JUDGMENT : In this second appeal, challenge is made to the judgment and decree dated 18.06.2003 passed in A.S.No.275 of 2001 on the file of the Principal Judge, City Civil Court Chennai, confirming the judgment and decree dated 13.12.2000 passed in O.S. No.5699 of 1994, on the file of V Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. 2. The second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law. 1. Whether the courts below were correct in holding that the suit was barred by Res Judicata in view of the judgment and decree in O.S. No.4765 of 1977, especially since neither the pleadings nor the judgment in O.S.No.4765 of 1977 had been exhibited before the courts below by the first defendant? 2. Whether the courts below were right in interpreting Order XXI Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to include the decree holder in filing a fresh suit as questions or objections could be raised only by the judgment debtor or any other person and not the decree holder? 3. Whether the courts below were correct in holding that the plaintiff's suit was barred by virtue of Order XXI Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in view of the fact that O.S. No.4765 of 1977 had been instituted on 18.01.1977, which rendered the rules inapplicable to the 2nd defendant? 4. Whether the courts below were right in holding that the plaintiff who was the decree holder in prior proceedings could not file a separate suit?" 3. Considering the scope of the issues involved between the parties as regards the subject matter lying in a narrow compass, it is unnecessary to dwell into the facts of the case in detail. 4. The Plaintiff devasthanam is the owner of the suit property. According to the plaintiff, the suit property had been leased out in favour of the first defendant and the plaintiff had terminated the tenancy of the first defendant and accordingly laid the suit in O.S.No.4765 of 1977 for recovery of possession and it is stated that the said suit ended in a decree in favour of the plaintiff and accordingly has laid execution proceedings against the first defendant in E.P.No.1257/88. It is the case of the plaintiff that the court Amin while executing the abovesaid decree reported obstruction on the part of the second defendant and accordingly it is stated that the plaintiff had filed E.A.No.138/92 for the removal of the obstruction caused by the second defendant. It is also admitted that the abovesaid E.A. had come to be dismissed for non prosecution on 27.07.1993. Accordingly alleging that the defendants are only the trespassers and in the occupation of the suit property illegally and liable to be vacated, it is stated that the plaintiff had been necessitated to lay the suit against the defendants for appropriate reliefs. 5. The first defendant remained exparte and the second defendant has resisted the plaintiff's case contending that the plaintiff having failed to pursue the application preferred by it for the removal of obstruction in the execution proceedings cannot be allowed to maintain a separate suit on the same cause of action and accordingly contended that the present suit laid by the plaintiff is barred by Order XXI Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure and on the basis of res judicata and it is further stated that the plaintiff is fully aware about the possession and occupation of the second defendant in respect of the suit property right from 1977 onwards and accordingly prayed for the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit. 6. The short point that arises for consideration is whether the plaintiff is percluded from filing a fresh suit in the light of Order XXI Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. There is no dispute that the plaintiff had obtained the decree in O.S. No.4765/77 against the first defendant and put the decree in execution in E.P.1257/88 and it is found that as abovestated, the execution had been resisted by the second defendant and accordingly the plaintiff had come to prefer the application in E.A. No.138/92 for the removal of the obstruction caused by the second defendant. It is found that the plaintiff had not evinced interest in prosecuting the abovesaid application and left it to go for dismissal. Thereafter, the plaintiff has come forward with the present suit. The courts below by holding that the present suit laid by the plaintiff is barred under Order XXI Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, dismissed the plaintiff's case. 8. Thereafter, the plaintiff has come forward with the present suit. The courts below by holding that the present suit laid by the plaintiff is barred under Order XXI Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, dismissed the plaintiff's case. 8. The scope of order XXI Rule 35, 97, 98, 99, 101 and 105 of Civil Procedure code has been explained by the Apex Court in the decision reported in (1997) 3 SCC 694 (Brahmdeo Chaudhary Vs. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and another) as follows: Civil Procedure Code, 1908 Or. 21 Rr.35, 97,98,99,101, 105 and Sch. Appendix E Form 40 Execution of eviction decree under R. 35 Resistance offered by appellant stranger occupying the decretal premises and asserting his own right Application filed by decree holder for issuance of fresh warrant for possession to be heard and his alleged right to the property to be adjudicated upon Held, executing court must first adjudicate upon objections of the appellant on merits under R. 97(2) r/w Rr.101 and 98 instead of insisting upon first handing over possession and then moving of application by the appellant under R.99 Words 'any person' in R.97(1) includes such a stranger as the appellant If the resistance or obstruction found to be unjust and unwarranted then the same would be removed by the court Order passed by the court would be treated as a decree under R.101 which would be appealable In case the stranger is already dispossessed his remedy would lie under R.99. Under Rule 35 of Order 21 CPC a warrant