JUDGMENT : This appeal is directed as against the judgment dated 23.05.2007 made in S.C.No.278 of 2006 on the file of the learned Additional District Sessions Judge (F.T.C.No.5) Coimbatore at Thirupur, thereby convicted appellant for the offence under Section 324 of IPC and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- in default to undergo nine months rigorous imprisonment and convicted the appellant under Section 304(i) of IPC and sentenced him to undergo five years rigorous imprisonment. 2. The case of the prosecution is that P.W.1 is the son of the deceased mother. His mother insisted the accused for partition of the land ad-measuring two acres being ancestral property. Due to which there was an enmity between both the families. Two months before the occurrence, there was a quarrel between the deceased and the wife of the accused and his daughter Janaki, in which a case had been registered against the deceased and she was arrested and remanded to Judicial custody. While being so, on 07.08.2005 at about 10.15 a.m., when the deceased and her elder son were washing their clothes, the daughter of accused came there. Due to wordy quarrel between the deceased and the said Janaki and heard the noise from the quarrel, the accused had come there with Aruval and attacked the elder brother of P.W.1 on his head and his hand. When the deceased intercepted, the accused attacked her with aruval on the head and neck of the deceased. After hearing the noise, P.W.1 came out from his house and had seen the occurrence and shouted to stop attacking the deceased and his elder brother P.W.7. When, P.W.1 reached the place of occurrence with aruval, the accused flew away. Due to injuries sustained by his mother, she died on the spot. Thereafter, P.W.7, the injured elder brother of P.W.1, was taken by one Muthu Kumar P.W.3, to the Thirupur Government Hospital. P.W.1 and P.W.2 went to the police station and lodged a complaint Ex.P1. 3. P.W.2 R. Nataraj is the eye witness and he deposed that the accused attacked P.W.7 and when the deceased intercepted the accused, he also attacked the deceased on her head and neck. Further the accused also threatened P.W.1 with dire consequences, if he came to rescue. Thereafter the injured P.W.7 was taken to the hospital. P.W.2 and P.W.1 went to the police station to lodge a complainant. Further the accused also threatened P.W.1 with dire consequences, if he came to rescue. Thereafter the injured P.W.7 was taken to the hospital. P.W.2 and P.W.1 went to the police station to lodge a complainant. Both P.W.1 and 2 deposed before the learned Magistrate and their statements were recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. The statement of P.W.1 marked as Ex.P.2 and the statements of P.W.3 marked as Ex.P.3. P.W.7 was treated by the Doctor P.W.9, Dr. Chandra and deposed that P.W.7 was sustained simple injuries and the wound certificate marked as Ex.P.11. 4. P.W.12 after receipt of the complaint from P.W.1, registered a case in Crime No. 805 of 2005 for the offences under Sections 307 and 302 of IPC against the accused. The FIR is marked as Ex.P13. P.W.13, Parthiban went to the place of occurrence and took photographs. P.W.15 Professor Edwin Joe conducted the post-mortem on the deceased body of Papathiammal and found the external injuries on her head and her neck. He also opined that the deceased died due to the injuries sustained by her on head, loss of blood and shock and haemorrage. The post-mortem report is marked as Ex.P.16. P.W.17, Ratha Krishnan, Investigation Officer went to the place of occurrence and prepared observation mahazar and rough sketch. P.W.17, the Investigating Officer laid charge sheet for the offence under Sections 307 and 302 of IPC against the accused. On committal of the case charges were framed under Sections 307 and 302 of IPC and the appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed for trial. 5. The prosecution in order to bring home the guilt of the accused examined P.W.1 to P.W.17 and marked Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.29 and produced material objects M.O.1 to M.O.9. During his examination under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., the appellant denied all the incriminating circumstances appeared against him in the evidence of prosecution. The accused has examined D.W.1 to D.W.3 and marked Ex.D1 to Ex.D.4. After hearing on both sides and on assessment of oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court acquitted the appellant for the offences of under Sections 307 and 302 of IPC. However, the trial Court convicted the appellant for the offences under Sections 324 and 304(i) of IPC and sentenced him as stated above. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant contented that the registration of FIR itself hit by the Section 162 of Criminal Procedure Code. However, the trial Court convicted the appellant for the offences under Sections 324 and 304(i) of IPC and sentenced him as stated above. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant contented that the registration of FIR itself hit by the Section 162 of Criminal Procedure Code. As per the evidence P.W.1, the deceased body was not taken immediately and only afternoon the deceased body was taken by the Investigation Officer. Further, P.W.17, the Investigation Officer reached the place of occurrence at about 11.00 a.m., and he was there till 4.00 p.m. Further contented that the contradiction between P.W.1 and 2 is fatal to the case of the prosecution. P.W.1 is not at all an eye witness, if at all he was there at the time of occurrence, he would have intercepted in the quarrel and tried to save his mother. Even after the occurrence, he did not even touch the body of his deceased mother and no blood stain on his dresses. Therefore the evidence of P.W.1 is not reliable one to prove the case of the prosecution. 7. P.W.1 deposed that the vessel and aruval were recovered from the place of occurrence. Whereas, P.W.17 recovered the M.O.1 aruval from some other place, as such the prosecution failed to prove the recovery. Further he pointed out that so many contradictions between the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 in the statements recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., by the learned Judicial Magistrate. Further P.W.1 categorically deposed that at the place of occurrence there was no stone for washing the clothes and he did not know about the presence of tap. It is also corroborated by D.W.2, the pump operator deposed that at the place of occurrence there was a pipe and it was broke down. As such it was blocked by the wooden lock and it is not possible to use the pipe. Further deposed that in front of the house of P.W.1 itself, there is a pipe for drinking water. Therefore there is no pipe in the place of occurrence and as such the entire theory of the prosecution cannot be believed. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that P.W.7, the injured witness deposed that he sustained only simple injury and his injury was not proved by the medical evidence. Whereas P.W.1 deposed that the accused attacked P.W.7 on his head by aruval. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that P.W.7, the injured witness deposed that he sustained only simple injury and his injury was not proved by the medical evidence. Whereas P.W.1 deposed that the accused attacked P.W.7 on his head by aruval. But he sustained only simple injuries and it is corroborated by the evidence of the doctor. P.W.17, the Investigation Officer deposed that he had seen P.W.7 at the place of occurrence at about 12.30 p.m., whereas P.W.1 deposed that immediately after occurrence, P.W.7 was taken to the hospital. Further P.W.7 the injured witness is a lunatic and he is not able to give any evidence therefore his evidence is not at all reliable one. 9. Further he also disputing the time of death of the deceased. P.W.15, the Doctor who conducted autopsy on the deceased body opined that the deceased died before 30 hours, from the time of post mortem. But the alleged occurrence took place on 07.08.2005 at about 10.15 a.m., and the post mortem conducted on 08.08.2005 on 11.30 a.m. Therefore the entire case has been foisted by the prosecution against the accused due to the enmity. Further he would contend that the sample of blood and viscera were not sent for any examination and it is also fatal to the case of the prosecution. Except P.Ws.1 and 2 no other witnesses corroborated the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 and no independent witness was examined to prove the case. The alleged occurrence took place on Sunday in a village and as such there might have so many persons present at the time of occurrence, even then the prosecution failed to examine any of the independent witness to bring home the charges. Therefore he prayed for acquittal. 10. Per contra the Government Advocate (Crl.Side) appearing for the respondent to justify the judgment under this appeal contented that the judgment does not suffer from any perversity or illegality, warranting interference from this court. He would further contend that the evidence and records are clearly established that the accused caused grievous injuries on the head of the deceased and due to which she died on the spot. Further the accused caused injuries on P.W.7 and as such he sustained injuries. The injuries are clearly corroborated by the medical evidence and to prove the charge. He would further contend that the evidence and records are clearly established that the accused caused grievous injuries on the head of the deceased and due to which she died on the spot. Further the accused caused injuries on P.W.7 and as such he sustained injuries. The injuries are clearly corroborated by the medical evidence and to prove the charge. The statements of P.Ws.1 and 2 recorded under section 164 of Cr.P.C. marked as Exs.P.2 and 3. Therefore there is absolutely no ground to interfere with the judgment of conviction. Hence he prayed for dismissal of this appeal. 11. Heard the arguments advanced by Mr. P.M. Duraiswamy, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. R. Ravichandran, learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) appearing for the State and perused the records. 