ORDER : Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Union of India. 2. Petitioner, a constable, under CISF while posted at CISF Unit, Bokaro Steel Plant, Bokaro was proceeded against for the following charges vide charge sheet dated 19.11.2008 (Annexure-3). (i) On 05.10.2008 he was deputed in the second shift between 13.00 hrs. to 21.00 hrs. at S.W.S North gate of B.S.L. Unit. He was found absent from his post without any prior information or permission from the competent authority. This conduct of the petitioner reflected acts of serious negligence and indiscipline. (ii) During the same period on the same day, after the shift was over, he appeared at the post at 21.15 hrs. and both his hands were found blackened. He thereafter left as a pillion rider on a private motorcycle of Constable M. Bhagat. A suspicious object was kept in between them on the bike. On being asked to stop by the Quick Response Team (QRT), he did not stop, rather motorcycle was driven at a very fast speed. It showed that he was involved in a suspicious behaviour of having stolen some property of the Plant. After the incident on 05.10.2008 petitioner was placed under suspension on 06.10.2008 (Annexure-2). Petitioner submitted his reply on 29.11.2008 denying the charges (Annexure-4). He also stated about his illness and that he was not stopped by the QRT. On 11.12.2008 his suspension was revoked vide Annexure-5. The Presenting Officer submitted his brief note vide Annexure-7 dated 05.03.2009. Petitioner also submitted his reply vide Annexure-8. The inquiry was conducted by the Inspector, CISF, BSL, Bokaro. 3. Prosecution adduced six witnesses. Four witnesses were summoned by the court including Constable M. Bhagat on whose motorcycle petitioner had driven out from the Unit on the fateful day after the shift hour. Petitioner did not adduce any witness in his defence. Apart from his defence statement, certain documents which include medical book (Annexure-1) were exhibited. Petitioner had taken a plea that he was suffering from dysentery. He had undertaken treatment at the Bokaro Steel Plant General Hospital and was prescribed medicines on 03.10.2008 and also on 04.10.2008. On the fateful day also, he was suffering from dysentery and had gone out to relieve himself for a while when he was found absent from his post. The Inquiry Officer held that charge no. 1 is proved. However, charge no. 2 was held as not proved. On the fateful day also, he was suffering from dysentery and had gone out to relieve himself for a while when he was found absent from his post. The Inquiry Officer held that charge no. 1 is proved. However, charge no. 2 was held as not proved. The Inquiry Officer came to a finding that on 05.10.2008 petitioner was found absent without information or permission. This conduct amounted to grave negligence and indiscipline on the part of a Member of the Disciplined Force towards his duty. In respect of charge no. 2, the Inquiry Officer referred to the statement of prosecution witness nos. 3 to 5 and court witness no. 4 and observed that the court witness no. 2 constable M. Bhagat did accept that the petitioner rode as a pillion rider with certain objects with him, but none of these witnesses were able to prove as to what that object was. Apart from above, PW-2 had deposed that both hands of the petitioner were blackened, but in answer to charge no. 2, he further stated that constable Rajendra Kumar was present at Kurmidih gate. Constable Rajendra Kumar in answer to charge no. 2 did not confirm that both hands of the petitioner were blackened. As such, charge no. 2 was not established. The inquiry report is Annexure-9 dated 17.03.2009. 4. The Disciplinary Authority gave a disagreement note, so far as finding on charge no. 2 is concerned while issuing second show-cause notice upon the petitioner. The Disciplinary Authority observed in his note that the prosecution witnesses no. 2 had found both hands of the delinquent blackened. Thereafter, constable M. Bhagat (CW-2) had also stated that the delinquent rode on his motorcycle as a pillion rider by keeping certain suspicious objects in between them and proceeded towards his house. He further observed that on being asked by the QRT Team inquiry, the delinquent did not stop, rather the motorcycle sped away. This fact was deposed by the prosecution witness no. 3 B.K. Yadav, who also confirmed that there was some object on the seat between the constable M. Bhagat and delinquent. Statement of PW-3 was supported by PWs-4 and 5 and court witness no. 4 Constable Jaswinder Singh that there was some object in between the two on the motorcycle, but they could not prove as to what that object was. Apart from that, court witness no. Statement of PW-3 was supported by PWs-4 and 5 and court witness no. 4 Constable Jaswinder Singh that there was some object in between the two on the motorcycle, but they could not prove as to what that object was. Apart from that, court witness no. 2 Constable M. Bhagat had also confirmed in his statement that there was a bag (thaila) with the delinquent. As such, on the basis of the documentary evidence and the statement of PWs, 2, 3, 4 and 5 and court witness nos. 2 and 4, second charge against the petitioner were also found to be proved. After recording his reasons for difference of opinion with the findings of the inquiry officer, petitioner was asked to offer reply to the second show-cause notice which also enclosed the inquiry report dated 23.03.2009 (Annexure-10). 