ORDER : The petitioners are the first and the second accused in the case registered as Crime No.75/2018 of the Ottappalam police station under Sections 448, 341, 323, 324 and 294(b) read with 34 IPC and also under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). They seek the protection envisaged under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the event of arrest by the police in the case. 2. The prosecution case, as disclosed from the first information report, is as follows: The de facto complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste. On 24.01.2018, at about 15.30 hours, she was sitting inside her house. Hearing a commotion, she came out of the house. Then she saw the two accused beating her son. When she tried to prevent the accused from assaulting her son, the first accused referred to the name of her caste and insulted her and her son by stating that being the children of a person belonging to such caste, they would be having the character/conduct of committing theft and he beat her on the left cheek with his hand. He also caught hold her hair and hit her against the wall. When she fell down, he kicked her and called her by her caste name. Meanwhile, the second accused beat her children with her hand and with a stick. When the de facto complainant tried to prevent the second accused from assaulting her children, the first accused again beat and kicked her and insulted her by calling her with reference to her caste name. When the neighbours and the local people gathered there, the accused left the place in an autorickshaw. It is alleged that the accused committed the aforesaid acts for the reason that the son of the de facto complainant had allegedly stolen a light from the autorickshaw owned by the first accused. 3. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Public Prosecutor. Perused the case diary and also the report filed by the investigating officer. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the application for granting anticipatory bail to the petitioners. He has contended that there is statutory interdict against granting pre-arrest bail to the petitioners who are accused of committing offences under the Act. 5. Perused the case diary and also the report filed by the investigating officer. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor has opposed the application for granting anticipatory bail to the petitioners. He has contended that there is statutory interdict against granting pre-arrest bail to the petitioners who are accused of committing offences under the Act. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the allegations raised against the petitioners in the complaint given by the de facto complainant are false. Learned counsel would further contend that the court has to examine whether a prima facie case is made out against the persons accused of having committed an offence under the Act and if the ingredients of the offence alleged against them under the Act are not made out from the allegations in the complaint, then the provision contained in Section 18 of the Act will not come into play. Learned counsel would submit that the allegations raised against the accused by the de facto complainant in the first information statement given to the police by her do not constitute any offence under the Act and therefore, Section 18 of the Act has no application to the facts of the case. 6. Even at the outset it is to be noted that the name of the second accused has been deleted from the array of accused in the case. The investigating officer has filed a report to that effect before the court concerned. The case diary reveals this fact. 7. It is also to be noted that the case was originally registered for the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act but subsequently the offence under that provision has been deleted and the offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act have been incorporated in the case. 8. Section 18 of the Act reads as under: "18. S.438 of the Code not to apply to persons committing an offence under the Act.- Nothing in Section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence under this Act." 9. There can be no doubt with regard to the fact that the protection envisaged under Section 438 Cr.P.C is not available to a person accused of having committed an offence under the Act. There can be no doubt with regard to the fact that the protection envisaged under Section 438 Cr.P.C is not available to a person accused of having committed an offence under the Act. Constitutional validity of Section 18 of the Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in State of M.P v. Ram Krishna Balothia, AIR 1995 SC 1198 and it was held therein as follows: ''The exclusion of S.438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in connection with offences under the said Act has to be viewed in the context of the prevailing social conditions which give rise to such offences, and the apprehension that perpetrators of such atrocities are likely to threaten and intimidate their victims and prevent or obstruct them in the prosecution of these offenders, if the offenders are allowed to avail of anticipatory bail''. 10. In Vilas Pandurang Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2012 SC 3316 , the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the Supreme Court has laid down the parameters to be followed in adjudging an application for anticipatory bail filed by a person accused of an offence under the Act. The Apex Court has held thus: "8. Section 18 of the SC/ST Act creates a bar for invoking Section 438 of the Code. However, a duty is cast on the Court to verify the averments in the complaint and to find out whether an offence under Section 3(1) of the SC/ST Act has been prima facie made out. In other words, if there is a specific averment in the complaint, namely, insult or intimidation with intent to humiliate by calling with caste name, the accused persons are not entitled to anticipatory bail. 9. The scope of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act read with Section 438 of the Code is such that it creates a specific bar in the grant of anticipatory bail. When an offence is registered against a person under the provisions of the SC/ST Act, no Court shall entertain application for anticipatory bail, unless it prima facie finds that such an offence is not made out. Moreover, while considering the application for bail, scope for appreciation of evidence and other material on record is limited. Court is not expected to indulge in critical analysis of the evidence on record. Moreover, while considering the application for bail, scope for appreciation of evidence and other material on record is limited. Court is not expected to indulge in critical analysis of the evidence on record. When a provision has been enacted in the Special Act to protect the persons who belong to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and a bar has been imposed in granting bail under Section 438 of the Code, the provision in the Special Act cannot be easily brushed aside by elaborate discussion on the evidence." 