Pune. It appears that, thereafter accused Ravindra and victim Manisha had shifted to Koyte Vasti Punavale, Wakad, District Pune. Prior to one month of the incident as the father of victim Manisha was ailing, Manisha went to see her father at Wathar, Tahsil Koregaon District Satara to her parental house prior to panchimi festival. At the relevant time, Manisha had reiterated her grievance regarding ill treatment to her. After the said panchimi festival, she was taken to her marital home at Koyte vasti Punavale, Pune, by her brother-in-law Ganesh Shikare. (C) On 19th August, 2008 at about 1.00 a.m. during night, Accused Ravindra knocked the door of the house of his father-in-law at Wathar station. His mother-in-law informant Smt Indubai Shamrao Kamble opened the door. The accused told that the victim Manisha was burnt and what was to be done, whereupon the informant Smt Indubai asked him as to where her daughter Manisha was? Accused Ravindra informed her that Manisha is in the vehicle brought by him. The informant Indubai noticed that one white coloured vehicle was standing in front of her house. The Informant rushed to the said car and noticed that victim Manisha was inside the said vehicle wrapped in one blanket. Manisha was then lifted by Ravindra and three more companions. Manisha was brought inside the house and was kept on bed. Accused Ravindra and his companions left the place. (D) Thereafter, the informant Smt Indubai asked her daughter victim Manisha as to what had happened, whereupon Manisha disclosed that her husband accused Ravindra was having illicit relations with one lady, and as she was not on talking terms with said lady, Ravindra used to beat and ill treat Manisha. On the day of the incident also as Manisha did not talk with the said lady, due to which Accused Ravindra got annoyed and poured kerosene on her person at about 6.00 p.m. An Informant thereafter removed the blanket and noticed in the light of torch that the victim Manisha had sustained burn injuries all over the body. Ultimately, the victim unfortunately succumbed to the said injuries. Ultimately, the victim unfortunately succumbed to the said injuries. (E) The matter was initially reported by Shri Santosh Shamrao Kamble - brother of the victim, to Wathar Police Station regarding the death of his sister. As a result of which initially A.D. No.20 of 2008 under section 174 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 was registered. Then API Shri Kale attached to Police Station Wathar visited the house of Shri Shamrao Kamble - the father of the victim along with panch witnesses Shri. Shankar Bandu Kamble and Sou. Sulabai Mahadev Mane, both inhabitant of Wathar Station. The inquest panchanama in respect of the dead body of Manisha was prepared on 19th August, 2008 during 8.35 a.m. to 9.15 a.m. The dead body of victim Manisha was referred to General Hospital Satara for postmortem examination. The then Medical Officer Dr.Shri Chakke conducted postmortem examination on the dead body of the victim deceased on 19th August, 2008 during 12.00 p.m. to 12.45 p.m. The Medical Officer noticed 95% superficial to deep burns and opined that the cause of death is due to 95% superficial to deep burns. Shri Santosh Kamble - the brother of the victim, produced the burnt sari pieces as well burnt petty coat and burnt underwear of the deceased victim Manisha before API Shri Kale in presence of panch witnesses Shri. Jagannath Shinde and Shri. Majid Pathan. The said clothes were seized and panchanama to that effect was prepared by API Shri.Kale in presence of panch witnesses during 9.30 a.m. to 10.45 a.m. He further recorded statements of Shri. Santosh Kamble, Sou. Rekha Ganesh Shikare, the married sister of the deceased and in view of the report lodged by informant Sou. Indubai, the Crime No. 0 of 2008 came to be registered under sections 302 and 498-A read with section 34 of IPC. Pursuant to thereof Accused No.1- Narayan, Accused No.2 - Ravaindra and Accused No.3 - Manisha Kale came to be arrested by API Shri Kale. Accused were referred to Rural Hospital Pimpode (Bk) on the very day and were examined by the concerned Medical Officer attached to Rural Hospital Pimpode (Bk). Pursuant to thereof Accused No.1- Narayan, Accused No.2 - Ravaindra and Accused No.3 - Manisha Kale came to be arrested by API Shri Kale. Accused were referred to Rural Hospital Pimpode (Bk) on the very day and were examined by the concerned Medical Officer attached to Rural Hospital Pimpode (Bk). After completing these initial formalities as the offence had taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of Hinjawadi Police Station, API Shri. P.K. Kale forwarded all the relevant documents in connection with the said crime along with his report to Police Inspector Hinjwadi Police Station on 19th August, 2008 itself. Consequently C.R. No.189 of 2008 was registered with Hinjawadi Police Station on 20th August, 2008 at about 4.00 a.m. Thereafter, all the three accused were arrested in connection with the said crime in presence of panch witnesses Shri Narayan Pol and Smt Ranjana Todkar on 20th August, 2008 at about 6.00 a.m. (F) The investigation of the Crime was assigned to P.S.I. Shri. R.T. Pawar who visited the place of occurrence on 20th August, 2008 where accused Ravindra was residing with victim Manisha, and in presence of panch witnesses Shri.Sakharam Tukaram Bokephode and Shri.Vasant Krishna Raut seized one plastic can, one match box and burnt pieces of clothes and prepared panchanama to that effect. Thereafter, P.S.I. Pawar recorded the statements of the witnesses. Accordingly, after collecting the necessary evidence and papers, investigating officer sent charge-sheet against the accused before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class Court No.7, Pune. (H) As the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, hence the Judicial Magistrate First Class Court No.7, Pune committed the case to the Court of Sessions. (G) The charge for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 498-A of the IPC was framed against the accused. The contents of the charge were read over and explained to the accused in ver nacular. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The defence of the accused is of total denial and false implication. 4. After recording the evidence and conducting full fledged trial, the trial Court convicted accused No.2 i.e. Appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 498-A, 302 of the IPC and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment as afore-stated and to pay fine, and in default of payment of fine, to suffer further imprisonment as afore-stated. 4. After recording the evidence and conducting full fledged trial, the trial Court convicted accused No.2 i.e. Appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 498-A, 302 of the IPC and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment as afore-stated and to pay fine, and in default of payment of fine, to suffer further imprisonment as afore-stated. Hence the present Appeal is filed by the Appellant original Accused No.2 Ravindra Narayan Gore challenging his conviction and sentence. For the sake of brevity, henceforth we will refer the Appellant original Accused No.2 Ravinda as "the Accused". 