ORDER : 1. This writ appeal has been filed against the order dated 25.7.2017 passed by the Single Bench of this Court in WP (C) No. 1857/2017 dismissing the writ petition as being not maintainable. 2. The above-stated petition came-up before the Division Bench consisting of one of us (Justice Pritinker Diwaker) and Justice Arvind Singh Chandel on 24.10.2017 when on the request of the appellant/petitioner it was directed to be listed after a week making it clear that no further adjournment shall be granted. On 7.11.2017 when the matter came to be listed before the Division Bench comprising the Chief Justice and Justice Sharad Kumar Gupta, it was posted for 6.12.2017. However, on that date, the matter was directed to be listed after winter holidays before Division Bench-II which consists of us on 17.1.2018. On 18.1.2018 when the matter was listed before Division Bench-II, none appeared for the appellant/petitioner even in the second round and hence fixed date SPC was issued to him and the matter was ordered to be listed after eight weeks. 3. In the meanwhile, on 12.12.2017 an application I.A. No. 1/2017 has been filed for recusal of the matter from the Bench in which one of us (Pritinker Diwaker, J.) is a member. In the said application, the appellant/petitioner has given reference to similar applications filed in his other petitions and has annexed copy of one such application filed in WPPIL Nos. 96/2017. The reason for recusal assigned in that application is that fifteen PILs have been dismissed contrary to law and fourteen PILs have been dismissed assigning various reasons and one PIL (W.P. (PIL) No. 25/2014) filed by advocate has been dismissed with a cost of Rs. 10,000/- on the ground that advocate cannot file PIL, whereas in other two PILs filed by advocates, cost was not imposed and some of the PILs have been dismissed for want of prosecution, whereas the petition once filed should be decided on merits. It is further stated that the PILs have been dismissed as withdrawn by the petitioners concerned fearing imposition of cost. 4. It has also been pleaded by the appellant/petitioner that attitude of Justice Pritinker Diwaker is not justice-oriented towards PIL and having negative attitude, therefore my petition be not listed before a Bench consisting of Justice Pritinker Diwaker. It is further stated that the PILs have been dismissed as withdrawn by the petitioners concerned fearing imposition of cost. 4. It has also been pleaded by the appellant/petitioner that attitude of Justice Pritinker Diwaker is not justice-oriented towards PIL and having negative attitude, therefore my petition be not listed before a Bench consisting of Justice Pritinker Diwaker. It has further been stated in paragraph 11 of the said application that in two writ appeals filed by him, attitude of Justice Diwaker is not proper and opinion has been expressed to impose heavy cost, therefore the matter be recused from the court of Justice Pritinker Diwaker. 5. The appellant/petitioner had filed this application before this Court on 12-12-2017 and has not appeared even to support that application. In paragraph 5 of the similar application annexed therewith, reference of certain orders have been given, which has been passed by the Division Bench of this Court in which one of us (Justice Pritinker Diwaker) was a member. If these orders were passed contrary to law, the legal remedy is to challenge the same before the higher forum and for want of such challenge, they attain finality. Moreover, in most of the cited cases, the appellant/petitioner was not even a party and as such, has no locus to call in question those orders in the present case. 6. Likewise, the PILs mentioned in second part of paragraph 5 of the said application have also been closed by the Division Bench in which one of us (Justice Pritinker Diwaker) was one of the members and in most of the cases the appellant/petitioner was not a party, therefore, he cannot be allowed to question the orders passed in those cases. 7. The order in W.P. (PIL) No. 25/2014 has also been passed imposing cost of Rs. 10,000/- in which also the appellant/petitioner was not a party. Likewise, non-imposition of cost in PIL Nos. 17/2015 and 39/2015 cannot be questioned by the appellant/petitioner and the litigant/applicant cannot be allowed to make comparison of two orders in which he was not a party and make a ground for recusal of his case. Likewise, the appellant/petitioner has referred to the orders passed by other Benches from time to time which is a matter of record and cannot be made a ground for recusal by the appellant/petitioner. 8. Likewise, the appellant/petitioner has referred to the orders passed by other Benches from time to time which is a matter of record and cannot be made a ground for recusal by the appellant/petitioner. 8. In the case of Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 2014 SC 3241 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India speaking through Justice J.S. Khehar has held, after approving the view taken by the High Court of Delhi, that a party cannot insist on a Judge recusing himself. This is a new trend emerging when Judges are challenged in the manner that has been repeatedly noted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. A mere inconvenient question or a query and which is raised during the course of appreciation and appraisal of the legal and factual issues in a matter at hand and particularly in the nature of PILs should not result in a litigant being taken aback or, if taken aback, responding in this manner. His Lordship held as under:- “9. But Mr. C.A. Sundaram, another Senior Counsel representing the petitioner, distanced himself from the above submissions. He informed the Court.........."I am not invoking the doctrine of bias, as has been alleged..." We are of the view, that a genuine plea of bias alone, could have caused us to withdraw from the matter, and require it to be heard by some other Bench. Detailed submissions on the allegations constituting bias, were addressed well after proceedings had gone on for a few weeks, the same have been dealt with separately (under heading VIII, whether the impugned order dated 4.3.2014, is vitiated on account of bias?). Based on the submissions advanced by learned counsel, we could not persuade ourselves in accepting the prayer for recusal. 