12. On considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also in the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on both sides, the points that arise for consideration are as follows :- i. Whether the judgment under this appeal suffers from any perversity or illegality warranting interference from this court? ii. Whether the trial court has justified in convicting the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 324 and 304(i) of IPC? If so, the order of sentence warrants any modification? 13. It is seen from Ex.P.4, the observation mahazar annexed with photographs shows that there is a pipe line without any tap and it was blocked by cloth. There was a bucket also kept near the pipe. The occurrence took place near the said pipe that too P.W.7 and the deceased were washing their clothes. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that there was no pipe and it got repaired for the past two years, and the accused examined D.W.2 that for the past two years it was repaired and there is no possibility to get water from the said pipe. Therefore, the deceased and P.W.7 would have not been washing their clothes at the time of occurrence. In this regard the learned counsel for the appellants cited the relevant judgment reported in "CDJ 1973 SC 138 - Kali Ram Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh" , which reads as follows :- "26. It needs all the same to be re-emphasised that if a reasonable doubt arises regarding the guilt of the accused, the benefit of that cannot be withheld from the accused. State of Himachal Pradesh" , which reads as follows :- "26. It needs all the same to be re-emphasised that if a reasonable doubt arises regarding the guilt of the accused, the benefit of that cannot be withheld from the accused. The courts would not be justified in withholding that benefit because the acquittal might have an impact upon the law and order situation or create adverse reaction in society or amongst those members of the society who believe the accused to be guilty. The guilt of the accused has to be adjudged not by the fact that a vast number of people believe him to be guilty but whether his guilt has been established by the evidence brought on record. Indeed, the courts have hardly any other yardstick or material to adjudge the guilt of the person arraigned as accused. Reference is sometimes made to the clash of public interest and that of the individual accused. The conflict in this respect, in our opinion, is more apparent than real. As observed on page 3 of the book entitled "The Accused" by J.A. Coutts 1966 Edition, "When once it is realised, however, that the public interest is limited to the conviction, not of the guilty, but of those proved guilty, so that the function of the prosecutor is limited to securing the conviction only of those who can legitimately be proved guilty, the clash of interest is seen to operate only within a very narrow limit, namely, where the evidence is such that the guilt of the accused should be established. In the case of an accused who is innocent, or whose guilt cannot be proved the public interest and the interest of the accused alike require an acquittal." 27. It is no doubt true that wrongful acquittals are undesirable and shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system, much worse, however, is the wrongful conviction of an innocent person. The consequences of the conviction of an innocent person are far more (1) Cr. App. 7 of 1972 decided on August 6, 1973 7 3 6 serious and its reverberations cannot but be felt in a civilized society. Suppose an innocent person is convicted of the offence of murder and is hanged, nothing further can undo the mischief for the wrong resulting from the unmerited conviction is irretrievable. App. 7 of 1972 decided on August 6, 1973 7 3 6 serious and its reverberations cannot but be felt in a civilized society. Suppose an innocent person is convicted of the offence of murder and is hanged, nothing further can undo the mischief for the wrong resulting from the unmerited conviction is irretrievable. To take another instance, if an innocent person is sent to jail and undergoes the sentence, the scars left by the miscarriage of justice cannot be erased by any subsequent act of expiation......." He relied another judgment reported in "(2007) 1 SCC(Cri) 113 - Samghaji Hariba Patil Vs. State of Karnataka" which held as follows:- "17. We have noticed hereinbefore that the High Court has taken a contrary view. Had the High Court been the first court, probably its view could have been upheld, but it was dealing with a judgment of acquittal. We have taken notice of the depositions of the main prosecution witnesses only to show that the view of the learned Trial Judge cannot be said to be perverse or the same was not possible to be taken. While dealing with a case of acquittal, it is well known, the High Court shall not ordinarily overturn a judgment if two views are possible. Appellant had no axe to grind. The prosecution had not proved that he had any motive. He was only said to be the friend of accused No.1. If the accused had gone there with six others to assault the deceased and his family members, it is unlikely that appellant would take with him for the said purpose, a hammer to an agricultural field. The hammer is not ordinarily used for agricultural operations. Even if we assume that accused No.1 had been nurturing any grudge against the deceased, it is unlikely that Appellant would be involved therein." 