5. Learned counsel appearing for the Appellant submitted that no complaint whatsoever was earlier reported to the Police by the parents of Manisha with respect to the alleged demand, and non-satisfaction of that demand, and that the deceased was subjected to harassment by the accused persons. The Trial Court has merely on the basis of oral dying declaration alleged to have been given by the victim to her mother i.e. informant, who had sustained more than 95% burns, has convicted the present appellant. If really the appellant has committed the said offence, then he would not have informed to the real brother of the victim immediately about the said incident. After the incident, it is at the instance of the accused, deceased Manisha was brought to Wathar i.e. the parental house of deceased. Learned counsel further submits that the said incident occurred due to busting of the stove and Manisha received burn injuries, and the appellant is no way concerned with the said occurrence, and he has been falsely implicated in the said incident. 6. Learned counsel further submits that the prosecution has examined only interested witnesses and no independent witness has been examined. It is further submitted that the prosecution has not led any concrete evidence on the point of cruelty. The findings recorded by the trial Court are perverse as the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Learned counsel therefore submits that the Appeal may be allowed. 7. On the other hand, learned A.P.P. appearing for the State referring to the evidence of informant PW-2, mother of deceased Manisha, submitted that at the time of incident only Accused and Manisha were present in the house. The incident took place within four years of the marriage. Manisha received 95% burn injuries. 7. On the other hand, learned A.P.P. appearing for the State referring to the evidence of informant PW-2, mother of deceased Manisha, submitted that at the time of incident only Accused and Manisha were present in the house. The incident took place within four years of the marriage. Manisha received 95% burn injuries. The prosecution has proved that deceased Manisha has given oral dying declaration to the informant stating that the Accused poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire. There was no reason for Manisha to falsely implicate her husband in the incident. Learned A.P.P. further submits that the conduct of the Accused/Appellant after the incident was not normal, as instead of admitting deceased Manisha in the nearby hospital at Pune, Accused had taken Manisha to her parental house at Wathar Station, Satara which was about 150 Kms away from the spot of incident. Learned A.P.P. further submits that the prosecution has proved motive by bringing the evidence on record showing that, the Accused was having illicit relations with one another lady, and on that count there used to be quarrels between the couple. Learned A.P.P. further submits that the findings recorded by the Trial Court are in consonance with the evidence brought on record and therefore the Appeal deserves to be dismissed. 8. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the Appellant and learned A.P.P. appearing for the State at length, with their able assistance perused the grounds taken in the Appeal memo, annexures thereto and also the entire evidence so as to find out the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court. 9. Firstly we will refer to the Medical evidence brought on record by the prosecution. PW5 Dr. Sagar Madhukar Chakke is the Medical Officer who has conducted post mortem on the dead body of Manisha. The evidence of Medical Officer shows that, on external examination, he noticed the following superficial deep burn injuries on the person of deceased Manisha, reddish in colour, the percentage of which is as under:- (1) Head, Neck and face 5% (2) Right Upper limb 9% (3) Left upper limb 9% (4) Chest and abdomen 18% (5) Back 18% (6) Right lower limb 18% (7) Left lower limb 18% (8) Perinium 0% 10. The evidence of PW-5 shows that the total percentage of the burn injuries sustained by Manisha was 95% and all the injuries were ante mortem. He opined that the cause of death of Manisha was "Due to 95% burns superficial to deep". Thus through the evidence of PW-5 Dr. Sagar, the prosecution has proved that Manisha received 95% burn injuries and she died due to 95% burns superficial to deep. 11. Now we will discuss the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, who are the star witnesses of the prosecution. Santosh Shamrao Kamble (PW-1) is brother and Indubai Shamrao Kamble (PW-2) is mother of Manisha. The evidence of Santosh (PW-1) shows that marriage of Manisha was solemnized with Accused about four years prior to the incident. His evidence further shows that during her visits to parental house, Manisha used to make complaints against the accused persons that they used to harass her and on the count of their insistence to go for agricultural work in the field, accused used to beat her, and also were not providing meals to her. His evidence further shows that few months after the marriage, the couple shifted to Hinjawadi area at Pune, but there also Manisha was not treated well by the Accused. His evidence further shows that, soon thereafter Manisha made telephone call to him complaining that Accused regularly used to beat her. 12. In regard to incident on 18th August, 2008, the evidence of PW-1 Santosh shows that Accused had informed him on telephone that Manisha had attempted to set herself on fire, but she sustained the minor injuries. The evidence of PW1 Santosh further discloses that, he had advised Accused to take Manisha to hospital. Accused again made telephone call to him at about 10.30 p.m. in the said night. His evidence further shows that, on 19th August, 2008 during night hours at about 1.00 a.m., Accused informed him on telephone that Accused along with Manisha had been to parental house of Manisha. The evidence of PW-1 shows that, he was residing separately from his parents and during the said night he had been to the residence of his parents. The evidence of PW-1 further shows that Accused dropped Manisha at her parental house and left the said place. The evidence of PW-1 shows that, he was residing separately from his parents and during the said night he had been to the residence of his parents. The evidence of PW-1 further shows that Accused dropped Manisha at her parental house and left the said place. His evidence further shows that in the next morning at about 6.00 a.m., he took one Dr.Anil Sawant to the residence of his parents for medical treatment of Manisha, but upon examination doctor informed that Manisha was no more. 13. The evidence of PW-2 Indubai, who is informant in this case, shows that Accused used to harass and beat Manisha on trifle grounds. Regarding the incident, the evidence of informant shows that three years prior to the incident Accused had been to her house during night at about 1.00 a.m. along with Manisha who was wrapped in one blanket in the vehicle in which Accused had been to her house. The evidence of informant further shows that Accused and three other persons who were accompanying Accused, had lifted her daughter Manisha and brought her inside the house. Her evidence further shows that soon thereafter Accused left her residence along with his three companions, saying that he had some work therefore he was going back and his parents would come later. The evidence of informant further shows that thereafter she had removed blanket and noticed that her daughter Manisha had received extensive burn injuries. The evidence of informant shows that when asked, Manisha stated that Accused had illicit relations with one lady and as Manisha was neither visiting the residential place of that lady nor talking with said lady, and on that count Accused used to beat her frequently. The evidence of informant further discloses that Manisha told her that on the day of incident Accused even did not allow Manisha to take food and in the evening at about 6.00 p.m., Accused poured kerosene on the person of Manisha and set her on fire, due to which Manisha sustained burn injuries. On the next day morning Manisha succumbed to the said burn injuries. 