JUDGMENT : 1. The applicant is the Central Bureau of Investigation (in brief, ‘CBI’), who was also the prosecuting agency before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magi, Special CBI Court No.1, Mirzapur, Ahmedabad, in CBI Special Case No. 46 of 2004 and where the appeal were CBI Criminal Appeal Nos. 1 of 2011 and 2 of 2011. 2. This is an application seeking condonation of delay of 560 days, caused in preferring application for leave to prefer appeal, being Criminal Misc. Application No. 5748 of 2017, against the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Special Judge (CBI) in Criminal Appeal No.1 of 2011, where, the appellate Court quashed and set aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mirzapur, who had recorded the conviction on 29.10.2010, in CBI Special Case No. 46 of 2004. 3. The opponent No.1, herein, namely, Shri Shailesh Bhagwandas Bhagat, has resisted this application for condonation of delay by way of filing affidavit-in-reply, contending inter alia that there is no proper explanation at all nor is there any reasonable cause emerging for such condonation. The certified copy was applied on 03.06.2015 and the same was prepared on 10.06.2015 and was delivered on 09.07.2015. He has given chronology of the events in detail and urged that Public Prosecutor submitted his recommendations to the Office of DIG, CBI, SPE, Gandhinagar etc. to urge that there are serious gaps, according to the answering opponent No.1, where the delay has not been explained. It is also urged that there are no reasonable or genuine grounds reflecting to justify the cause of delay. It is urged that for the gross delay of 476 days, there is no explanation, much less any reasonable explanation. 4. The counter affidavit / rejoinder affidavit to the application for condonation of delay is also filed by Shri. Lalji Garva, Inspector of Police, CBI. It is urged that the CBI being a statutory body, created under the law, it has legal obligations to follow the statutory guidelines and to act in accordance with the established principles. The matter deserves scrutiny at different levels in the hierarchy so that the cogent decision could be arrived at. It is further contended on merits that the order of acquittal recorded by the appellate Court is based on no evidence on record. The matter deserves scrutiny at different levels in the hierarchy so that the cogent decision could be arrived at. It is further contended on merits that the order of acquittal recorded by the appellate Court is based on no evidence on record. The order is perverse and contrary to the established principles of law and the same may eventually result into failure or denial of justice. Therefore, the trial Court’s judgment and order deserves to be restored to uphold the rule of law. It is, further, contended that the application for condonation of delay caused in preferring the application for leave to appeal contains certain grounds and reasons, which are bona fide and are fully capable of reflecting genuine cause of delay. It is, further, urged that all the grounds are genuine and fully capable to reflect the reasonable cause of delay. 5. This Court has heard the learned Standing Counsel, Mr. Kodekar, for the applicant- CBI, who has strenuosly made his submissions, urging this Court that each days delay has been sufficiently explained by the applicant. It is, further, his say that not only the requisite procedure, which is prescribed, needs to be followed, but, the other procedures expected under the rules, has led to the causing of delay. Further, it is the explanation of such a delay and the reasonable cause to be made by the applicant by taking this Court through the details, which have been revealed from the record that the delay of 560 days caused in preferring the application for leave to appeal is sufficiently exaplained, and therefore, the Court may condone such a period of delay and allow this application. 5.1 He has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in ‘COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG AND ANOTHER VS. MS. KATIJI AND OTHERS’, (1987) 2 SCC 107 , and of this Court in Civil Application No. 748 of 2013 and the cognate matters. 6. Per contra, learned Sr. Advocate, Mr. Shah, appearing for Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 strongly resisted this application on the ground that each day’s delay needs to be explained. He has urged that the law, which was prevalent before the decision of the Apex Court in ‘POSTMASTER GENERAL AND OTHERS VS. 6. Per contra, learned Sr. Advocate, Mr. Shah, appearing for Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 strongly resisted this application on the ground that each day’s delay needs to be explained. He has urged that the law, which was prevalent before the decision of the Apex Court in ‘POSTMASTER GENERAL AND OTHERS VS. LIVING MEDIA INDIA LIMITED AND ANOTHER’, (2012) 3 SCC 563 , has taken volteface and more particularly with the advancement of the technology, as the access to the files etc. has become much easy, unexplained delay on the part of the government department should not be little done. He has urged that the condonation of delay being an exception, no leniency can be shown for the lethargy on the part of the state department. He took this Court through the chronology of the events to urge that for the period between 04.07.2016 to 09.01.2017, there is no explanation offered for the delay six months. Furthermore, he has urged that from 13.01.2017 to 14.02.2017, i.e. when the draft affidavit was put to DLA and on 23.01.2017 and it was approved and was sent to the retainer Counsel, after notorizing the same. He, further, urged that this is not a case, where, the government exchequer is incurring any loss, as the appeals being C/312 and 313 of 2012 are already pending before the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad, whereby, the appellate Tribunal held that the amount of Rs.20/- lakh deposited by the appellant, therein, by way of duty, penalty etc., is sufficient. It is, further, urged that if, at all, the adjudication goes against the present opponents before the appellate Tribunal, the state exchequer shall be receiving funds, by way of duty, penalty etc.. 6.1 He has sought to rely on the following decisions: ‘P.K. RAMACHANDRAN VS. STATE OF KERALA’, (1997) 7 SCC 556 , ‘MANIBEN DEVRAJ SHAH VS. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF BRIHAN MUMBAI’, (2012) 3 SCC (civ.) 24; ‘STATE OF UP THROUGH EXECUTIVE ENGINEER AND ANOTHER VS. AMAR NATH YADA’, AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 1987; ‘ALCOCK ASHDOWN GUJARAT LIMITED VS. INTEROCEAN NAVIGATION LIMITED’, Civil Application No. 13607 of 2016, Dated: 02.02.2017; 7. Learned Advocate, Mr. Ramnandan Singh, appearing for Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 has also argued along the line and has urged that the condonation of delay may not be permitted, when there is a huge delay of 560 days. INTEROCEAN NAVIGATION LIMITED’, Civil Application No. 13607 of 2016, Dated: 02.02.2017; 7. Learned Advocate, Mr. Ramnandan Singh, appearing for Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 has also argued along the line and has urged that the condonation of delay may not be permitted, when there is a huge delay of 560 days. In support of his submission, he sought to rely on the decision in ‘POSTMASTER GENERAL AND OTHERS VS. LIVING MEDIA INDIA LIMITED AND ANOTHER’ (Supra). He, further, urged that in the said decision, the Apex Court has mandated of the government bodies, agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable delay and there are bona fide efforts, usual explanation of keeping file pending and the procedural delays will not be taken lightly or kindly. He urged that the government departments have special obligations to ensure that they perform their duties diligently. The condonation of delay being an exception, as laid down in ‘POSTMASTER GENERAL AND OTHERS VS. LIVING MEDIA INDIA LIMITED AND ANOTHER’ (Supra) the Court refused to give shelter to anyone, who has not chosen to follow these directions. 8. Having heard both the sides and also having considered the material on record, at the outset, the case of the prosecution, as is unfurled before the trial Court and the appellate forum, would deserve consideration. It was the case of the prosecution that the investigation department of the Customs received an information that one Siddhnath Shipping Company located at Special Economic Zone (for short, ‘SEZ’), Kandla, has exported 100% knitted fabrics ‘Dupattas’ by container bearing No. 2605740 and that fabrics were of inferior quality and the weight mentioned in document was not genuine. The Superintendent of intelligence of Custom ordered to investigate and it was realized that the container was owned by one M/s. Sheltonshipping and the Custom seized the said contained and weighed the same in the presence of Shakti Enterprise (CHA), which was found to be weighing less than what was declared in the register of the documents, which were necessary to be submitted before the authorities. Further, the quality, which was claimed of the exported material, also found to be completely different. The trial Court, therefore, after following the due procedure of law, sentenced original accused and opponent Nos. Further, the quality, which was claimed of the exported material, also found to be completely different. The trial Court, therefore, after following the due procedure of law, sentenced original accused and opponent Nos. 1 to 3, herein, to undergo solitary imprisonment with fine of Rs.5000/- and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for the offence punishable under Sections 120B and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. Further, they were also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of one year and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for the offence punishable under Sections 120B, 468 and 471 of the IPC. So far as original accused and opponent Nos. 4 and 5, herein, are concerned, they were sentenced to undergo solitary imprisonment with fine of Rs.5000/- and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for the offence punishable under Sections 120B and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. Opponent Nos. 4 and 5 were also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of one year and to pay fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default to undergo further simple imprisonment for the offence punishable under Sections 120B, 468 and 471 of the IPC. 8.1 Aggrieved by the same, the convicts had preferred Appeal Nos. 1 of 2011 and 2 of 2011 under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the Code’), which came to be allowed by the appellate Court vide its order dated 30.04.2015 quashed and set aside the judgment and order of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Special CBI Court No.1, Mirzapur, Ahmedabad. 8.2 It is necessary to make a mention, here, of two appeals bearing Nos. C/312 and 313 of 2012, which are pending before the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad, where, the question is regarding the export of sub-standard goods, as received from EOU by SEZ, where, the learned Counsel would take a legal plea as regards the liability to pay Customs duty by a SEZ and also counter the findings by the adjudicating authority as regards the switchover of the consignment of poor quality. Out of the total demand of Rs.57/- lakh, the appellant has also deposited an amount of Rs.20/- lakh during the course of investigation, which had been considered to be enough deposit for hearing their appeal and the issue which is under consideration by the appellate forum is, as to whether, the duty liability on the SEZ would be Customs Duty or Central Excise Duty so also the poor quality of consignment entered into SEZ. An application for waiver of the pre-deposit of the balance amount has been allowed by the appellate tribunal and those matters for final adjudication are still pending before it. 9. In this backdrop of facts, it is urged by the learned Standing Counsel, Mr. Kodekar, for and on behalf of the applicant-CBI to condone the delay and the same has been strongly and fairly resisted by the learned Advocates for the opponents. 