ORDER : The petitioners, who are the defendants in Original Suit No. 73 of 2015, were debarred from filing their written statement of defence by an order dated 27.05.2016. On 06.12.2016, they filed an application for permission to them to file their written statement. This application was dismissed for non-prosecution on 22.07.2017 and their application seeking permission to prosecute the application dated 06.12.2016 has been dismissed by the impugned order dated 21.05.2018. 2. Contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that if they are not permitted to contest the suit on merits they would suffer irreparable loss and injury and, moreover, default on their part in not prosecuting the application dated 06.12.2016 could have been condoned by imposing cost upon them. 3. Briefly stated, Original Suit No. 73 of 2015 has been instituted by Shahjanha Khatoon and her son namely, Md. Mustaqu for a decree for declaration of their title over the land comprised under schedule “B” of the plaint and for a declaration of confirmation of their possession over the suit land and, in the alternative, a decree for recovery of possession of schedule “B” land by ejecting the defendants from the suit property. Another relief sought in the plaint is for a decree for Rs.3000/- as arrears of rent. The plaintiffs have pleaded that the parties are governed by Hanfi School of Muslim Law and they are descendants of a common ancestor namely, Hansu Mian. The said Hansu Mian had three sons namely, Lecha Miyan, Naju Miyan and Halkhori Miyan. The plaintiffs are the descendants of Lecha Miyan and the defendants are the descendants of Halkhori Miyan. Case set-up by the plaintiffs is that mother of the plaintiff no. 1 received 13 decimals land from her husband namely, Ramjan Ali in dan mohar through a registered deed dated 26.07.1965. She thereafter got her name mutated and paid rent to the Chatra Municipality. This land is comprised under schedule “B” to the plaint. The plaintiff no. 1 has received the suit land from her mother through a registered gift deed dated 09.12.1993. The suit land has been mutated in her name and she has been depositing rent and tax in the Circle Office as well as with the Chatra Municipality. 4. The plaint was presented on 06.08.2015 and the suit was admitted on 07.10.2015. The defendant nos. The suit land has been mutated in her name and she has been depositing rent and tax in the Circle Office as well as with the Chatra Municipality. 4. The plaint was presented on 06.08.2015 and the suit was admitted on 07.10.2015. The defendant nos. 1 to 4 appeared in the suit on 14.12.2015 and the defendant no. 5 put his appearance through his counsel on 08.01.2016. Thereafter, the suit was posted on 18.02.2016 for filing the written statement by the defendants. When the defendants, who are the petitioners, failed to file their written statement, after granting opportunities to them on 30.03.2016 and 03.05.2016, the trial Judge by an order dated 27.05.2016 has debarred them from filing their written statement. It appears that on 06.12.2016 along with an application under Section 148 CPC read with Section 151 CPC the petitioners filed their written statement. This application has been dismissed for non-prosecution and, as noticed above, the application for prosecuting the said application dated 06.12.2016 has been dismissed by an order dated 21.05.2018. 5. Order VIII Rule 1 CPC provides that within 30 days of service of summons the defendants shall file his written statement of defence. This period of 30 days for filing the written statement can be extended to 90 days under proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC. But then an order of extension of the period for filing the written statement must record the reasons for granting extension of time to a defendant for filing his written statement. By the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002, proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC has been incorporated. The object behind the aforesaid proviso is to curtail unnecessary delay during the trial of a suit. It also needs to be recorded that by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999, Section 148 CPC has been amended and power of the court to enlarge time has now been restricted to 30 days in total. The object and purpose behind the aforesaid amendments in the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be permitted to be frustrated on a plea of prejudice or irreparable loss sought to be raised by a party to the suit. No doubt, provision under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC has been held directory, but the mandate of law cannot be so overlooked so as to render the statutory provision nugatory. In “Kailash Vs. No doubt, provision under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC has been held directory, but the mandate of law cannot be so overlooked so as to render the statutory provision nugatory. In “Kailash Vs. Nanhku and Others” reported in (2005) 4 SCC 480 , it has been held that where a party to the suit or his counsel has been found negligent, permission to file written statement beyond the statutory provision provided under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC cannot be granted. 6. The petitioners were debarred from filing their written statement after they were granted four opportunities and the application dated 06.12.2016 filed by them was adjourned on as many as 10 occasions; on seven occasions the petitioners were not represented through their counsel or no step was taken by them. There is no explanation by the petitioners for the aforesaid default on their part. The medical certificate produced by the petitioners refers to their alleged illness for the period between February, 2016 to December, 2016, however, they have filed an application under Section 148 CPC read with Section 151 CPC only on 06.12.2016. In “New India Assurance Company Limited Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited” reported in (2015) 16 SCC 20 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the District Forum – it was a case under the Consumer Protection Act – cannot grant extension of time beyond 15 days of the period prescribed under Section 13(2)(a) for filing reply by the opposite-party. In “New India Assurance”, reference before the Supreme Court was whether judgment in “J.J. Merchant Vs. Shrinath Chaturvedi” reported in (2002) 6 SCC 635 which was delivered by a larger Bench was binding on “Kailash”, in which a 2-Judges Bench has held that the court can grant extension of time for filing written statement beyond ninety days as provided under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC. The 3-Judges Bench in “New India Assurance” has held that the judgment in “J.J. Merchant” shall prevail. The 3-Judges Bench in “New India Assurance” has held that the judgment in “J.J. Merchant” shall prevail. The judgment in “Kailash” discusses several other issues also and it has not been specifically held per incurium, however, in view of the decision in “New India Assurance” all that can be argued is that the inherent powers of the Superior Courts cannot be curtailed by legislative enactments and, as held in “Kailash” in exceptional cases time beyond the period prescribed under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC can be granted by the High Court/Supreme Court. 7. In the present case, no such exceptional circumstance has been pleaded by the petitioners. Negligence on the part of the petitioners writ large on the face of the records. Without any plausible explanation for their absence in the suit, the petitioners cannot be permitted to file their written statement of defence. May be their application dated 29.01.2018 has been dismissed on a technical ground, in the aforesaid facts, no interference is warranted in the matter. For the reasons indicated hereinabove, their challenge to the impugned orders dated 27.05.2016, 22.07.2017 and 21.05.2018 must fail. 8. In the above facts, I am not inclined to interfere in the matter and accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.