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2018 DIGILAW 2697 (JHR)

Sarabjeet Narayan Jha, Son of Dwarika Nath Jha v. State of Jharkhand

2018-12-10

PRAMATH PATNAIK, PRAMATH PATNAIK

body2018
JUDGMENT : Pramath Patnaik, J. In the captioned writ application, the petitioner has inter alia prayed for quashing portion of office order dated 30.10.2010 whereby second Assured Career Progression benefits (ACP) granted in favour of petitioner w.e.f. 09.08.1999 has been cancelled and 1st ACP benefits has been accepted from the said date on the erroneous ground that the petitioner has not been passed Hindi and Excise Rule and Procedure (Higher level). Further prayer has been made to restrain the respondents from recovering any amount from the retiral benefits of the petitioner. 2. The facts, in brief, is that the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Assistant Sub Inspector, Excise and was posted vide order dated 21st July, 1975 in the district of West Champaran. By passage of time, in the year 1980 he appeared and passed the departmental examination for the post of Sub Inspector Excise and thereafter vide memo dated 06.06.1989, he was authorized to work as Sub Inspector, Excise in the pay-scale of Assistant Sub Inspector, as evident from the extracts of service book, though he was not given regular promotion. In the meantime, from 09.08.1999 he became entitled for A.C.P. after completion of 24 years of service. However, vide memo dated 24.06.2005, the petitioner was granted 2nd A.C.P. benefit w.e.f. 09.08.1999 and the monetary benefit was given w.e.f 15.11.2000 along with other persons. It has further been averred that the petitioner on attaining the age of superannuation retired on 31.07.2010 and after his retirement, he came to know about memo dated 30.10.2010 whereby second Assured Career Progression benefits (ACP) granted in favour of petitioner w.e.f. 09.08.1999 has been cancelled, which is impugned in this case. 3. Heard Mr. Afaque Ahmad, learnd counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Chandra Prabha, learned S.C. IV being assisted by Mr. Rohit, A.C. to learned S.C. IV for the respondents. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even after completion of 24 years of service when the petitioner did not get any regular promotion he was granted 2nd A.C.P. that ought not to have been withdrawn that too after retirement. It has further been submitted before cancelling the order of grant of 2nd A.C.P. neither any show cause was issued nor any opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to place his case. It has further been submitted before cancelling the order of grant of 2nd A.C.P. neither any show cause was issued nor any opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to place his case. It has further been submitted that it is also nowhere in the case of the respondents that there was any misrepresentation on the part of the petitioner. So far grounds made for cancellation of grant of 2nd A.C.P. is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner referring to Rule 2(d) of the Rules submitted that the term 'Officer' mean the post of Superintendent of Excise, Inspector of Excise or Sub Inspector of Excise. In the case at hand, since the petitioner had to stagnate on the substantive post of Assistant Sub Inspector of Excise without any fault on his part, he was not eligible to appear in the said departmental examination; thus no opportunity was afforded to him to clear the departmental examination in Hindi and Excise Rules and Procedure (Higher Standard). On the ground of discrimination, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that 2nd A.C.P. granted to some similarly situated persons who have been given such benefit along with petitioner has not been cancelled but the A.C.P. granted to the petitioner has been cancelled subjecting the petitioner to discrimination. Referring to memo dated 20.06.2007, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that 84 excise constables, who have not passed the departmental examination, have been granted 1st and 2nd A.C.P. benefits. 5. As against this, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that vide order dated 24.06.2005, the petitioner was granted second Assured Career Progression w.e.f. 09.08.1999 and consequential monetary benefits were granted to him w.e.f. 15.11.2000 but when it came to knowledge of the authority that the petitioner did not pass the departmental examination, the 2nd A.C.P. granted to the petitioner was cancelled vide memo dated 30.10.2010. It has further been submitted that it is settled principle of law that for granting 'Assured Career Progression'/'Time Bound Promotion' rules of promotion has to be followed and in the case at hand, admittedly the petitioner did not pass the departmental examination; hence the benefit of A.C.P. which was granted to the petitioner was rightly cancelled, which needs no interference by this Court. 6. 6. From the pleadings available on record, it is quite apparent that the petitioner, who joined the services as Assistant Sub Inspector, Excise and was posted vide order dated 21st July, 1975 did not get any substantive promotion during his service tenure, Hence, for stagnation of his promotion, the respondents-authority vide order dated 24.06.2005, granted second Assured Career Progression w.e.f 09.08.1999 on completion of 24 years of service and consequential monetary benefits were granted to him w.e.f. 15.11.2000 along with many other persons. But, after retirement of petitioner, the respondents vide order dated 30.10.2010 modifying order or grant of 2nd A.C.P., granted 1st A.C.P. w.e.f. 09.08.1999 and cancelled the benefit of 2nd A.C.P. on the ground that the petitioner did not pass the Hindi and Excise Rule and Procedure (Higher level). 7. Admittedly, there was no misrepresentation on the part of petitioner to get the benefit of 2nd A.C.P. vide order dated 24.06.2005. It is the authority, who granted such benefit to the petitioner and after lapse of more than five years from the date of grant of 2nd A.C.P. the authority all of a sudden wake up from a deep slumber and passed the impugned order that too after retirement of the petitioner. It is established principle of law that after retirement the relationship of employer and employee ceases and only in some peculiar circumstance, order of recovery can be passed that too after following due procedure of law. But, the respondents-authorities without taking into consideration these facts that the petitioner has neither misrepresented passed the impugned order without any show cause notice or opportunity of hearing. Hence, the impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside on the ground alone. 8. Besides, issue of recovery after retirement from services has well been discussed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab & Ors. Vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and Ors. as reported in (2015) 4 SCC 334 . For better appreciation, paragraphs 16, 18 of the decision are reproduced herein below : “16. This Court in Syed Abdul Qadir V. State of Bihar [ (2009) 3 SCC 475 ] held as follows : 59. Vs. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) and Ors. as reported in (2015) 4 SCC 334 . For better appreciation, paragraphs 16, 18 of the decision are reproduced herein below : “16. This Court in Syed Abdul Qadir V. State of Bihar [ (2009) 3 SCC 475 ] held as follows : 59. Undoubtedly, the excess amount that has been paid to the appellant teachers was not because of any misrepresentation or fraud on their part and the appellants also had no knowledge that the amount that was being paid to them was more than what they were entitled to. It would not be out of place to mention here that the Finance Department had, in its counter-affidavit, admitted that it was a bona fide mistake on their part. The excess payment made was the result of wrong interpretation of the Rule that was applicable to them, for which the appellants cannot be held responsible. Rather, the whole confusion was because of inaction, negligence and carelessness of the officials concerned of the Government of Bihar. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant teachers submitted that majority of the beneficiaries have either retired or are on the verge of it. Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case at hand and to avoid any hardship to the appellant teachers, we are of the view that no recovery of the amount that has been paid in excess to the appellant teachers should be made. 18. It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship which would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement. Be that as it may, based on the decisions referred to hereinabove, we may, as a ready reference, summarise the following few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible in law : (i) Recovery from the employees belonging to Class III and Class IV service (or Group C and Group D service). (ii) Recovery from the retired employees, or the employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery. (iii) Recovery from the employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued. (ii) Recovery from the retired employees, or the employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery. (iii) Recovery from the employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued. (iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post. (v) In any other case, where the court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer’s right to recover.” 9. As a logical sequitur to the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncement, the impugned order 30.10.2010, so far petitioner is concerned, is hereby quashed and set aside and recovery, if any, is made in pursuance to order dated 30.10.2010 the same be refunded to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 10. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the writ application stands allowed.