14. The defence Counsel has extensively cross examined PW-1 and PW-2, but nothing useful to the defence elicited from the said cross examination, Thus, the evidence of both these prosecution witnesses is trustworthy, reliable and consistent with each other. On the next day morning Manisha succumbed to the said burn injuries. 14. The defence Counsel has extensively cross examined PW-1 and PW-2, but nothing useful to the defence elicited from the said cross examination, Thus, the evidence of both these prosecution witnesses is trustworthy, reliable and consistent with each other. Learned counsel has challenged the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 on the ground that, the prosecution has examined only interested witnesses and no independent witness has been examined. However in this respect it is pertinent to note that, when the incident took place only Manisha and Accused were present in the house and therefore there was no occasion to anybody to witness the incident. 15. Upon careful perusal of evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, it emerges on record that the Accused was having illicit relations with one lady, and on that count he used to frequently beat Manisha. On the day of incident when Manisha received burn injuries, the Accused instead of taking her in the nearby hospital at Pune, travelled more than two hours distance, and went to Wathar Station, Koregaon, Dist. Satara and dropped Manisha in her parental house in burnt condition and soon thereafter left the parental house of Manisha. Thus this conduct of the Accused soon after the incident was not at all natural. Any prudent person in such a situation, where his wife has received such extensive burn injuries, would immediately try to take the patient in the nearby hospital for treatment, and would not travel such long distance and leave his wife to her parental house in 95% burn condition. At this stage, it would be useful to refer to the provisions of Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads as under :- "Section 8 : Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct.- that any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact. At this stage, it would be useful to refer to the provisions of Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which reads as under :- "Section 8 : Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct.- that any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact. The conduct of any party, or of any agent to any party, to any suit or proceeding in reference to such suit or proceedings, or in reference to any fact in issue therein or relevant thereto, and the conduct of any person an offence against whom is the subject of any proceeding, is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or subsequent thereto." 16. As observed earlier, in the present case the subsequent conduct of the Accused/Appellant after the incident is not at all natural, in as much as, soon after the incident Accused did not try to take his wife in the nearby hospital, but taken wife Manisha to her parental house by travelling the distance of more than two hours. 17. Pw-4 Sakharam Tukaram Bokephode is the panch to the spot panchanama (Exhibit P-54). The evidence of PW-4 shows that in his presence spot panchanama was prepared at the spot of incident, situate at Malwadi, Punawale, Tq. Mulshi, Dist. Pune owned by one Vithal Dagadu Dhawale. His evidence further shows that one plastic can, one match box and pieces of burnt clothes were seized from the spot. Thus, this witness has proved the spot panchanama. When match box - Article P-2 and burnt pieces of clothes Article P-3 were shown to him, he identified the same. Thus the evidence of PW-4 shows that from the spot of incident Police seized one plastic can, one match box and pieces of burnt clothes and thus the evidence of PW-4 lends support to the prosecution case and shows that the prosecution has proved that the incident of pouring kerosene on the person of deceased Manisha and setting her on fire took place at the residential house of Accused. 18. Pw-3 Jagannath Laxman Shinde is the panch to seizure panchanama (Exhibit P-52) regarding seizure of burnt clothes of deceased smelling of kerosene. 18. Pw-3 Jagannath Laxman Shinde is the panch to seizure panchanama (Exhibit P-52) regarding seizure of burnt clothes of deceased smelling of kerosene. PW-6 Ramesh Tukaram Pawar, API Thane City Police Station was the Investigating Officer and he deposed about the manner in which he has carried out the investigation of the crime. 19. In support of its case, the defence has examined DW-1 Shri Vithal Dagadu Dhavale, who was land lord of Accused at the relevant time. His evidence shows that at the relevant time accused and Manisha were residing as his tenants. His evidence shows that on 18th August, 2008 at about 8.00 p.m. he had been to the house of Accused to demand rent from him at which time Accused was not at the resident and his wife Manisha told that, Accused would return at about 9.00 p.m. and the land lord should come after 9.00 p.m. to claim rent and therefore he returned back. His evidence further shows that after 9.00 p.m. to 9.30 p.m., he received phone call from the neighbour of Accused that smoke was coming from the residential room of Accused. His evidence further shows that after some time he had been to the said room of Accused and at the said place Manisha, wife of Accused was seen in burnt condition. His evidence further shows that Accused Ravindra was present there and he asked Accused as to what had happened, and Accused told that there was nothing serious and Manisha had minor burns and that Accused was taking her to hospital for treatment. During the course of cross examination, when asked DW-1 Vithal has specifically stated that when he had been to the said room of Accused at about 9.00 p.m. to 9.30 p.m., on receipt of phone call from his neighbour the said room was closed from inside. 