10. Before adverting to the facts of the case on hand in the application for condonation of delay, the law on the subject would deserve reference at this stage. 10.1 In ‘POSTMASTER GENERAL AND OTHERS VS. LIVING MEDIA INDIA LIMITED AND ANOTHER’ (Supra), the question that arose for consideration before the Apex Court was whether the office of Post Master General has shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 427 days in filing Special Leave Petition before it. Living Media India Ltd.-Respondent No.1 is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, which publishes the magazines Reader’s Digest and India Today. The dispute arose with regard to transmission of the journals and the material at concessional rates of Post, when the postal department denied to so do, Living Media India Limited preferred a writ-petition against the postal department, which came to be allowed by the High Court. Being aggrieved by the same, the Postal Department approached the Division Bench, which too vide its judgment and order dated 11.09.2009, upheld the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, dismissing the appeals filed by the postal department. Challenging the said order, postal department preferred appeal by way of SLP before the Apex Court, where, there was delay of 427 days in filing appeal. Therefore, the Apex Court examined, as to whether, there was sufficient cause for condonation of such a huge delay. Referring to the base judgment in the case of ‘COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG AND ANOTHER VS. MS. Therefore, the Apex Court examined, as to whether, there was sufficient cause for condonation of such a huge delay. Referring to the base judgment in the case of ‘COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG AND ANOTHER VS. MS. KATIJI AND OTHERS’ (Supra), the Apex Court relied on the guidelines mentioned hereunder: “14. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, (1987) 2 SCC 107 , while considering "sufficient cause" in the light of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, this Court pointed out various principles for adopting liberal approach in condoning the delay in matters instituted in this Court. Learned ASG heavily relied on the following principles:- "1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." By showing the above principles, learned ASG submitted that there is no warrant for according stepmotherly treatment when the "State" is the applicant. It is relevant to mention that in this case, the delay was only for four days. 14. In G. Ramegowda, Major and Others vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, (1988) 2 SCC 142 , the principles enunciated in paras 15 & 17 are heavily relied on by the learned ASG. They are:- "15. It is relevant to mention that in this case, the delay was only for four days. 14. In G. Ramegowda, Major and Others vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, (1988) 2 SCC 142 , the principles enunciated in paras 15 & 17 are heavily relied on by the learned ASG. They are:- "15. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. 17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes "sufficient cause" for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making." Considering the peculiar facts, namely, the change of government pleader who had taken away the certified copy after he ceases to be in office, the High Court condoned the delay which was affirmed by this Court.” 10.2 Considering various other judgments on the subject, the Apex Court, while keeping the question of law open, held that there was no proper explanation offered by the Postal Department for the delay, except, mentioning of various dates. The Apex Court, therefore, held that Postal Department miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons, sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Here, it may also be noted that the Apex Court had offered another opportunity to the Postal Department to produce better evidence by placing the same on record by way of an affidavit. However, neither the Postal Department nor the person in charge filed any affidavit explaining the delay. Further, the dates mentioned in the affidavit, according to the Apex Court, had shown that there was delay at very stage and, except, the mentioned the dates on which the file was received, there was no explanation. However, neither the Postal Department nor the person in charge filed any affidavit explaining the delay. Further, the dates mentioned in the affidavit, according to the Apex Court, had shown that there was delay at very stage and, except, the mentioned the dates on which the file was received, there was no explanation. The Apex Court also held that in absence of any plausible and acceptable explanation, as to why the delay should be condoned mechanically just because the government authority is before it. It also added that “Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.” 10.3 Reference also needs to be made, at this stage, to the decision in ‘STATE OF UP THROUGH EXECUTIVE ENGINEER AND ANOTHER VS. AMAR NATH YADA’ (Supra), where, there was a delay of 481 days in filing SLP before the Apex Court. The delay was attributed to the moving of file from one department / officer to another. The Apex Court found that the explanation was not sufficient to condone the delay and dismissed the SLP. 10.4 In ‘MANIBEN DEVRAJ SHAH VS. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF BRIHAN MUMBAI’ (Supra), there was administrative delay of more than 7 years in filing appeal, wherein, the Apex Court held that the law of limitation is founded on public policy. The limitation act has not been enacted with the object of destroying the right of the parties, but, to ensure that they approach the Court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the Legislature. At the same time, the Courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the Legislature. At the same time, the Courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation. It, further, held that “What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. What colour the expression be sufficient cause be would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay”. 10.5 The Apex Court, further, emphasized that “In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and / or its agencies / instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest”. 10.6 The Apex Court, therefore, directed that “...the Court observed that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises”. 10.7 The Division Bench of this Court (Coram: Mr. Akil Kureshi, Ms. Sonia Gokani, J. J.) in Civil Application No. 748 of 2013 vide its order dated 14.03.2014, was considering the civil application for condonation of delay in filing respective tax appeals by the State. The delay was of 342 days in preferring the respective tax appeals and while considering the application for condonation of delay, the Division Bench by giving detailed reasons and on payment of costs in each appeal condone the delay. The relevant observations, read thus: “Section 77 of the Act provides that in computing the period laid down under sections 73, 75 and 78 of the Act and provisions of sections 4 and 12 of the Limitation Act shall also as far as apply. It is on account of this provision that the counsel for the opponent contended that section 5 of the Limitation Act would have no application. The Bombay High Court in the case of N.H. Polymers (supra) had examined somewhat similar provision contained in the Bombay Sales Tax Act and opined that by necessary implication section 5 of the Limitation Act would be excluded. The issue, however, does not rest here. In which case, we must refer to section 84 of the Act, which is contained in Chapter-X pertaining to the proceedings. Section 84 of the Act reads as under : 84. Extension of period of limitation in certain cases : An appellate authority may admit any appeal or permit the filing of a memorandum of cross objections under section 73 and the Tribunal may admit an application under section 75 or under section 78 after the period of limitation laid down in the said sections, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the appellate authority or the Tribunal, as the case may be, that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or filing a memorandum of cross objections or making the application, within such period. 7.In clear terms, this section 84 of the Act empowers the Court competent to hear the appeals under section 78 of the Act and to accept such appeals after the period of limitation has expired, provided that the Court is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. It is true that in section 84 of the Act, the reference is to the Appellate Authority of the Tribunal. There is no specific mention to the High Court. Nevertheless what is of significance is that such power to condone the delay on being satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause preventing him from preferring appeal, is available in the case of an appeal preferred under section 78 of the Act also. Section 78 of the Act, as we noticed, pertains to an appeal to the High Court. Under the circumstances, the legislature intended to empower the High Court also to condone the delay for sufficient cause in the case of appeals filed under section 78 of the Act. This is precisely what this Court in the case of Rama News Print and Papers Ltd. (supra) held in the following terms : 19. As noticed above, section 84 specifically provides for admitting an application under section 78 of the Act by the Tribunal after the prescribed period of limitation. Whereas, section 78 of the Act provides for appeal (not application) to the High Court. No power is vested in the Tribunal under section 78 of the Act. Thus, if section 84 of the Act is construed literally, the same results into an absurdity, inasmuch as the words section 78 are rendered meaningless. It appears that though the intention of the legislature was to make the provisions of section 84 applicable to appeals to the High Court under section 78 of the Act, due to some error on the part of the draftsman, the words the High Court may admit an appeal have been accidentally omitted before the words under section 78. Since section 78 has in fact been included in section 84 of the Act, unless such an interpretation is adopted, namely, that the legislature has through inadvertent error, left out the words the High Court may admit an appeal in the said provisions, the words under section 78 of the Act would become meaningless. Since section 78 has in fact been included in section 84 of the Act, unless such an interpretation is adopted, namely, that the legislature has through inadvertent error, left out the words the High Court may admit an appeal in the said provisions, the words under section 78 of the Act would become meaningless. Though it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there, but where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is