11. The principles laid down in the aforesaid case have been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Bachu Das v. State of Bihar, (2014) 3 SCC 471 . 12. In Niyas v. State of Kerala, 2017 (5) KHC 1004 , this Court has held as follows: ''It is evident from S.18 that an application seeking anticipatory bail is not maintainable under S.438 Cr.P.C. for an offence punishable under the Act, when it has been preferred by a person 'accused of having committed an offence under the Act'. When a person approaches the Court with an application for anticipatory bail, the Court dealing with such an application can go to the limited extent of examining whether the person who has approached the Court 'is accused of having committed an offence under the Act' and if he is not accused of having committed an offence under the Act, it cannot be said that the application seeking anticipatory bail is not maintainable ..... Merely by quoting a penal provision under the Act in the FIR, without incorporating the facts to show that he is accused of having committed an offence under the Act, a person cannot be deprived of his right to seek anticipatory bail under S.438 Cr.P.C” 13. The dictum laid down in the aforesaid cases is to the effect that the Court dealing with an application for anticipatory bail filed by a person accused of an offence under the Act is not precluded from verifying and examining the allegations made in the complaint and to find out whether an offence under the Act has been prima facie made out. But the Court is not supposed to examine the correctness/veracity of the allegations made in the complaint. The Court is not expected to indulge in a critical analysis of the evidence on record. But the Court is not supposed to examine the correctness/veracity of the allegations made in the complaint. The Court is not expected to indulge in a critical analysis of the evidence on record. It is not open to the Court to enter into a roving inquiry of the veracity of the allegations in the complaint/first information report. The Court can examine whether the ingredients of any offence under the Act are attracted. In case, if a prima facie case is made out against the accused, the bar under Section 18 of the Act would squarely apply. 14. In the instant case, the offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act are alleged against the first petitioner/first accused. Section 3(1)(r) of the Act provides that, whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view, shall be punished. Section 3(1)(s) of the Act provides that, whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, abuses any member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within pubic view, shall be punished. 15. In the instant case, in the first information statement given to the police by the de facto complainant, there is a specific allegation that the first accused referred to the caste name of the de facto complainant and that he stated that being the children of a person belonging to such caste, the son of the de facto complainant would be having the conduct/character of committing theft. There is also allegation against the first accused that he insulted and abused the de facto complainant by calling her by her caste name. These allegations in the first information statement given to the police by the de facto complainant, prima facie, attract the ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act. The incident had allegedly occurred in front of the house of the de facto complainant. Whether it was a place within public view or not is a matter of evidence. The incident had allegedly occurred in front of the house of the de facto complainant. Whether it was a place within public view or not is a matter of evidence. At any rate, the statement of the de facto complainant reveals that the neighbours and local people had seen the incident and that the first accused abused her in front of the local people by calling her by her caste name. 16. The incident alleged had occurred on 24.01.2018. The de facto complainant gave first information statement to the police at 14.00 hours on 26.01.2018. True, the delay in giving report to the police regarding the incident is not explained in the first information statement. However, it is to be noted that the de facto complainant has given statement to the police while she was undergoing treatment at the hospital. She cannot be blamed for the delay, if any, occurred in giving intimation to the police from the hospital and in recording her statement by the police. 17. The petitioners have produced two documents and contended that the case against them is false. One of these documents is a complaint given by the first accused to the police on 24.1.2018 alleging that articles were being stolen from his autorickshaw. This document shows that the Sub Inspector had settled the matter by summoning the parties to the police station on 24.1.2018. However, this document does not reveal the time at which the settlement was made by the parties at the police station. The incident alleged by the de facto complainant had occurred at about 15.30 hours on 24.01.2018. This document does not in any way indicate that the incident alleged by the de facto complainant has not taken place or that the complaint given by her is false. 