ORDER : 1. The petitioners herein are the defendants in a suit for partition. The first respondent/ plaintiff is the brother of the petitioners herein. The petitioners were set ex-parte on 07.04.2010 and an ex-parte decree came to be passed on 25.3.2011. The application to condone the delay of 1008 days to set aside the ex-parte decree came to be rejected by the Trial Court, which is under challenge in the present revision. 2. Heard Mr. J. Ravikumar, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. G. Jeremiah, learned counsel for the respondents. 3. The reason assigned by the revision petitioners herein for the delay is that the first petitioner who is a Homepathy practitioner had suffered a fracture, and subsequently developed ailments of Jaundice also and in view of the home treatment taken by him, the delay had occurred. It is their further explanation during the course of treatment, the first respondent herein who is their brother, had approached them sympathetically and promised to settle the issue amicably by withdrawing the suit. The petitioners were carried away by such a promise and hence they were not following up the case which led to the delay. 4. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, the suit itself is an abuse of process of law since the first respondent herein claims right over certain properties through a Will and the present suit properties have been allotted in favour of the petitioners herein, having dealt with the properties assigned in his favour under the Will, the first respondent has filed the present suit suppressing these facts. Since the petitioners have a triable and a good case, the learned counsel submitted that the delay and the cause assigned for the delay should not alone be looked into, but the cause should be given liberal consideration so as to advance substantial justice. In support of such a proposition, the learned counsel relied upon the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and Others vs. Gobardhan Sao and Others, AIR 2002 SC 1201 . 5. Mr. G. Jeremiah, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand vehemently opposed the submissions. In support of such a proposition, the learned counsel relied upon the Judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and Others vs. Gobardhan Sao and Others, AIR 2002 SC 1201 . 5. Mr. G. Jeremiah, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand vehemently opposed the submissions. According to him, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed challenging to the application rejecting the petitioners request for condonation of delay and what requires to be looked at into at this stage is the cause adduced by the petitioners in the application and its consideration by the Trial Court. By referring to the reasons adduced in the application seeking for condonation of delay, the learned counsel submitted that fracture of leg and subsequent Jaundice without proper medical records would not be a sufficient cause for the delay of more than three years. Even otherwise, it was only one of the petitioners herein who had the medical ailment and nothing prevented the other petitioner from contacting his counsel for the purpose of setting aside the ex-parte decree. The learned counsel further submitted that apart from the affidavit, there is nothing on record to show that there was a promise from the plaintiff that he would withdraw the suit and this aspect has also been denied by relying upon the Judgment of this Court in P. Sathivinayagam vs. G. Bhoopalan, 2004 (2) CTC 415. The learned counsel submitted that the delay being inordinate, and since the Trial Court had considered the reasons adduced by the petitioners to be insufficient cause, no interference is required. 6. I have given careful considerations to the submission made by the respective counsels. 7. The delay in the instant case is 1008 days. The reasons adduced by the petitioners are two fold. One is that, one of the petitioners had a medical ailment which prevented them from making out an application in time. The second reason is that, during the period of ailment, the plaintiff had approached them and had offered to withdraw the suit and believing his words, the petitioners had restrained themselves from pursuing with the case. 8. The Trial Court on consideration of the reasons adduced by the petitioners in their application, found that there were no medical records evidencing that the first petitioner was bed ridden and was suffering from prolonged illness. 8. The Trial Court on consideration of the reasons adduced by the petitioners in their application, found that there were no medical records evidencing that the first petitioner was bed ridden and was suffering from prolonged illness. The Trial Court further held that there was no direct evidence to prove that the plaintiff had given undertaking to the first petitioner to withdraw the case except for his evidence. According to the Trial Court, the petitioner having engaged a counsel, could have got in touch with him at least over phone and being a qualified doctor, such a reasoning is not acceptable. In normal circumstances, this Court would have had second thoughts of interfering to condone an inordinate delay of 1008 days unless and until there are sufficient causes establishing and substantiating such a delay. Though the Court would not normally look into as to whether there is a prima facie defence for the petitioners herein, in view of the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, I am constrained to make an observation on the bare facts as evidenced from the pleadings. Before that, it would be relevant to look into the observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Judgment Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu and Others vs. Gobardhan Sao and Others, AIR 2002 SC 1201 and the relevant paragraphs are extracted here under: "10. In the case of N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy, MANU/SC/0573/1998 : 2008 (228) ELT 162 (SC), there was a delay of 883 days in filing application for setting aside ex-parte decree for which application for condonation of delay was filed. The trial court having found that sufficient cause was made out for condonation of delay, condoned the delay but when the matter was taken to the High Court of Judicature