10. We have recorded the above narration, lest we are accused of not correctly depicting the submissions, as they were canvassed before us. In our understanding, the oath of our office, required us to go ahead with the hearing. And not to be overawed by such submissions. In our view, not hearing the matter, would constitute an act in breach of our oath of office, which mandates us to perform the duties of our office, to the best of our ability, without fear or favour, affection or ill will. This is certainly not the first time, when solicitation for recusal has been sought by learned counsel. In our view, not hearing the matter, would constitute an act in breach of our oath of office, which mandates us to perform the duties of our office, to the best of our ability, without fear or favour, affection or ill will. This is certainly not the first time, when solicitation for recusal has been sought by learned counsel. Such a recorded peremptory prayer, was made by Mr. R.K. Anand, an eminent Senior Advocate, before the High Court of Delhi, seeking the recusal of Mr. Justice Manmohan Sarin from hearing his personal case. Mr. Justice Manmohan Sarin while declining the request made by Mr. R.K. Anand, observed as under: “The path of recusal is very often a convenient and a soft option. This is especially so since a Judge really has no vested interest in doing a particular matter. However, the oath of office taken under Article 219 of the Constitution of India enjoins the Judge to duly and faithfully and to the best of his knowledge and judgment, perform the duties of office without fear or favour, affection or ill will while upholding the constitution and the laws. In a case, where unfounded and motivated allegations of bias are sought to be made with a view of forum hunting/Bench preference or brow-beating the Court, then, succumbing to such a pressure would tantamount to not fulfilling the oath of office.” The above determination of the High Court of Delhi was assailed before this Court in R.K. Anand v. Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106 . The determination of the High Court whereby Mr. Justice Manmohan Sarin declined to withdraw from the hearing of the case came to be upheld, with the following observations: “The above passage, in our view, correctly sums up what should be the Court's response in the face of a request for recusal made with the intent to intimidate the court or to get better of an inconvenient judge or to obfuscate the issues or to cause obstruction and delay the proceedings or in any other way frustrate or obstruct the course of justice.” 11. In fact, the observations of the High Court of Delhi and those of this Court reflected, exactly how it felt, when learned counsel addressed the Court, at the commencement of the hearing. In fact, the observations of the High Court of Delhi and those of this Court reflected, exactly how it felt, when learned counsel addressed the Court, at the commencement of the hearing. If it was learned counsel's posturing antics, aimed at bench-hunting or bench- hopping (or should we say, bench-avoiding), we would not allow that. Affronts, jibes and carefully and consciously planned snubs could not deter us, from discharging our onerous responsibility. We could at any time, during the course of hearing, walk out and make way, for another Bench to decide the matter, if ever we felt that, that would be the righteous course to follow. Whether or not, it would be better for another Bench to hear this case, will emerge from the conclusions, we will draw, in the course of the present determination. ............. 14. One of the reasons for retaining the instant petition for hearing with ourselves was, that we had heard eminent Senior Counsel engaged by the two companies exclusively for over three weeks during the summer vacation of 2012. We had been taken through thousands of pages of pleadings. We had the occasion to watch the demeanour and defences adopted by the two companies and the contemnors from time to time, from close quarters. Writing the judgment, had occupied the entire remaining period of the summer vacation of 2012, as also, about two months of further time. The judgment dated 31.8.2012 runs into 269 printed pages. Both of us had rendered separate judgments, concurring with one another, on each aspect of the matter. During the course of writing the judgment, we had the occasion to minutely examine numerous communications, exchanged between the rival parties. That too had resulted in a different kind of understanding, about the controversy. For any other Bench to understand the nuances of the controversy determined through our order dated 31.8.2012, would require prolonged hearing of the matter. Months of time, just in the same manner as we had taken while passing the order dated 31.8.2012, would have to be spent again. Possibly the submissions made by the learned counsel seeking our recusal, was consciously aimed at the above objective. Was this the reason for the theatrics, of some of the learned Senior Counsel? Difficult to say for sure. But deep within, don't we all understand? Possibly the submissions made by the learned counsel seeking our recusal, was consciously aimed at the above objective. Was this the reason for the theatrics, of some of the learned Senior Counsel? Difficult to say for sure. But deep within, don't we all understand? It was also for the sake of saving precious time of this Court, that we decided to bear the brunt and the rhetoric, of some of the learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner. We are therefore satisfied, that it would not be better, for another Bench to hear this case. II Must judicial orders be obeyed at all costs? Can a judicial order be disregarded, if the person concerned feels, that the order is wholly illegal and void?” 