for possession can be straightaway sought against persons occupying immovable property which is the subject-matter of decree by the decree-holder provided such persons who are occupying the suit property are judgment-debtors or persons claiming through the former. Once resistance is offered by a purported stranger to the decree and which comes to be noted by the exacting court as well as by the decree-holder the remedy available to the decree holder against such as obstructionist is only under Order 21, Rule 97, sub-rule (1) and he cannot bypass such obstruction and insist on re-issuance of warrant for possession under Order 21, Rule 35 with the help of police force, as that course would amount to bypassing and circumventing the procedure laid down under Order 21, Rule 97 in connection with removal of obstruction of purported strangers to the decree. Once such an obstruction is on the record of the executing court the executing court cannot tell such obstruction that he must first lose possession and then only his remedy is to move an application under Order 21, Rule 99 CPC and pray for restoration of possession. The resistance and/or obstruction to possession of immovable property as contemplated by Order 21, Rule 97 CPC could have been offered by any person. The words "any person" as contemplated by Order 21, Rule 97, Sub-rule (1) are comprehensive enough to include apart from judgment-debtor or anyone claiming through him even persons claiming independently and who would, therefore, be total strangers to the decree. In an application under Order 21, Rule 97 moved by a decree-holder who complains about the resistance or obstruction offered by any person to the decree-holder in his attempt at obtaining possession of property and who wants such obstruction or resistance to be removed which otherwise is an impediment in his way, a lis arises between the decree-holder applicant under Order 21, Rule 97 on the one hand and such obstructionist or resisting party on the other, to whom summons have been issued by the court as per Form No.40. When such a lis arises, it has to be adjudicated upon as enjoined by Order 21, Rule 97, sub-rule (2). The procedure for adjudicating such a lis has to be culled out from the remaining succeeding Rules of Order 21. Such questions relating to the right, title and interest in the property arising between the parties to any proceedings under Order 21, Rule 97 or Rule 99 have to be adjudicated upon by following an identical gamut of procedure by the executing court. The said gamut of procedure is laid down by Order 21, Rule 98. Therefore, after hearing the decree-holder and the obstructionist the court can pass appropriate orders after adjudicating upon the controversy between the parties as enjoined by Order 21, Rule 97, sub-rule (2) read with Order 21, Rule 98. After such adjudication if it is found that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without a just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf then such obstruction or resistance would be removed as per Order 21, Rule 98, sub-rule (2) and the decree-holder would be permitted to be put in possession. After such adjudication if it is found that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without a just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf then such obstruction or resistance would be removed as per Order 21, Rule 98, sub-rule (2) and the decree-holder would be permitted to be put in possession. Even in such an eventuality the order passed would be treated as a decree under Order 21, Rule 101 and no separate suit would lie against such order meaning thereby the only remedy would be to prefer an appeal before the appropriate appellate court against such deemed decree. If for any reason a stranger to the decree is already dispossessed of the suit property relating to which he claims any right, title or interest before his getting any opportunity to resist or offer obstruction on the spot on account of his absence from the place or for any other valid reason then his remedy would lie in filing an application under Order 21, Rule 99 CPC claiming that his dispossession was illegal and that possession deserves to be restored to him. If such an application is allowed after adjudicating then as enjoined by Order 21, Rule 98, sub-rule (1) CPC the executing court can direct the stranger applicant under Order 21, Rule 99 to be put in possession of the property or if his application is found to be substanceless, it has to be dismissed. Such an order passed by the executing court disposing of the application one way or the other under Order 21, Rule 98, sub-rule (1) would be deemed to be a decree as laid down by Order 21, Rule 103 and would be appealable before appropriate appellate forum. But no separate suit would lie against such orders as clearly enjoined by Order 21, Rule 101. Thus, the view that only remedy of such stranger to the decree lies under Order 21, Rule 99 and he has no locus standi to get adjudication of his claim prior to the actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder in the execution proceedings is erroneous. Thus, the view that only remedy of such stranger to the decree lies under Order 21, Rule 99 and he has no locus standi to get adjudication of his claim prior to the actual delivery of possession to the decree-holder in the execution proceedings is erroneous. The view also results in patent breach of principles of natural justice as the obstructionist, who alleges to have any independent right, title and interest in the decretal property and who is admittedly not a party to the decree even though making a grievance right in time before the warrant for execution is actually executed, would be told off the gates and his grievance would not be considered or heard on merits and he would be thrown off lock, stock and barrel by use of police force by the decree-holder. That would obviously result in irreparable injury to such obstructionist whose grievance would go overboard without being