20. Thus upon careful perusal of the evidence of DW-1 Vithal, it is crystal clear that through the evidence of this defence witness, nothing has been brought on record to disprove the prosecution case. On the contrary evidence of DW-1 Vithal supports the prosecution case, as this witness has specifically stated that when he had been to the house of the Accused at that time, Manisha was seen in burnt condition and Accused Ravindra was very well present there. On the contrary evidence of DW-1 Vithal supports the prosecution case, as this witness has specifically stated that when he had been to the house of the Accused at that time, Manisha was seen in burnt condition and Accused Ravindra was very well present there. Thus evidence on record convincingly shows that at the time of incident only Manisha and Accused Ravindra were present in the house. Manisha being the wife of Ravindra, was in his custody and the fact that how she received burn injuries, was exclusively within the knowledge of Accused Ravindra. Therefore, it was obligatory on the part of the accused husband to explain how his wife Manisha received such extensive burn injuries. But the accused has not given any explanation how Manisha sustained burn injuries except he stated to Santosh Kamble (P@-1) that, Manisha attempted to set herself on fire. 21. We have discussed the entire evidence brought on record by the prosecution. As observed earlier, the evidence of PW-1 Santosh and PW-2 Indubai shows that, Accused was ill-treating and harassing Manisha. The evidence on record shows that, Accused had illicit relations with one another lady and on the said count also he was harassing and beating his wife Manisha. The evidence on record shows that marriage between the couple took place in the year 2004 and the incident had taken place in the year 2008, and thus within four years of the marriage, Manisha succumbed to the burn injuries. Thus the prosecution has proved that the Accused has committed an offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC. 22. As observed earlier, the evidence on record shows that, at the time of incident Accused was very well present in the house and Manisha has given oral dying declaration to her mother and specifically stated that, Accused was having illicit relations with another lady and on that count he always used to beat Manisha and in the night of incident quarrel took place between the couple on the said count, and Accused poured kerosene on the person of Manisha and set her on fire. Thus the prosecution has proved that the Accused/Appellant has committed an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. 23. Thus the prosecution has proved that the Accused/Appellant has committed an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. 23. Therefore, upon considering the evidence in its entirety, we are of the opinion that the findings recorded by the Trial Court are in consonance with the evidence brought on record and hence we do not think it necessary to cause interference in the findings recorded by the Trial Court. 24. We do not find that there is any substance in the Appeal. Accordingly the Criminal Appeal stands dismissed. 25. We appreciate the sincere efforts taken by learned counsel Mr. Swapnil Ovalekar in extending able assistance to this Court during the course of hearing of the Appeal so as to reach to the proper conclusion. Since Mr. Swapnil Ovalekar, learned counsel is appointed to prosecute the cause of the appellant, his fees and expenses are quantified at Rs. 10,000/- (Rs. Ten Thousand only). We direct the High Court Legal Services Committee, Mumbai to pay the aforesaid fees and expenses to the learned appointed counsel within four weeks from receipt of copy of the judgment. Having consented and submitted to the jurisdiction of U.S. Law, we do not think that Mr Dada is correct in submitting that the arbitration award is governed by the Laws of India. 29. One must not lose sight of the fact that the parties are free to choose which law would apply to the arbitration agreement. This is a matter of contract. Taking this into consideration, we think that it would be also very relevant to see how the parties themselves understood and interpreted clauses 15 and 16 of the Escrow Agreement. It is not in dispute that respondent Nos.3 to 6 were not parties to the arbitration agreement contained in clause 15. Despite this, the appellant purported to join respondent Nos.3 to 6 as parties to the arbitration proceedings. Thereafter, respondent Nos.3 to 6 moved an application before the Arbitral Tribunal objecting to the Arbitral Tribunal's jurisdiction over them. In response to the said application, the appellant filed its reply dated 28th November, 2012 wherein the appellant took a categorical stand that respondent Nos.3 to 6, though not expressly being signatories to the amended Escrow Agreement, the Tribunal was nonetheless bound to arbitrate this dispute under the Federal Arbitration Act and the prevailing New York Law. In response to the said application, the appellant filed its reply dated 28th November, 2012 wherein the appellant took a categorical stand that respondent Nos.3 to 6, though not expressly being signatories to the amended Escrow Agreement, the Tribunal was nonetheless bound to arbitrate this dispute under the Federal Arbitration Act and the prevailing New York Law. Further, in its post-hearing brief dated 15th May, 2015, the appellant clearly stated that "the joinder of parties to arbitration is a procedural matter, to be considered under U.S. Law". From what we have stated, it is quite clear that the appellant itself understood clauses 15 & 16 in such a way that the arbitration agreement would be governed by U.S. Law. 30. We are unable to agree with Mr Dada that the appellant's reliance on the Federal Arbitration Act is irrelevant and immaterial for determination of the law applicable to the arbitration agreement. We find no merit in the argument of the appellant that the reliance placed by the respondents about the conduct of the appellant cannot confer jurisdiction and which according to Mr Dada, is a well settled proposition. As stated earlier, the appellant themselves had relied upon the Federal Arbitration Act to substantiate the joinder of respondent Nos.3 to 6 to the Arbitration Proceedings. Having done so, it was clear that the appellant herein and all throughout, were also of the view that the law governing the arbitration agreement was U.S. Law. It is only now, and when the petition was filed under Section 34 of the Act that the appellant takes a stand that Indian Law governs the arbitration agreement. We are clearly of the view that this is another factor and on the basis of the interpretation of the appellant itself that the law governing the arbitration agreement was U.S. Law and not the Indian Law. We, therefore, do not think that the actions of the appellant to justify and substantiate the joinder of respondent Nos.3 to 6 to the arbitration proceedings is irrelevant as contended by Mr Dada. It is not in dispute that the parties by contract can choose the law applicable to the arbitration agreement. This being the case, how the parties understood the contract is certainly a very relevant factor that would be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion as to which law applies to the arbitration agreement. It is not in dispute that the parties by contract can choose the law applicable to the arbitration agreement. This being the case, how the parties understood the contract is certainly a very relevant factor that would be taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion as to which law applies to the arbitration agreement. This being the case, we are clearly of the view that the arbitration agreement was not governed by Indian Law as contended by Mr Dada but was governed by U.S. Law. 31. Before concluding this issue, we must mention that Mr Dada has relied upon clause 16 of the Escrow Agreement to contend that Indian Law was expressly made applicable to the arbitration agreement. Mr Dada submitted that clause 16 deals with the Governing Law and clearly stipulates that the Escrow Agreement is governed by and to be construed in accordance with the laws of India. He submitted that clause 16 only excluded clauses 4.7, 12.3, 14.1.7, 14.1.8, 18.6 and 18.7 from the applicability of Indian Law. He submitted that clause 15 (which deals with Dispute Resolution) was not excluded from the applicability of the Indian Law. This being the case, he submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in coming to the conclusion that U.S. Law applied to the arbitration agreement. 