ORDER : 1. This civil revision is directed against the judgment and decree dated 09.03.2016 and 17.03.2016 respectively, passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Jamshedpur, whereby the Eviction Suit No- 29 of 2004 filed by the plaintiff was dismissed. 2. The plaintiff instituted the suit pleading therein that the plaintiff is an institution/club, known as Amal Sangha and Amal Sangha Pathsala having its premises at Sidhgora, Jamshedpur. The premises was allotted to the plaintiff by M/s TISCO, Ltd., Jamshedpur, for imparting social and cultural activities and education to the poor children of the area. The institution is a Trust having President, General Secretary and the Trustees. The Trust runs a school. That Dasrath Nag, the father of the defendant was inducted as a caretaker of the club and was given a residential room in the premises of school on monthly rent of Rs.239.20/-. That Dasrath Nag fell seriously ill and the defendant along with her children came to look after him during his illness. After death of her father, the defendant requested the plaintiff to allow her to continue to reside in the premises. The plaintiff on humanitarian ground allowed her to reside in the premises as a caretaker on a monthly rent of Rs.400/-. The defendant was being paid a monthly salary of Rs.1200/-. That after some time the husband of the defendant also started residing with her. It is alleged that the husband of the defendant is a drunkard and a person of unruly behavior. He uses abusive language which has an adverse impact on smooth functioning and discipline of the school. That several complaints were received from the teachers regarding the bad behavior of defendant’s husband. The plaintiff requested the defendant and her husband to maintain decorum but all requests fell on deaf ears. It is pleaded that the plaintiffs run the school in the name Amla Sangh Pathshala and the District Education, Superintendent vide letter dated 20.04.2004 has allowed the plaintiff to run classes for class-VI and class-VII. However, due to insufficiency of space in the premises the plaintiff is facing difficulty in starting the classes for class VI and VII. Therefore, the plaintiffs require the premises, for starting aforesaid classes. 3. However, due to insufficiency of space in the premises the plaintiff is facing difficulty in starting the classes for class VI and VII. Therefore, the plaintiffs require the premises, for starting aforesaid classes. 3. The defendants appeared and filed their written statement stating that the premises was subleased by M/s TISCO to the plaintiff Amal Sangh for carrying out cultural programs and not for running a school. It is stated that the there are two plaintiffs and the plaintiff is not a Trustee of Amal Sangh. That the defendant was employed by Amalsangha as a permanent staff in place of her father. That the plaintiff is annoyed with the defendant because on her complaint, the Labour Superintendent cum Inspector conducted an inquiry and by report dated 23.10.2003 directed the plaintiff to pay the salary of Rs.13,588.24 paise for the period running from 01.04.2001 to 30.09.2003. That the plaintiff instead of complying with the order as a retaliatory measure has instituted the suit for eviction on false and frivolous grounds. 4. On the pleading of the parties the court below framed as many as seven issues. The issues are as under:- I. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and for the reliefs claimed? II. Whether the plaintiffs has raised cause of action to bring the suit? III. Whether the suit is barred by limitation, waiver and acquiescence? IV. Whether the plaintiffs requires the suit premises bonafidely and in good faith for its personal necessity or requirement? V. Whether there is any relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and defendant? VI. Whether the partial eviction from the tenanted premises would suffice the need of the plaintiffs? VII. Whether the plaintiffs is entitled for any other relief or reliefs as claimed? 5. The trial court adjudicated issue nos. 1 to 5 and held that the plaintiff had no locus standi to institute the suit since he was not a Trustee of Amal Sangha. He failed to produce the constitution of the Trust or the deed of lease. Though PW-2 deposed that the club Amal Sangha Pathsala is a Trust but no Trustee was examined to prove that the P.W 2 was authorized by the Trustee to institute the suit. The trial court recorded the finding that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant. 6. Though PW-2 deposed that the club Amal Sangha Pathsala is a Trust but no Trustee was examined to prove that the P.W 2 was authorized by the Trustee to institute the suit. The trial court recorded the finding that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff has assailed the finding of the court below inter alia on the ground that the court below has failed to appreciate that it has been specifically pleaded that in the General Body meeting held on 26.05.2004, the Trustees had authorized PW-2 to institute the suit. It is argued that the court below has exceeded its jurisdiction while recording the finding that PW-2 has not produced the authorization letter of the Trustees empowering him to institute the suit. It is argued that the defendant has not denied that she is not paying the monthly rent. Therefore, in view of admission of the defendant the finding by the trial court that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant is a glaring perversity in the findings. In view of the admission of the defendant in her written statement regarding the existence of sub-lease by M/s TISCO Ltd., the trial court has erred in recording the finding that the lease deed was not produced by the plaintiff to substantiate the pleading. It is argued that the suit was instituted for eviction of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff requires the premises for starting the classes of Class VI and VII, however, the trial court has erred in law in not adjudicating the issue of bona fide reasonable requirement of the premises by the plaintiffs and the question whether partial eviction would satisfy the need of the plaintiffs. It is argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that Amal Sangha and Amal Sangha Pathsala, are juristic persons created by a Trust deed. That burden lies heavily on the plaintiff to establish the factum of relationship of landlord and tenant. That the impugned judgment does not suffer from any illegality requiring any interference by this Court. 7. Heard. It is argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that Amal Sangha and Amal Sangha Pathsala, are juristic persons created by a Trust deed. That burden lies heavily on the plaintiff to establish the factum of relationship of landlord and tenant. That the impugned judgment does not suffer from any illegality requiring any interference by this Court. 7. Heard. In view of the contention of the parties, the moot question to be determined in the instant revision, is whether the application filed by the person claiming himself to be General Secretary of the Trust (Amal Sangha and Amal Sangha Pathsala) was maintainable under Section 11 (1) (c) of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2000 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). 8. For answering the said question it is pertinent to refer to Section of the Indian Trust Act. Section 47 of the Indian Trust Act mandates that a Trust cannot delegate its office or any of its duty either to a manager or to a stranger unless the constitution of the trust stipulates or provides for the same. The explanation to section 47 contemplates that the appointment of an attorney or a proxy to do an act merely ministerial and involving no independent discretion is not a delegation within the meaning of the section. Section 48 of Indian Trust Act prohibits co-trustees to act singly and it provides that when there are more Trustees than one, all must join in the execution of the Trust except where the instrument of Trust otherwise provides. 9. Thus, in view of the provisions of Section 47, it has to be determined whether the suit instituted by the PW-2, claiming himself as Secretary of the Trust, was maintainable. As per mandate of Section 47 of the Indian Trust Act, PW-2 was required to produce the authorization latter of the Trustees, showing that they had authorized PW-2 to institute suit under Section 11 (1) (c) of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2000. Such authorization was mandatory to prove that the Trustees had delegated the authority to PW-2 to institute the suit. 10. In this context, it is pertinent to state that in the case of Rishab Chand Bhandari vs. National Engg. Such authorization was mandatory to prove that the Trustees had delegated the authority to PW-2 to institute the suit. 10. In this context, it is pertinent to state that in the case of Rishab Chand Bhandari vs. National Engg. Industry Ltd.; (2009) 10 SCC 601 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that unless there is some documentary proof that the Trust had authorized its agent to file a suit for eviction on its behalf, it cannot be said that the agent had any right to file such a suit. 11. At this juncture it is relevant to take notice that the definition of ‘landlord’ though exhaustive under Section 2(g) of the Act has a restrictive meaning under the provisions of section 11(1)(c) of the Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2000 which stipulates that the landlord must be the owner of the building in case the eviction is sought on the ground of personal necessity. 12. This settled principle has been enunciated and elaborated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M.M.Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal; AIR 1981 SC 1113 and held that the person claiming possession on the ground of his reasonable requirement of the leased building must show that he is a landlord in the sense that he is owner of the building and has a right to occupy the same in his own right. It has been observed that by restricting the meaning of expression “landlord” for the purpose of Section 11(1)(c), the legislature manifested its intention namely that landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building himself and exclude any one holding a title lesser than his own. 13. The court below has considered and elaborately discussed the materials on record and has rightly held that the suit as instituted by the plaintiff was not maintainable. It is noticed that PW-2, i.e., the plaintiff has neither produced the Trust deed nor any documentary evidence, to establish that he had delegated authority by the Trust to institute the suit. It is abundantly clear that PW-2 has failed to adduce such evidence to substantiate the pleading of relationship of landlord between PW-2 and the defendant. 14. In the result the revision is, hereby, dismissed. Revision dismissed.