JUDGMENT : Ajit Borthakur, J. 1. By this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioner has sought for setting aside and quashing the order, dated 10.08.2016, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Goalpara in Crl. Rev. No. 33/2016 and order, dated 09.06.2016, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Goalpara in connection with Mornoi P.S. Case No. 105/2016 under Section 420/406 IPC whereby the learned Sessions Judge, Goalpara dismissed the said revision petition. 2. The petitioner's case, in a nutshell, is that the petitioner is a private limited company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and the respondent No. 2 is a proprietorship firm and service provider dealing with supply of heavy duty cranes. The petitioner-company took one crane, bearing registration No. NL-01G-3920, by executing an agreement for sale, dated 01.07.2014 with the respondent No. 2 for Rs. 72,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Two Lakhs) and paid Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs) by cheque as advance. Subsequently, dispute arose between the parties for respondent No. 2's failure to comply with the terms of the said sale agreement and therefore, the petitioner filed an application on 30.05.2016 under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Court of the District Judge, Kamrup (M) at Guwahati, which was registered as Misc. Arbitration Case No. 19/2016, with a prayer for passing an appropriate temporary injunction restraining the respondent No. 2 from forcibly taking away the crane till settlement of the dispute. The learned Addl. District Judge No. 1, Kamrup (M), Guwahati passed an ex-parte ad-interim injunction on 01.06.2016 till the next date fixed in the aforesaid proceeding. 3. During the pendency of the aforesaid arbitration proceeding, the respondent No. 2 filed an FIR, on 01.06.2016, at Mornoi Police Station, whereupon Mornoi P.S. Case No. 105/2016 under Section 406/420 IPC was registered and seized the crane of the petitioner, inspite of being informed about the interim order, dated 01.06.2016, passed in Misc. Arb. Case No. 19/2016. 3. During the pendency of the aforesaid arbitration proceeding, the respondent No. 2 filed an FIR, on 01.06.2016, at Mornoi Police Station, whereupon Mornoi P.S. Case No. 105/2016 under Section 406/420 IPC was registered and seized the crane of the petitioner, inspite of being informed about the interim order, dated 01.06.2016, passed in Misc. Arb. Case No. 19/2016. Therefore, on 02.06.2016, the petitioner filed an application, under Section 451 Cr.P.C., in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Goalpara seeking interim custody of the crane and likewise, on its following day, that is, on 03.06.2002, the respondent No. 3, the brother of the respondent No. 2, also filed another application, under Section 451 Cr.P.C., claiming, inter-alia, the interim custody of the crane and further, the respondent No. 3 filed objection against the aforesaid prayer of the petitioner. Thereafter, despite allegedly having knowledge about the pendency of the arbitration proceeding in respect of the dispute, arising out of the said crane, and the interim restraint order, passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No. 1, Goalpara, by an order, dated 09.06.2016, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Goalpara decided the zimma of the crane in favour of the respondent No. 3, he being the registered owner. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, the petitioner preferred a criminal revision before the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Goalpara, on 10.06.2016, vide Crl. Rev. No.33/2016, which was dismissed on 10.08.2016 holding, inter-alia, that mere pendency of a civil suit or proceeding is not an impediment in granting zimma under Section 451/457 Cr.P.C., and that no revision lies against such interlocutory order. Hence, the instant petition praying for setting aside the aforesaid impugned orders. 4. In the affidavit-in-opposition, the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 have taken the stand that the petitioner company did not pay the sale consideration price of the crane as per the terms of the agreement for sale, but was operating the same at the plant site at Mornoi, Goalpara. They have further contended with reference to clauses 6.1 and 6.2 of the sale agreement that if any dispute or question arises in regard to the subject matter of the sale agreement, it was agreed to negotiate between them for resolution of such dispute. They have further contended with reference to clauses 6.1 and 6.2 of the sale agreement that if any dispute or question arises in regard to the subject matter of the sale agreement, it was agreed to negotiate between them for resolution of such dispute. Accordingly, a meeting was held on 17.06.2015 at Kolkata between the respondent No. 2 and the Director of the petitioner-company, wherein an amicable settlement of the dispute was reached between the parties, which was duly signed by both the parties and on the same day, a gate pass was also issued by the petitioner-company in favour of the respondent No. 2 to lift the crane from the plant site of the petitioner-company. The said agreement was mutually settled by the parties, on 17.06.2015 and it was not in force on the date of 01.06.2016, when the interim order was obtained by the petitioner, suppressing the material facts, from the Court of learned Addl. District Judge No. 1, Kamrup (M), Guwahati. As such, there arose no question of any arbitral dispute between the parties and for settlement of any dispute by way of arbitration since the differences between the parties were already mutually settled vide the meeting, dated 17.06.2015, held at Kolkata and thus, terminated the agreement, dated 01.07.2014, as per procedure stipulated in the subsequent agreement, dated 17.06.2015. Therefore, the arbitration clause incorporated in the agreement, dated 01.07.2014, after mutual settlement of the dispute on 17.06.2015 has no legal force. 