32. We are unable to agree with this submission for the simple reason that it is now all well settled that even though the arbitration clause may be contained in the main agreement, it is to be treated as a separate agreement altogether and in fact even survives termination of the main agreement as provided in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Arbitation Agreement is a stand alone agreement. Either it can be in a separate document providing that the parties agree to submit the dispute that arise between them under another agreement to arbitration, or in the main agreement itself the arbitration clause can be incorporated. In either situation, the arbitration agreement is an agreement by itself. This is well settled, but if one needs to refer to any authority on this subject it would be apposite to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of SMS Tea Estates (P) Ltd. v. Chandmari Tea Co. (P) Ltd., (2011) 14 SCC 66 . Paragraphs 12 & 13 of this decision read thus:- "12. This is well settled, but if one needs to refer to any authority on this subject it would be apposite to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of SMS Tea Estates (P) Ltd. v. Chandmari Tea Co. (P) Ltd., (2011) 14 SCC 66 . Paragraphs 12 & 13 of this decision read thus:- "12. When a contract contains an arbitration agreement, it is a collateral term relating to the resolution of disputes, unrelated to the performance of the contract. It is as if two contracts-one in regard to the substantive terms of the main contract and the other relating to resolution of disputes-had been rolled into one, for purposes of convenience. An arbitration clause is therefore an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract or the instrument. Resultantly, even if the contract or its performance is terminated or comes to an end on account of repudiation, frustration or breach of contract, the arbitration agreement would survive for the purpose of resolution of disputes arising under or in connection with the contract. 13. Similarly, when an instrument or deed of transfer (or a document affecting immovable property) contains an arbitration agreement, it is a collateral term relating to resolution of disputes, unrelated to the transfer or transaction affecting the immovable property. It is as if two documents-one affecting the immovable property requiring registration and the other relating to resolution of disputes which is not compulsorily registerable-are rolled into a single instrument. Therefore, even if a deed of transfer of immovable property is challenged as not valid or enforceable, the arbitration agreement would remain unaffected for the purpose of resolution of disputes arising with reference to the deed of transfer." 33. As noted earlier clause 15 and which is the arbitration agreement between parties, clearly stipulates that the Aritrating Parties shall submit to a binding arbitration and the arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association and the place of arbitration shall be New York, New York or such other place as may be agreed upon by the Arbitrating Parties. This being the case, we are clearly of the view that clause 16 of the Escrow Agreement which provides only certain clauses that would be governed by New York Law, would not take within its ambit the arbitration agreement contained in clause 15. This being the case, we are clearly of the view that clause 16 of the Escrow Agreement which provides only certain clauses that would be governed by New York Law, would not take within its ambit the arbitration agreement contained in clause 15. This is for the simple reason that clause 15 is the arbitration agreement and is an agreement by itself though contained in the Escrow Agreement. To put it differently, clause 16 would apply to the main agreement (the Escrow Agreement) and not clause 15 thereof which is the arbitration agreement and in law is a separate and a stand alone agreement from the main agreement. This is why, and correctly so, we find no reference to clause 15 as one of the clauses being excluded from the application of Indian Law. We, therefore, find that this argument of Mr Dada also needs to be rejected. We may hasten to add that it would be totally different if the arbitration agreement was completely silent on which law would apply to it. In such a situation, it could possibly be argued that the law governing the main contract would also govern the arbitration agreement. However, that is not the case before us. 34. We find that the facts of the present case clearly fall within the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Yograj Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Ssang Yong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd, (2011) 9 SCC 735 and thereafter as clarified in Yograj Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Ssang Yong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd., (2012) 12 SCC 359. In the case of Yograj, the Supreme Court also held that once the parties had specifically agreed that the arbitration proceedings would be continued in accordance with Foreign Law, the decision in Bhatia would no longer apply. In fact the decision in Yograj was followed by a Division Bench of this Court to which one of us was a party (B. P. Colabawalla J.), in the case of Harkirat Singh Vs. Rabobank International Holding, (2015) 5 BomCR 9 [(2015) SCC OnLine Bom 605 : ]. We must also mention that the SLP filed from this Division Bench judgment in the case of Harkirat Singh was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on 12th May, 2016. 35. Rabobank International Holding, (2015) 5 BomCR 9 [(2015) SCC OnLine Bom 605 : ]. We must also mention that the SLP filed from this Division Bench judgment in the case of Harkirat Singh was also dismissed by the Supreme Court on 12th May, 2016. 35. We also find that the present case is covered by another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Reliance II. The Supreme Court in this case was considering a case of a foreign seated arbitration where the arbitration agreement was prior to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case BALCO. The Supreme Court, after discussing the law on the subject, at paragraph 21 held as under: "21. The last paragraph of BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 ] judgment has now to be read with two caveats, both emanating from para 32 of Bhatia International [Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A., (2002) 4 SCC 105 ] itself - that where the Court comes to a determination that the juridical seat is outside India or where law other than Indian law governs the arbitration agreement, Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would be excluded by necessary implication. Therefore, even in the cases governed by the Bhatia [Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A., (2002) 4 SCC 105 ] principle, it is only those cases in which agreements stipulate that the seat of the arbitration is in India or on whose facts a judgment cannot be reached on the seat of the arbitration as