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has clarified that when a Judge takes oath of office and in terms, prescribed by the constitution, implicit in that is there is no ill will, much less any enmity and when a Judge is supposed to decide a case impartially, he has to be strict. Such strictness is demanded by the very office to which a person is appointed as a Judge. Eventually, it is a constitutional office and the institution of judiciary is above all. The law is applicable to all, rich or poor, men or women. Thus, to all citizens cutting across their religion, caste, creed, race and sex. Therefore, it is the Constitution and the laws, which a Judge is obliged to uphold and while upholding them, he is bound to face the wrath of litigants and advocates frequently. 10. The trend, which is now increasing, of Judges being called upon to recuse themselves, therefore, has to be deprecated and discouraged. It must be nipped in the bud. His Lordship Khehar, J once again pronounced in The Recusal order in NJAC case Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association and another v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 808 , that:- “.........A Judge may recuse himself at his own from a case entrusted to him by the Chief Justice. That would be a matter of his own choosing. But recusal at the asking of a litigating party, unless justified, must never be acceded to. For that would give the impression that the Judge had been scared out of the case, just by the force of the objection. That would be a matter of his own choosing. But recusal at the asking of a litigating party, unless justified, must never be acceded to. For that would give the impression that the Judge had been scared out of the case, just by the force of the objection. A Judge before he assumes his office, takes an oath to discharge his duties without fear or favour. He would breach his oath of office, if he accepts a prayer for recusal, unless justified. It is my duty to discharge my responsibility with absolute earnestness and sincerity. It is my duty to abide by my oath of office, to uphold the Constitution and the laws. My decision to continue to be a part of the Bench, flows from the oath which I took, at the time of my elevation to the Supreme Court.” 11. A similar view has also been taken by the Bombay High Court in a reported decision in the case of Ganesh Ramkisan Bairagi v. Parwatabai Tukaram Appa Landge & Ors. 2016 (4) ABR 699, wherein Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.K. Deshpande had this to observe and hold:- “14. Again, at this stage, Shri V.V. Bhangde, the learned counsel for the appellant/ defendant No. 2, submits that the office be given direction not to list the matters in which he is appearing for any of the parties before this Court. In other words, he submits that I should recuse from taking up the matters wherein Shri. V.V. Bhangde is appearing for any of the parties. The submission shocks my conscience, particularly when it suddenly came from a regular practitioner from this Court, who was being looked at as an experienced and responsible officer of the Court. The entire arguments in this matter went on smoothly, patiently and with interest. After conclusion of the arguments, both the learned counsel were asked as to whether they intend to make any additional submissions, and thereafter the dictation commenced as per the usual practice. I need not delve upon any further and I refrain from making any comments against Shri. V.V. Bhangde. However, the increasing trend need to be commented upon; so as to caution the lawyers and the litigants about the consequences of it, which can be avoided. 15. A lawyer has his own choice of appearing before the Court presided over by a particular Judge to conduct the matter. However, the increasing trend need to be commented upon; so as to caution the lawyers and the litigants about the consequences of it, which can be avoided. 15. A lawyer has his own choice of appearing before the Court presided over by a particular Judge to conduct the matter. If his matter is listed before the Court where he does not want to appear, he is at liberty return such matter and/or fees to his client and can ask him to engage some other lawyer or he may refuse to accept the matter if he has not already filed his vakalatnama. A judge may also recuse himself from taking up the matters of the lawyers with whom he is closely related or where his conscience does not permit him to take up the matters of some lawyers. In these situations, there may not be any problem either with a Judge or a lawyer, but where the Court passed an order against a particular lawyer not to appear in his Court, it takes a colour of penalty or punishment to such a lawyer, which may result in taking some disciplinary action against him by the Bar Council of India or of State, which issued him a Stand of Practice. Such a stage by a Court may be construed of blacklisting of a lawyer. Seldom, such event occurs, and the Courts also normally avoid it. 16. A tendency has started growing amongst lawyers to dictate a Judge to recuse from taking up his matters when the decision goes against his client or his wavelength does not match with the Judge or he does not find comfort in conducting the matter or for some such reasons. This is an insult personally to a Judge. Such reactions are normally experienced when the lawyers take heavy fees from their clients with an assurance to bring the result of the cases in their favour or to impress upon the clients sitting in the court room during the course of hearing, the boldness which he possesses to browbeat the Court. If a lawyer exercises his choice of not conducting the matter, he loses his client and fees, which he does not want to do. If a lawyer exercises his choice of not conducting the matter, he loses his client and fees, which he does not want to do. If a Judge accedes to such demand of a lawyer for recusal, the effect is threefold (i) the confidence of a lawyer to browbeat the Court is boosted (ii) a lawyer gets rid of the Court where he finds discomfort in conducting the matter and (iii) it creates an additional source of income for him, from the other lawyers and the litigants, who do not want their matters listed or dealt with by such a Judge. This promotes the practice of Bench hunting. No system of justice can tolerate such practice by a lawyer and the same is required to be curbed and deprecated. 