5. The respondents have further contended that although the respondent No. 2 sent his staff to the site of the petitioner-company at Mornoi, Goalpara to lift the crane on the strength of the gate pass, issued by the petitioner-company, they were not allowed to lift the crane. Subsequently, on enquiry, the respondent No. 2 came to know that Indian Overseas Bank had seized the site of the petitioner-company for default in repayment of the loan amount and further, came to know, through an application filed under the RTI Act that the crane was provided to Kohinoor Pulp & Paper Pvt. Ltd. (the petitioner-company, herein) on rental basis and the crane was not mortgaged in consortium. 6. 6. The respondents have further contended that on 01.06.2016, the respondents and other employees went to the site of the petitioner-company to take back the crane, but they were not allowed to do so and instead they were rebuked and driven away from the factory premises, for which reason, they filed an FIR at Mornoi P.S., whereupon Mornoi P.S. Case No. 105/2016 under Section 420/406 IPC (corresponding to G.R. Case No. 1222/2016) was registered and seized the crane for the purpose of investigation, before the interim order, dated 01.06.2016, was passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No. 1 in Misc. Arb. Case No. 19/2016 came into force. 7. According to the respondents, till the time of seizure of the crane, the interim order passed in Arb. Case No. 19/2016 was neither served on them nor copy of the same was furnished to the Officer-in-Charge of Mornoi P.S. It has been further contended that on 02.06.2016, the petitioner-company filed a petition under Section 451 Cr.P.C., seeking zimma of the crane, which was rejected by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, at Goalpara vide order, dated 09.06.2016, which has now attained finality by reason of dismissal of the revision petition vide order, dated 10.08.2016, passed in Crl. Rev. No. 33/2016 by the learned Sessions Judge, Goalpara. As such, the petitioner-company cannot be allowed to claim the interim zimma of the crane by challenging the concurrent findings of the learned Courts below allowing the zimma of the crane to its registered owner-the respondent No. 3 by indirect way of filing the instant second revision without challenging the order, dated 09.06.2016, whereby the zimma petition was rejected by the learned Magistrate. 8. Heard Mr. T.H. Hazarika, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. M. More, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2 & 3. I have gone through the entire record inclusive the documents produced by both the sides. 9. 8. Heard Mr. T.H. Hazarika, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. M. More, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2 & 3. I have gone through the entire record inclusive the documents produced by both the sides. 9. So far the question of maintainability of the instant petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., after the petitioner failed to succeed in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Goalpara in respect of the petition u/s. 451 Cr.P.C. and on revision under Section 397 against the said order in the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Goalpara is concerned, it may pertinently be referred to the legal proposition enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of Madhu Limaye v. the State of Maharashtra, reported in (1977) 4 SCC 551 , wherein the difference between 397 and 482 Cr.P.C., in applicability was succinctly laid down as herein below extracted- "The 1973 code put a bar on the power of revision in order to facilitate expeditious disposal of cases. But in Section 482, it was provided that nothing in the Code, which would include Section 397(2) also, shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. On a harmonious construction, it should be held that the bar provided in Section 397(2) operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby, that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. But in such a case, the inherent power will come into play there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. In case the impugned order clearly brings out a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court, or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference of the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court. Such cases would necessarily be few and far between. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. Such cases would necessarily be few and far between. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. The present case would undoubtedly fall for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code even assuming that the invoking of the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible". 