permissible to supply the words. In the present case, unless the words and the High Court may admit an appeal are read to be existing before the words under section 78, the words under section 78 would lose all meaning. In the circumstances, adopting a purposive interpretation, the words the High Court may admit an appeal have to be read into section 84 of the Act. 20. The Supreme Court in the case of Surjit Singh Kalara v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 87 , has held thus: 19. True it is not permissible to read words in a statute which are not there, but where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it is permissible to supply the words (Craies Statute Law, 7th edn., p. 109). Similar are the observations in Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar where it was observed that the court construing a provision should not easily read into it words which have not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context in which a provision appears and the object of the statute in which the said provision is enacted the court should construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute. (See: Sirajul Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf.) 21. Thus, reconciling the relevant provisions, it is apparent that section 84 of the Act provides for extension of period of limitation even in respect of appeal to the High Court under section 78 of the Act. 22. (See: Sirajul Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf.) 21. Thus, reconciling the relevant provisions, it is apparent that section 84 of the Act provides for extension of period of limitation even in respect of appeal to the High Court under section 78 of the Act. 22. In Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., (2008) 4 SCC 755 , the Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid view and held thus: 52. No doubt ordinarily the literal rule of interpretation should be followed, and hence the court should neither add nor delete words in a statute. However, in exceptional cases this can be done where not doing so would deprive certain existing words in a statute of all meaning, or some part of the statute may become absurd. 53. In the chapter on Exceptional Construction in his book on Interpretation of Statutes, Maxwell writes: WHERE the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words, by altering their collocation, by rejecting them altogether, or by interpolating other words, under the influence, no doubt, of an irresistible conviction that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. 54. Thus, in Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India this Court has observed that sometimes courts can supply words which have been accidentally omitted. 55. In G.P. Singhs Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 9th Edn., 2004 at pp. 71-74 several decisions of this Court and foreign courts have been referred to where the court has added words to a statute (though cautioning that normally this should not be done). 23. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that the High Court has no power to condone the delay in respect of an appeal preferred under section 78 of the Act, does not merit acceptance and is, accordingly, rejected. 8. 23. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that the High Court has no power to condone the delay in respect of an appeal preferred under section 78 of the Act, does not merit acceptance and is, accordingly, rejected. 8. Coming to the question of explanation for delay, we notice that in the application for condonation, it was stated as under : 4. xxx xxx xxx After receiving the judgment/ order from the Tribunal, it is required to study the judgment and then opinions of several officers are sought as whether to file the Tax Appeal. Thereafter, the department sends a proposal to the Finance Department to get the approval of the Government to file the Tax Appeal. After receiving the approval from the Finance Department, all the papers along with the Judgment/ Order are to be submitted to the G.P. Office to file the Tax Appeal. And thereafter, the G.P. Office after receiving the papers prepares, gets approved and then files Tax Appeal before this Honourable Court. The applicant further says that, in the present case, the Tribunal passed the order on 27.09.2012, in Second Appeal No.54 of 2011. The applicant says that the order dated 27.09.2012 was communicated to the Applicant on 10.10.2012. Thereafter, on 21.06.2013, the proposal to file the tax appeal was sent to the Finance Department of the State, and on 24.07.2013 the Finance Department approved the proposal. After receiving the proposal from the Finance Department, on 29.07.2013, relevant papers along with Judgment/ order were handed over to the office of the Government Pleader (Gujarat High Court) on 13.08.2013 to file the Tax Appeal. The applicant says that, the tax appeal was required to be filed on or before 07.01.2013. However, the same was filed on 16.12.13 and thus there is a delay of 342 days in preferring tax appeal. 