5. Petitioner submitted his reply (Annexure-11) on 08.04.2009. He took the plea that he was suffering from dysentery and was under medication since 03.10.2008. For this reason, he had left the post for a while on 05.10.2008 during the second shift of his posting. Petitioner categorically denied the charges of having indulged in theft of any property from BSL Unit. He also referred to the statement of PW-6 Rajendra Kumar on the point that both hands of the petitioner was not found blackened. He pleaded to be exonerated of the charges. However, Disciplinary Authority on consideration of the materials adduced during inquiry and the reply of the petitioner, found both the charges established. Petitioner was imposed with a punishment of reduction of salary for two years by two stages vide order dated 17.04.2009 (Annexure-12). 6. Petitioner preferred an appeal before the D.I.G, CISF. The Appellate Authority also by order dated 15.09.2009 (Annexure-14) upheld the punishment and refused to interfere in the order of punishment. The Appellate Authority was also of the view that the petitioner’s conduct was found to be suspicious nature and in connivance with the constable M. Bhagat, was responsible for theft of property from the Unit. Petitioner preferred revision before the Inspector General, CISF, Eastern Zone, Headquarters, Patna. The Revisional Authority concurred with the opinion of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority on both counts. He also held that the delinquent was found involved in theft of plant’s property which he was supposed to guard. The punishment awarded was already lenient for such a serious charges. The Revisional Authority concurred with the opinion of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority on both counts. He also held that the delinquent was found involved in theft of plant’s property which he was supposed to guard. The punishment awarded was already lenient for such a serious charges. However, in order to give him a chance to improve, no fresh show-cause notice to enhance the punishment was being issued, but the revision petition being devoid of merit, stood rejected (Annexure-16) on 31.03.2010. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has made following submissions in support of the challenge to the impugned orders: In respect of the first charge, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the discussions made by the Enquiry Officer under the heading Analysis- “Vishleshan” at page 81 of the writ petition i.e. enquiry report. He submits that specific plea of medical ground raised by the petitioner relying upon the prescriptions of the doctors at General Hospital, Bokaro Steel Plant recorded in his medical book (Annexure-1)has been totally ignored. As such, the findings suffered from non consideration of the relevant materials adduced by the petitioner in his defence. Petitioner was bonafide attending the duty despite suffering from stomach ailment for the last two days i.e., 03.10.2008 and 04.10.2008 but had gone out for a while to relieve himself on 05.10.2008 when he was found absent during inspection at the post. There are no charges of habitual absence against the petitioner. As such, the findings on that score also suffers from error in appreciation of the materials produced during enquiry. In respect of the charge no.2, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the whole charge is actuated by a mistaken impression that he was carrying the property of the Unit stolen by him after the shift was over on 05.10.2008 around 9.15 p.m. However, there has been no report of any theft at Bokaro Steel Plant Unit on that particular day. Theft of property are always entered into in station diary and other records maintained in the Unit. The evidence of the prosecution and the court witnesses were duly considered by the Enquiry Officer to come to a finding that charges of suspicious conduct of indulging in theft of property of Bokaro Steel Plant, were not substantiated. Mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof even in a departmental proceeding. The evidence of the prosecution and the court witnesses were duly considered by the Enquiry Officer to come to a finding that charges of suspicious conduct of indulging in theft of property of Bokaro Steel Plant, were not substantiated. Mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof even in a departmental proceeding. Learned counsel for the petitioner in particular has relied upon a judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Roop Singh Negi Versus Punjab National Bank and others [ (2009) 2 SCC 570 , para 23] in support thereof. He further submits that charges of theft on suspicious conduct were of very serious nature and the burden to prima facie establish it was upon the prosecution. Petitioner could not have been saddled with the onus to prove the negative circumstances. On this point, he has relied upon a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Nirmala J. Jhala Versus State of Gujarat and another [ (2013) 4 SCC 301 , para 39]. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the disagreement note of the Disciplinary Authority based on very same material did not establish the second charge against him. However, the Disciplinary Authority proceeded to hold him guilty for the second charge as well on mere ipse dixit. The findings of guilt in respect of second charge were against the weight of evidence. Even if the incidence as it stood were accepted as true, the conclusion drawn by the Disciplinary Authority does not follow therefrom. The principle laid down in the matters of departmental enquiry by the Apex Court permits scrutiny of the conclusion drawn even in a disciplinary proceeding. If the evidence taken as a whole do not lead to the conclusion that charge no.2 were proved against him, the findings on the said charge could be said to be based on no evidence. If the findings on charge no.2 falls to the ground, then the punishment of reduction of salary for two years by two stages is disproportionate and excessive, which should shock the conscience of the Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while summarizing, submitted that the impugned orders suffered on both count, one related to the findings of guilt in respect of charge no. 1and 2 and even if the findings of charge no.1 are assumingly correct, then the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the established misconduct. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while summarizing, submitted that the impugned orders suffered on both count, one related to the findings of guilt in respect of charge no. 1and 2 and even if the findings of charge no.1 are assumingly correct, then the punishment imposed is disproportionate to the established misconduct. As such, this Court under powers of judicial review is required to interfere in the matter. 8. Learned counsel for the Respondent Union of India has adverted to the detailed facts and circumstances relating to the gravity of the charge proved as recorded hereinabove. He has also referred to the detailed material evidence adduced during enquiry on the basis of which, the Enquiry Officer found Charge no.1 proved and Disciplinary Authority also came to the opinion that charge no.2 as well was proved on the same materials. The principles of natural justice has been duly complied with during the course of departmental proceeding. Petitioner has not been able to show that at any stage of the proceeding he was denied opportunity to defend himself. Petitioner was served with second show cause notice containing the disagreement note of the Disciplinary Authority on charge no.2 and thus given ample opportunity to defend. The charge relating to unauthorized absence without information or permission from the competent authority had been fully established. Materials adduced during the enquiry also show the suspicious conduct of the petitioner. He had reappeared at the post immediately after the shift was over at 9 pm. Petitioner’s hand was blackened and that he was carrying a bag has been proved both by the prosecution witnesses and court witness no.2 constable M. Bhagat on whose motor cycle he left the post. The prosecution witnesses have also been able to establish that the petitioner refused to stop the motorcycle on being asked by the QRT Team on that very day. Court witness no.2 also proved that he was carrying a bag on the motorcycle. Disciplinary Authority therefore had proper reasons to differ with the opinion of the Enquiry Officer on Charge no.2. Learned counsel for the Respondent submits that findings of fact in a disciplinary enquiry are not susceptible to be questioned by the Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Court witness no.2 also proved that he was carrying a bag on the motorcycle. Disciplinary Authority therefore had proper reasons to differ with the opinion of the Enquiry Officer on Charge no.2. Learned counsel for the Respondent submits that findings of fact in a disciplinary enquiry are not susceptible to be questioned by the Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. He has placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar Singh Versus Union of India and others [ (2011) 14 SCC 692 , para 23 to 24]. He has also placed reliance on another judgment of Apex Court in the case of Bank of India and another Versus Degala Suryanarayana [ (1999) 5 SCC 762 para 11], which lay down the test in exercise of powers of judicial review while dealing with matters of disciplinary proceeding. Learned counsel for the Respondent submits that there are concurrent findings of there authorities i.e., Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority on the charges. Petitioner is a member of Uniformed Police Force, which require exemplary conduct disciplinary and integrity from its member. If the conduct of the petitioner was found suspicious in nature, Disciplinary Authority had full authority to impose a proper punishment upon him once the charges were proved. Given the nature of the misconduct, the punishment imposed is neither disproportionate nor excessive and does not require reconsideration. He has prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 9. Considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties in the light of the relevant material facts and documents on record. On the conspectus of facts and materials on record, referred to in the foregoing paragraphs and on consideration of the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, the following questions are posed for determination in the instant matter: (i) Whether under powers of judicial review, this court is entitled to examine and test the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority in a departmental proceeding and if so, what are the parameters thereof? (ii) Whether the findings recorded against the petitioner on either of the charges meet the test to be followed in exercise of such powers? (iii) If the contention of the petitioner specifically in relation to the findings on charge no. 2 is accepted, whether the punishment imposed is disproportionate and excessive to the established misconduct? 10. (ii) Whether the findings recorded against the petitioner on either of the charges meet the test to be followed in exercise of such powers? (iii) If the contention of the petitioner specifically in relation to the findings on charge no. 2 is accepted, whether the punishment imposed is disproportionate and excessive to the established misconduct? 