14. It is seen from the evidence of D.W.2 in his cross examination which reads as follows :- “XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX” It is seen from the above, his evidence is not believable one, since instead of tap it was blocked by wooden lock and as such whenever necessary, after removing the wooden lock, the water can be drawn. Therefore, it cannot be said that the prosecution failed to prove the place of occurrence. 15. Therefore, it cannot be said that the prosecution failed to prove the place of occurrence. 15. Another contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that P.W.1 is being an eye witness, he would have intercepted the occurrence, if at all he was there in the place of occurrence. P.W.2 is a close friend of P.W.1, therefore their evidence are not reliable one. The relevant portion of the evidence of P.W.1 reads as follows :- “XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX” The relevant portion of the evidence of P.W.2 is read as follows :- “XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX” Though there are slight contradictions between the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, only because of the said contradictions, their evidence cannot be rejected. When the person was attacking with aruval, no one can intervene and that too threatened P.W.1 with dire consequences to his life. Further when he reached the place of occurrence the deceased was died. Therefore there is no chance to P.W.1 to intervene the accused and it is also clearly corroborated by P.W.2. Further in the cross examination with regard to arrival of police, there are minor discrepancies between P.Ws.1 and 2. At any cost, it would not affect the case of the prosecution, since all other aspects clearly proved by the prosecution. Therefore, this Court believes that the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused without any doubt and rejected the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. 16. The another contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that P.W.7 is a lunatic and his evidence cannot be relied upon to prove the charges. He was not even able to speak and as such his evidence and his statement recorded under section 164 of Cr.P.C, are liable to be rejected. It is seen from the evidence of P.W.7, he is not a lunatic person and he is a normal person and he understand everything and his evidence reads as follows :- “XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX” Even assuming that P.W.7 is a lunatic person, he understand the question put by the accused in the cross examination and he is able to answer by hand sign. Therefore, the trial court rightly recorded his evidence and had taken into consideration. Further he deposed that he was attacked by the accused with aruval. But the injuries sustained by him are simple in nature further there is no injury on his head. Therefore, the trial court rightly recorded his evidence and had taken into consideration. Further he deposed that he was attacked by the accused with aruval. But the injuries sustained by him are simple in nature further there is no injury on his head. P.W.9, the Doctor who treated P.W.7 found the following injuries and the relevant portion of his evidence reads as follows :- “XXXXXXXXXXXX” Further in Ex.P.11 the wound certificate, P.W.7 did not say anything about the person who attacked him whether known or unknown person. Further the injuries sustained by him are simple in nature and there is no injury on his head. Therefore, the prosecution failed to prove the charge under Section 307 of IPC against the accused. 17. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that Ex.P.12, the confession statement recorded by P.W.10, the Revenue Divisional Officer is not a believable one, since P.W.10 is not a competent person to record the confession statement. In this regard, he relied upon the judgment reported in "2005 2 LW(Cri) 904, Ali @ Mohammed and others Vs. The Inspector of Police, Melapalayam Police Station" which held as follows. "31. In the present case, according to the prosecution, P.W.24 is a Tahsildar and even if we treat him as an Executive Magistrate, he has no power to record the statements of accused under Section 164 Cr.P.C. It is also not brought before the trial court any instruction or circular by the competent authority empowering Tahsildars for recording confessions or statements of the accused even though he is fit to act as an Executive Magistrate. In such circumstances, as rightly argued by the learned counsel for the appellants, we hold that P.W.24, being an Executive Magistrate, has no power to record the statements of the accused in this case under Section 164 Cr.P.C., consequently Exs.P-10, P-11 and P-12 are inadmissible in evidence. 