considered on merits and such obstructionist would be condemned totally unheard. Such an order of the executing court, therefore, would fail also on the ground on non-compliance with basic principles of natural justice. On the contrary the statutory scheme envisaged by Order 21, Rule 97 CPC clearly guards against such a pitfall and provides a statutory remedy both to the decree-holder as well as to the obstructionist to have their respective say in the matter and to get proper adjudication before the executing court and it is that adjudication which subject to the hierarchy of appeals would remain binding between the parties to such proceedings and separate suit would be barred with a view to seeing that multiplicity of proceedings and parallel proceedings are avoided and the gamut laid down by Order 21, Rule 97 to 103 would ramain a complete code and the sole remedy for the parties concerned to have their grievances once and for all finally resolved in execution proceedings themselves. 9. The abovesaid position of law had been reiterated by the Apex Court in the decision reported in (1998) 4 SCC 543 (Shreenath and another Vs. 9. The abovesaid position of law had been reiterated by the Apex Court in the decision reported in (1998) 4 SCC 543 (Shreenath and another Vs. Rajesh and others) as follows: Civil Procedure Code, 1908 Or.21 Rr.97(1) & (2), 101, 98, 99, 100, 103 (as they stood prior to, and after, 1976 Amendment), 35 and 36 Execution of decree for vacant possession or mortgaged property Tenants in possession of the property obstructing the decree-holder and filing an application/objection under R.97 on the ground that they (the tennats) were not parties to the suit and had to the property independent legal right not affected by the mortgage or redemption thereof Such application/objection, held, maintainable both under the pre and post 1976 amendment law Distiniction between pre and post 1976 amendment provisions pointed out Further held the maintainability of such application/objection is not affected by the provisions of amended R.99 or unamended R.100 Words "any person" occuring in R.97(1) Scope Held, include even persons not bound by the decree words and phrases "Any person". Under Order 21 Rule 35(1), the executing court delivers actual physical possession of the disputed property to the decree-holder and, if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the said property. Under Rule 36, the decree-holder gets the symbolic possession. Order 21 Rule 97 conceives of resistance or obstruction to the possession of immovable property when made in execution of a decree by "any person". This may be either by the person bound by the decree, claiming title through the judgment-debtor or claiming independent right of his own including a tenant not party to the suit or even a stranger. A decree-holder, in such a case, may make an application to the executing court complaining such resistance for delivery of possession of the property. Rule 97(2) after 1976 substitution empowers the executing courts when such claim is made to proceed to adjudicate upon the applicant's claim in accordance with the provisions contained thereinafter. This refers to Order 21 Rule 101 (as amended by 1976 Act) under which all questions relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties under Order 21 Rule 97 or Rule 99 should be determined by the court and not by a separate suit. This refers to Order 21 Rule 101 (as amended by 1976 Act) under which all questions relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties under Order 21 Rule 97 or Rule 99 should be determined by the court and not by a separate suit. By the amendment, one has not to go for a fresh suit but all matters pertaining to that property including any obstruction by a stranger are adjudicated in the executing proceedings. The expression "any person" in Rule 97(1) is used deliberately for widening the scope of power so that the executing court could adjudicate the claim made in any such application under Order 21 Rule 97. Thus by the use of the words "any person" it includes all persons resisting the delivery of possession, claiming right in the property, even those not bound by the decree, including tenants or other persons claiming right on their own, including a stranger. So, under Order 21 Rule 101 all disputes between the decree-holder and any such person is to be adjudicated by the executing court. A party is not thrown out to relegate itself to the long drawn out arduous procedure of a fresh suit. This is to salvage the possible hardship both to the decree holder and the other person claiming title on their own right to get it adjudicated in the very execution proceedings. Provisions of Rule 97(1) before that after the 1976 Amendment are the same but after the 1976 Amendment all disputes relating to the property raised under Rules 97 and 99 are to be adjudicated under Rule 101, while under unamended provision under sub-clause (2) of Rule 97, the executing court issued summons to any such person obstructing possession over the decretal property. After investigation under Rule 98 the court puts back a decree-holder in possession where the court found obstruction was occasioned without any just cause, while under Rule 9 where obstruction was by a person claiming in good faith to be in possession of the property on his own right, the court had to dismiss the decree-holder's application. Thus, even prior to 1976, right of any person claiming right on his own or as a tenant, not party to the suit, had to be adjudicated under Rule 99 and he need not fall back to file a seperate suit. Thus, even prior to 1976, right of any person claiming right on his own or as a tenant, not party to the suit, had to be adjudicated under Rule 99 and he need not fall back to file a seperate suit. By this, he is saved from a long litigation. So a tenant or any person claiming a right in the property on the own, if resists delivery of possession to the decree holder, the dispute and his claim