JUDGMENT : Lok Pal Singh, J. 1. Appeal from order has been preferred under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act., with a delay condonation application No. 408 of 2018. The delay in filing the appeal has not been explained properly and how much is the delay in filing the appeal has been left blank in the application. The prayer made in the delay condonation application is reproduced herein under: “It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to condone the delay of …………………………… days in filing the present appeal against the impugned judgment and award dated 19.08.2017 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/1st Additional District Judge, Rishikesh, Dehradun in Motor Accident Claim Case No. 60 of 2017, Paramjeet Singh versus Brijesh Singh & Others.” 2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that, though the delay has not been explained in an application for condonation of delay, but the same has been sufficiently explained in paragraph No.8 of the affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application. The contents of para No. 8 of the affidavit filed in support of an application for condonation of delay, which are reproduced herein under:- “8. That after the certified copy of the impugned judgment was received in the divisional office, the file was sent to the Regional Office for getting the approval to file the appeal and after the approval was granted, the file was sent to the Haldwani Divisional Office, which distributes the files to the lawyers to prepare the case and vide letter dated 07.12.2017 the file was sent to the counsel for preparation of appeal by courier but the draft of statutory deposit was not ready by that time, so it could not be sent and after the preparation of appeal and getting ready of the draft, the appeal is being filed and all these procedure took time and thus there is some days delay in filing the appeal, which delay is not intentional or deliberate and thus in the interest of justice the delay is necessary to be condoned and the appeal be heard on merit, otherwise the insurance company will suffer irreparably.” 3. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others reported in 2013 (12) SCC 649 has laid down certain principle of law and held that an application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. Then, application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment (supra) are extracted herein under:- 8. Before we delve into the factual scenario and the defensibility of the order condoning delay, it is seemly to state the obligation of the court while dealing with an application for condonation of delay and the approach to be adopted while considering the grounds for condonation of such colossal delay. 9. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji, a two-Judge Bench observed that: (SCC p. 108, para 3) “3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice—that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts.” (emphasis in original) The learned Judges emphasised on adoption of a liberal approach while dealing with the applications for condonation of delay as ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late and refusal to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated. 10. It was stressed that there should not be a pedantic approach but the doctrine that is to be kept in mind is that the matter has to be dealt with in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner and cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred over the technical considerations. 10. It was stressed that there should not be a pedantic approach but the doctrine that is to be kept in mind is that the matter has to be dealt with in a rational commonsense pragmatic manner and cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred over the technical considerations. It was also ruled that there is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence and that the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice on technical grounds as it is the duty of the court to remove injustice. 11. In the said case the Division Bench observed that the State which represents the collective cause of the community does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status and the courts are required to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause”. 12. In G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer, Venkatachaliah, J. (as his Lordship then was), speaking for the Court, has opined thus: (SCC pp. 147-48, para 14) “14. The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. See Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd, Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi, Mata Din v. A. Narayanan and Collector (LA) v. Katiji, etc. There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay.” 13. However, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay.” 13. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh the Court was dealing with a fact situation where the interim order passed by the court of first instance was an interpolated order and it was not ascertainable as to when the order was made. The said order was under appeal before the District Judge who declined to condone the delay and the said view was concurred with by the High Court. The Court, taking stock of the facts, came to hold that if such an interpolated order is allowed to stand, there would be failure of justice and, accordingly, set aside the orders impugned therein observing that the appeal before the District Judge deserved to be heard on merits. 14. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, the Court, after referring to New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma, came to hold that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public justice and it may result in public mischief. 15. In this context, we may refer with profit to the authority in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn., where a two-Judge Bench of this Court has observed that: (SCC p. 465, para 14) “14. … The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.” Thereafter, the learned Judges proceeded to state that this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate. 16. In Improvement Trust v. Ujagar Singh it has been held that: (SCC p. 789, para 16) “16. While considering [an] application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not.” It has been further stated therein that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and behaves. 17. A reference to the principle stated in Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh-would be quite fruitful. In the said case the Court referred to the pronouncements in Union of India v. Ram Charan, P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao and stated thus: (Balwant Singh case, SCC p. 696, paras 25-26) “25. We may state that even if the term ‘sufficient cause’ has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of ‘reasonableness’ as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise (sic a lis). These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” 18. Recently in Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai, the learned Judges referred to the pronouncement in Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil wherein it has been opined that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises. Thereafter, the two-Judge Bench ruled thus: (Maniben Devraj Shah case, SCC pp. 168-69, paras 23-24) “23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24. What colour the expression ‘sufficient cause’ would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” 19. Eventually, the Bench upon perusal of the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to hold that certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and, accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had condoned the delay of more than seven years. 20. Eventually, the Bench upon perusal of the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to hold that certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and, accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had condoned the delay of more than seven years. 20. In B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy the Court referring to earlier decisions reversed the decision of the learned Single Judge who had condoned delay of 1236 days as the explanation given in the application for condonation of delay was absolutely fanciful. 21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 4. In my view an application for condonation of delay has not been drafted sincerely and carefully rather it has been drafted in negligently and haphazard manner. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 4. In my view an application for condonation of delay has not been drafted sincerely and carefully rather it has been drafted in negligently and haphazard manner. An affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application is also cryptic in nature, which does not explain delay. An application for condonation of delay as well as averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application do not satisfy the conditions laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment (supra). Thus, the delay condonation application is liable to be dismissed and the same is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal stands dismissed.