10. To understand the above observation of the Apex Court, it is apposite to understand the expression 'interlocutory order'. The term 'interlocutory order' has been used in Section 397(2) Cr.P.C., in a restricted sense. It denotes an order of purely interim or temporary nature which does not decide the rights or liabilities of the parties. Therefore, any right which substantially affects the rights of the parties cannot be said to be interlocutory order to bar a revision. The essential feature of an interlocutory order is an order passed in the course of the proceeding only before the final order is passed determining the rights or liabilities of the parties. As such, an interim order of custody of property under Section 451 Cr.P.C., pending trial of the case, is apparently an interlocutory order, against which no revision lies under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. Taking into consideration of the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the above noted case, it can, however, be said that in case an order clearly reveals a situation, which indicates abuse of the process of the Court or when the purpose of securing the ends of justice, interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary in exercise of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may be invoked. In the instant case, having regard to the backdrop of exceptional factual matrix as delineated through the rival contentions, this Court finds that despite the petitioner having preferred the revision against the aforesaid order of the learned Magistrate, where he failed to succeed, the matter of dispute may be re-examined in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to secure the ends of justice, if not done so, although a second revision is barred. 11. 11. On perusal of the instant case record along with the copy of the documents annexed thereto and hearing the learned counsel of both the sides, it appears that the petitioner placed a work order, dated 26.06.2014, with the respondent No. 2-firm for supply of one 80 MT Groove Make Tyre Mounted Telescopic Crane and accordingly, the respondent No. 2 supplied the Crane on higher basis. Thereafter, an agreement for sale, dated 01.07.2014, was executed between the petitioner-company and the respondent No. 2 for sale of the said Crane at a consideration of Rs. 72,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Two Lakhs). According to the petitioner, an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs) was paid as advance to the respondent No. 2 by cheque. 12. However, subsequently, the respondent No. 2 wanted to withdraw the crane from the petitioner in contravention of the terms of the agreement for sale, aforementioned, which resulted in a dispute between the parties, without finally executing the deed of sale of the crane as per the agreement for sale, despite issuance of notices by the petitioner-company to the respondent No. 2 and therefore, as per the arbitration clause No. 6.0, the petitioner filed a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, in the Court of learned District Judge, Kamrup (M) at Guwahati praying for an interim injunction for restraining the respondent No. 2 and it's men, agents and all servants from taking away the crane vide Misc.(Arb) Case No. 19/2016. In the said proceeding, by an order, dated 01.06.2016, the learned Addl. District Judge No. 1, Kamrup (M) at Guwahati passed an ex-parte interim injunction as prayed by the petitioner-company against the respondents with notice as to why the interim injunction so passed shall not be made absolute fixing 21.06.2016 for service report, objection, if any and hearing. The documents produced by the petitioner do not, however, show whether the aforesaid ex-parte injunction order was ever communicated to the respondent No. 2. The averment made in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 reveals that the crane in dispute was placed in operation under the petitioner-company at Goalpara on 06.09.2014. 13. The documents produced by the petitioner do not, however, show whether the aforesaid ex-parte injunction order was ever communicated to the respondent No. 2. The averment made in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 reveals that the crane in dispute was placed in operation under the petitioner-company at Goalpara on 06.09.2014. 13. Thereafter, having arose disputes, the petitioner-company and the respondent No. 2 negotiated the disputes at Kolkata on 17.06.2015 and resolved their disputes by preparing the minutes of the said meeting and it was resolved that the respondent No. 2 shall lift the crane from the plant site of the petitioner-company at Mornoi, Goalpara as the work site was stopped and purchase of the crane by the petitioner was deferred for a further period of 2 months, which was not agreed to by the respondent No. 2 and accordingly, on mutual agreement, the petitioner issued a Gate Pass, dated 17.06.2015, in favour of the respondent No. 2 to lift the crane from the plant site at Mornoi, Goalpara. Long thereafter, the aforesaid petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was filed and the learned Arbitral Tribunal on the very first day itself i.e. on 01.06.2016, on hearing the petitioner's side passed the aforesaid ex-parte interim injunction against the respondent No. 2 in respect of the disputed crane till 21.06.2016. 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the said petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was finally dismissed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal and on the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 submits that on the aforesaid very date of ex-parte order of injunction, there was no arbitrable dispute or binding agreement between the parties, for which the arbitration clause of the agreement, dated 01.07.2014, was not applicable after final settlement of the disputes on 17.06.2015. The legality and validity of this aspect of the matter is, however, not relevant to the instant proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C., which is related to the domain of the arbitral Tribunal. 15. The legality and validity of this aspect of the matter is, however, not relevant to the instant proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C., which is related to the domain of the arbitral Tribunal. 