being outside India that would continue to be governed by the Bhatia [Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A., (2002) 4 SCC 105 ] principle. Also, it is only those agreements which stipulate or can be read to stipulate that the law governing the arbitration agreement is Indian law which would continue to be governed by the Bhatia [Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A., (2002) 4 SCC 105 ] rule." 36. As can be seen from this decision, the Supreme Court held that where the Court comes to the determination that the juridical seat is outside India OR where Foreign Law governs the arbitration agreement, Part-I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would be excluded by necessary implication. As can be seen from this decision, the Supreme Court held that where the Court comes to the determination that the juridical seat is outside India OR where Foreign Law governs the arbitration agreement, Part-I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would be excluded by necessary implication. The Supreme Court opined that, therefore, even in the cases governed by the Bhatia principle it was only those cases in which the seat of arbitration was in India or on whose facts a judgment could not be reached on the seat of arbitration being outside India, that would continue to govern by the judgment of Bhatia. The Supreme Court also held that it is only those agreements which stipulate or can be read to stipulate that the law governing the arbitration agreement is Indian Law, it would continue to be governed by the principles laid down in Bhatia's case. 37. Having said this, we shall now turn our attention to what was the juridical seat of the arbitration. In this context, if one refers to clause 15, it clearly stipulates that the place of the arbitration shall be New York, New York or such other place as may be agreed upon by the Arbitrating Parties. Mr Dada submitted that what the agreement provides was only the venue of the arbitration and seat of arbitration was not fixed under clause 15. 38. We are unable to agree with this submission. On a plain reading of clause 15, it is clear that the place of arbitration referred to in clause 15 is the seat of arbitration. The parties expressly chose to have the place of arbitration in New York. This being the case, juridical seat of arbitration was New York. In fact, the appellant themselves invoked arbitration and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of New York. This being the case, we do not think that Mr Dada is correct in his submission that the place of arbitration referred to in clause 15 was merely a venue and not a seat of arbitration. In fact, the appellant themselves invoked arbitration and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of New York. This being the case, we do not think that Mr Dada is correct in his submission that the place of arbitration referred to in clause 15 was merely a venue and not a seat of arbitration. In this regard it would be apposite to refer to Section 2(2) [and which falls in Part - I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996] which reads thus: "(2) This Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India: "Provided that subject to an agreement to the contrary, the provisions of sections 9, 27 and clause (a) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of section 37 shall also apply to international commercial arbitration, even if the place of arbitration is outside India, and an arbitral award made or to be made in such place is enforceable and recognized under the provisions of Part II of this Act." 39. Section 2(2) of the Act falls in Part - I of the Act and stipulates that Part - I shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India. The proviso to Section 2(2) [and which was inserted by Act 3 of 2016 w.r.e.f. 23rd October, 2015], clearly carves out an exception as to which provisions of Part - I would apply even though the place of arbitration was outside India. Those provisions are Sections 9, 27, 37(1)(a) and 37(3) of the said Act. From a plain reading of these provisions, two things become clear. Firstly, even the Act clearly stipulates that Part - I would apply only where the place of arbitration is in India. Secondly, the proviso to Section 2(2) also clearly stipulates that even though the place of arbitration may be outside India, the provisions of Section 9, 27, 37(1)(a) and 37(3) would also apply to International Commercial Arbitrations. This is subject to an agreement to the contrary. What is important to note is that Section 34 and which falls within Part - I and deals with challenge to the arbitral award, does not find place in the proviso. This is subject to an agreement to the contrary. What is important to note is that Section 34 and which falls within Part - I and deals with challenge to the arbitral award, does not find place in the proviso. In other words, what the proviso makes explicit is that even if the place of arbitration is outside India and it is an International Commercial Arbitration, then also, only Sections 9, 27, 37(1)(a) and 37(3) of Part - I would continue to apply to such an arbitration. No other provision of Part - I of the Act would apply where the place of arbitration was outside India. 40. If we were to apply section 2(2) along with its proviso to the facts of the present case, we find that even in clause 15.1 [the clause regarding Dispute Resolution] clearly stipulates that the place of arbitration shall be New York, New York or such other place as agreed upon by the arbitrating parties. It is not in dispute that the arbitration was in fact initiated by the appellant in New York and was thereafter held in New York under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. This being the case and without anything more, we find that the reference to place of arbitration in clause 15.1 of the Escrow Agreement was clearly the seat of arbitration which was outside India. This being our conclusion, and when one reads this with the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Act, it becomes abundantly clear that a challenge to such an award could not have been brought before this Court under Section 34 of the Act which falls within Part - I. Once we come to this conclusion, then clearly, neither the seat of arbitration was in India and nor the law governing the arbitration agreement was Indian Law. If this is the case and as mentioned earlier, this is also how the parties understood it, then Part-I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was impliedly excluded. Corollary to this is that the appellant could not have approached the Courts in India under Section 34 of the Act to challenge the award. 41. Whilst on this subject, we would also like to take note of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EITZEN Bulk A/S Vs. Corollary to this is that the appellant could not have approached the Courts in India under Section 34 of the Act to challenge the award. 