9. In the further affidavit, reasons were reproduced as under : 3. I humbly submit that the certified copy of the said judgment was received by the department on 10.10.2012. Thereafter, on 21.02.2013 the Commercial Tax Department filed Rectification Application No.9-10/2013, U/s 79 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003 before the Tribunal, but all efforts in vain, because on 21.03.2013 the Tribunal rejected the rectification applications. I humbly submit that the certified copy of the said judgment was received by the department on 10.10.2012. Thereafter, on 21.02.2013 the Commercial Tax Department filed Rectification Application No.9-10/2013, U/s 79 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003 before the Tribunal, but all efforts in vain, because on 21.03.2013 the Tribunal rejected the rectification applications. Thereafter the Commercial Tax Department sent a proposal to the Finance Department, Gandhinagar for challenging the judgment dated 27.09.2012, on 21.06.2013. It was in lieu of this proposal, the Finance Department has granted permission on 24.07.2013. I further submit that, on receipt of the said permission from the Legal Department, all the relevant papers were sent by the Commercial Tax Department to KAYDA BHAVAN Government Pleader's Office, High Court Campus, Sola, Ahmedabad for filing tax appeal challenging the judgment and order dated 27.09.2012 passed in Second Appeal No.54 of 2011. That said papers were received by the Officer of the Government Pleader on 13.08.2013, and necessary follow ups were taken in this regard by the Commercial Tax Department, but due to heavy work load at the GP Office Tax Appeal could not be filed in earlier, though delayed from very beginning due to Government Procedural work. 4. I humbly submit that for the reason mentioned hereinabove, the present tax appeal is filed at the belated stage having delay about ____ days. 5. I humbly submit that all the genuine efforts were made by the Office of the Government Pleader as well as office of the Commercial Tax Department to file the tax appeal at least within reasonable period. I further submit that the said delay may be condoned considering the fact due to heavy pressure of workload, which is a true fact, it cannot be filed within reasonable time period. 10. In addition to such explanation, we, of course, refer largely to the administrative consideration at various levels of screening before the appeal is filed. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the appeal involves revenue implication of Rs.21 crore. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Tolat Electronics, decided on August 23, 2013 while dealing with Civil Application No.385 of 2013 in Stamp No.1776 of 2013, this Court had condoned the delay making following observations : 12. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the appeal involves revenue implication of Rs.21 crore. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Tolat Electronics, decided on August 23, 2013 while dealing with Civil Application No.385 of 2013 in Stamp No.1776 of 2013, this Court had condoned the delay making following observations : 12. This Court in the case of State of Gujarat vs. Welspun Gujarat Stahl Rohren Ltd. (supra) allowed the condonation of delay by holding thus: We are conscious that there is a considerable delay in filing the Tax Appeal. We are also aware that much of the delay is attributable to the time consumed in the office of the Government Pleader in drafting the Tax Appeal. We are equally aware that in large number of tax appeals filed by the Government after a long delay, we had not accepted such a ground for condoning the delay. We may, however, notice that in such cases, the delay was inordinate and in majority of those cases, delay was more than 1200 days and in some cases, it crossed 1700 days. In the present case, however, we find for the reasons recorded thereinafter, such delay is required to be condoned. Firstly, in our opinion, the affidavit contents of which are noted above, renders reasonable explanation for such delay and gives reasons why appeal could not be presented within the prescribed time limit. It is pointed out that upon receipt of the judgment of the Tribunal, after obtaining opinion of the concerned officers, a decision was taken for filing the appeal. Approval from the Finance Department had thereafter, to be obtained. After obtaining such approval, necessary papers were handed over to the office of Government Pleader, Gujarat High Court. Due to heavy work load and shortage of staff, considerable time was consumed in the office of the Government Pleader in drafting such appeal. It is contended that the appeal involves substantial question of law. Simultaneously, we also notice that the duty amount involved in the present case is in excess of Rs.6 Crores. In our opinion, looking to the nature of delay, explanation rendered by the appellant in various affidavits and the tax impact in the appeal, we would be inclined to condoned the delay. We would not in the case of this nature, like to dismiss the State appeal without consideration on merits. In our opinion, looking to the nature of delay, explanation rendered by the appellant in various affidavits and the tax impact in the appeal, we would be inclined to condoned the delay. We would not in the case of this nature, like to dismiss the State appeal without consideration on merits. The applicant has correctly placed reliance on the observation of Supreme Court in case of Commissioner of Income Tax V. West Bengal Infrastructure Development Finance Corporation Ltd, reported in [2011] 334 ITR 269 (SC), in which it was observed thus : 5. Looking to the amount of tax involved in this case, we are of the view that the High Court ought to have decided the matter on the merits. In all such cases where there is delay on the part of the Department, we request the High Court to consider imposing costs but certainly it should examine the cases on the merits and should not dispose of cases merely on the ground of delay, particularly when huge stakes are involved. In case of State of Nagaland V. Lipok AO & Ors., reported in (2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 752, it was observed as under : 13. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, filepushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra (1987 Supp SCC 339), this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra (1987 Supp SCC 339), this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law. 14. In G. Ramegowda, Major v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer ( 1988 (2) SCC 142 ), it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts, omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the consideration that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning of course, within reasonable limits is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned. 15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every days delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justiceoriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a- vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. 16. The above position was highlighted in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. ( 1996 (3) SCC 132 ); and Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma ( 1996 (10) SCC 634 ). It was noted that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fail to protract public justice, and it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing an appeal. It could thus be seen that though like any other litigant, the State authorities are also equally bound by the law of limitation, recognizing certain elements of public interest and the impersonal and slow moving machinery of the Government, the Courts have moulded their approach, while considering request of the State for condoning the delay. In the present case, as already noticed, explanation in the form of administrative clearances and consumption of time in the office of the Government Pleader in preferring the appeals are pressed in service for explaining the delay. Further, the duty amount involved in the appeal is also substantially large. Considering these aspects of the matter, delay is condoned by awarding cost of Rs.15,000/-, which shall be paid to the respondent within four weeks from today.” 10.8 From the discussion of law on the subject, as above, it can be gathered that these provisions are based on public policy of the Law of Limitation which is based on the maxim “interest reipublicase ut sit finis litium”, which means that it is in the interest of the State that there be an end to litigation. Where, sufficient cause is shown, the same needs to be construed by the Court liberally without any hard and fast rules. Where, sufficient cause is shown, the same needs to be construed by the Court liberally without any hard and fast rules. However, though, substantial rights are not to be ignored because of the delay, no premium can be granted to any party, which is either lethargy or utterly negligent, even if, it is the agency or instrumentality of the State Government. In other words, when the sufficient cause is made out, which would again depend on the factual matrix of each given case and the explanation offered by the authority and on the Court finding that there had been no negligence nor had there been sheer lethargy on the part of the department, the Court in such a case, needs to be liberal in its approach. It is legitimate exercise of discretion to be undertaken by the Court and while so doing it needs to bear in mind the factual matrix and the approach adopted by the party, after once the decision is delivered. There has been a considerable shift in the approach of the Courts, which were expected to adopt a very liberal approach, while exercising discretion of condonation of delay, as was done in the case of ‘COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG AND ANOTHER VS. MS. KATIJI AND OTHERS’ (Supra), where, it was emphasized that the Courts should adopt a liberal and justice-oriented approach, while considering the sufficiency of cause for condoning the delay. Of course, for the Courts to do substantial justice to the parties, what is required is to decide the matter on merits. In the present technological age, where the accessibility of the document and transmitting any such document from one department to another could be done with the lightening speed, the Courts are expected to adopt a pragmatic approach and not to condone the delay in a stereotype manner. What has been emphasized, in all the decisions referred herein above, is that when lethargy and negligence is found on the part of the litigating party and more particularly, instrumentalities of the government departments and the Court is not to be liberal in condoning the delay. 11. With this torch bearer, adverting to the facts of the case on hands, this Court notices that the trial Court’s judgment and order of conviction had been quashed and set aside by the appellate forum, which delivered the judgment on 30.04.2015. 11. With this torch bearer, adverting to the facts of the case on hands, this Court notices that the trial Court’s judgment and order of conviction had been quashed and set aside by the appellate forum, which delivered the judgment on 30.04.2015. The certified copy was applied on 03.06.2015 and the same was prepared on 10.06.2015 and was delivered on 09.07.2015. Public prosecutor, CBI, submitted his recommendations to the Office of DIG, CBI, SPE, Gandhinagar and the Public Prosecutor, CBI, recommended for filing appeal on 12.08.2015. Then, the papers were placed before the Dy. Legal Adviser, CBI, for his comments and he submitted his recommendations on 12.09.2015. The Joint Director forwarded his recommendations for approval, after perusing the same, on 14.09.2015. On 16.09.2015, the file was placed before DLR, who give his opinion on 21.09.2015 and it was opined to challenge the impugned judgment and order. Then, the Joint Director, CBI, Mumbai, forwarded the papers to CBI, Gandhinagar. On 16.02.2016, the matter was forwarded to Director, Vigilance, New Delhi. Then, on 28.04.2016, Under Secretary advised to file appeal before the Gujarat High Court. On 02.05.2016, the order was received and file was send to Public Prosecutor, CBI. Draft petition was received on 13.05.2016, which was re-drafted by the Sr. Public Prosecutor, CBI, on 25.05.2016. The file was sent to DLA on 27.05.2016 and the affidavit was put to DLA on 09.06.2016, which came to be approved on 10.06.2016. Draft petition was received by CBI, Mumbai Zone, on 17.06.2016 and on 04.07.2016, the affidavit was notorized and sent to the retainer counsel. On 09.01.2017, the retainer Counsel prepared a new draft petition / proposal and sent to the branch. On 13.01.2017, draft affidavit was put to DLA and on 23.01.2017, the same was approved. On 14.02.2017, it was sent to the retainer Counsel, after notorizing the same. The petition was sworn on 20.02.2017, which clearly reveals that the verification was prepared and typed in the month of December, 2016. 