17. Recently, in the judgment, which I have delivered in Civil Revision Application No. 26 of 2016 on 6-6-2016, Satish Mahadeorao Uke v. The Registrar, High Court of Bombay, Bench at Nagpur. I have observed in para 25 thereof as under: “25. A Judge may recuse at his own choice from a case entrusted to him by the Chief Justice and it would be a matter of his own choosing. But recusal at the asking of the litigating party, unless justified, must never be acceded to. This is what the Apex Court has held recently in NJAC case instituted by the Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association and Another v. Union of India. The question of recusal is normally decided by a Judge on the basis of his personal or private interest in the subject-matter of the litigation, his intimacy with the party/parties to a lis before him, his perception about conflict of interest in taking up the matter, and his own conscience. Such decision does not depend upon the dictates of lawyers or litigants..........” 18. Recusal to take the matters to be conducted by some lawyers, is a matter of Judge's own choosing and it cannot be at the dictates of the lawyers. What a Judge has to see is that he performs his duty of deciding the matters before him without fear or favour, affection or ill will. He has to keep in mind the principle that the justice should not only be done, but it must appear to have been done. What a Judge has to see is that he performs his duty of deciding the matters before him without fear or favour, affection or ill will. He has to keep in mind the principle that the justice should not only be done, but it must appear to have been done. The decision of recusal to take the matters of lawyers, depends upon the Judge's personal relations or intimacy with such lawyers, and his own conscience to decide a case by observing the oath which he has taken while occupying the position as a Judge. Ultimately, a Judge is also a human being and the Judges come from different strata of the Society, having their own views, ideas, angle or perception, based on the varied individual experience in life, which may or may not match with each others or with some lawyers or litigants. However, this cannot be a reason to avoid conducting the matters listed before such a Judge or the Judges. Once the constitutional authority of a Judge or the Judges to adjudicate the matters is accepted, it cannot be lowered down by asking him or them to recuse to hear and decide the matter. 19. To prevent a Judge or the Judges from performing his or their duties in this fashion causes distraction of attention in the judicial proceedings, which amounts to interference in the course of justice. Merely because a lawyer, litigant or public at large feels that the approach adopted or a decision is wrong, the authority or the force of the decision does not get eroded. A wrong decision in the matter is equally enforceable like a correct decision. If the Constitution and the laws provide a remedy to get such decision corrected in a higher forum, such a remedy can be availed. Even a wrong decision becomes final, binding and enforceable like a correct decision, if there is no remedy available. The lawyers, litigants or public at large cannot run away from such decision and they have to be cautioned about the authority of the Courts.” 12. In such circumstances, we do not think that the litigant who is appearing in person before us can be given an opportunity to dictate to the Court and to any judicial officer as to who should be the Judge/presiding Judge to whom his cases should be assigned and who should preside over any Division Bench. In such circumstances, we do not think that the litigant who is appearing in person before us can be given an opportunity to dictate to the Court and to any judicial officer as to who should be the Judge/presiding Judge to whom his cases should be assigned and who should preside over any Division Bench. It is the prerogative of Hon'ble the Chief Justice and it is he/she who decides how the judicial work should be assigned. Once the Chief Justice assigns judicial work to a particular Bench, then, it is not, unless there is a power exercised otherwise, open to a litigant to call upon the Judges to recuse themselves from judicial work in this manner. 13. After reserving the matter on 18.4.2018 for order on IA No. 1/2017, yet another communication has been sent by the appellant/petitioner dated 18.4.2018 through speed post stating therein that his cases are likely to be dismissed contrary to law and he may also be harassed. The said communication is taken on record and copy of the same has been given to the State counsel. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, keeping in mind the settled legal position governing the field, the application (I.A. No. 1/2017) is hereby rejected and we do not wish to entertain the petitioner's subsequent communication as well. 15. However, considering the overall facts and circumstances, in the larger interest of justice, Registrar (Judicial) is directed to place this matter before Hon'ble the Chief Justice on administrative side for listing of the same before the appropriate Bench.