has to be decided after the 1976 Amendment under Rule 97 read with Rule 101 and prior to the amendment under Rule 97 read with Rule 99. However, under the old law, in case order was passed against the person resisting possession under Rule 97 read with Rule 99 then by virtue of Rule 103, as it then was, he was to file a suit to establish his right. But now after the amendment one need not file suit even in such cases as all disputes are to be settled by the executing court itself finally under Rule 101. Thus, both either under the old law or the present law, the right of a tenant or any person claiming right on his own of the property in case he resists, his objection under Order 21 Rule 97 has to be decided by the executing court itself. The provisions of old Rule 100 or new Rule 99 will not defeat the right of such a person to get his objection decided under Rule 97 which is a stage prior to his dispossession or a case where he is in possession. 10. Our High Court in the decision reported in 98 Law weekly page No.116 (Fathima Automobiles Vs. P.K.P. Nair, Court of small causes-cum-Rent Controller, Madras) has held that all the questions arising between the parties to the application for the removal of obstruction have to be decided by the executing court itself as per the amended CPC and a separate suit is not maintainable with reference to the same and the position of the law has been elucidated in the abovesaid decision as follows: C.P.C., O.21, Rr.97 and 101 (as amended by Act 104 of 1976) See T.N. Buildings (lease and Rent Control) Act, Ss.18 and 23. After the Amending Act 104 of 1976 was passed, the executing court before which an application is filed for removal of obstruction has to decide all questions arising between the parties viz., the decree-holder and the obstructor and no separate suit will lie for the purpose of deciding the dispute between the decree holder and the obstructor. Having regard to the specific and express provision contained in R.101 O.21, C.P.C., that against an order of removing or refusing to remove obstruction, a separate suit is not maintainable, all the questions arising between the parties to the application for removal of obstruction have to be decided by the executing court itself as that court has been conferred a specific power to decide all the questions arising between the parties while disposing of the application for removal of obstruction. Therefore, we are not in a position to agree with the view taken by Mohan, J., to the effect that a suit is maintainable in this case by the appellant who is an obstructor against whom an order of removing obstruction has been passed. 11. The same principle has also been reiterated by the Apex Court in the decision reported in (2015) 1 SCC 379 (Sameer Singh and another Vs. Abdul Rab and others) as follows:- The aforesaid authorities clearly spell out that the executing court has the authority to adjudicate all the questions pertaining to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties. It also includes the claim of a stranger who apprehends dispossession or has already been dispossessed from the immovable property. The self-contained code, as has been emphasised by this court, enjoins the executing court to adjudicate the lis and the purpose is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. It is also so because prior to 1976 amendment the grievance was required to be agitated by filing a suit but after the amendment the entire enquiry has to be conducted by the executing court. Order 21 Rule 101 provides for the determination of necessary issues. Rule 103 clearly stipulates that when an application is adjudicated upon under Rule 98 or Rule 100 the said order shall have the same force as if it were at decree. Thus, it is a deemed decree. 12. Order 21 Rule 101 provides for the determination of necessary issues. Rule 103 clearly stipulates that when an application is adjudicated upon under Rule 98 or Rule 100 the said order shall have the same force as if it were at decree. Thus, it is a deemed decree. 12. On an analysis of the abovesaid principles of law governing the removal of obstruction as per the amended CPC and when it is found that there is a bar of a separate suit with reference to the same under Order XXI Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is found that the courts below are justified in holding that the suit laid by the plaintiff is not legally sustainable and the plaintiff having failed to exhaust the remedies available in the execution proceedings, cannot be allowed to circumvent the same by laying a separate suit for the same reliefs. 13. The counsel for the defendant in support of his contention qua the abovesaid position of law, relied upon the decisions reported in (1995) 5 SCC 238 (B. Gangadhar Vs. B.G. Rajalingam) AIR 1998 Kar. 186 (V.K. Rama Setty Vs. A. Gopinath) AIR 1992 Cal. 153 (Sampatraj Pagaria Vs. Delta International Ltd., and another) AIR 1985 P&H 76 (Jagdish Lal and another Vs. Surender Kumar and others) AIR 1983 MP 82 (Dattatraya Vs. Mangal and another) AIR 1984 Bom. 357 (Nusserwanji E. Poonegar and others Vs. Mrs. Shirinbai F. Bhesania and others). 14. The principles of law outlined in the abovesaid decisions are taken into consideration and followed as applicable to the case at the hand. 15. In the light of the above discussions, considering the disentitlement of the plaintiff in laying a separate suit for recovery of possession and other reliefs against the defendant, it is seen that the courts below are fully justified in holding that the plaintiff's suit is barred by virtue of provisions contained in Order XXI Rule 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure and no interference is called for with reference to the same. The substantial questions of law formulated in this second appeal are accordingly answered against the plaintiff and in favour of the second defendant. 16. In conclusion, the second appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition, if any, is closed.