10. In order to answer the first question, this court seeks to place reliance upon the Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in the H.C. Goel [ (1964) 4 SCR 718 ] which has been relied upon in the case of Roop Singh Negi Vrs. Punjab National Bank and others [ (2009) 2 SCC 570 , relevant paragraphs thereof is quoted hereunder: “We are not prepared to accept this contention. Mala fide exercise of power can be attacked independently on the ground that it is mala, fide. Such an exercise of power is always liable to be quashed on the main ground that it is not a bona fide exercise of power. But we are not prepared to hold that if mala fide are not alleged and bona fides are assumed in favour of the appellant, its conclusion on a question of fact cannot be successfully challenged even if it is manifest that there is no evidence to support it. The two infirmities are separate and distinct though, conceivably, in some cases both may be present. There may be cases of no evidence even where the Government is acting bona fide; the said infirmity may also exist where the Government is acting mala fide and in that case, the conclusion of the Government not supported by any evidence may be the result of mala fides but that does not mean that if it is proved that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the Government, a writ of certiorari will not issue without further proof of mala fides. That is why we are prepared to accept the learned Attorney-General’s argument that since no mala fides are alleged against the appellant in the present case, no writ of certiorari can be issued in favour of the respondent. That takes us to the merits of the respondent’s contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. That takes us to the merits of the respondent’s contention that the conclusion of the appellant that the third charge framed against the respondent had been proved, is based on no evidence. The learned Attorney-General has stressed before us that in dealing with this question, we ought to bear in mind the fact that the appellant is acting with the determination to root out corruption, and so, if it is shown that the view taken by he appellant is a reasonably possible view, this Court should not sit in appeal over that decision and seek to decide whether this Court would have taken the same view or not. This contention is no doubt absolutely sound. The only test which we can legitimately apply in dealing with this part of the respondent’s case is, is there any evidence on which a finding can be made against the respondent that Charge No.3 was proved against him? In exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 on such a plea, the High Court cannot consider the question about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. That is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which dealt with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence illegally the impugned conclusion follows or not. Applying this test, we are inclined to hold that the respondent’s grievance in well founded because, in our opinion, the finding which is implicit is the appellant’s order dismissing the respondent that charge number 3 is proved against him is based on no evidence.” In the case of Narinder Mohan Arya Versus United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others [ (2006) 4 SCC 713 ], the Apex Court laid down the following principles to be followed by a writ court while deciding the findings arrived at in a departmental proceeding at para-26, which reads as under: “26. Ltd. and others [ (2006) 4 SCC 713 ], the Apex Court laid down the following principles to be followed by a writ court while deciding the findings arrived at in a departmental proceeding at para-26, which reads as under: “26. In our opinion the learned Single Judge and consequently the Division Bench of the High Court did not pose unto themselves the correct question. The matter can be viewed from two angles. Despite limited jurisdiction a civil court, it was entitled to interfere in a case where the report of the enquiry officer is based on no evidence. In a suit filed by a delinquent employee in a civil court as also a writ court, in the event the findings arrived at in the departmental proceedings are questioned before it, it should keep in mind the following: (1) the enquiry officer is not permitted to collect any material from outside sources during the conduct of the enquiry. (See State of Assam v. Mahendra Kumar Das.) (2) In a domestic enquiry fairness in the procedure is a part of the principles of natural justice. (See Khem Chand v. Union of India and State of U.P. v. Om Prakash Gupta.) (3) Exercise of discretionary power involves two elements—(i) objective, and (ii) subjective and existence of the exercise of an objective element is a condition precedent for exercise of the subjective element. (See K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India.) (4) It is not possible to lay down any rigid rules of the principles of natural justice which depend on the facts and circumstances of each case but the concept of fair play in action is the basis. (See Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan.) (5) The enquiry officer is not permitted to travel beyond the charges and any punishment imposed on the basis of a finding which was not the subject-matter of the charges is wholly illegal. [See Director (Inspection & Quality Control) Export Inspection Council of India v. Kalyan Kumar Mitra.] (6) Suspicion or presumption cannot take the place of proof even in a domestic enquiry. The writ court is entitled to interfere with the findings of the fact of any tribunal or authority in certain circumstances. (See Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain, Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. The writ court is entitled to interfere with the findings of the fact of any tribunal or authority in certain circumstances. (See Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain, Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police.)” The Apex Court further observed at para-44 that the Inquiry Officer cannot base his findings on mere hypothesis. Mere ipse dixit on his part cannot be a substitute of his evidence. This opinion has also been relied in the case of Roop Singh Negi (Supra). At para 23, it has been observed as under: “23. …….. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the enquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof.” 11. Undisputedly, a writ court has to bear in mind the distinction between some evidence or no evidence, but the question which is required to be posed and necessary should be as to whether some evidence adduced would lead to the conclusion as regards the guilt of the delinquent officer or not. In the case of Roop Singh Negi (Supra), the Apex Court at para-23 of the report held that the materials brought during inquiry pointing to the guilt of the delinquent are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at some evidence which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in the departmental proceeding, but principles of natural justice are. In the said case, since the report of the inquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not be sustained. The inference drawn by the Inquiry Officer were not supported by any evidence. The Apex Court categorically observed that suspicion howsoever high, may under no circumstances, be held to be substitute to legal principles. 12. In the case of Om Kumar Vs. The inference drawn by the Inquiry Officer were not supported by any evidence. The Apex Court categorically observed that suspicion howsoever high, may under no circumstances, be held to be substitute to legal principles. 12. In the case of Om Kumar Vs. Union of India [ (2001) 2 SCC 386 ] the Apex Court referred to the wednesbury test being applied to an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary case and at paragraphs-67 and 71 held as under:- “67. But where an administrative action is challenged as ‘arbitrary’ under Article 14 on the basis of Royappa (as in cases where punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged), the question will be whether the administrative order is ‘rational’ or ‘reasonable’ and the test then is the Wednesbury test. The courts would then be confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see whether the administrator has done well in his primary role, whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors into consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable person could have taken. If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. In G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council (SCC at p.111), Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) pointed out that ‘reasonableness’ of the administrator under Article 14 in the context of administrative law has to be judged from the standpoint of Wednesbury rules. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India (SCC at pp.679-80), Indian Express Newspapers Bombay (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (SCC at p.691), Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India (SCC at p.241) and U.P. Financial Corpn. v. Gem Cap (India) (P) Ltd. (SCC at p.307) while judging whether the administrative action is ‘arbitrary’ under Article 14 (i.e. otherwise then being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to a Wednesbury review always. * * * 71. Thus, from the above principles and decided cases, it must be held that where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned as ‘arbitrary’ under Article 14, the court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary reviewing authority. The court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies in such a context. The court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies in such a context. The court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the courts, and such extreme or rare cases can the court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment.” The Apex Court referred to the ratio laid down in the case of Tata Cellular Versus Union of India [ (1994) 6 SCC 651 ] on the applicability of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness. 13. In the case of Tata Cellular Versus Union of India [ (1994) 6 SCC 651 ] the Apex Court while dealing with the “Wednesbury Principle of reasonableness” held that a decision of a public authority will be liable to be quashed or otherwise dealt with by an appropriate order in judicial review proceedings where the court concludes that the decision is such that no authority properly directing itself on the relevant law and acting reasonably could have reached it. (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. Per Lord Greene, M.R.)” The Apex Court at para-81 of the Report held that there are two facets to the irrationality which may be mentioned. It is profitable to quote the opinion of the Apex Court at para-81 therein. “81. Two other facets of irrationality may be mentioned.