11.1 Though the affidavit notorized and sent to the retainer Counsel on 04.07.2016, the retainer Counsel prepared a new draft on 09.01.2017 and sent to the branch. Thus, there was a huge delay of six months, i.e. between 04.07.2016 to 09.01.2017. 11.1 Though the affidavit notorized and sent to the retainer Counsel on 04.07.2016, the retainer Counsel prepared a new draft on 09.01.2017 and sent to the branch. Thus, there was a huge delay of six months, i.e. between 04.07.2016 to 09.01.2017. Barring that there is also delay of one month from 13.01.2017, when the draft affidavit was put to DLA, which came to be approved on 23.01.2017, whereas, it was notorized and sent to the retainer Counsel on 14.02.2017. 11.2 It can, thus, be noted that, at every stage, there is delay of about four weeks, except, the period of six months, which had been taken by the learned retainer Counsel in preparing a new draft. It is also expected and is rightly submitted by the learned Advocates on the other side that in the present technical age, when the communication and transmission of the documents is not at all a matter of delay and on the contrary, such transmissions, have become extremely speedy, the delay at every stage, from one authority to another and from one department to another, when ordinarily has taken four weeks time, the said period could have been curtailed drastically. It is also not difficult to appreciate the concern, when the retainer Counsel himself has taken about six months time in preparing a new draft, what has been orally argued before this Court and the explanation is that the delay is caused on account of his pre- occupation with other matters. It also has been urged that the bulky set of record, which had been sent to the retainer counsel, which needed to be scanned and scrutinized and the final draft was to be prepared, which took a little while. Further, his engagement in other matters, during the said period, was also one of the reasons why it took six months time to prepare a new draft. 11.3 This Court is complete conscious that what is needed is a pragmatic justice oriented approach. Without going into the merits of the matter, it can be noticed that it was the trial Court, who had decided against the present respondents and in favour of the applicant, whereas, the appellate Court has quashed and set aside the judgment and order. 11.3 This Court is complete conscious that what is needed is a pragmatic justice oriented approach. Without going into the merits of the matter, it can be noticed that it was the trial Court, who had decided against the present respondents and in favour of the applicant, whereas, the appellate Court has quashed and set aside the judgment and order. In that view of the matter, at every stage, there would be a need for scrutinizing and scanning not only the impugned judgment and order but also of the evidence, which have been recorded. It is not only in the matters of tax and revenues, which benefit the public exchequer that the Courts need to adopt a liberal approach, but even when there is a question of serious evasion of public revenue by circumventing the provisions of the law and also by adopting the alleged fraudulent modes in exporting material. The Court when finds that there was no lethargy nor was there any negligence on the part of the department, hypertechnicalities are not to curtail and stultify the right and reasonable cause. 11.4 Undoubtedly, after once the judgment and order of acquittal has come, the delay caused is of 560 days. At the same time, when the Court found from the explanation of the delay that the authority concerned is required to adopt and adhere to the proceduralities and also that the hierarchy fixed of the officers decides preferring of the appeals. All in all, it can be concluded that in absence of any negligence or lethargy in the entire matter, this Court finds that the litigating party was not to benefit by filing the appeal belatedly and that while appreciating the condition explaining of each day’s delay is needed, what is meant there is that such a doctrine needs to apply in a rational and pragmatic manner. Bearing in mind also the public interest even when there is a pendency of the appeal on civil side, this Court is of the opinion that the discretion needs to be exercised by condoning the delay in preferring appeal against the judgment and order of the appellate forum, by adopting a justifiable and liberal approach. 12. Bearing in mind also the public interest even when there is a pendency of the appeal on civil side, this Court is of the opinion that the discretion needs to be exercised by condoning the delay in preferring appeal against the judgment and order of the appellate forum, by adopting a justifiable and liberal approach. 12. In the result, this application is ALLOWED and the delay, caused in fling the appeal against the impugned judgment and order dated 30.04.2015, is condoned, subject to State paying costs of Rs.15,000/-, i.e. total Rs.30,000/- to the original appellants-respondents in CBI Criminal Appeal Nos. 1 of 2011 and 2 of 2011. Rule is made absolute.