32. In 1972 Cr.L.J. 1317 (Nika Ram v. State of H.P.), the Supreme Court, after finding that record of confession by Second Class Magistrate not specifically empowered in that behalf, has concluded that the record was inadmissible evidence at the trial. 33. We have already referred to Section 164 CR.P.C. and it makes it clear that the power to record statement or confessions is conferred upon the Judicial Magistrates only and not on the Executive Magistrates. 33. We have already referred to Section 164 CR.P.C. and it makes it clear that the power to record statement or confessions is conferred upon the Judicial Magistrates only and not on the Executive Magistrates. The object of empowering the Judicial Magistrate to record confessional statement is obvious and is intended to minimise the apprehension of the Investigating Agency getting the statement recorded according to their choice and upon their asking. The provisions of Section 164 Cr.P.C. empowering the Judicial Magistrates only to record the confessional statement is mandatory having no exception. Confessional statement recorded by a Magistrate not empowered to do so under this section is not admissible in evidence. Though it was pointed out that P.W.24 has scrupulously followed the formalities provided under Section 164 Cr.P.C., in the light of the infirmity, as pointed out above, we hold that Exs.P-10, P-11 and P-12 are inadmissible in evidence, as a corollary the recoveries made based on the same cannot be used on the side of the prosecution." It is seen from the Ex.P12, the confession statement, it cannot be believable one, since P.W.10 did not sign in the confession statement. 18. The another contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the M.O.5, blood stained Lungi and M.O.1 blood stained aruval were recovered under the mahazar Exs.P.-7 & 8, on the same date of occurrence at about 04.30 P.M. Whereas, P.W.17, the Investigating Officer deposed that M.Os. 1 and 5 were recovered on the confession statement of accused recorded at 8.15 p.m. Therefore the entire recovery is not believable one. Further P.W.1 deposed that the M.O.1 was recovered at night from the place of occurrence. Therefore, the recovery is not proved by the prosecution. To support his contention, he relied upon judgment reported in "1997 SCC(Cri) 857, Vijender Vs. State of Delhi" held as follows :- "17. Another elementary statutory breach which we notice in recording the evidence of the above witnesses is that of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Evidence was led through the above three police witnesses that in consequence of information received from the three appellants on June 30, 1992 they discovered the place where the dead body of Khurshid was thrown. As already noticed, the dead body of Khurshid was recovered on June 27, 1992 and therefore the question of discovery of the place where it was thrown thereafter could not arise. As already noticed, the dead body of Khurshid was recovered on June 27, 1992 and therefore the question of discovery of the place where it was thrown thereafter could not arise. Under Section 27 of the Evidence Act if an information given by the accused leads to the discovery of a fact which is the direct outcome of such information then only it would be evidence but when the fact has already been discovered as in the instant case the evidence could not be led in respect thereof." The accused after giving statement before the Revenue Divisional Officer and also the confessed before P.W.17, the Investigating Officer. The confession statement marked as Ex.P6. On his confession under Ex.P.7, M.O.5 and under Ex.P.8, M.O.1 were seized. Therefore, the seizer of M.Os. 1 and 5 clearly proved by the prosecution. 19. Another contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the alleged occurrence happened on 07.08.2005 at about 08.00 a.m., and on 08.08.2015 at about 11.30 a.m., the post mortem was conducted. The doctor, who conducted the post mortem opined that the deceased would have died before 30 hours. Therefore he contended that the deceased would have died even before 05.30 a.m., on 07.08.2005 and no possibility of death at 10.15 a.m., on 07.08.2005. When the prosecution did not examine any independent witness, the charge against the accused is not proved by the prosecution without any doubt. In this regard he relied upon the judgment reported in "2002 SCC (Cri) 1382 - Thangavelu Vs. State of Tamilnadu" which reads as follows :- "A. Criminal Trial - Time of death - Assessment of, by the doctor taking into account the time and month of the incident and also time required for setting of and passing off of rigor mortis - Doctor's opinion regarding time of death on the basis of such assessment, held is a probability on facts - The remaining evidence therefore should be considered independently - Medical Jurisprudence............ B. Penal Code, 1860 - S.302 - Appreciation of evidence - Murder of two persons by a sickle by appellant alleged - Testimony of only two witnesses, who were interested being closely related to the deceased, found to be inconsistent with the medical evidence - Having regard to the nature of the injuries caused to the deceased persons, doctor opining that more than one person and more than one weapon could have been used - Time of the incident, as suggested by the prosecution, also becoming doubtful in view of the doctor's opinion - Doctor's evidence on these aspects remaining unchallenged - Incident having occurred on midday at a place where there were nearly 50 houses fact that none of the residents of that place were supposed to have seen the incident creating further doubt about the prosecution case - Material on record also showing that there were others also who entertained animosity with the deceased apart from appellant - Prosecution also failed to examine all the eyewitnesses - In the facts and circumstances of the case, held, it is difficult to rely on the testimony of the two interested eyewitnesses - Evidence of the doctor coupled with the possibility of the incident having taken place at a different time as suggested by the doctor and the discrepancies in the evidence of the two eyewitnesses as also other improbabilities of the case, rendered the prosecution case unreliable" It is seen from the photographs that there was no house located nearer to the place of occurrence. It is also proved from the rough sketch Ex.P.18, that the house of the deceased and the accused located in the outer village. There was no row houses and therefore there would not have been any public to see the occurrence. Therefore this Court does not suspect the case of the prosecution as if the occurrence was not at all happened at about 10.15 a.m., on 07.08.2005. It is proved that the deceased died only due to the injuries sustained by her by M.O.1. 20. It is also seen from the evidence of P.W.4 that the deceased Papathiammal is his father's brother's wife i.e., paternal aunt. He further deposed that she was living with his sons and daughter and she got separate from his husband and she was living separately. She also use to quarrel with others. 20. It is also seen from the evidence of P.W.4 that the deceased Papathiammal is his father's brother's wife i.e., paternal aunt. He further deposed that she was living with his sons and daughter and she got separate from his husband and she was living separately. She also use to quarrel with others. While she was washing her clothes, the daughter of accused viz., Janaki came there to draw water. At that juncture, the deceased and P.W.7 were scolded her with filthy languages and also abused her. When P.W.7 was chasing the said Janaki to beat her, after hearing the noise from the said Janaki her father, the accused went to the place with aruval and attacked P.W.7 on his hand and shoulder. When the accused was attacking P.W.7, the deceased intercepted and as such the accused also attacked the deceased and she died on the spot. Therefore the accused only on his grave and sudden provocation, he lost his self control and to protect her daughter, he attacked P.W.7. As such, he had no intention to kill P.W.7 or the deceased. Unfortunately the deceased died due to the injuries sustained on her head, as such it is proved that the accused had no mens rea to commit the offence of murder. Even then his act is culpable homicide and not amount to murder and as such the trial Court rightly convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 304(i) of IPC. Therefore, having recording all evidence, the trial Court has justified in holding that the act committed by the accused amount to culpable homicide and found guilty for the offences under Sections 304(i) of IPC and 324 of IPC. As such the judgment under this appeal does not suffer from perversity or illegality warranting interference from this court. 21. In respect of the sentence is concerned, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, the occurrence took place in the year 2005 and the accused suffered torment of criminal proceedings for past 13 years. Further there was no intention and mens rea to the appellant to attack the deceased and P.W.7. Only due to the grave and sudden provocation, he lost his self control and to protect his daughter, Janaki, he came with M.O.1 Aruval and attacked P.W.7 and the deceased. Further there was no intention and mens rea to the appellant to attack the deceased and P.W.7. Only due to the grave and sudden provocation, he lost his self control and to protect his daughter, Janaki, he came with M.O.1 Aruval and attacked P.W.7 and the deceased. In view of the totally of the facts and circumstances the sentence awarded to the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 304(1) of IPC is reduced to three years of rigorous imprisonment. 22. In the result, the criminal appeal is partly allowed and the conviction against the accused under Sections 324 and 304(i) of IPC is confirmed. However the sentence imposed by the trial court reduced to rigorous imprisonment of three years. The trial Court is directed to secure the appellant for the purpose of sentencing him to undergo the reduced/modified period of sentence. It is also directed that the period of sentence already undergone by the appellant, if any, shall be given set off, as required under Section 428 Cr.P.C.