(1) It is open to the court to review the decision-maker’s evaluation of the facts. The court will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision-maker. If the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision the other way, cannot be upheld. Thus, in Emma Hotels Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Environment34, the Secretary of State referred to a number of factors which led him to the conclusion that a non-resident’s bar in a hotel was operated in such a way that the bar was not an incident of the hotel use for planning purposes, but constituted a separate use. Thus, in Emma Hotels Ltd. v. Secretary of State for Environment34, the Secretary of State referred to a number of factors which led him to the conclusion that a non-resident’s bar in a hotel was operated in such a way that the bar was not an incident of the hotel use for planning purposes, but constituted a separate use. The Divisional Court analysed the factors which led the Secretary of State to that conclusion and, having done so, set it aside. Donaldson, L.J. said that he could not see on what basis the Secretary of State had reached his conclusion. (2) A decision would be regarded as unreasonable if it is impartial and unequal in its operation as between different classes. On this basis in R. v. Barnet London Borough Council, ex p Johnson the condition imposed by a local authority prohibiting participation by those affiliated with political parties at events to be held in the authority’s parks was struck down.” 14. While testing the decision on grounds of irrationality, it is open to the court to review the decision maker’s evaluation of the facts. The court will intervene where the facts taken as a whole could not logically warrant the conclusion of the decision maker. If the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, then a decision the other way, cannot be upheld. Viewed in this perspective and in the light of the well settled principles of law laid down by the Apex Court, the findings in disciplinary inquiry are liable to be interfered with in case even if whole of the evidence led in the inquiry is treated as true the conclusion based thereupon does not logically result therefrom. If the weight of facts pointing to one course of action is overwhelming, the conclusion drawn other way cannot be upheld. High court cannot consider the question under Article 226 of the Constitution of India about the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a particular conclusion. This is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. This is a matter which is within the competence of the authority which deals with the question; but the High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the inquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the Respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence, legally the impugned conclusion follows or not. The scope of interference in a departmental proceedings have been delineated as such by the Apex Court. This also answers the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents relying upon the case of Sanjay Kumar Singh (supra) and Degala Suryanarayana (supra). 15. Moving on to the second question, it is to be seen whether findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority on the charges meet the test, as referred to hereinabove. So far as charge no. 1 is concerned, petitioner had tried to offer explanation for his absence based on a treatment paper of the doctor of General Hospital, Bokaro Steel Plant as entered in his medical book on 03.10.2008 and 04.10.2008, one day prior to the incident. He was treated as an outdoor patient and prescribed certain medicines apparently for his stomach condition. Petitioner in his wisdom did not chose to take leave for his ailment, but on 05.10.2008 during his shift from 13.00 hrs. to 21.00 hrs., he was found absent from his post at North Gate during inspection. Responsibility of Member of an uniformed Force like the constable of CISF posted to guard the Industrial Unit at Bokaro Steel Plant are of extreme vigilance which could not permit any lapse or excuse. Whether the petitioner was suffering from dysentery and had to leave the post for a while to relieve himself or not, makes no difference as he was found absent in course of his duty at the post on that particular day. The Inquiry Officer was well within his jurisdiction to refuse to accept the explanation of his medical condition in such circumstances. Charge no. 1 was therefore rightly held to be proved on the basis of weight of evidence. 16. So far as charge no. 2 is concerned, allegations made therein are serious. The Inquiry Officer was well within his jurisdiction to refuse to accept the explanation of his medical condition in such circumstances. Charge no. 1 was therefore rightly held to be proved on the basis of weight of evidence. 16. So far as charge no. 2 is concerned, allegations made therein are serious. Essentially, the import of the charge is that the petitioner was found indulging in suspicious conduct of carrying stolen property of the Unit. None of the prosecution witnesses or the court witness deposed of theft of any particular property of BSL Unit and that too by the petitioner. If the statement of the prosecution witnesses and the court witnesses are taken together as has been adequately referred to in the foregoing paragraphs, it was to the effect that the petitioner was carrying a bag on the motorcycle in between him and the driver constable M. Bhagat (CW-2). Whether the bag contained stolen property or not, was not established by anyone. Petitioner was carrying the bag and riding the motorcycle along with CW-2 after the shift hours. Petitioner stated that he was carrying vegetables in that bag. The allegations of having both hands of the petitioner blackened on the one hand, have not been corroborated by the other prosecution witness no. 6 who was posted at the said gate. Even on that basis, it could not lead to a finding of theft or suspicious conduct on that account against the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer in his wisdom therefore, chose to exonerate the petitioner for the said charge. The Disciplinary Authority’s observation have been discussed hereinabove. Statement of the witnesses as relied upon by him, if accepted in entirety, also do not warrant a conclusion that the petitioner was involved in theft of the property of the Unit and was therefore moving or escaping in a suspicious manner on a motorcycle with CW-2 constable M. Bhagat around 9.15 pm on that day. The evidence which were before the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority as well if taken as a whole and accepted as true, does it lead to the conclusion that charge no. 2 were proved against him? 17. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, this court is of the considered view that such a conclusion does not flow or follow out of the evidence on record. 2 were proved against him? 17. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, this court is of the considered view that such a conclusion does not flow or follow out of the evidence on record. Charges of such quasi criminal nature even in a departmental proceeding are required to be proved to the hilt. Even in a departmental proceeding, serious charges which could also give rise to criminal prosecution in ordinary circumstances, are required to be proved with a more serious burden of proof upon the prosecution as it carries not only slur upon the reputation of the petitioner, but also liability of criminal prosecution as well. [See (2009) 12 SCC 78 (Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chatter)] para-21 thereof quoted hereunder: “21. Such a serious charge of corruption requires to be proved to the hilt as it brings civil and criminal consequences upon the employee concerned. He would be liable to be prosecuted and would also be liable to suffer severest penalty awardable in such cases. Therefore, such a grave charge of quasi-criminal nature was required to be proved beyond any shadow of doubt and to the hilt. It cannot be proved on mere probabilities.” 18. This court in the present exercise does not intend to question whether the evidence adduced during departmental proceedings were sufficient or adequate to support a particular conclusion. If the evidence taken as a whole stands, the question that has to be answered is whether the impugned conclusion of the Disciplinary Authority flows out of it? Applying this test, as has been laid down in the case of H.C. Goel (Supra) by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, this court is of the considered view that findings on charge no. 2 recorded by the Disciplinary Authority were not substantiated. The conclusion drawn were contrary to the weight of evidence and the course of decision which it suggested. Mere suspicion could not be a substitute for legal proof. Perusal of the findings drawn by the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority both indicate that they are also guided by the findings of the Disciplinary Authority on charge no. 2. The Appellate Authority while dismissing the appeal, had held that the delinquent petitioner in connivance with the constable M. Bhagat was involved in the theft of the property of the Unit which showed suspicious character of the employee. 2. The Appellate Authority while dismissing the appeal, had held that the delinquent petitioner in connivance with the constable M. Bhagat was involved in the theft of the property of the Unit which showed suspicious character of the employee. The Revisional Authority while dismissing the grounds urged by the petitioner, also held at para-6 of the order dated 31.03.2010 that this charge was serious in nature where delinquent was found in theft of the plant’s property which he is supposed to guard. The findings of the inferior authorities therefore tested on the aforesaid principles on charge no. 2 cannot be sustained in the eye of law in view of the detailed discussions made hereinabove. 19. The third question which remains to be answered is, in case findings on charge no. 2 is found to be unsustainable whether the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is disproportionate and excessive to the established misconduct. If the findings on charge no. 2 do not remain, what remains is the established misconduct of absence from duty during shift hours on one day during inspection, 05.10.2008 on the part of the petitioner. The charge sheet did not refer to habitual unauthorized absence on the part of the petitioner. Petitioner in his defence, had taken the plea of stomach ailment and treatment which he was undergoing for the last three days. His absence on a particular day found during inspection though was serious, but did not reflect a conduct of habitual nature. Viewed thus, the punishment of reduction of salary for two years by two stages on the basis of the established misconduct of charge no. 1, appears to be disproportionate and excessive. The punishment is such that it could have a cascading effect on the entire service career of the petitioner and his future salary and emoluments as well. Petitioner is in service. As such, this court is of the opinion that the Disciplinary Authority should consider the question of penalty afresh in the light of the established misconduct under charge no. 1 of unauthorized absence on 05.10.2008 of the delinquent petitioner. Question no. 3, posed above, is answered in the aforesaid manner. 20. As a result of the detailed discussion made hereinabove and reasons recorded, the findings in relation to the charge no. 2 recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, as confirmed by the Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority, are set aside. 1 of unauthorized absence on 05.10.2008 of the delinquent petitioner. Question no. 3, posed above, is answered in the aforesaid manner. 20. As a result of the detailed discussion made hereinabove and reasons recorded, the findings in relation to the charge no. 2 recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, as confirmed by the Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority, are set aside. The matter is remanded to the Disciplinary Authority to pass order afresh on the quantum of penalty. 21. Writ petition is allowed in the manner and to the extent indicated hereinabove. Petition allowed.