18. Another document produced by the petitioners is the copy of the complaint given by the de facto complainant to the police stating that the first accused came to her house and beat her and assaulted her children. This document shows that on 22.1.2018, at 18.30 hours, the parties were summoned to the police station and the matter was settled at the police station. The report of the Sub Inspector in this regard is dated 24.1.2018. This document also does not in any way indicate that the incident alleged by the de facto complainant is false. This document shows that on 22.1.2018, at 18.30 hours, the parties were summoned to the police station and the matter was settled at the police station. The report of the Sub Inspector in this regard is dated 24.1.2018. This document also does not in any way indicate that the incident alleged by the de facto complainant is false. Moreover, the court is not expected to examine and analyse the documents produced by the accused and to conduct a roving enquiry to find out whether the allegations made by the complainant are false or not. The Supreme Court has expressly prohibited such an enquiry in Vilas Pandurang Pawar v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 2012 SC 3316 ). 19. In a recent decision in Manju Devi v. Onkarjit Singh Ahluwalia, AIR 2017 SC 1583 , the Supreme Court has held as follows: ''The exclusion of S.438 of the Code in connection with offences under the SC/ST Act has to be viewed in the context of the prevailing social conditions which give rise to such offences, and the apprehension that perpetrators of such atrocities are likely to threaten and intimidate their victims and prevent or obstruct them in the prosecution of these offenders, if the offenders are allowed to avail of anticipatory bail”. It was further held by the Supreme Court as follows: ''Though the Constitution of India abolishes 'untouchability' but in view of the social attitudes which lead to the commission of such offences against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, there is justification for an apprehension that if the benefit of anticipatory bail is made available to the persons who are alleged to have committed such offences, there is every likelihood of their misusing their liberty while on anticipatory bail to terrorise their victims and to prevent a proper investigation. It is in this context that S.18 has been incorporated in the SC/ST Act”. Regarding the use of caste name against a member of a scheduled caste, the Apex Court has observed as follows: “The use of the word 'Harijan'' Dhobi' etc. is often used by people belonging to the so - called upper castes as a word of insult, abuse and derision. Calling a person by these names is nowadays an abusive language and is offensive. It is basically used nowadays not to denote a caste but to intentionally insult and humiliate someone. is often used by people belonging to the so - called upper castes as a word of insult, abuse and derision. Calling a person by these names is nowadays an abusive language and is offensive. It is basically used nowadays not to denote a caste but to intentionally insult and humiliate someone. We, as a citizen of this country, should always keep one thing in our mind and heart that no people or community should be today insulted or looked down upon, and nobody's feelings should be hurt'. Regarding the plea raised by the accused that the case against him is false, the Apex Court has held as follows: “With regard to the plea that the complaint filed by the complainant is false and malicious and to wreck vengeance by the brother of the respondent No. 1 herein, we are of the view that it cannot be looked into at the stage of taking cognizance and issue of process and the mala fide or bona fide of a case can only be taken into consideration at the time of trial. A victim of molestation and indignation is in the same position as an injured witness and her testimony should receive the same weight”. 20. The decisions in Ram Krishna Balothia (supra), Vilas Pandurang Pawar (supra) and Manju Devi (supra) were referred to and discussed by the Supreme Court in the judgment dated 20.03.2018 in Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra (Criminal Appeal No.416 of 2018) and it has been held therein as follows: "Exclusion of anticipatory bail has been justified only to protect victims of perpetrators of crime. It cannot be read as being applicable to those who are falsely implicated for extraneous reasons and have not committed the offence on prima facie independent scrutiny. ..... It is, therefore, all the more necessary and important that the express exclusion under Section 18 of the Act is limited to genuine cases and inapplicable where no prima facie case is made out. We have no quarrel with the proposition laid down in the said judgment that persons committing offences under the Atrocities Act ought not to be granted anticipatory bail in the same manner in which the anticipatory bail is granted in other cases punishable with similar sentence. We have no quarrel with the proposition laid down in the said judgment that persons committing offences under the Atrocities Act ought not to be granted anticipatory bail in the same manner in which the anticipatory bail is granted in other cases punishable with similar sentence. Still, the question remains whether in cases where there is no prima facie case under the Act, bar under Section 18 operates can be considered. .... If a person is able to show that, prima facie, he has not committed any atrocity against a member of SC and ST and that the allegation was mala fide and prima facie false and that prima facie no case was made out, we do not see any justification for applying Section 18 in such cases. ..... As a policy, anticipatory bail may be excluded but exclusion cannot be intended to apply where a patently mala fide version is put forward. .... There can be no dispute with the proposition that mere unilateral allegation by any individual belonging to any caste, when such allegation is clearly motivated and false, cannot be treated as enough to deprive a person of his liberty without an independent scrutiny. Thus, exclusion of provision for anticipatory bail cannot possibly, by any reasonable interpretation, be treated as applicable