41. Whilst on this subject, we would also like to take note of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EITZEN Bulk A/S Vs. Ashapura Minechem Ltd. and Anr., (2016) 11 SCC 508 (for short "EITZEN Bulk") . The Supreme Court in paragraph 34 of this decision has clearly held that as a matter of fact, mere choosing of a juridical seat of arbitration attracts the law applicable to said location. In other words, the Supreme Court held that it would not be necessary to specify which law would apply to the arbitration proceedings, since the law of that particular country would apply ipso jure. To buttress this finding the Supreme Court relied upon a passage from Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration. Paragraphs 34 & 35 of this decision reads thus: "34. As a matter of fact the mere choosing of the juridical seat of arbitration attracts the law applicable to such location. In other words, it would not be necessary to specify which law would apply to the arbitration proceedings, since the law of the particular country would apply ipso jure. The following passage from Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration contains the following explication of the issue: "It is also sometimes said that parties have selected the procedural law that will govern their arbitration, by providing for arbitration in a particular country. This is too elliptical and, as an English court itself held more recently in Breas of Doune Wind Farm it does not always hold true. What the parties have done is to choose a place of arbitration in a particular country. That choice brings with it submission to the laws of that country, including any mandatory provisions of its law on arbitration. To say that the parties have "chosen" that particular law to govern the arbitration is rather like saying that an English woman who takes her car to France has "chosen" French traffic law, which will oblige her to drive on the right-hand side of the road, to give priority to vehicles approaching from the right, and generally to obey traffic laws to which she may not be accustomed. But it would be an odd use of language to say this notional motorist had opted for "French traffic law". What she has done is to choose to go to France. The applicability of French law then follows automatically. It is not a matter of choice. Parties may well choose a particular place of arbitration precisely because its lex arbitri is one which they find attractive. Nevertheless, once a place of arbitration has been chosen, it brings with it its own law. If that law contains provisions that are mandatory so far as arbitration are concerned, those provisions must be obeyed. It is not a matter of choice any more than the notional motorist is free to choose which local traffic laws to obey and which to disregard." 35. In this view of the matter, the judgment of the Gujarat High Court holding that Ashapura's objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act are tenable before a court in India, that is, the court at Jamkhambhalia, Gujarat is contrary to law. The proceedings under Section 34, which occurs in Part I, are liable to be dismissed as untenable. The civil appeals of Eitzen are liable to succeed and are, therefore, allowed. The judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 3-12-2015 [Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Ashapura Minechem Ltd., (2016) 1 BomCR 466, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 5909 :] enforcing the foreign award under Part II of the Arbitration Act is correct and liable to be upheld." 42. We must mention that even this Court in Harkirat Singh has relied upon the very same passage from Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration that has been relied upon by the Supreme Court in the case of EITZEN Bulk. 43. Mr Dada, faced with all the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court submitted that all these decisions have been referred to a larger bench in the case of Union of India Vs. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc., (2018) 7 SCC 374 . He therefore submitted that the issue is still at large before the Supreme Court. Firstly, we must mention that merely because an issue has been referred to a larger bench will not in any way prevent us from deciding the present issue. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc., (2018) 7 SCC 374 . He therefore submitted that the issue is still at large before the Supreme Court. Firstly, we must mention that merely because an issue has been referred to a larger bench will not in any way prevent us from deciding the present issue. In any event, after this judgment was reserved on 14th September, 2018, we found that the reference made to a larger bench in Hardy Exploration has been decided by a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court vide its decision dated 25th September, 2018 [2018 SCC OnLine SC 1640]. In view thereof, and after we noticed the three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Hardy Exploration, we placed this matter on board on 25th October, 2018 to give an opportunity to the parties to address us on this decision, though earlier a full hearing was over and the judgment was reserved. Accordingly, Mr Dada as well as Mr Chinoy have addressed us on the decision of the larger bench of the Supreme Court in Hardy Exploration. 44. The facts of Hardy Exploration would reveal that a challenge was laid before the Delhi High Court to the award made by the Arbitrators in Kuala Lumpur under section 34 of the Act. The challenge to the said award was contested mainly on the ground that the Courts in India did not have jurisdiction to entertain the challenge under section 34 of the Act. This contention was accepted by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. This is how the matter first came up before the Supreme Court and was thereafter referred to the larger bench. The larger bench, whilst deciding Hardy Exploration, referred to all the judgments that we have been referred to herein and thereafter in paragraph 39 (of the SCC OnLine SC Report) inter alia noted that the terms "place" and "seat" are used interchangeably. When only the term "place" is stated and mentioned and no other condition is postulated, it is equivalent to "seat" and that finalizes the facet of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court further held that however, if a condition precedent is attached to the term "place", the said condition has to be satisfied so that the "place" can become equivalent to "seat". Paragraph 39 of the said judgment reads thus :- "39. The Supreme Court further held that however, if a condition precedent is attached to the term "place", the said condition has to be satisfied so that the "place" can become equivalent to "seat". Paragraph 39 of the said judgment reads thus :- "39. The word 'determination' has to be contextually determined. When a 'place' is agreed upon, it gets the status of seat which means the juridical seat. We have already noted that the terms 'place' and 'seat' are used interchangeably. When only the term 'place' is stated or mentioned and no other condition is postulated, it is equivalent to 'seat' and that finalises the facet of jurisdiction. But if a condition precedent is attached to the term 'place', the said condition has to be satisfied so that the place can become equivalent to seat. In the instant case, as there are two distinct and disjunct riders, either of them have to be satisfied to become a place. As is evident, there is no agreement. As far as determination is concerned, there has been no determination. In Ashok Leyland Limited and State of T.N.29, the Court has reproduced the definition of 'determination' from Law Lexicon, 2nd Edition by Aiyar, P. Ramanatha and Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition. The relevant paragraphs read thus:- "Determination or order.