15. As stated above, it is noticed from the contents of the FIR, dated 01.06.2016, filed by the respondent No. 2 that based on the mutual agreement, dated 17.06.2015, and issue of a gate pass in favour of the respondent No. 2 by the petitioner-company, the employees of the respondent No. 2 went to the plant site of the petitioner at Matia, Mornoi in Goalpara district of Assam to lift the disputed crane, but they found the plant sealed by the creditor bank namely, Indian Overseas Bank for default in loan repayment and they were not allowed to lift the crane and they were rebuked and drove them out of the plant premises. On receipt of the aforesaid FIR, the Mornoi P.S. Case No. 105/2016 under Section 420/406 IPC was registered and seized the crane on 01.06.2016 (corresponding G.R. Case No. 1222/2016). 16. It is further noticed that upon consideration of a petition supported by an affidavit filed under Section 451 Cr.P.C. and the report of the investigating officer and also, on being satisfied that the respondent No. 3 is the registered owner of the seized crane, it was directed that the seized crane be handed over in interim zimma of him and rejected the objection petition filed on behalf of the present petitioner, herein on the ground, inter-alia, that Section 451 Cr.P.C. simply empowers the Court to give zimma of articles, who prima-facie satisfies about the ownership of the articles and that Section 451 Cr.P.C., does not empower the Court to enter into and decide dispute which is of civil nature as that has arisen between the parties. It may pertinently be noted that the respondent No. 3, the registered owner of the crane was not a party to the agreements entered into between the petitioner-company and the respondent No. 2-firm. 17. Aggrieved, the petitioner-company preferred Crl. Rev. It may pertinently be noted that the respondent No. 3, the registered owner of the crane was not a party to the agreements entered into between the petitioner-company and the respondent No. 2-firm. 17. Aggrieved, the petitioner-company preferred Crl. Rev. No. 33/2016 against the said order of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Goalpara, which was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, Goalpara on the grounds, inter-alia, that mere pendency of a civil suit or proceeding is not an impediment in granting zimma under Section 451/457 Cr.P.C., and that the impugned order is being purely a temporary arrangement for custody of the seized crane, no revision lies under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. 18. In the case of M.S. Sheriff and Anr. v. State of Madras and Ors., reported in AIR 1954 SCC 397 (1), the Supreme Court held that as between the civil and the criminal proceedings, the criminal matters should be given precedence. No hard and fast rule can be laid down, but the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal Courts is not a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality, when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one Court binding on the other or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration is the likelihood of embarrassment. Further, in Kishan Singh (Dead) through LRs. v. Gurpal Singh and Ors., reported in (2010) 8 SCC 775 , the Supreme Court held that the findings of fact recorded by the civil court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is concerned and vice versa. Standard of proof is different in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases it is preponderance of probabilities while in criminal cases it is proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by the court either in civil or criminal proceedings shall be binding between the same parties while dealing with the same subject matter and both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. 19. In Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State, reported in (2002) 10 SCC 283, the Supreme Court observed- "7...., the powers under Section 451 Cr.P.C., should be exercised expeditiously and judiciously. It would serve various purposes, namely: 1. 19. In Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State, reported in (2002) 10 SCC 283, the Supreme Court observed- "7...., the powers under Section 451 Cr.P.C., should be exercised expeditiously and judiciously. It would serve various purposes, namely: 1. Owner of the article would not suffer because of its remaining unused or by its misappropriation; 2. Court or the police would not be required to keep the article in safe custody; 3. If the proper panchnama before handing over possession of the article is prepared, that can be used in evidence instead of its production before the court during the trial. If necessary, evidence could also be recorded describing the nature of property in detail; and 4. This jurisdiction of the court to record evidence should be exercised promptly so that there may not be further chance of tampering with the articles". 20. Applying the above principle of law propounded by the Apex Court, this Court is of the view, that the learned Magistrate while giving interim custody of the seized crane legally exercised the power conferred on him under Section 451 Cr.P.C. and accordingly passed the impugned order of interim custody of the crane to its registered owner i.e. the respondent No. 3, who was neither a party to the aforesaid agreements entered into between the petitioner. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Magistrate has not committed any error or illegality while giving the interim safe custody of the disputed crane pending trial of the case to the respondent No. 3 and consequently, no interference is called for in the impugned orders. 21. For the reasons, set forth above, the petition stands dismissed.