when no case is made out or allegations are patently false or motivated. We hold that the exclusion of Section 438 Cr.P.C. applies when a prima facie case of commission of offence under the Atrocities Act is made. On the other hand, if it can be shown that the allegations are prima facie motivated and false, such exclusion will not apply. Thus, unless exclusion of anticipatory bail is limited to genuine cases and inapplicable to cases where there is no prima facie case was made out, there will be no protection available to innocent citizens. Thus, limiting the exclusion of anticipatory bail in such cases is essential for protection of fundamental right of life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in holding that exclusion of provision for anticipatory bail will not apply when no prima facie case is made out or the case is patently false or mala fide. This may have to be determined by the Court concerned in facts and circumstances of each case in exercise of its judicial discretion. Accordingly, we have no hesitation in holding that exclusion of provision for anticipatory bail will not apply when no prima facie case is made out or the case is patently false or mala fide. This may have to be determined by the Court concerned in facts and circumstances of each case in exercise of its judicial discretion. In doing so, we are not diluting the efficacy of Section 18 in deserving cases where Court finds a case to be prima facie genuine warranting custodial interrogation and pre-trial arrest and detention. ..... It is thus patent that in cases under the Atrocities Act, exclusion of right of anticipatory bail is applicable only if the case is shown to bona fide and that prima facie it falls under the Atrocities Act and not otherwise. Section 18 does not apply where there is no prima facie case or to cases of patent false implication or when the allegation is motivated for extraneous reasons." After holding thus, the Supreme Court issued the following directions: "Accordingly, we direct that in absence of any other independent offence calling for arrest, in respect of offences under the Atrocities Act, no arrest may be effected, if an accused person is a public servant, without written permission of the appointing authority and if such a person is not a public servant, without written permission of the Senior Superintendent of Police of the District. Such permissions must be granted for recorded reasons which must be served on the person to be arrested and to the concerned court. As and when a person arrested is produced before the Magistrate, the Magistrate must apply his mind to the reasons recorded and further detention should be allowed only if the reasons recorded are found to be valid. To avoid false implication, before FIR is registered, preliminary enquiry may be made whether the case falls in the parameters of the Atrocities Act and is not frivolous or motivated". 21. In the instant case, it cannot be found that the allegations raised against the first petitioner by the de facto complainant are motivated or false or malafide. There is no material to find that such allegations have been raised against him by her on extraneous considerations. Even if the two documents produced by the first petitioner are accepted on their face value, it cannot be found that the case against him is false. There is no material to find that such allegations have been raised against him by her on extraneous considerations. Even if the two documents produced by the first petitioner are accepted on their face value, it cannot be found that the case against him is false. On the other hand, those two documents indicate that the incident alleged by the de facto complainant has taken place. At this stage, the court cannot go further and analyse the evidence in the case. 22. The upshot of the discussion above is the following: The name of the second petitioner is deleted from the array of accused in the case. Therefore, there cannot be any reasonable basis for the apprehension of the second petitioner that she would be arrested by the police in connection with the case. It follows that the prayer for granting anticipatory bail to the second petitioner is liable to be rejected. The allegations contained in the first information statement given to the police by the de facto complainant, prima facie, attract the ingredients of the offences under the Act alleged against the first petitioner. It cannot be found that the case against the first petitioner under the Act is false. Therefore, in view of the statutory interdict under Section 18 of the Act, the prayer for granting pre-arrest bail to the first petitioner is also liable to be rejected. However, he is entitled to get limited protection from arrest in the light of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in the decision in Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan (supra). 23. In the result, the prayer for granting anticipatory bail to the petitioners is rejected and the petition is dismissed. However, in the light of the directions issued by the Supreme Court in the decision in Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan (supra), it is ordered that the first petitioner shall not be arrested in respect of the offences alleged against him under the Act, without the written permission of the Senior Superintendent of Police of the District concerned. Such permission, if found necessary, shall be granted for recorded reasons which must be served on the first petitioner. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan (supra), it is ordered that the first petitioner shall not be arrested in respect of the offences alleged against him under the Act, without the written permission of the Senior Superintendent of Police of the District concerned. Such permission, if found necessary, shall be granted for recorded reasons which must be served on the first petitioner. In case occasion arises for the Special Court/Exclusive Special Court to consider application for regular bail, if any, moved by the first petitioner, such Court shall keep in mind the principles laid down and the directions issued by the Supreme Court in the decision in Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan (supra).