-The expression 'determination' signifies an effective expression of opinion which ends a controversy or a dispute by some authority to whom it is submitted under a valid law for disposal. The expression 'order' must have also a similar meaning, except that it need not operate to end the dispute. Determination or order must be judicial or quasi-judicial. Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Lakshmi Chand (Constitution of India, Article 136)." "A 'determination' is a 'final judgment' for purposes of appeal when the trial court has completed its adjudication of the rights of the parties in the action. Thomas Van Dyken Joint Venture v. Van Dyken."" 45. What we find that is in the facts of the case in Hardy Exploration, the Supreme Court, after considering the arbitration clause and Article 20 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, came to the conclusion that in the facts of that case, since only the venue was Kuala Lumpur and it was not the "seat", the Courts in India had jurisdiction to entertain the challenge the award under section 34 of the Act. We must mention here that in the case of Hardy Exploration the arbitration agreement/clause was completely silent on which law was to govern the arbitration agreement. This is clear from paragraph 30 of this decision where the arbitration clause has been reproduced. 46. On reading paragraph 39 of this decision (and as reproduced by us above), we think that the controversy before us is now completely put to rest. In the facts of the present case, clause 15.1 clearly stipulates that the "place" of arbitration shall be New York or such other "place" as agreed to by the parties. It is not in dispute that the arbitration was initiated by the Appellant in New York and arbitration took place in New York. The award was also passed in New York. There was no condition precedent attached to the term "place" in clause 15.1. This being the case and as set out by the Supreme Court in paragraph 39 of its decision in Hardy Exploration, the term "place" of arbitration would be equivalent to "seat" of arbitration. We therefore find that even on the strength of this decision, the "seat" of arbitration in the facts before us was clearly New York. To put it differently, the "seat" of arbitration was not in India but was outside India. This being the case, Part - I of the Act was clearly excluded. 47. As far as the reliance placed by Mr Dada on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sumitomo is concerned, we find that this decision has absolutely no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. As rightly submitted by Mr Chinoy, in the case of Sumitomo, the Supreme Court has held that upon the conclusion of the arbitration (that is on the passing of the award) the Arbitral Tribunal becomes functus officio and the corresponding authority of the courts administering the curial law ceases. On aspects of enforcement and setting aside, they are entirely governed by the law governing the arbitration agreement only. Firstly, we must mention that in the case of Sumitomo the Supreme Court was interpreting the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and not the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which in fact, are quite different from the earlier Arbitration Act. Firstly, we must mention that in the case of Sumitomo the Supreme Court was interpreting the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and not the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which in fact, are quite different from the earlier Arbitration Act. Secondly, the decision in Sumitomo has been discussed in great detail by the larger bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Hardy Exploration and the Supreme Court (in paragraph 11 thereof) has clearly held that the principles laid down in Sumitomo were in no way applicable to the concept of determination of jurisdiction. This has been again reiterated in paragraph 27 wherein it is held that Sumitomo has no applicability to a controversy under the 1996 Act. We therefore find that no assistance can be derived by Mr. Dada from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sumitomo. 48. Even otherwise, assuming for the sake of argument that this judgment would apply, the same certainly does not fit into the facts and circumstances of the present case. Even assuming that the Curial Law ceases to apply after passing of the award, the Supreme Court in the case of Sumitomo has held that the law governing the arbitration agreement would continue to apply even after the passing of the award. In the facts of the present case, we have categorically found that the law governing the arbitration agreement was U.S. Law. This being the case, even if the ratio laid down in Sumitomo were to apply, in the facts of present case, we find that this judgment does not support the case of the appellant. We must point out that the Supreme Court in the case of EITZEN Bulk (in paragraph 34 thereof) has clearly laid down the law that once the party chooses the juridical seat of arbitration, the law applicable to said location/seat is automatically attracted and the law of that particular country would apply ipso jure. We, therefore, find that the reliance placed by Mr Dada on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sumitomo is wholly misplaced. 49. Similarly we find that the reliance placed by Mr Dada on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of NTPC Vs. Singer is also wholly misplaced. In fact this judgment of NTPC Vs. 49. Similarly we find that the reliance placed by Mr Dada on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of NTPC Vs. Singer is also wholly misplaced. In fact this judgment of NTPC Vs. Singer was considered by the Supreme Court in Reliance II wherein the Court pointed out that the case of NTPC Vs. Singer was decided in the context of Section 9(b) of the Foreign Awards Act, 1961 which stipulates that the award made in respect of the contract governed by Indian Law would not be considered a foreign award. The Supreme Court in Reliance II held that NTPC Vs. Singer was no longer applicable as it did not give effect to the difference between the substantive law of the contract and the law that governed the arbitration. The Supreme Court held that since the contruction of Section 9(b) of Foreign Awards Act, 1961 led to the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction, the 1996 Act, while enacting Section 9(a) of the repealed Foreign Awards Act, 1961 (in Section 51 of the 1996 Act), was careful enough to omit Section 9(b) of the 1961 Act, which excluded the Foreign Awards Act, 1961 from applying to any award made on arbitration agreements governed by the Laws of India. In these circumstances, we find that the reliance placed by Mr Dada on NTPC Vs. Singer is also wholly misconceived. 50. To sum it up in a nutshell, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, once the juridical seat of arbitration is outside India, and also the law governing the arbitration agreement is Foreign Law, then clearly, Part-I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is impliedly excluded. This being the case, we find that the learned Single Judge was absolutely correct in holding that the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, could not be challenged before this Court, under Section 34 of the Act. 51. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.