at Madras in a revision application under Section 115 of the Code, it was observed that the delay of 883 days in filing the application was not properly explained and it was held that the trial court was not justified in condoning the delay resulting into reversal of its order whereupon this Court was successfully moved which was of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with order passed by trial court whereby delay in filing the application for setting aside ex-parte decree was condoned and accordingly order of the High court was set aside. K.T. Thomas, J. speaking for the Court succinctly laid down the law observing thus in paras 8, 9 and 10: "8. The appellant's conduct does not on the whole warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. What he did in defending the suit was not very much far from what a litigant would broadly do. Of course, it may be said that he should have been more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short intervals to check up the progress of the litigation. But during these days when everybody is fully occupied wit his own avocation of life an omission to adopt such extra vigilance need not be used as a ground to depict him as a litigant not aware of his responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic consequences. 9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncontainable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court. 10................ The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause." (Emphasis added) The Court further observed in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 which run thus:- "11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. The time-limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause." (Emphasis added) The Court further observed in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 which run thus:- "11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest republic up sit finis lithium (it is for the general welfare) that a period be put to litigation. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain vs. Kuntal Kumari, MANU/SC/0335/1968 : (1969) 1 SCR 1006 and State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, MANU/SC/0534/1971 : (1972) 2 SCR 874 . 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala-fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show almost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses." (Emphasis added) 11. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependant upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bone fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the list terminates either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way." 9. The above said observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court is self-explanatory. According to the observations made above, the expression sufficient cause should receive a liberal consideration so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona-fide is imputable to a party. The Apex Court had also observed that when the explanation for the delay is being rejected, the arguable points of facts and laws involved in the case defeating the valuable right of a party to have a decision on merit should also be taken into account. 10. The brief facts as evidenced in the pleadings is that the first respondent claims right over the suit property through a Will executed by his mother. The petitioners claim that by deriving the rights through the same Will, the plaintiff had already alienated the properties assigned to him through a Sale Deed and the present suit for partition has been made by suppressing this aspect. These are the facts submitted by the petitioners herein, which is subject to proof through proper evidence and documents during the course of trial. Nevertheless, when the petitioners have come out with a specific case that they were carried away by the first respondent's offer to withdraw the case and had not pursued the case with their lawyer and insists this Court to take cognizance of such a defence being put forth before the Court. 11. Nevertheless, when the petitioners have come out with a specific case that they were carried away by the first respondent's offer to withdraw the case and had not pursued the case with their lawyer and insists this Court to take cognizance of such a defence being put forth before the Court. 11. The issue as to whether the suit property was assigned in favor of any of the parties and that there was Will in existence are all matters which require to be established only during the course of the trial and it is made clear that this Court has not expressed any of its views on the merits of the submissions made by the petitioners herein. But, on a prima facie appraisal of the pleadings, it can only be felt that the petitioners may have arguable points on the facts and by depriving them to adduce evidence to establish these facts by refusing to condone the delay to set aside the ex-parte decree, may not amount to substantial justice being rendered. In my view, the petitioners can be given an opportunity to put-forth their case during the course of a trial. 12. This Court is also aware of the prejudice that is now being caused to the respondents when the delay is being condoned. The respondents have been dragged to defend the present revision by engaging a lawyer and a substantial amount of time and money could have been spent, which could have also caused serious inconvenience to them. As such, if the petitioners herein are directed to pay a substantial cost to the respondents, the ends of justice could be secured. 13. In the light of the above observations, the order passed in I.A. No. 98 of 2014 in O.S. No. 155 of 2009, dated 22.08.2017 on the file of the District Munsif, Arakkonam, Vellore District is set aside. Consequently, the delay of 1008 days is condoned. It is open to the petitioners to take necessary steps to set aside the ex-parte decree before the appropriate Courts. Petitioners shall also pay a sum of Rs. 50,000/- [Rupees Fifty Thousand Only] to the respondents by way of exemplary costs, within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 14. With the above observations, the Civil Revision Petition stands allowed accordingly. No Costs. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.